Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (FCX): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $76.28, Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (FCX) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~7.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FCX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFCX
CompanyFreeport-McMoRan Inc.
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$76.28/sh
CompositionU.S. 35% / Switzerland 21% / Japan 11% / Indonesia 8% / Singapore 5% / United Kingdom 4% / Spain 3% / China 2% / Chile 2% / Germany 1% / France 1% / Egypt 1% / South Korea 1% / India 1% / Philippines 0% / Other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)28.4%
Operating margin today26.8%
Margin expansion (value-band)+1.6pp
Must persist for7.3y
Multiple paid17x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.53σ
cohort percentile (of 78 peers)45

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple; asset-based/earnings-power/growth-DCF land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.42x5expensive
Earnings4.03x5expensive
Relative1.20x2expensive
Growth1.51x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$19.783.86xyesFCF base $2.9B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.8%, WACC 8.7%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$60.591.26xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.7x / 15.7x / 20.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 17.66x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 26x), scenarios: 13.2x / 17.7x / 21.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10.32x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$31.492.42xyesBV/sh $14.00, ROE (TTM) 20.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$46.821.63xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$50.411.51xyesRev $25.9B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.2x / 4.2x / 5.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$61.251.25xyesEPS $1.75, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.75 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$39.521.93xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $7.11B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$44.761.70xyesBV $14.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 20.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$23.483.25xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.75 × BVPS $14.00) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $7.44B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$16.354.67xyesFCF $2866.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$15.225.01xyesSBC-adj FCF $2.72B (FCF $2.87B − SBC $0.15B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$56.471.35xyesEPS $1.75 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.188.31xyesBV $14.00 × (ROIC 5.7% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $25.89B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$65.631.16xyesEPS $1.75 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$18.924.03xyesEPS $1.75 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Morencioperatingenterprise$2.6b$607.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Cerro Verdeoperatingenterprise$4.7b$1.8b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Indonesia Operationsoperatingenterprise$8.6b$3.8b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
U.S. Rod & Refining Operationsoperatingenterprise$6.9b$31.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Atlantic Copper Refiningoperatingenterprise$3.2b$11.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$5.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.97x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.77x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.2%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Valuing a copper miner turns on two numbers most industries never think about: what it costs to lift a pound of metal out of the ground, and how many pounds are left underneath. Everything else is downstream of those. A mine low on the cost curve keeps earning when the metal price falls, and a mine with decades of reserve life gets to do it again next cycle. Freeport organises itself along exactly those lines, into U.S. copper mines, South America operations, Indonesia operations and Molybdenum mines.

The American half is the quiet one, and quiet is the point. Bagdad, in Arizona, produced 149 million pounds of copper and 11 million pounds of molybdenum in 2025, against 146 million pounds of copper in each of the two prior years. Flat is not the interesting part. What sits underneath it is: We have defined an opportunity to more than double the concentrator capacity of the Bagdad operation. That is expansion on ground the company already holds, in a jurisdiction where the permitting risk is known rather than negotiated each year.

Demand is the other half of the cost-curve argument, and the company is unusually direct about why it thinks the metal matters. Fundamentals for copper are favorable, the annual filing says, with growing demand supported by copper's critical role in electrification initiatives, continued urbanization in developing countries, data centers and artificial intelligence (AI) growth, increased defense spending. Four separate demand pulls, none of them a substitute for the others, and none of them present together a decade ago.

Indonesia is where the optionality lives. In February 2026 Freeport and PTFI signed an understanding with the Indonesian government covering a life of resource extension of operating rights in the Grasberg minerals district, past the 2041 expiry currently on the books. Grasberg is not an ordinary asset, and the gap between rights that stop in 2041 and rights that run to depletion is measured in decades of copper and gold.

The near-term case rests on the restart working, and management has put its own arithmetic behind that: Consolidated operating cash flows are expected to approximate $8.7 billion for the year 2026, struck on a deck of 6.00 dollars a pound for copper, 4,500 dollars an ounce for gold and 25.00 dollars a pound for molybdenum. A forecast built on a mine still ramping carries a wide error bar, and the bear is right to say so. The bull's answer is that the orebody has not moved. Block caving is a sequencing problem rather than a geology problem, and At December 31, 2025, the Grasberg Block Cave underground mine had 470 open drawbells. The tons are still there. What was lost was time.

Bear Case

Run the price past every family of valuation method and not one of them reaches it. Book value plus excess profitability lands under. Peer multiples land under. Even the forward-growth methods, the ones allowed to credit expansion that has not happened yet, land under, and they are the closest of the four. Furthest away by a wide distance is the earnings-power lens, which simply capitalises what the business has actually earned and assumes no growth at all. On a cyclical, that particular gap is not automatically an indictment, because trailing earnings on a miner are a snapshot of one point on a price cycle. It does mean something narrower and harder to argue with: the price is being carried by growth, and by nothing else in the toolkit.

So how much growth. Today's price requires operating profit for the whole company to compound at roughly 21.1% a year for five years. The demanding part is persistence: among companies that have grown at this pace, only about 41% held it for that long. And the base being compounded from is a year in which Grasberg milled 138,100 metric tons of ore per day, against 208,400 metric tons the year before. The bull reads a depressed base as the opportunity. The bear reads it as the reason the compounding looks so achievable on paper.

