Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. (FIS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $41.31, Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. (FIS) is priced for +3.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FIS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFIS
CompanyFidelity National Information Services, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$41.31/sh
CompositionTransaction processing and services 67% / Software maintenance 9% / Other recurring 4% / Software license 6% / Professional services 9% / Other non-recurring 5%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)7.0%
Operating margin today15.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.9pp
Implied growth3.6%
Multiple paid23x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.2% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.36σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)73

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.69x5justifies
Earnings0.37x3justifies
Relative0.63x5justifies
Growth0.91x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$76.800.54xyesP/E 15.2x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 8x), scenarios: 12.5x / 15.2x / 17.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$58.110.71xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$55.870.74xyesBV/sh $30.91, ROE (TTM) 16.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$74.130.56xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$36.961.12xyesRev $11.4B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$61.920.67xyesEPS $5.16, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=4.00 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$112.690.37xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $5.13B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$74.800.55xyesBV $30.91 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$59.910.69xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.16 × BVPS $30.91) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$65.430.63xyesEBITDA $3.87B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$166.500.25xyesEPS $5.16 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$5.667.30xyesBV $30.91 × (ROIC 0.9% / WACC 5.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$33.201.24xyesRevenue $11.44B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$193.500.21xyesEPS $5.16 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$55.780.74xyesEPS $5.16 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The disclosed units share an operating capital structure; consolidated cash-flow lenses remain coherent and the unit split is explanatory.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Banking Solutionsoperatingenterprise$7.3b$143.7b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Capital Market Solutionsoperatingenterprise$3.2b$75.2b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$20.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)14.14x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)11.17x
Interest coverage3.6x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.2%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Traditional valuation arithmetic has an unusually hard time with this company, and the reason is worth understanding before any of the numbers mean anything. FIS has spent a decade buying businesses, and the accounting for those purchases sits on the income statement as amortisation of acquired software and customer relationships. Depreciation and amortisation is the difference between roughly 3.87 billion dollars of earnings before those charges and 1.82 billion dollars of reported operating income over the trailing year. Neither figure is wrong. They simply answer different questions, and a valuation model reading only the lower one is valuing a company whose largest single expense is the accounting echo of transactions completed years ago.

What the business actually does is duller and stickier than the income statement suggests. Roughly two thirds of revenue is transaction processing and services, with software maintenance, licences and professional services making up most of the rest. The 10-K describes what that means for the revenue line: these solutions lend relative stability to our revenue stream. These solutions, in general, are considered critical to our clients' operations, and Fixed fees for processing services are generally recognized ratably over the contract period. A bank does not change the system that moves its deposits because a salesperson called. That is not a moat anyone chose; it is a moat built out of switching risk, and it is why the revenue base survived the company selling more than half of itself.

The January transaction is the clearest thing management has done in years. FIS gave up a minority interest in a merchant-acquiring business it no longer controlled and received a card-issuer processing business that sits directly alongside its bank franchise. The bank that runs its core on FIS software is the same bank that issues the cards Issuer Solutions processes. Excluding the acquired business, revenue still grew 7% in the first quarter, so the underlying franchise was not standing still while the deal was negotiated. Reported operating income reached 423 million dollars against 347 million a year earlier, on revenue of 3,295 million against 2,532 million.

The balance sheet has been shrinking in share count even while it expanded in assets. Weighted average diluted shares fell to 517 million in the first quarter of 2026 from 531 million a year earlier, and the company still had about 1.8 billion dollars of repurchase authorisation remaining on 31 March 2026. Buying was nearly suspended during the quarter, roughly 0.4 million shares for about 30 million dollars, which is what a company does when it is writing an eight-billion-dollar cheque for something else. The authorisation sitting unused is optionality, not failure.

Scale comparison sharpens where this company actually competes. On the share of revenue that survives as operating profit, FIS at 15.9% sits alongside GPN at 15.3% and PYPL at 17.9%. It does not sit anywhere near V at 61.1% or MA at 57.9%, and that gap is structural rather than managerial: a network that owns the rails earns rent, while a processor that runs the plumbing earns a fee. Investors who price FIS against network economics will always be disappointed. Priced against the processors, the franchise looks solid and the price does not.

Bear Case

The single variable with the most leverage on this thesis is now the cost of money, and the exposure arrived three months ago. To buy Issuer Solutions the company arranged senior unsecured term loans to fund the Issuer Solutions Acquisition and drew on them in January. Total borrowings went from about 13.1 billion dollars at the end of 2025 to 21.1 billion by 31 March 2026. Net interest expense in the first quarter alone was 197 million dollars against 80 million in the same quarter of 2025. Annualise the current quarter and the interest bill approaches 800 million dollars a year, against reported operating income of 1,817 million for the whole trailing year. That is a company whose earnings before interest now need to be roughly twice its financing cost just to stand still.

The leverage ratios in front of an investor understate rather than overstate the problem, because they are measured on a trailing basis that predates most of the debt. Net borrowings less liquid balances stood near 20.3 billion dollars, about 11 times operating profit on the trailing year, and interest was covered about 3.8 times across that same year. Both of those figures were computed on a year in which the new debt existed for less than a quarter. The acquired earnings will lift the denominator; the acquired interest will lift the numerator faster in the near term, because the debt was drawn in full on day one while the synergies arrive over years.

