FIRST HAWAIIAN, INC. (FHB): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $25.79, FIRST HAWAIIAN, INC. (FHB) is priced for 10.6% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FHB

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFHB
CompanyFIRST HAWAIIAN, INC.
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$25.79/sh
CompositionRetail Banking 68% / Commercial Banking 32%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed10.6%
Return on equity now10.0%
ROE gap+0.6pp
Price-to-book1.11x

Solve inputs: computed at a 10% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.19σ
cohort percentile (of 122 peers)23
sustained it ~10 years at this level74%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.98x3justifies
Earnings1.04x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0.70x1justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$17.991.43xyesTBVPS $15.04 × 1.20x (ROE (TTM) 10.1% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption))
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.3x / 10.0x / 11.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$36.910.70xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$25.311.02xyesBV/sh $23.22, ROE (TTM) 10.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$26.400.98xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $0.9B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.9x / 3.5x / 4.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $2.30, growth 20% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.55 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$34.670.74xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.30 × BVPS $23.22) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $2.30 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $2.30 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 20.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 30.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$24.861.04xyesEPS $2.30 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Retail Bankingfinancialequity$598.4mwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Commercial Bankingfinancialequity$279.5mwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.1%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the one ratio that decides whether a bank is worth owning: what it collects on the money it lends against what it pays for the money it holds. First Hawaiian's net interest margin was 2.92% in 2023, 2.95% in 2024 and 3.15% in 2025, then 3.19% in the March 2026 quarter and 3.25% in the June quarter. Over roughly the same stretch the efficiency ratio, which measures what it costs to produce a dollar of revenue, fell from 61.57% to 56.43%. Return on average assets went from 0.96% to 1.16%, and reached 1.23% in the June quarter. Four measures, one direction.

The engine behind that is unglamorous, and it is not the loan book. The annual filing puts it flatly: Deposit funding costs were $279.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, a decrease of $56.4 million or 17% compared to 2024. The bank did not have to charge borrowers more. It paid depositors less as rates came down and kept the difference. That continued into the June quarter, when the cost of deposits improved to 1.20% from 1.22%.

Why the depositors stay is the actual franchise. First Hawaiian Bank was founded in 1858 under the name Bishop & Company and is Hawaii's oldest and largest financial institution, and its 10-K describes the funding base in the plainest possible terms: Deposits are the primary funding source for the Bank and are acquired from a broad base of local markets, including both individual and corporate customers. Scale in a small, physically bounded market compounds until it hits a legal wall, and this bank has hit it. It controls more than 30% of the total amount of deposits in the Hawaii market, which bars it from buying another Hawaii bank, and the filing draws the conclusion itself: any further growth in the Hawaii market will most likely have to occur organically rather than by acquisition.

That constraint has shaped where the cash goes. Unable to buy growth at home, the bank has been buying itself, repurchasing 4,020,554 shares for 100.0 million dollars during 2025 and announcing a further authorization of up to 250.0 million dollars in January 2026. Dividends declared held steady at 1.04 dollars a share in each of 2023, 2024 and 2025 while the payout ratio fell to 47.27% from 58.10%. A dividend that stays flat while earnings rise is a dividend getting safer.

The TriCo agreement is the same constraint answered eastward. The combined company would carry about 34 billion dollars of assets and rank as the sixth largest bank headquartered in the Western United States, with First Hawaiian shareholders keeping roughly 65% of it. And the commercial half of the business it would bring that scale to is the half that has been moving: at BOH, the other large Honolulu bank, Commercial Banking Net income increased by $22.7 million or 19% in 2025 compared to the prior year, primarily due to an increase in net interest income and noninterest income.

Bear Case

Every loan this bank writes is a bet on the same island economy. The 10-K does not soften it: Our operations are heavily concentrated in Hawaii, as well as in Guam and Saipan. Nearly all residential mortgages and home equity lines are secured by property in those islands, and Commercial lending represents approximately 56% of our total loan and lease portfolio as of December 31, 2025, extended largely to small and mid-sized businesses whose results track the same visitor arrivals, the same construction cycle and the same federal spending. A mainland lender having a bad year in one metro has other metros. This one has one economy and two territories that move with it.

Against that exposure, the shares already assume improvement. The market is paying for a sustained return on equity of about 11.6%. The bank has recently been earning about 10%, and over more than a decade of its own record it has averaged about 9.2%. The gap is modest, and that is the problem rather than the comfort: there is no slack in it. If the assumed return settles nearer nine than twelve, the multiple of book the shares command compresses toward the book value itself, and the case for owning a bank above its own equity goes with it.

The macro variable with the most leverage here is not credit, it is the path of deposit rates. Almost all of the recent margin gain came from paying depositors less rather than charging borrowers more, with the annual filing attributing the offsetting move to lower rates on our earning assets driven by lower yields in our loan and lease portfolio. Falling deposit costs are a finite resource. Once the cost of deposits reaches its floor, and 1.20% in the June quarter is not far from one, further margin has to come from loan pricing in a market where the bank already holds the dominant share and is legally barred from buying more of it.

