FIDELIS INSURANCE HOLDINGS LIMITED (FIHL): what the price requires
At today's price, FIDELIS INSURANCE HOLDINGS LIMITED (FIHL) is priced for 8.1% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FIHL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FIHL |
| Company | FIDELIS INSURANCE HOLDINGS LIMITED |
| Current price | $20.72/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 8.1% |
| Return on equity now | 4.6% |
| ROE gap | +3.5pp |
| Price-to-book | 0.79x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.2% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~0.8pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.40σ |
| cohort percentile (of 80 peers) | 8 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 82% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.47x | 3 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.35x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.47x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.40x | 2 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=10)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $66.16 | 0.31x | yes | TBVPS $24.07 × 2.75x (ROE (TTM) 16.7% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $31.52 | 0.66x | yes | P/E 8.66x (blended: static sector reference 11x + trailing (TTM) 5x), scenarios: 7.3x / 8.7x / 10.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $20.15 | 1.03x | yes | Stage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $43.41 | 0.48x | yes | BV/sh $24.07, ROE (TTM) 16.7%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $57.54 | 0.36x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $11.73 | 1.77x | yes | Rev $2.5B, growth -3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $43.68 | 0.47x | yes | EPS $3.64, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.53 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $44.40 | 0.47x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.64 × BVPS $24.07) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $117.45 | 0.18x | yes | EPS $3.64 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $136.50 | 0.15x | yes | EPS $3.64 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $39.35 | 0.53x | yes | EPS $3.64 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -5.4% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
The market is pricing Fidelis below the value of its own equity. The stock trades near $21 against book value per diluted share of about $26, even as the company posted a strong 86.6% combined ratio and a 15.2% annualized operating return on equity in Q1 2026.
The fundamentals support the price on the conservative methods. The bank-style tangible-book model, relative valuation, and the excess-return methods all cluster in the $23 to $25 range, above the current price, while the growth-DCF is the lone method calling it expensive.
Q1 2026 EPS of $0.94 beat the $0.77 estimate, and the company is returning capital aggressively, with a $400 million buyback and a $0.15 dividend. The catch is a related-party underwriting structure that complicates the picture.
Bull Case
Begin with what the market is pricing in, then check it against the fundamentals, because the two are out of step. At roughly $21 the stock trades below book value per diluted share of about $26, so the market is valuing Fidelis at around 0.8 times the equity it carries. That is the price the market assigns a company it expects to earn below its cost of capital. The fundamentals say otherwise. Q1 2026 produced a combined ratio of 86.6%, meaning the company kept roughly 13 cents of underwriting profit on every premium dollar before investment income, and an annualized operating return on equity of 15.2%, well above the 9.3% cost of capital. A specialty insurer underwriting at a profit and earning a mid-teens return should not trade at a discount to book.
The earnings beat reinforces the disconnect. Q1 EPS of $0.94 cleared the $0.77 estimate by a wide margin, and the company reported a record quarterly increase in book value per share driven by improved underwriting and capital returns. For an insurer, growing book value per share while buying back stock below book is the cleanest form of value creation: each repurchased share is retired at a discount to its intrinsic worth, lifting the per-share equity of everyone who stays.
The valuation methods that fit a financial agree the price is low. The bank-style tangible-book model lands at $24, relative valuation at $25, the excess-return methods at $23, the earnings-yield method at $23, and the Graham number at $33, all above the current price. Only the growth-DCF, which a specialty insurer's lumpy results suit poorly, says expensive. For a buyer who underwrites the combined ratio and the book-value compounding rather than a smooth growth curve, a profitable insurer trading below book while returning capital is a value-supported setup.
Bear Case
The structure of this company is the reason to hesitate, and it is a governance and capital-allocation question more than a valuation one. Fidelis does not do its own underwriting. All underwriting is outsourced to the separately owned Fidelis MGU, the managing general underwriter, under a rolling ten-year framework agreement signed at the 2023 separation, and that MGU is not consolidated with Fidelis. In plain terms, the entity that sources and binds the risk Fidelis carries on its balance sheet is a related party with its own owners and incentives, compensated through commissions. That arrangement aligns interests in good years and strains them in bad ones, because the MGU is paid to write business while the insurance balance sheet bears the loss if the underwriting turns. A shareholder is trusting a structure, not just a management team, and structures like this are exactly why the market applies a discount that the per-share book-value math does not explain.
