Four Corners Property Trust, Inc. (FCPT): what the price requires
At today's price, Four Corners Property Trust, Inc. (FCPT) is priced for -2.6% FFO growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FCPT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FCPT |
| Company | Four Corners Property Trust, Inc. |
| Current price | $25.24/sh |
| Composition | Real estate operations 89% / Restaurant operations 11% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | reit |
| Implied FFO growth | -2.6% |
| Price-to-FFO | 16.0x |
| FFO yield | 6.3% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied growth ~4.6pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.43σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 61 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.37x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.35x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.33x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.00x | 5 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $47.23 | 0.53x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.7%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $24.66 | 1.02x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 61.4x / 63.4x / 65.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $26.33 | 0.96x | yes | P/E 27.39x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 16x), scenarios: 22.8x / 27.4x / 32.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 33.01x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $69.08 | 0.37x | yes | DPS $1.44, g=7.0% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $25.32 | 1.00x | yes | Stage 1: 3% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $11.50 | 2.19x | yes | BV/sh $15.17, ROE (TTM) 7.0%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $9.93 | 2.54x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $13.23 | 1.91x | yes | Rev $0.3B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.7x / 8.0x / 9.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $18.96 | 1.33x | yes | FFO/share $1.58, growth 3% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median), PEG=8.20 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $9.71 | 2.60x | yes | BV $15.17 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 7.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.6%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $23.22 | 1.09x | yes | √(22.5 × FFO/share $1.58 × BVPS $15.17) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.62 | 40.71x | yes | EBITDA $0.06B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $7.81 | 3.23x | yes | FCF $187.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $6.95 | 3.63x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.19B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $18.92 | 1.33x | yes | FFO/share $1.58 × (8.5 + 2×2.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $16.47 | 1.53x | yes | Revenue $0.30B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $7.90 | 3.19x | yes | FFO/share $1.58 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 2.9% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median)) → PE 4.3x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $17.08 | 1.48x | yes | FFO/share $1.58 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | $22.47 | 1.12x | yes | FFO/share $1.58 × 14.2x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $0.17B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 110M |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Funds from operations (trailing) | $173.6m |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 8.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Net debt could not be resolved from the corporate debt tags in the filings (REIT notes and mortgage debt are often tagged outside the corporate ladder), so the leverage ratio is withheld rather than rendered from incomplete tags. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
Four Corners is valued on adjusted funds from operations, trading at about 16x AFFO (a roughly 6.1% AFFO yield) at $24.45; the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple families all read it as richly valued while only the growth-DCF reaches the price, the signature of a net-lease quality premium.
Q1 2026 was solid: total revenue up 9.4% to $78.2 million, rental revenue up 10.0%, AFFO per share up 3.4% to $0.45, a dividend covered around 1.21x, and accretive acquisitions of 17 properties year-to-date at a 6.9% cash cap rate with a ten-year lease term.
The risk is concentration and rates: casual-dining tenants exceed 50% of rental income (anchored by Darden), a category under cost and demand pressure, while a competitive net-lease acquisition market and rate sensitivity can compress both the multiple and the buying spread.
Bull Case
At $24.45 (June 27, 2026), Four Corners Property Trust sits above where most of its valuation methods land, and understanding the shape of that premium is the way into the bull case. On a reverse-DCF basis only the growth-DCF family reaches the price; the asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple families all read the trust as richly valued. For a net-lease REIT, that ordering is the signature of a quality premium: the market is paying above the static frames because it credits the durability and reliability of the cash flows, the kind of moat the snapshot frames structurally cannot price.
The cash flows earn that credit. Four Corners is a net-lease landlord with a portfolio anchored by restaurant properties on long leases, and the recent results show steady internal and external growth. First-quarter 2026 total revenue rose 9.4% to $78.2 million, rental revenue rose 10.0% to $69.8 million, AFFO per diluted share reached $0.45 (up 3.4%), and NAREIT FFO per share rose 4.7% to $0.42. The dividend is well covered, with a coverage ratio around 1.21x (AFFO of $1.78 per share against an annualized dividend near $1.47), which means the payout is funded by cash earnings rather than borrowed against the future.
The external growth engine is accretive at today's cost of capital. During the first quarter the trust acquired ten properties for $26.2 million at a roughly 6.8% initial cash yield, and year-to-date had invested about $52 million across 17 properties at a 6.9% cash and 7.4% GAAP cap rate with a ten-year weighted-average lease term. Buying long-dated, contractually-escalating leases at high-6% cash yields, while funding a covered dividend, is how a net-lease REIT compounds. The inversion reads the priced-in assumption as within range, with the price implying only a modest AFFO decline that the trust's record does not support. The bull wager is that a high-quality, well-covered net-lease compounder deserves the premium it carries.