Then there is the acquisition, which is a regulatory question before it is a business one. Both boards approved it unanimously, but completion depends on regulatory approvals and separate shareholder votes at both companies, with the parties expecting to close by the end of 2026. The consideration is stock: 2.095 First Hawaiian shares for each TriCo share, leaving TriCo holders roughly 35% of the combined company. A holder who has watched the share count shrink about 0.9% a year since early 2022 is being asked to accept the opposite in a single step, with the earnings that would justify the issuance arriving later and only if the integration works.

Credit itself is genuinely clean, and the bull deserves that concession: non-accrual loans ran 0.27% of total loans and leases and net charge-offs 0.14% of average loans in the March 2026 quarter. The bear case is not about losses. It is about the durability of a return the market has already treated as achieved, inside a franchise that cannot grow at home. Retail banking earnings do go backwards even in good industry years: at CBSH, During 2025, income before income taxes for the Retail Banking segment decreased $19.1 million, or 7.8%, compared to 2024.

Valuation

A bank is worth what it earns on the capital it holds, so the question worth answering is not how many times earnings the shares cost but what return on equity the market is paying for. The shares change hands near 1.24 times book value, which implies a sustained return on equity of about 11.6%. Recent earnings have been running near 10%. Of the firms that have reached this level of return, only about 71% held it for a decade.

Where that lands against the valuation methods is the part most readers would not guess. Almost all of them sit above the current quote rather than below it. The asset-value methods, which start from book equity and add the excess return earned on it, come closest, with the shares about 7% above that family. The earnings-power methods and the peer-multiple methods land higher still, and none of them reads the shares as expensive. So the arithmetic cuts two ways and both are true: an assumed return above the demonstrated one is a demanding assumption, but the multiple being paid for it is not a demanding multiple.

One method is built specifically for banks, and it is the one that reads hardest. It values tangible book, which strips out goodwill and other intangibles, and pays a multiple of it set by the return the bank earns relative to its cost of equity. Tangible book value per share was 15.04 dollars at the end of June against a book value per share of 23.22 dollars. That difference is the intangible balance the method declines to credit, and it is why the same shares look meaningfully dearer measured on tangible equity than on total equity. Whether a deposit franchise assembled over more than a century deserves to be paid for above the assets recorded against it is the actual disagreement.

Set against its peer group, the bank sits in the lower half on price-to-book, so the market is plainly not awarding a premium for the deposit share. The balance-sheet frame for a lender is capital and payout rather than borrowings: common equity tier 1 capital stood at about 13.1% as filed at March 31, 2026, and in the latest fiscal year roughly 83.6% of earnings went back to shareholders through dividends and repurchases. Those are the numbers that bound the downside here, not coverage ratios.

The share count carries the last of it. It has fallen about 0.9% a year since early 2022, the visible residue of buybacks that could not be spent on acquisitions at home. The TriCo agreement reverses that in one motion, issuing enough stock to leave TriCo holders roughly 35% of the combined company. Every per-share figure above describes First Hawaiian standing alone, and the votes that would change them are still ahead.

Catalysts

The June quarter, reported July 24, 2026, was the strongest in the recent run. Net income was 73.4 million dollars and diluted earnings per share 60 cents, against 67.8 million dollars and 55 cents in the March quarter. Net interest margin expanded six basis points to 3.25%, return on average assets improved to 1.23% from 1.14%, and return on average tangible common equity reached 16.3% from 15.3%. Gross loans grew to 14.6 billion dollars from 14.4 billion, and book value per share rose to 23.22 dollars from 22.75 dollars, with tangible book value per share of 15.04 dollars.

Eleven days before that print, on July 13, 2026, First Hawaiian announced a definitive agreement to acquire TriCo Bancshares, parent of Tri Counties Bank in California, in an all-stock transaction; the agreement itself was filed on Form 8-K on July 15, 2026. TriCo shareholders would receive 2.095 First Hawaiian shares for each TriCo share, worth 63.12 dollars per TriCo share against First Hawaiian's July 10 close, and would end up owning roughly 35% of the combined company. The combined bank would hold about 34 billion dollars of assets. Four TriCo directors, including chief executive Rick Smith, would join the boards, the Tri Counties Bank name would be retained on the mainland, and no branch closings are expected.

The gating items from here are dated and specific: regulatory approvals, a First Hawaiian shareholder vote and a TriCo shareholder vote, all of which the companies expect to clear by the end of 2026. The capital plan sits behind them. The repurchase authorization announced in January 2026 covered up to 250.0 million dollars of stock, and that same stock is now the currency for the acquisition.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Retail Banking (reported)

Commercial Banking (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement, 8-K, July 13, 2026 · second-quarter 2026 results, 8-K, July 13, 2026 · FY2025 annual filing · first-quarter 2026 filing

View the full interactive FHB report on boothcheck