Capital allocation deserves the same scrutiny. The company returned $313.7 million to shareholders in 2025, repurchasing about 15.2 million shares for $261.4 million and paying $52.3 million in dividends, and it has since expanded the buyback authorization to $400 million. Buying back stock below book is accretive, but a property-and-specialty insurer returning capital this aggressively is also drawing down the buffer it would need if a major catastrophe year arrives. The business is inherently lumpy, and the discount to book may be the market's way of pricing the tail risk that a single bad season, or an adverse reserve development, can erase several quarters of underwriting gains.
The return profile is also thinner than the Q1 headline suggests. On a trailing basis the return on equity sits at about 9.4%, essentially at the cost of capital, so the 15.2% operating figure reflects a favorable quarter rather than a through-cycle norm. The conservative methods that land above the price all assume the company keeps earning around its cost of capital, and the growth-DCF, the one forward-looking method, says expensive. Sentiment is divided, with a consensus around Hold and a spread of ratings that includes both strong-buy and strong-sell calls, and the average target near $24 implies only modest upside. A below-book insurer with a related-party engine and a catastrophe-exposed balance sheet is the kind of value that can stay cheap because the risks are real, not imagined.
Valuation
Fidelis is a financial, so the read is the return on equity against its cost and the multiple of book the market assigns. On a trailing basis the company earns about 9.4% on equity against a 9.3% cost of capital, essentially breakeven, while Q1 2026 showed a much stronger 15.2% annualized operating return. Book value per diluted share is about $26, and the stock trades near $21, roughly 0.8 times book. The bank-style tangible-book model, adjusted for the modest spread, lands at $24, just above the price.
The other financial-appropriate methods cluster in the same zone. Relative valuation puts it at $25 on a sector P/E near 11x, the simple and two-stage excess-return methods at $23, the earnings-yield method at $23, and the Graham number at $33. The two-stage dividend-discount method is the outlier on the low side at $12, reflecting a modest dividend, and the growth-DCF reads expensive because it cannot handle lumpy insurance earnings well.
The model's reported band is degenerate here, with the low and base both pinned near a token figure and the high implausibly high, so it carries no information and should be ignored; the method cluster is the better guide. On that cluster the stock is modestly cheap, trading below book and below where the conservative financial methods land. The deciding variable is whether the through-cycle return settles closer to the strong Q1 reading or the breakeven trailing figure, and whether the related-party structure and catastrophe exposure justify the persistent discount to book.
Catalysts
Q1 2026, reported in mid-May, was the most recent data point and it beat. EPS of $0.94 cleared the $0.77 estimate, the combined ratio came in at a healthy 86.6%, the annualized operating return on equity reached 15.2%, and book value per diluted share rose to a record near $26. The next print is the test of whether the favorable underwriting holds, since a single catastrophe-heavy quarter can swing a specialty insurer's results sharply.
Capital return is the most active catalyst and the clearest signal of management's view of the discount. The company returned $313.7 million to shareholders in 2025 and has expanded its buyback authorization to $400 million while paying a $0.15 dividend. Continued repurchases below book are accretive, so the pace of buybacks is the thing to watch for closing the gap to book value.
Two structural items round out the picture. The company is moving to rebrand as Pelagos Insurance Capital, and it continues to operate through the non-consolidated Fidelis MGU under the long-term framework agreement, so any change in that relationship would be material. Sentiment is mixed, with a Hold consensus, a wide spread of individual ratings, and an average target near $24 against a current price near $21, implying modest upside if the underwriting and capital-return story stays on track.
