FB Financial Corp (FBK): what the price requires
At today's price, FB Financial Corp (FBK) is priced for 14.2% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/FBK
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | FBK |
| Company | FB Financial Corp |
| Current price | $59.94/sh |
| Composition | Banking 89% / Mortgage 11% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Price-to-book | 1.56x |
| Return on equity now | 6.3% |
The implied return on book is non-physical at this price-to-book and is suppressed as misleading. The price sits beyond a 12.4% return on equity sustained for 40 years and is not resolvable as a sustainable-ROE point. The rarity read below is the honest signal.
Solve inputs: computed at a 10.5% cost of equity; ROE searched up to the 12.4% ROE ceiling.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~12.2%; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: extreme
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +1.27σ |
| cohort percentile (of 119 peers) | 67 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 63% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.06x | 3 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.37x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.26x | 3 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.19x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $15.72 | 3.81x | yes | TBVPS $30.54 × 0.51x (ROE (TTM) 7.1% / CoE 9.3%, g=4.6% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption), credit 1.51% allowance/loans → ×0.96, NPL 0.75% → ×0.99) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $44.29 | 1.35x | yes | P/E 13.67x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 22x), scenarios: 10.9x / 13.7x / 16.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $29.16 | 2.06x | yes | BV/sh $37.81, ROE (TTM) 7.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $25.43 | 2.36x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $50.49 | 1.19x | yes | Rev $0.6B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.5x / 5.6x / 6.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $47.46 | 1.26x | yes | EPS $2.71, growth 18% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.27 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $48.02 | 1.25x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.71 × BVPS $37.81) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $87.44 | 0.69x | yes | EPS $2.71 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $71.19 | 0.84x | yes | EPS $2.71 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 17.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 26.3x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $29.30 | 2.05x | yes | EPS $2.71 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 2.3% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
FB Financial is valued off price-to-book, trading at about 1.4x book at $53.79, which prices a return on equity toward the elite tier; the reverse-DCF band of about $23 to $50 places the price just above the top, a modest premium to fundamentals.
Q1 2026 was strong: net income of $57.5 million ($1.10 diluted EPS), net interest margin of 3.94%, and loans up to $12.50 billion from $9.77 billion a year earlier (about 28% growth); the earnings-power, relative-multiple, and growth-DCF families support the price while only the asset frame says expensive.
The risk is qualitative and cyclical: the implied return on equity runs above what the bank has recently earned, a large slice of the loan book is newly originated and unseasoned, and the margin was modestly pressured by rate cuts, so a credit or rate turn would pull the valuation toward book.
Bull Case
The single most decisive number for FB Financial is its return on equity, because a bank is worth the return it earns on its capital, and that one figure, if it changed, would flip the whole verdict. At $53.79 (June 27, 2026) the market is paying about 1.4x book, which prices a sustained return on equity at the high end of what regional banks achieve. The bull case is that FB Financial's recent earnings trajectory points the ROE in the right direction, and that the price-to-book premium is the market correctly anticipating a higher, more durable return as the balance sheet scales.
The recent quarter supports that read. First-quarter 2026 net income was $57.5 million, or $1.10 per diluted share, on $146.8 million of net interest income and a net interest margin of 3.94%, which is a solid margin for a regional bank in a rate-cut environment. The growth underneath is real: loans held for investment reached $12.50 billion, up from $9.77 billion a year earlier, and deposits grew to $14.08 billion from $11.20 billion. That is roughly 28% loan growth and 26% deposit growth year over year, the signature of a bank gaining share or integrating an acquisition, and it is the engine that lifts ROE if the new assets earn well.
The valuation frame agrees the bet is reasonable. The earnings-power, relative-multiple, and growth-DCF families all support the price; only the asset-based family says expensive, which is the expected complaint about a bank trading above book. With a healthy net interest margin, strong balance-sheet growth, and stable credit, the case is that FB Financial earns its way into the multiple rather than having to grow into a stretched one.
Bear Case
The honest worry about FB Financial is qualitative before it is numerical: the price is paying for a level of through-cycle profitability that the bank has not consistently demonstrated. A regional bank trading at a premium to book is making a promise about sustained returns on capital, and the gap between that promise and the bank's actual recent earnings on equity is the crux of the bear case. Rapid balance-sheet growth, with loans up from $9.77 billion to $12.50 billion in a year, flatters near-term earnings, but it also means a large slice of the loan book is newly originated and unseasoned. Credit quality looks fine today, as it usually does early in a loan's life; the test comes when those loans age into a less benign environment.
The price-to-fundamentals disconnect shows up in the valuation families. Only the asset-based family flags the stock as expensive, and for a bank the asset frame (price relative to book and to demonstrated return on equity) is not a frame to wave away, because book value is the capital that actually generates the returns. The price embeds a return on equity searched up toward the elite 12.5% tier, while the bank has more recently been earning well below that. The other families reach the price only by crediting the forward growth case; if that growth decelerates or the new loans earn less than underwritten, the asset frame is the one that proves right.
