FRANKLIN ELECTRIC CO., INC. (FELE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $100.56, FRANKLIN ELECTRIC CO., INC. (FELE) is priced for +12.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FELE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFELE
CompanyFRANKLIN ELECTRIC CO., INC.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$100.56/sh
CompositionWater Systems 59% / Distribution 33% / Energy Systems 14% / Intersegment Eliminations/Other -6%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.4%
Operating margin today12.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.1pp
Implied growth12.9%
Multiple paid17x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.02σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)36

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.49x5expensive
Earnings2.63x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.11x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$90.871.11xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$106.720.94xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.4x / 13.4x / 15.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 21.46x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 30x), scenarios: 17.8x / 21.5x / 25.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$36.822.73xyesBV/sh $30.32, ROE (TTM) 11.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$40.412.49xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$86.291.17xyesRev $2.2B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.7x / 2.0x / 2.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$47.382.12xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.25B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$41.102.45xyesBV $30.32 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.3%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$47.592.11xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.32 × BVPS $30.32) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$39.762.53xyesFCF $169.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$36.862.73xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.16B (FCF $0.17B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.7836.17xyesEPS $3.32 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$8.7011.56xyesBV $30.32 × (ROIC 2.6% / WACC 9.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.18B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$35.892.80xyesEPS $3.32 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Water Systemsoperatingenterprise$1.1b$207.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Distributionoperatingenterprise$700.7m$39.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Energy Systemsoperatingenterprise$299.0m$99.1m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$143.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.70x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.53x
Interest coverage24.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.3%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

A submersible well pump sits underground, out of sight, doing one job until the day it stops. When that day comes the homeowner is not shopping around; they are phoning whoever the local driller uses. The same logic governs a fuel dispenser under the forecourt of a filling station. Businesses like this are not valued on how many new houses get built, though that helps at the margin. They are valued on the size of the installed base and the rate at which it wears out, because replacement demand is the part of the order book that shows up whether or not anybody is feeling optimistic.

Franklin Electric sells into three of those installed bases at once. Water Systems is the largest at 59% of revenue, the distribution arm accounts for 33%, and Energy Systems, which designs, manufactures and sells pumps, electronic controls and related parts and equipment primarily for use in submersible fueling system applications, takes the remaining share. That last one is where the economics get interesting. Energy Systems operating income in 2025 was $99.1 million, an increase of $5.5 million as compared to the prior year. Compare it with the largest business, where Water Systems operating income in 2025 was $207.2 million, an increase of $9.3 million as compared to the prior year, and the shape becomes clear: the fuelling business earns roughly half of what the water business does on about a quarter of the sales.

The distribution arm is the piece that changed most. Distribution operating income in 2025 was $39.8 million, an increase of $15.5 million on the prior year, which is the sort of step that only comes from mix and pricing rather than volume, since the segment's sales did not move nearly that far. Consolidated operating income rose to $268.9 million from $243.6 million on the same comparison. Two thirds of that improvement came from a business the market has historically treated as the low-margin appendage.

Growth in the core has been unglamorous and real. Water Systems sales in the U.S. and Canada rose 3% in 2025, with sales of large dewatering equipment increased 7 percent, and the company adds that consolidated sales growth carried an incremental sales impact from recent acquisitions of approximately 4 percent alongside price realisation. Neither number is spectacular. Together they describe a business that compounds by taking small pieces of adjacent markets rather than by winning a single large bet.

The balance sheet gives management room to keep doing that. On the funded-debt basis the company carries about 54.0 million dollars of net debt against a business whose operating profit covers its interest bill roughly 25 times over, and the share count has been drifting lower for four years. In April the board lifted the quarterly dividend 5.7% to $0.28 a share. That combination, a modest leverage position and a rising payout, is what a company looks like when it believes its cash flows are dull in the best sense of the word.

Bear Case

Watch where the cash goes, because it explains a good deal of what looks like organic momentum. The company is explicit that buying things is the plan: One of the Company's continuing strategies is to increase revenues and expand market share through acquisitions that will provide complementary Water and Energy Systems products, add to the Company's global reach, or both. In 2025 that strategy contributed an incremental sales impact from recent acquisitions of approximately 4 percent, and in May 2026 it closed on Wood Bros., a Nebraska distributor. Purchased revenue is still revenue. It is just revenue that has to clear a return hurdle before it counts as value creation, and a serial acquirer's returns are the hardest thing in its accounts to see from outside.

The return on the equity already invested gives a rough read on how that has gone. Trailing return on equity runs near 11.2% against a required return in the region of 9.3%. That spread is positive, which is the bull's point, and it is thin, which is the bear's. A roll-up earning two points above its cost of equity is compounding at a pace that a single misjudged deal or a goodwill write-down can erase, and the segment most fed by acquisitions is the one that until last year earned the least per dollar of sales.

