FirstCash Holdings, Inc. (FCFS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $219.21, FirstCash Holdings, Inc. (FCFS) is priced for +7.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FCFS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerFCFS
CompanyFirstCash Holdings, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$219.21/sh
CompositionU.S. Pawn 63% / U.K. Pawn 5% / Retail POS Payment Solutions (AFF) 31%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.2%
Operating margin today12.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.6pp
Implied growth7.1%
Multiple paid23x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)72

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.92x4expensive
Earnings2.06x4expensive
Relative0.69x2justifies
Growth0.58x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$699.690.31xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 22% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.2x / 20.0x / 23.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$96.752.27xyesBV/sh $53.53, ROE (TTM) 16.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$128.381.71xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$257.500.85xyesRev $4.1B, growth 22% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.3x / 2.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$306.600.71xyesEPS $8.76, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.70 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$129.541.69xyesBV $53.53 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$102.722.13xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.76 × BVPS $53.53) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$109.372.00xyesFCF $672.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$103.892.11xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.65B (FCF $0.67B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$282.660.78xyesEPS $8.76 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $4.12B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$328.500.67xyesEPS $8.76 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$94.702.31xyesEPS $8.76 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
U.S. Pawnoperatingenterprise$1.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Latin America Pawnoperatingenterprise$889.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value
U.K. Pawnoperatingenterprise$150.7mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Retail POS Payment Solutions (AFF)operatingenterprise$870.2mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.60x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.12x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.9%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The case against this company is easy to make and worth making first. FirstCash is, on one reading, a leveraged bet on the gold price wearing a retail costume. The 10-K discloses that approximately $623.6 million, or 75%, of total pawn loans were collateralized by jewelry, which was also primarily gold, and that jewelry supplied 44% of retail merchandise revenue during 2025, a year in which the average market price of the metal rose 44%, from 2,385 dollars to 3,441 dollars an ounce. If that is the business, then the last two years of results are a commodity rally with a store network attached, and the multiple is a mistake.

The segment disclosures say otherwise, and they say it in the company's own accounting language. U.S. pawn generated segment pre-tax operating income of $452.6 million in 2025 on a 26% segment margin, against $397.3 million and 25% the year before. Latin America pawn produced $177.4 million at a 20% margin against $150.2 million and 19%. Those are margin expansions of a point each, which is not what a pure price-of-gold windfall looks like; a windfall shows up as a margin spike, not a grind. The pawn model earns on the spread between what it lends and what the forfeited collateral fetches at retail, and a higher gold price moves both sides of that trade.

The line that actually changed the company is the one nobody wanted. Retail POS payment solutions, the lease-to-own and point-of-sale finance business FirstCash bought as AFF, delivered segment pre-tax operating income of $169.1 million in 2025 at a 19% segment margin, against $128.6 million and 13% in 2024. Six points of margin in a year is a different order of improvement from the pawn segments, and the mechanism is visible: operating expenses fell to 11% of segment revenues from 14%. The allowance for loan losses then fell 12% to $104.6 million at March 31, 2026 from $118.3 million a year earlier. AFF was the acquisition the market treated as a distraction. It is now the fastest-improving profit line in the business.

Scale is the second engine, and it is being bought deliberately rather than opportunistically. FirstCash describes itself as the leading international operator of more than 3,300 retail pawn stores. The H&T acquisition closed August 14, 2025 and created a fourth reportable segment that earned $52.5 million of segment pre-tax operating income at a 35% segment margin in roughly four and a half months of ownership, the highest of the four. Ramsdens, agreed in June 2026, adds 174 more U.K. locations and would take the U.K. network past 450 stores. Pawnbroking is a fragmented, licence-bound, locally-regulated trade, which is exactly the kind of industry where a consolidator with a balance sheet compounds by arithmetic rather than by cleverness.