The cyclical and rate exposures complete the picture. Net interest margin was 3.94% but management noted it was modestly pressured by benchmark rate cuts and balance-sheet growth, so further cuts or deposit-cost competition could compress it. A bank's earnings are also a leveraged function of credit costs: a single bad credit cycle can erase several quarters of net income, and the rapid asset growth means there is simply more loan book exposed to that risk. At a 1.4x book multiple, the stock is priced for the benign case to continue; the bear's view is that paying above book for an unseasoned, fast-growing loan book in an uncertain rate environment is paying full price for an outcome that has not yet been proven across a cycle.
Valuation
FB Financial is valued the way a bank should be, off price-to-book rather than an operating multiple, because a bank is worth the return it earns on its capital. At $53.79 the stock trades at about 1.4x book, which prices in a return on equity searched up toward the elite 12.5% tier sustained over time. The inversion reads that as within range against the bank's own record and notes the price-to-book sits in the upper half of the peer group.
The method families line up with that read. The earnings-power, relative-multiple, and growth-DCF families support the price; only the asset-based family says expensive. For a bank trading above book that ordering is expected, but it is not a free pass: the asset frame is the one that keeps the others honest, because the book value is the capital that generates the returns the other frames are projecting forward.
The honest read: this is a reasonably-valued growth-oriented regional bank where the premium to book is the market crediting recent momentum, expanding net interest margin (3.94% in the first quarter), and strong loan and deposit growth. The case works if the rapidly grown balance sheet earns the underwritten return and credit stays clean. The risk is that the implied ROE runs above what the bank has recently delivered, so a deceleration in growth, margin compression from further rate cuts, or normalization in credit costs would pull the valuation back toward the asset frame. The cleaner way to weigh it is against demonstrated return on equity and the seasoning of the new loan book, not the latest quarter's reported earnings alone.
Catalysts
The most recent catalyst was the first-quarter 2026 report. FB Financial posted net income of $57.5 million, or $1.10 per diluted share, with adjusted net income of $58.3 million ($1.12). Net interest income was $146.8 million and the net interest margin was 3.94%, which management described as modestly pressured by benchmark rate cuts and balance-sheet growth but solid for a regional bank (StockTitan).
Balance-sheet growth was the standout. Loans held for investment reached $12.50 billion, up from $9.77 billion a year earlier, and deposits grew to $14.08 billion from $11.20 billion, with management highlighting credit quality and capital strength. That pace of loan and deposit growth is the engine behind the bank's earnings trajectory and the premium-to-book valuation (StockTitan, stockanalysis).
The forward catalysts are the next earnings release, expected around July 13, 2026, with a consensus EPS estimate near $1.16, and the rate path. The questions to watch are whether net interest margin holds as the Federal Reserve adjusts rates, whether the rapidly grown loan book continues to perform on credit, and whether deposit costs stay contained. A margin hold with clean credit would validate the premium valuation; margin compression or rising charge-offs would be the clearest near-term risks (StockTitan, MarketBeat).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Banking (reported)
- NIC (NICOLET BANKSHARES, INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …money market funds and other mutual funds, hedge funds and other financial services companies that serve in our markets. The emergence of non-traditional, disruptive service providers (see Industry Disruption section below) has intensified this competitive environment. In addition, as customer preferences and…
- FY2025 10-K: …the effect of the transaction on the national bank's shareholders, depositors, other creditors, and customers. Under the Bank Merger 8 Act, the OCC is also required to consider other statutory factors, including the effect of a proposed business combination on competition, the financial and managerial resources of…
- DCOM (DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and investments are predictable sources of funds, deposit flows and prepayments on real estate loans and MBS are influenced by interest rates, economic conditions and competition. The Bank is a member of American Financial Exchange ("AFX"), through which it may either borrow or lend funds on an overnight or…
- FY2025 10-K: …in the aggregate may not exceed the bank's unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. With certain exceptions, loans to an executive officer, other than loans for the education of the officer's children and certain loans secured by the officer's residence, may not exceed the greater of $25,000 or 2.5% of the bank's…
- SBCF (Seacoast Banking Corporation of Florida)
- FY2025 10-K: …located in Florida or elsewhere, may acquire a bank located in any other state, subject to certain deposit-percentages, age of bank charter requirements, and other restrictions. The BHC Act requires that a BHC obtain the prior approval of the FRB before (i) acquiring direct or indirect ownership or control of more…
- FY2025 10-K: …the account or transaction requested, and it must notify the appropriate authorities. Concentrations in Lending: In 2006, the federal bank regulatory agencies released guidance on "Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending" (the "Guidance") and advised financial institutions of the risks posed by CRE lending…
- INDB (Independent Bank Corp.)
