FTI CONSULTING, INC (FCN): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers FTI CONSULTING, INC (FCN) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FCN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFCN
CompanyFTI CONSULTING, INC
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$151.70/sh
CompositionCorporate Finance 41% / Forensic and Litigation Consulting (FLC) 20% / Economic Consulting 19% / Technology 10% / Strategic Communications 10%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.8%
Operating margin today9.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.9pp
Multiple paid13x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.1% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.56σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)16

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.53x5expensive
Earnings1.51x5expensive
Relative0.87x2justifies
Growth0.62x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$505.240.30xyesFCF base $0.4B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.3%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$242.950.62xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.5x / 13.5x / 15.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$98.981.53xyesBV/sh $48.31, ROE (TTM) 19.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$140.001.08xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$153.630.99xyesRev $3.9B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.1x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$145.591.04xyesEPS $8.26, growth 18% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.94 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$122.981.23xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.35B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$137.421.10xyesBV $48.31 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$94.761.60xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.26 × BVPS $48.31) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.39B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$100.481.51xyesFCF $358.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$83.221.82xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.31B (FCF $0.36B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$266.520.57xyesEPS $8.26 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$18.368.26xyesBV $48.31 × (ROIC 2.8% / WACC 7.3%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.92B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$218.380.69xyesEPS $8.26 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 17.6% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 26.4x
Earnings YieldEarnings$89.301.70xyesEPS $8.26 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Corporate Financeoperatingenterprise$1.6b$288.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Forensic and Litigation Consultingoperatingenterprise$764.7m$121.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Economic Consultingoperatingenterprise$720.8m$18.8m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Technologyoperatingenterprise$373.9m$28.1m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Strategic Communicationsoperatingenterprise$378.5m$60.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$855.6m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.84x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.25x
Interest coverage11.4x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.2%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Begin with the balance sheet, because it explains what management believes. FTI carries roughly 754 million dollars of borrowings on a funded-debt basis, or about 1.0 billion dollars once operating leases are counted, against liquid assets near 198 million dollars. Interest expense in 2025 came to about 21.4 million dollars, which sits close to nineteen times covered by trailing operating profit. That is a services firm with a mortgage rather than a leveraged one, and it leaves management with genuine choices about where the cash goes.

What they chose was their own shares. The share count has fallen about 4% a year over the past four years, the repurchase programme first authorised in 2016 has retired roughly 19.1 million shares, and in June 2026 the board added another 370 million dollars of capacity to it. A consulting firm buying back stock at scale is making a specific claim: that its own equity is cheaper than the next hire, the next tuck-in acquisition or the next office. Given a multiple of about 14 times operating profit and a position in the lower half of the peer multiple range, that claim is at least internally consistent.

The operating case is that four practices out of five are working and one is not. Forensic and Litigation Consulting produced gross profit of $274.1 million in 2025 against $225.2 million, a 21.7% increase, at a gross profit margin of 35.8% against 32.6%. It did that with a headcount of 1,541 against 1,542, which means the entire gain came from pricing and mix: the average billable rate rose to $442 an hour from $390. Corporate Finance, the largest practice, moved the same way with utilisation of 60% against 58% and an average rate of $529 an hour against $510. Getting paid more per hour by the same people is the highest-quality revenue growth a professional services firm can produce.

Strategic Communications added the second-best year in the group. Revenue rose 11.1% excluding currency effects, driven by demand for corporate reputation work and an $18.2 million increase in pass-through revenues, and gross profit rose 14.1% to $140.0 million at a 37.0% margin. That happened with 907 billable professionals against 981, so the practice grew while carrying fewer people. Across the firm, the pattern in 2025 was fewer heads earning more per head, which is the opposite of the way consulting businesses usually chase growth.

There is also a structural hedge inside the portfolio that most service companies lack. The 10-K notes that certain practices, particularly our restructuring practice, tend to experience their highest demand during periods of economic distress, while the litigation, investigations and reputation practices run on regulatory and legal activity that does not track the business cycle either. Against peers, HURN reported a 10.4% operating margin on $1.75 billion of revenue growing 11.8%, and BAH a 9.2% margin on $11.2 billion with revenue down 6.4%; FTI's roughly 10% trailing operating margin sits in that same band while its multiple sits below the group. The bull case does not need a recovery story. It needs one practice to stop shrinking.

Bear Case

The entire investment case rests on an assumption that is neither stated nor obviously true: that Economic Consulting stabilises. That practice, which houses Compass Lexecon, produced gross profit of $142.4 million in 2025 against $235.1 million, a fall of 39.5%, at a gross profit margin of 19.7% against 27.2%. Look at what did and did not move underneath that. The average billable rate was $583 an hour against $584, so pricing held. Billable headcount fell 8.6% to 1,014 and utilisation fell to 59% from 66%. This is not a demand problem or a pricing problem. It is fewer people, working less of the time, and the people in question are exactly the ones clients hire by name.

The 10-K describes the mechanism without flinching. Client relationships in this business rest on expertise and bonds of personal trust and confidence, and as a result the barriers to our professionals pursuing independent business opportunities or joining our competitors or clients are low. It adds that although clients contract with the company rather than the individual, if a professional leaves, those clients may follow. A firm whose assets go home every evening has no mechanism to stop this other than paying more, and the cash flow statement shows exactly that happening.

Which is the second problem. Free Cash Flow was an inflow of $93.6 million in 2025 against $360.2 million in 2024, and the 10-K attributes the decline primarily to higher forgivable loan issuances, compensation payments and income tax payments. Forgivable loans are retention money advanced to senior professionals and written off over time if they stay. So the firm is converting cash into contractual stickiness, which is a reasonable response and also an admission of where the risk sits. That cost recurs, it scales with the threat, and it does not appear as an expense in the year it is paid.