Bear Case
The disruption risk for Four Corners is concentrated in its tenants and the competition for the deals that grow it. The portfolio carries a casual-dining tenant concentration exceeding 50% of rental income, anchored by Darden, the operator of Olive Garden and LongHorn Steakhouse, alongside Chili's and similar operators. Casual dining is a category under structural pressure: rising labor and food costs, shifting consumer preferences toward fast-casual and delivery, and the constant threat that a major operator restructures or closes underperforming locations. The landlord's rent is only as safe as the restaurant brands paying it, and a concentrated book means one anchor tenant's trouble is the trust's trouble.
On growth, Four Corners competes for net-lease acquisitions against a deep field of better-capitalized rivals: Realty Income, Agree Realty, NNN REIT, and a host of private capital all chase the same single-tenant properties. That competition compresses cap rates, which is precisely why the trust is buying at a roughly 6.9% cash yield rather than higher; if its own cost of capital rises or peers bid more aggressively, the spread that makes external growth accretive narrows or disappears. A net-lease REIT that cannot buy at a positive spread to its cost of capital loses its primary growth lever.
The valuation leaves little room for these risks to surface. The asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple families all read the stock as richly valued, with only the growth-DCF reaching the price, and the price-to-AFFO sits in the upper half of the REIT peer group. The entire premium therefore rests on the durability the static frames cannot price, and the inversion's reading that the price implies only a modest AFFO decline means the market is paying for continued steadiness. REITs are also rate-sensitive: higher long rates pressure both the valuation multiple and the acquisition spread at once. The bear's view is that paying an upper-tier price for a casual-dining-concentrated net-lease REIT, in a competitive acquisition market and a rate environment that can move against it, offers thin compensation if either the tenant base or the growth engine weakens.
Valuation
Four Corners is valued on adjusted funds from operations, the right frame for a REIT, since AFFO is cash earnings plus property depreciation minus the recurring maintenance capex that keeps buildings leasable. At $24.45 the stock trades at about 16x AFFO, a roughly 6.1% AFFO yield, which inverts to the price implying the trust lets AFFO decline about 3.1% a year. The inversion reads that as within range: the assumed pace is within what the trust has delivered, and notably it is a low bar, since a quality net-lease REIT with escalating leases would normally grow AFFO rather than shrink it.
The method families show the premium pattern. The asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple families all read the trust as richly valued; only the growth-DCF reaches the price. The price-to-AFFO sits in the upper half of the REIT peer group. That is the profile of a quality premium: the market pays above the static frames for the perceived durability of the cash flows, which the growth-DCF credits and the others do not.
The honest read: this is a well-run net-lease REIT trading at an upper-tier multiple, where the premium is justified if the cash flows are as durable as the growth frame assumes. The strengths are concrete: rental revenue up 10%, AFFO per share up 3.4%, a dividend covered around 1.21x, and accretive acquisitions at a roughly 6.9% cash cap rate. The risks are the casual-dining tenant concentration above 50% of rent and the rate sensitivity that can pressure both the multiple and the acquisition spread. The cleaner way to weigh the price is against AFFO-per-share growth and dividend coverage, recognizing that the price already embeds a quality premium and that the modest implied AFFO decline is a low bar the trust has historically cleared.
Catalysts
The most recent catalyst was the first-quarter 2026 report. Four Corners posted total revenue of $78.2 million, up 9.4% year over year, with rental revenue up 10.0% to $69.8 million and net income attributable to common shareholders of $30.3 million, or $0.28 per diluted share. AFFO per diluted share was $0.45 (up 3.4%) and NAREIT FFO per share was $0.42 (up 4.7%), with the dividend covered around 1.21x (StockTitan, stockanalysis).
External growth continued at accretive yields. During the first quarter the trust acquired ten properties for $26.2 million at a 6.8% initial cash yield (7.3% GAAP) with a ten-year weighted-average remaining lease term, and year-to-date had invested about $52 million across 17 properties at a 6.9% cash and 7.4% GAAP cap rate. The trust declared a first-quarter dividend of $0.3665 per share (Four Corners 8-K, Sure Dividend).
The forward catalysts are the pace of accretive acquisitions, the rate environment, and tenant health. The thesis depends on continued buying at positive spreads to the cost of capital, a stable-to-lower long-rate backdrop, and the casual-dining tenant base (over 50% of rent, anchored by Darden) holding up. A slowdown in acquisitions, higher long rates, or stress at a major restaurant tenant would be the clearest near-term risks; continued AFFO-per-share growth with a covered dividend would support the premium valuation. The next quarterly print and acquisition cadence are the things to watch (Benzinga, Four Corners 8-K).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Real estate operations (reported)
- O (REALTY INCOME CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NNN (NNN REIT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ADC (Agree Realty Corporation)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EPRT (Essential Properties Realty Trust, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BNL (BROADSTONE NET LEASE, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NTST (NETSTREIT Corp.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GTY (GETTY REALTY CORP.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WPC (W. P. Carey Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Restaurant operations (reported)
- DRI (DARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- EAT (BRINKER INTERNATIONAL, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TXRH (Texas Roadhouse, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CAKE (THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.