- FY2025 10-K: …co-operative banks, credit unions, internet banks, as well as other non-bank institutions that offer financial alternatives such as brokerage firms and insurance companies. Competitive factors considered in attracting and retaining deposits include deposit and investment products and their respective rates of return,…
- FY2025 10-K: …is inherent in any lending function. Loans are approved based upon a hierarchy of authority, predicated upon the size of the loan, quality of collateral and perceived level of risk. Levels within the hierarchy of lending authorities range from individual lenders to the Company's Loan Approval Committees. In…
- COLB (COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …banks of a bank holding company are subject to restrictions on extensions of credit to the holding company or its subsidiaries, on investments in securities of the holding company or its subsidiaries and on the use of their securities as collateral for loans to any borrower. These regulations and restrictions may…
- FY2025 10-K: …our strategic branch locations, and the long-standing community presence of our associates, we believe we are well positioned to attract new customers while not only retaining existing customers but also deepening our relationships with them. We focus on balanced, relationship-driven growth in loans, deposits, and…
- FBNC (FIRST BANCORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …to approve mergers and assumptions of deposit liability transactions by member banks, and to prevent capital or surplus diminution in such transactions if the resulting, continuing, or assumed bank is an insured member bank. The Bank is a member of the Federal Reserve, and accordingly the Federal Reserve also…
- FY2025 10-K: …geographic area. Safety and Soundness Standards . Certain non-capital safety and soundness standards also are imposed upon banks. These standards cover, among other things, internal controls, information systems, internal audit systems, loan documentation, credit underwriting, interest rate exposure, asset growth,…
- SSB (SOUTHSTATE BANK CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …in the markets in which we conduct business. In the financial services industry, market demands, technological and regulatory changes and economic pressures have increased competition among banks, as well as other financial institutions. Competition may further intensify as additional companies enter the markets…
- FY2025 10-K: ; the maintenance of required capital and liquidity ratios; the granting of credit under equal and fair conditions; the disclosure of the costs and terms of such credit, requirements to maintain reserves against deposits and loans, limitation on the types of investment that may be made and requirements governing risk…
- HOMB (HOME BANCSHARES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …institutions and credit unions have offices in our primary market areas. These institutions include many of the largest banks operating in these respective states, including some of the largest banks in the country. Many of our competitors serve the same counties we do. Our competitors often have greater 11 Table of…
- FY2025 10-K: …other things, to curb inflation or combat a recession. The monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Board affect the levels of bank loans, investments and deposits through its control over the issuance of United States government securities, its regulation of the discount rate applicable to banks and its influence…
Mortgage (reported)
- RKT (Rocket Companies, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …affect demand for our mortgage services and consequently our origination volume, which could be detrimental to our business. We cannot definitively predict whether the impact of any proposals to move Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac out of conservatorship would require them to increase their fees. 31 Challenges to the…
- FY2025 10-K: Delays in the sale of mortgage loans, loss in confidence in the debt, obligations or in the U.S. government, increased borrowing costs or increased hedge risk also increase our exposure to market risks, which could adversely affect our profitability on sales of loans. Any such delays or failure to sell loans could…
- UWMC (UWM HOLDINGS CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …were sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or were transferred to Ginnie Mae pools in the secondary market, while the remainder primarily include non-agency jumbo loans that are underwritten to the same "Qualified Mortgage" underwriting standards and have a similar risk profile but are sold to third party investors…
- FY2025 10-K: …advises the borrower on loan options, runs the initial credit check, gathers the borrower's information for the loan application and submits the loan application. • Underwrite, Close and Fund . The borrower's loan application is reviewed, the mortgage loan is underwritten, the borrower is approved, the closing is…
- PFSI (PennyMac Financial Services, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: $ 20,591 January 7, 2026 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. $ 17,918 January 23, 2026 Santander US Capital Markets LLC $ 13,956 January 15, 2026 Mortgage Loan Participation Purchase and Sale Agreements Two of the borrowing facilities secured by mortgage loans held for sale are in the form of mortgage loan…
- FY2025 10-K: …of certain settlement services; ● the Truth in Lending Act, and Regulation Z thereunder, which require certain disclosures to mortgagors regarding the terms of their mortgage loans, notices of sale, assignments or transfers of ownership of mortgage loans, new servicing rules involving payment processing, and…
- WD (Walker & Dunlop, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …programs of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac" and, together with Fannie Mae, the "GSEs"), the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), and the Federal Housing Administration, a division of the U.S. Department of Housing…
- FY2025 10-K: …The existence of the fraud has been revealed following the prolonged period of market stress brought on by rapidly rising interest rates, higher inflation and stagnant rent growth. Federal prosecutors and regulators have ramped up enforcement and scrutiny of borrower misrepresentation and loan fraud over the last two…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.