Nor is the headcount contraction confined to one practice. Technology ended 2025 with 662 billable professionals against 714, and Strategic Communications with 907 against 981. Consolidated across the firm, growth in 2025 came from realised rates rather than capacity, and rate increases have a ceiling that client legal budgets set. A business that grows by charging more per hour while employing fewer hours has a finite runway on that strategy.

The valuation offers less protection than the headline multiple suggests. The methods that reach today's price are the ones that project growth forward. The methods that assume none do not: the price sits roughly 76% above where the earnings-power approaches land, and those approaches simply capitalise today's profit at a required return with no growth credited. For a firm where one practice is shrinking and three others are cutting heads, zero growth is not a hypothetical scenario, it is a plausible one, and on that assumption the current price is not cheap at all. Peer multiples land essentially on top of today's price rather than above it, which means the comparison group offers no cushion either.

Finally, the debt is real even if it is modest. Borrowings run about 754 million dollars on the funded-debt build, and roughly 1.0 billion dollars once leases are included, against liquid assets near 198 million dollars. The credit agreement contains covenants that may limit the ability to incur additional indebtedness. None of that threatens the firm today. It does mean the buyback capacity announced in June competes with the retention spending that is currently consuming the free cash flow, and one of those two commitments will give first.

Valuation

The market is paying about 14 times company-wide operating profit for FTI, and it is worth pausing on how unusual a starting point that is. Trailing operating profit runs close to 394 million dollars on revenue of roughly 3.87 billion dollars, which is an operating margin near 10%. The multiple sits in the lower half of the range applied to the peer group, and the arithmetic runs backwards from where it usually does: rather than requiring growth to justify the price, the price sits below what even a sustained decline in operating profit would warrant. That is a bound rather than a solved figure, and it is the most informative single statement available about this stock.

How the methods split tells the rest. The approaches that credit forward growth land above today's price, including a discounted cash-flow model that holds today's enterprise-value-to-EBITDA multiple of 13.9 times flat as its base case, compressing to 11.9 times in the bear scenario and expanding to 15.9 times in the bull. Peer multiples land essentially on top of the price: the comparison uses a static sector reference of eighteen times earnings held flat, with compression and expansion around it. The earnings-power approaches, which capitalise today's profit at a required return and credit no growth whatever, sit well under the price, which is about 76% above where they land. That spread is the actual question. It asks whether this is a business that grows at all from here.

The filing-sourced inputs make the question concrete rather than abstract, because the answer differs by practice. In 2025 Forensic and Litigation Consulting lifted gross profit 21.7% to $274.1 million with headcount flat and an average billable rate of $442 an hour against $390. Strategic Communications lifted gross profit 14.1% to $140.0 million. Economic Consulting went the other way, gross profit down 39.5% to $142.4 million with billable headcount at 1,014 against 1,110. Corporate Finance, the largest practice, ran utilisation of 60% against 58% at an average rate of $529 an hour. Four of five moving forward and one moving sharply back is what a 14 times multiple on a whole company looks like from the inside.

Set against the cohort, the position is unremarkable rather than distressed. HURN carries a 10.4% operating margin on $1.75 billion of revenue growing 11.8%, EXPO a 19.4% margin on $602.8 million growing 7.8%, and BAH a 9.2% margin on $11.2 billion with revenue down 6.4%. FTI's roughly 10% trailing operating margin belongs in that group without apology, and EXPO's premium margin comes from a far smaller and more specialised book. What separates FTI from these names is not profitability. It is that one of its five practices had a bad year visible enough to reset the multiple.

The balance sheet bounds the downside without doing much else. Interest expense of about 21.4 million dollars in 2025 is covered close to nineteen times by trailing operating profit, and borrowings run near 754 million dollars on the funded-debt build, or about 1.0 billion dollars once leases are counted, against liquid assets around 198 million dollars. The share count has fallen roughly 4% a year over four years. The decisive variable is not solvency and not the multiple. It is the billable headcount line in the Economic Consulting practice, which is disclosed every quarter and which will settle this argument before any valuation method does.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results arrive July 30, 2026, before the market opens, and the company confirmed the date on July 9, 2026. The line that matters is the one the market has stopped trusting: billable headcount and utilisation in Economic Consulting, which ended 2025 at 1,014 professionals and 59% utilisation. A stabilisation there changes the argument about this business more than any margin figure in the release will.

Capital allocation moved twice in the past two months. On June 5, 2026 the board authorised an additional 370 million dollars for the repurchase programme, which has retired roughly 19.1 million shares since it was first approved in 2016. Then on July 1, 2026 the company announced an increase and extension of its senior unsecured revolving credit facility, its third amendment to that agreement. Taken together, those are the actions of a management team arranging capacity to keep buying stock rather than preparing to defend a balance sheet.

The hiring side is worth watching for the same reason the departures were. On July 15, 2026 the firm announced the appointment of a senior managing director to expand its financial crime risk management practice in Australia. Individually that is a minor item. In a business where revenue arrives attached to named individuals and the bear case is built on those individuals leaving, the direction of senior hiring announcements is a genuine leading indicator, and it currently points the other way from 2025.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Corporate Finance (reported)

Forensic and Litigation Consulting (reported)

Economic Consulting (reported)

Technology (reported)

Strategic Communications (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FTI Consulting Form 8-K, June 5, 2026 · FY2025 10-K segment results · FTI Consulting earnings announcement, July 9, 2026 · FTI Consulting Form 8-K, July 1, 2026 · FTI Consulting announcement, July 15, 2026

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