Underneath the financing question sits a slower structural one the company names itself. The 10-K flags the risks of reduction in revenue from the elimination of existing and potential customers due to consolidation in, or new laws or regulations affecting, the banking, retail and financial services industries. Every regional bank merger removes a licence. The same filing names the other end of the pincer, competition from smaller start-ups with emerging technologies which are receiving increasing investments, as well as global banks (and businesses controlled by combinations of global banks) and global internet companies that are introducing competitive solutions and services into the marketplace, particularly in the payments area. A vendor squeezed between consolidating customers and better-funded challengers does not lose contracts quickly. It loses pricing power quietly.

The quality of the reported result deserves a hard look too. Net earnings attributable to FIS of 2,366 million dollars in the quarter came almost entirely from 2,214 million of equity-method investment earnings, net of tax, as the Worldpay interest left the balance sheet: the equity-method investment line went from 3,681 million dollars at the end of 2025 to 13 million three months later. Operating income for the same quarter was 423 million, and asset impairments of 104 million ran through it. The trailing twelve months of reported net income sit above trailing operating income for exactly this reason, and any earnings multiple built on the former is measuring a disposal rather than a business.

What the price requires, then, is straightforward and not obviously generous. It needs company-wide operating profit to compound at roughly 3.6% a year for the next five years and to keep compounding after that. Reaching that from here means the acquired business performs, the interest on it is absorbed, and the bank customer base neither consolidates nor defects fast enough to offset it. Miss the growth and the multiple has nothing to fall back on except a balance sheet carrying 24.6 billion dollars of goodwill and an accumulated deficit of 20.6 billion, both of which are monuments to the last round of large acquisitions.

Valuation

Start with what the price is asking for, because it is modest. The market is paying roughly 23 times company-wide operating income, and that multiple embeds operating growth of about 3.6% a year across a five-year stretch before settling into a long-run pace. Against the company's own recent record, that near-term rate is unremarkable. The demanding part is not the speed; it is the persistence.

Every family of method reaches above the current share price, which is rare and needs explaining rather than celebrating. Book value plus profitability, peer multiples, the cash-flow work and the earnings-power lenses all land higher than where the shares change hands, the earnings-power group by the widest margin. Look at how that group gets there and the enthusiasm cools. It capitalises a five-year average of operating income, roughly 5.13 billion dollars, against a cost of capital. Five years ago this company owned Worldpay outright and was close to twice its present size. Averaging across that period measures a business that has since been sold in two pieces. The lower reads, the peer-multiple and book-value approaches, are working from what is actually here, and they still sit above the price.

Cohort position is where the argument gets concrete. Operating margin of 15.9% puts FIS beside GPN at 15.3% and PYPL at 17.9%, which is the right comparison, and nowhere near V at 61.1% or MA at 57.9%, which is not. Note that GPN is the counterparty on both sides of January's transaction, so the two companies are now running each other's former assets. Whether Issuer Solutions is worth more inside FIS than it was inside GPN is the question the next several quarters answer, and neither company's trailing figures can settle it yet.

Solvency is where the risk actually sits, and the honest version has to name its basis. Borrowings less liquid balances came to roughly 20.3 billion dollars, which works out near 11 times operating profit measured across the trailing year, with interest covered about 3.8 times over the same span. Both ratios divide a post-acquisition balance sheet by pre-acquisition earnings. They will improve mechanically as the acquired business earns for a full year and worsen mechanically as a full year of interest lands. Which effect is larger is the single most consequential unknown in this report, and the first quarter offers only a partial view: 423 million dollars of operating income and 197 million of net interest expense in the same three months.

One more number frames the rest. The company carries 24.6 billion dollars of goodwill against 16.0 billion of stockholders' equity, and an accumulated deficit of 20.6 billion sits inside that equity. The book value the asset-based methods lean on is real, but it is composed largely of what was paid for other companies rather than what this one has retained.

Catalysts

The defining event has already happened and its effects are still landing. FIS completed the acquisition of the Issuer Solutions business from Global Payments on 9 January 2026 and simultaneously exited its remaining interest in Worldpay, which had been carried as an equity-method investment since the 2024 sale of a 55% stake to funds managed by GTCR. Revenue for the quarter reached 3,295 million dollars against 2,532 million a year earlier, with growth of 7% once the acquired business is excluded.

The financing behind it is the live item. A term facility of senior unsecured loans was arranged during 2025 specifically to fund the purchase, replacing an earlier bridge commitment, and it was drawn as the deal closed. The visible consequence in the first quarter was net interest expense of 197 million dollars, up from 80 million. Purchase accounting is still provisional: the filing describes provisional fair values assigned to acquired computer software, customer relationship assets and trademarks, with weighted average estimated useful lives of seven, ten and two years respectively, and about 6.0 billion dollars of the recognised goodwill expected to be deductible for United States federal income tax purposes. Those allocations can move, and the amortisation that follows from them sets reported operating income for years.

Capital return is the quieter thread. Repurchases in the first quarter came to roughly 0.4 million shares for about 30 million dollars, with approximately 1.8 billion dollars of authorisation still available on 31 March 2026. Transition service arrangements are also unwinding on one side and starting on the other: net income from those services fell year over year as certain Worldpay arrangements wound down, partially offset by new reverse transition services provided to Global Payments. Both lines are small, and both are useful markers of how quickly the separation is finishing.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Banking Solutions / Capital Market Solutions (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, filed 8 May 2026

View the full interactive FIS report on boothcheck