Set that against what the price is asking for. Today's price embeds operating-profit growth of roughly 16.5% a year over the next five years. In 2025 the company grew consolidated operating income from $243.6 million to $268.9 million, a little over 10%, and about four points of the sales growth underneath it was bought rather than built. So the requirement is not merely to repeat last year. It is to run faster than last year, organically, for half a decade. Of companies that have grown at that pace, only about 48% sustained it that long.

The operating environment is not helping the arithmetic. Housing is the named demand risk, and the company reports that one segment's operating margin fell on higher tariff cost and an unfavorable geographic sales mix shift. Tariffs on imported components land directly on a manufacturer that ships motors and pumps across borders, and price realisation only offsets them until customers stop accepting price.

Finally the frames that credit nothing forward. The price sits roughly 164% above the asset-value methods, which measure the business by its book and the return earned on that book, and about 179% above the earnings-power methods, which capitalise what it earns today with no growth credited at all. The bear case is not that the balance sheet is fragile, because it plainly is not. It is that a business earning around 12.5% operating margins is being priced as though the next five years will look materially better than the last one did, and the evidence for that is a distribution segment that improved once.

Valuation

Start with what the price asks the company to do. Run the arithmetic backwards from $105.49 a share and roughly 4.7 billion dollars of market value, and the embedded assumption is operating-profit growth of about 16.5% a year for the next five years, from a business currently converting sales into operating profit at around 12.5%. That is not a heroic rate in isolation. Plenty of industrials have grown that fast for a year or two. The demanding part is the tenure: only about 48% of the companies that reached that pace held it for five years.

No family of method reaches today's price, but they miss by very different distances, and the pattern is the useful part. The forward-growth methods and the peer-multiple methods both land within about a fifth of the price, at premiums of roughly 17% and 18%. The price runs about 164% above the asset-value methods and about 179% above the earnings-power methods. That is the signature of a quality premium rather than a value opportunity: the market is paying for the business to keep doing what it does, and the frames that refuse to credit the future are the ones that say the price is expensive.

What has to be true, then, is that the growth eventually stops being purchased. The reported segment detail shows where it would have to come from. Energy Systems operating income in 2025 was $99.1 million on the smallest revenue base of the three, so incremental fuelling-system demand carries more profit per dollar than anything else the company sells, and any prolonged pause in filling-station upgrade cycles removes the most valuable growth available. Water Systems, at $207.2 million, is the ballast rather than the accelerator. Distribution improved sharply in one year and has to prove it can hold the gain.

The peer cohort supports the framing rather than the price. MWA, which sells into overlapping municipal water infrastructure, reported that its Water Management Solutions Net sales for 2025 were $604.8 million as compared with $559.2 million in the prior year, an increase of $45.6 million or 8.2%, per its own annual filing. That is roughly the growth rate the water side of this industry has been delivering, and it is comfortably short of the pace embedded in this share price. The gap has to be closed by mix, by the fuelling business, or by acquisition.

Solvency neither adds to that case nor subtracts from it, which is the appropriate outcome for a company of this shape. Net debt on the funded-debt basis runs about 54.0 million dollars, a figure that rises to roughly 163 million dollars once operating-lease obligations are folded in, and operating profit covers the interest bill about 25 times over on either basis. The share count has been falling for four years. What the balance sheet buys the company is the ability to be wrong about a deal or two without the equity holder paying for it, and given that acquisitions are the stated strategy, that is not a small thing.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for July 28, 2026, and they arrive with a specific question attached rather than a general one. The first quarter, reported on April 28, 2026, carried sales growth of about 10% with margin expansion across the segments. The distribution arm's step up in profitability during 2025 was the single largest contributor to consolidated improvement, so a second consecutive quarter of it would change how durable that gain looks.

Capital allocation has been moving in the meantime. The board raised the quarterly dividend 5.7% to $0.28 a share on April 27, 2026, and in May the company completed the purchase of Wood Bros., a Nebraska distributor. Both actions fit the pattern the 10-K describes, in which growth arrives partly through bolt-on acquisition and cash returns rise alongside it. Neither is large enough on its own to move the consolidated numbers; together they indicate management is comfortable spending and returning at the same time.

Guidance itself is worth watching for tone rather than level. Across the record since 2008 management has raised its outlook on five occasions, cut it on three, reaffirmed it on ten and withdrawn it once, which is the profile of a team that sets targets it expects to meet rather than targets that stretch. Against a share price embedding growth well above what the company delivered last year, a reaffirmation would read differently than it usually does.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Water Systems (reported)

Distribution (reported)

Energy Systems (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company earnings calendar, July 2026 · dividend declaration, April 27, 2026 · company announcement, May 2026 · Q1 2026 results, April 28, 2026

View the full interactive FELE report on boothcheck