Meanwhile the share count goes down and the cash comes back. Weighted-average diluted shares were 44.0 million in the June 2026 quarter against 44.6 million a year earlier, the previous $150 million repurchase authorisation was completed and a new one of the same size approved, and the board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.42 a share payable in August 2026. Over four years the share count has fallen about 2.2% a year. Set that against what the market is asking of the business, which is company-wide profit growth of roughly 8.6% a year sustained for five years. The most recent quarter grew revenue 29%. The bar is not the problem here.

Bear Case

There is an uncomfortable observation buried in the results, and it is not about the multiple. Pawn is what people use when other credit has run out. Consolidated pawn receivables up 63%, and up 22% on a same-store basis, is a demand signal, and the demand being signalled is that a lot of households cannot borrow anywhere cheaper. FirstCash is being valued as a growth compounder for delivering results that describe deteriorating household balance sheets. That works until it does not, because the same customer who pawns a chain this year defaults on a lease-to-own contract next year, and both of those flows run through the same income statement. The market is paying about 24 times trailing pre-tax profit for that, with the price sitting roughly 89% above where the asset-value methods land and roughly 114% above the earnings-power methods.

The gold concentration is not a hedge, it is the collateral. Approximately 623.6 million dollars of pawn loans, three quarters of the book, sit against jewelry that is primarily gold, and jewelry was 44% of retail merchandise revenue in 2025. The 10-K is explicit that a significant decline in market prices produces decreased merchandise sales and margins, lower inventory valuations and, in its own words, sub-standard collateralization of outstanding pawn loans, along with a smaller balance of loans outstanding. Gold averaged 3,441 dollars an ounce across 2025 and stood at 4,323 dollars at year end. Every one of those effects arrives at once and in the same direction, which is the definition of an unhedged exposure.

AFF carries a different problem, and it is legal rather than economic. The 10-K's own risk language contemplates that the business may need to rely on existing state licenses, obtain new state licenses, pursue a bank charter, offer consumer loans and/or be subject to the interest rate limitations of certain states, and that AFF could be subject to litigation, whether private or governmental, or administrative action over those claims. Consumer finance regulators have examination authority over providers of short-term small-dollar credit and can inspect books and question business practices. A segment margin of 19% earned partly through pricing that a state could cap is a return with a policy variable inside it.

The acquisition pace deserves scrutiny of its own. H&T closed in August 2025, Ramsdens was agreed ten months later for roughly 273 million dollars, and the second quarter of 2026 included a 750 million dollar bond offering whose proceeds paid down the revolver and funded further expansion. Net borrowings net of liquid assets stand at roughly 2.1 billion dollars. Integrating two U.K. platforms with almost no store overlap while also running U.S., Mexican and lease-to-own operations is a genuine management load, and it arrives at the same moment as a leadership handover: Rick Wessel steps out of the chief executive role on January 1, 2027 after nearly a decade in it.

Finally, the valuation rests on a rate assumption more than an operating one. The growth the price embeds, roughly 8.6% a year of company-wide profit growth over five years, is computed against a 7.4% cost of capital, and each additional percentage point of that cost raises the required growth by about 8.3 points. That is an extreme lever. It means most of the support under this multiple is the discount rate rather than the business, and a repricing of small-cap consumer finance credit would do more damage to the shares than a bad quarter ever could.

Valuation

A word on the denominator before any multiple, because FirstCash does not report a consolidated operating profit line. Its income statement runs to income before income taxes, and its own segment tables use the label segment pre-tax operating income. So the multiple that matters here is roughly 24 times trailing pre-tax profit, and every margin and leverage figure downstream of it carries the same pre-tax basis. Reported revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 was about 3.66 billion dollars, and pre-tax income for that year was about 448 million dollars.

What the market is buying at that multiple is company-wide profit growth of roughly 8.6% a year held for five years. Measured against what the business has recently delivered, that is unremarkable; the near-term pace is inside its own recent record, and the demand is on persistence rather than acceleration. The figure is a single solve rather than a measurement, and it is unusually sensitive: each additional percentage point of assumed cost of capital lifts the required growth by about 8.3 points. A reader should treat the 8.6% as the centre of a wide band whose width is set by interest rates, not by pawn demand.