Cost position is where the sector lens turns against the company. Freeport guides its South America operations to average unit net cash costs of about 2.60 dollars a pound for 2026. SCCO, mining the same metal in the same part of the world, reported operating cash cost net of by-product revenues of 0.58 dollars a pound in 2025, improved from 0.89 the year before, per its own annual filing. The two figures rest on different definitions and different orebodies, so the ratio between them is not a like-for-like ranking. Nobody reading them, though, concludes that Freeport is the low-cost producer in its own cohort. Low-cost producers are the ones that keep operating through the part of the cycle nobody is currently modelling.

Indonesia concentrates three risks into one geography. The export licence expired on September 16, 2025, and PTFI does not have export licenses for copper concentrate or anode slimes, which turns a smelter commissioning schedule into a hard production constraint. The February 2026 understanding on operating rights is an understanding, and the rights on the books still stop in 2041. And the protection behind the mud rush has a ceiling: the policies cover up to $1.0 billion in losses (subject to a limit of $0.7 billion on underground incidents), after a $0.5 billion deductible.

The balance sheet is not where this bear case lives, and pretending otherwise would be dishonest. Borrowings of 9.4 billion dollars set against 3.7 billion dollars of liquidity is not a stressed structure for a business this size, and the share count has barely moved in four years. What a strong balance sheet cannot do is shorten a ramp. It buys time. It does not buy tons.

Valuation

Today's price is paying for one thing above all others: that operating profit across the whole company compounds at roughly 21.1% a year over the next five years. Run the arithmetic backwards from $62.61 a share and 90.4 billion dollars of market value and that is what falls out. It is not a forecast, and it is not a target. It is the assumption a buyer inherits on day one.

Set against it, the map of methods is unusually one-sided. No family reaches the price. Book-value-plus-profitability lands beneath it, peer multiples land beneath it, and the growth methods, which are permitted to credit the future, come closest and still fall short. The approach that reaches furthest is a discounted cash-flow run that carries today's cash-profit multiple unchanged into its terminal year, which is to say the method most dependent on nothing changing. The one that falls shortest capitalises a multi-year average of operating profit with no growth credited whatsoever. The whole disagreement sits between those two, and the disagreement is the information rather than a defect in it.

Translated into mining terms, the growth requirement is a volume requirement. Grasberg's milling rate fell to 138,100 metric tons of ore per day in 2025 from 208,400 metric tons in 2024, and the restart that began at the end of March 2026 is what closes that gap. Recovering lost throughput does a large share of the compounding by itself. What the price does not answer is what happens in the back half of the window, once the recovery is banked and the growth has to come from new tons rather than restored ones.

Cohort position sharpens the question rather than softening it. SCCO reported operating cash cost net of by-product revenues of 0.58 dollars a pound in 2025; Freeport guides its South America division to roughly 2.60 dollars a pound this year. Different definitions, different orebodies, and still a clear ordering. A producer sitting higher on the cost curve has more torque to the copper price in both directions. That is a reasonable thing to own and a harder thing to own at a premium to every standard frame.

None of the balance-sheet arithmetic argues either way, which is itself worth saying. The latest quarterly filing reports consolidated debt of $9.4 billion and consolidated cash and cash equivalents of $3.7 billion, carrying a weighted-average interest rate of 5.2%, with 3.0 billion dollars of undrawn revolving capacity behind it. Strip out the borrowings that funded PTFI's new smelters and the company's own figure is Net debt totaled $2.4 billion. Share count has moved by less than half a percent a year since early 2022, so the dividend, split between a fixed quarterly base and a variable performance-linked half, is the return channel rather than repurchases. Solvency here does not shorten the growth requirement. It only guarantees the company gets a full cycle to meet it.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results landed on July 23, 2026, with revenue of $7.03 billion against a Q2 2026 revenue consensus of $6.75 billion. Two brokers moved the following day: RBC Capital lifted its target to $73 from $70, and Wells Fargo to $70 from $68. Both sit above where every family of valuation method in this report lands, and the difference is worth naming rather than reconciling away. The street is underwriting the Grasberg recovery and a firm copper deck; this framework measures the price against what the business has already demonstrated.

The operating calendar is set by the mine, not the calendar year. PTFI commenced initial ramp-up activities at the end of March 2026 in Production Blocks 2 and 3 and is advancing a planned future start-up of Production Block 1S alongside drainage and cave-management work. Because the export licence is gone, smelter commissioning and mine ramp now have to move in step, which makes each quarterly report a progress check on two schedules at once rather than one.

Capital return runs on a declared schedule. The board declared $0.15 a share on March 25, 2026, half of it a fixed quarterly base and half a variable performance-based amount, paid on May 1. It declared the same figure again on June 23, 2026, payable August 3. The variable half is the one worth tracking: it moves with what the operations actually generate, which makes it the cleanest public read on how the restart is going.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Morenci / Cerro Verde +3 more (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 earnings results, July 23, 2026 · analyst notes, July 24, 2026 · FCX quarterly report for the period ended March 31, 2026 · Freeport dividend declaration, June 23, 2026

View the full interactive FCX report on boothcheck