Sources: stocktitan.net (2025 results and buyback), investing.com (buyback expansion), fool.com (Q1 2026 transcript), marketbeat.com (FIHL forecast).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- AFG (AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …negative effect not only on AFG's business in that market but also on AFG's reputation generally. RISKS RELATING TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY Intense competition could adversely affect AFG's results of operations. The property and casualty insurance segment operates in a highly competitive industry that is affected by…
- FY2025 10-K: …the property and inland marine and crop insurance operations was 68 Table of Contents partially offset by lower underwriting profitability in the transportation businesses. Catastrophe losses were $66 million (2.3 points on the combined ratio), including $1 million in net reinstatement premiums, in 2024 compared to…
- THG (HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …at acceptable margins, and we continue to seek rate increases across many lines of business, as appropriate. Personal Lines Personal Lines focuses on working with high quality, value-oriented agencies that deliver consultative selling to customers and stress the importance of total account solutions, which is the…
- FY2025 10-K: …ratings and effective claims handling, among other things. Our competitors include national, international, regional and local companies that sell insurance through various distribution channels, including independent agencies, captive agency forces, brokers, and direct to consumers, through the internet or…
- RLI (RLI Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …actions could ultimately impact our overall results. We are vulnerable to the actions of other companies who may seek to write business without the appropriate regard for risk and profitability, especially during periods of intense competition for premium. During these times, it is very difficult to grow or…
- FY2025 10-K: Our primary competitors in the property segment include AmRisc, Arch, Arrowhead, CNA, Golden Bear, Lexington, Liberty Mutual, Markel, Palomar, RSUI, Special Risk Underwriters, Travelers, Velocity and Westchester. Our primary competitors in the surety segment are AIG, Arch, Beazley, Berkley, Chubb, CNA, Great…
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …lines of business continue to decrease. We face significant competitive pressures in our businesses, which can pressure premium rates in certain areas and could harm our ability to maintain or increase our profitability and premium volume in some parts of our business. We compete with a large number of other…
- FY2025 10-K: …substantial infusions of capital or access to third-party capital, provide increasing competition, which may adversely impact our business and profitability. Further, an expanded supply of capital may lower costs for insurers and, as a consequence, those insurers may be able to price their products more…
- RNR (RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGS LTD)
- FY2025 10-K: …and commercial insurance across the United States. COMPETITION The markets in which we operate are highly competitive. Our competitors include independent reinsurance and insurance companies, subsidiaries, divisions and/or affiliates of globally recognized insurance companies, domestic and international underwriting…
- FY2025 10-K: …of our management team, our integrated and flexible underwriting and operating platform, our significant financial strength, our strong relationships with brokers, customers and capital partners, our commitment to superior service and our proprietary modeling technology. By consistently applying each of our three…
- AXS (AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LIMITED)
- FY2025 10-K: …Refer to 'Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations - Other Expenses (Revenues), Net' for further details. Refer to 'Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations - Results by Segment' for further details on underwriting expenses. 64…
- FY2025 10-K: …breach obligations owed to us in the future, our results of operations or financial condition could be materially adversely affected. Strategic Risk Strategic risks affect or are created by an organization's business strategy and strategic objectives. Our review of strategic risk evaluates not only internal and…
- HMN (HORACE MANN EDUCATORS CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …reducing the value of our securities may have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, or financial condition. Strategic Risks The personal lines insurance, retirement and supplemental group benefit markets are highly competitive and our financial condition and results of operations may be…
- FY2025 10-K: 9.7%; Indiana, 9.0%; and Iowa, 8.7%. Competition Competition in this market for employee benefit products is robust and consists of a number of national and regional carriers offering disability, accident, and health insurance, including Aflac, American Fidelity, Colonial (a subsidiary of Unum), Reliance Standard, The…
- CNA (CNA FINANCIAL CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition. 8 Table of Contents Strategic Risks We face intense competition in our industry; we may be adversely affected by the cyclical nature of the property and casualty business and by the evolving landscape of our distribution network. All…
- FY2025 10-K: As such, only Insurance and Reinsurance receivables, Insurance reserves, Deferred acquisition costs, Goodwill and Deferred non-insurance warranty acquisition expense and revenue are readily identifiable for individual segments. Distinct investment portfolios are not maintained for every individual segment;…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.