The methods split along a line that is worth reading carefully. The price sits roughly 89% above where the asset-value approaches land and roughly 114% above the earnings-power approaches, while peer multiples land essentially on top of today's price and the cash-flow methods land above it. That gap is not a contradiction, it is a definition. The earnings-power methods here capitalise today's free cash flow at a required return with no growth credited at all, so they are answering the question of what the business is worth if it stops growing tomorrow. The peer-multiple approach applies a static sector reference of twenty times earnings held flat in its base case, compressing in the bear scenario and expanding in the bull, and reaches the price on that flat setting. For a business compounding by acquisition, the zero-growth frames are a floor, not a verdict.

The filing-sourced inputs the whole build rests on are the segment results, and they are unusually legible. In 2025 U.S. pawn earned $452.6 million of segment pre-tax operating income at a 26% segment margin, Latin America pawn $177.4 million at a 20% segment margin, the U.K. segment $52.5 million at 35% for the partial year since August 14, 2025, and retail POS payment solutions $169.1 million at 19%. Administrative expenses and amortisation of acquired intangibles sit outside those figures, which is why the segments sum well above the consolidated pre-tax number. Against peers in the same trade, EZPW reported consolidated pawn loans outstanding of $307.5 million as of September 30, 2025, of which $117.9 million, or 38%, was in Texas stores, so FirstCash is running a book several times the size of its closest listed pawn comparison and across four countries rather than two.

On the balance sheet, borrowings net of liquid assets run around 2.1 billion dollars, and the second quarter of 2026 added a 750 million dollar bond issue that repaid revolver drawings and pre-funded expansion. Against that sits a share count falling about 2.2% a year, a completed repurchase authorisation immediately replaced with another, and a quarterly dividend. The debt is being used to buy stores rather than to buy back stock, which is the more defensible of the two uses when the stores earn segment margins in the twenties. What decides the next few years is whether pawn demand stays where it is, because it is currently supplying both the growth and the reason to be cautious about it.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results, reported July 23, 2026, were the strongest print the company has published. Revenue reached $1,074.7 million against $830.6 million a year earlier, up 29%, and GAAP diluted earnings per share were $2.12 against $1.34. Consolidated pawn receivables rose 63% in total and 22% on a same-store basis. Management raised full-year consolidated pawn revenue guidance on the back of it. The board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.42 a share payable in August 2026, confirmed completion of the prior $150 million repurchase authorisation and approved a new one of the same size.

The Ramsdens transaction is the item with a live timetable. Announced June 23, 2026, FirstCash agreed to acquire Ramsdens Holdings plc for cash consideration of 600 pence per share plus an interim dividend of up to 9 pence, a total equity value of roughly 206 million pounds, or about 273 million dollars at the exchange rate on June 22, 2026. Ramsdens operates 174 pawn locations across England, Scotland and Wales. Closing is expected by the end of 2026 and requires Ramsdens shareholder approval plus antitrust and regulatory clearances, so the risk is timing rather than price. Completion would take the U.K. network past 450 stores, with limited overlap against the H&T footprint.

The succession is the third dated item and the least discussed. On July 22, 2026 the company announced that Rick Wessel will move to executive chairman and stop serving as chief executive on January 1, 2027, with Brent Stuart, president and chief operating officer since September 2016, appointed to succeed him and elected to the board that day. Wessel is expected to remain on the board for at least three years subject to re-election. Compensation terms for both roles were left to be determined and will be disclosed in an amended filing, which is the detail worth checking when it appears.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

U.S. Pawn / Latin America Pawn / U.K. Pawn (reported)

Retail POS Payment Solutions (AFF) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FirstCash second-quarter results release, July 23, 2026 · FY2025 10-K segment results · FirstCash Form 8-K exhibit, June 23, 2026 · FirstCash Form 8-K, July 22, 2026 · FirstCash Form 8-K and results release, July 23, 2026

View the full interactive FCFS report on boothcheck