EZCORP, INC. (EZPW): what the price requires
At today's price, EZCORP, INC. (EZPW) is priced for +2.0% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EZPW
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | EZPW |
| Company | EZCORP, INC. |
| Current price | $32.73/sh |
| Composition | Merchandise sales 55% / Jewelry scrap sales 8% / Pawn service charges 37% / Other revenues 0% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Implied growth | 2.0% |
| Multiple paid | 21x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~8.2pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~18.2%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.18σ |
| cohort percentile (of 212 peers) | 62 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.46x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.80x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.91x | 5 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.60x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $118.43 | 0.28x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 23% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.3%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $54.72 | 0.60x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 13.1x / 15.1x / 17.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $36.08 | 0.91x | yes | P/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.1x / 20.0x / 23.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $19.00 | 1.72x | yes | BV/sh $13.43, ROE (TTM) 13.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $22.41 | 1.46x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $39.32 | 0.83x | yes | Rev $1.5B, growth 23% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $64.75 | 0.51x | yes | EPS $1.85, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.53 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $8.74 | 3.74x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.11B × (1−24%) / WACC 7.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $23.14 | 1.41x | yes | BV $13.43 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.5%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $23.64 | 1.38x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.85 × BVPS $13.43) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $29.95 | 1.09x | yes | EBITDA $0.21B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $11.67 | 2.80x | yes | FCF $131.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $9.59 | 3.41x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.12B (FCF $0.13B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $59.69 | 0.55x | yes | EPS $1.85 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $6.01 | 5.45x | yes | BV $13.43 × (ROIC 3.3% / WACC 7.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $26.56 | 1.23x | yes | Revenue $1.48B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $69.38 | 0.47x | yes | EPS $1.85 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $20.00 | 1.64x | yes | EPS $1.85 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $166.1m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 1.47x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 1.11x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 11.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
At $31.71 the price implies only about 0.8% company-wide operating-income growth per year for five years, a near-zero bar, while the company just reported second-quarter fiscal 2026 net income up 93% and pawn loans outstanding up 33%; the central tension is a low-growth price on a high-growth current cycle.
The risks are cyclical and structural: pawn demand is countercyclical, so today's record loan book may reflect peak rather than sustainable earnings; share count is rising at about 11% a year, diluting per-share gains; and the two operating-income bases diverge by more than 20%, so the implied multiple depends on which figure you trust.
Bull Case
Here is the number that does not fit the obvious story. At $31.71 the price embeds company-wide operating-income growth of only about 0.8% a year for five years, while EZCORP just reported second-quarter fiscal 2026 net income up 93% to $49.1 million, total revenues up 46% to $446.9 million, and pawn loans outstanding up 33% to $349.4 million. The market is pricing in almost no forward growth from a pawn lender that is, by its own reporting, growing faster than it has in years. That gap between what the price assumes and what the business is delivering is the whole bull case.
EZCORP makes money two ways, and both are working. It earns pawn service charges on collateralized short-term loans, and it sells merchandise (much of it forfeited collateral) at a retail margin. When demand for immediate cash rises, the loan book grows, and a bigger loan book seeds a bigger inventory of goods to sell later. The 33% jump in pawn loans outstanding is the leading indicator; the revenue and merchandise sales follow it with a lag. CEO commentary framed the quarter as record revenue and pawn loans on sustained demand for immediate cash and affordable secondhand goods, which is exactly the flywheel the model is built on.
The sector backdrop confirms it is not company-specific. Larger peer FirstCash reported first-quarter consolidated revenue above $1 billion (up 26%), EPS up 30%, and same-store pawn receivables up an unprecedented 19% in the U.S. and roughly 30% in Latin America and the U.K. (accession 0000840489-25-000032). Two operators of different sizes posting record receivable growth at the same time points to a genuine demand cycle, not a one-off. With the price implying near-zero growth, EZCORP only needs the cycle to keep going for the stock to look cheap; it does not need a heroic outcome.
Bear Case
The case against EZCORP starts with where the cycle sits. Pawn demand is countercyclical: loan books swell when households are squeezed and cash is scarce. The record receivable growth EZCORP and the broader pawn sector are posting is the signature of consumers reaching for short-term collateralized credit, and FirstCash's filing language attributes its own forfeited-inventory build to rising pawn loan balances over the past several quarters (accession 0000840489-25-000032). That is great for current revenue, but it raises the question of whether today's earnings are peak earnings rather than sustainable ones. If household cash flow normalizes, the demand that drove the loan book higher can recede just as quickly.
The valuation families split on exactly this point. The price is reached by the relative-multiple and growth-DCF methods, with relative valuation near $36 and DCF exit-multiple near $54, but the earnings-power family says expensive: earnings power value lands near $8.84, far below the price, because it capitalizes normalized profit with no growth credit. When a stock trades well above its zero-growth earnings floor, the buyer is paying for the cycle to persist. The inversion reads the priced-in growth as within range only because the implied rate is so low; the risk is that even a low bar gets missed if the current demand surge proves to be the high-water mark.
There are two structural cautions on top of the cycle. Share count has been rising, with a share-count CAGR around 11%, so per-share growth lags the headline totals and dilution quietly works against holders. And the operating-income measures disagree: the EDGAR trailing figure reads about $201 million while the record basis reads about $160 million, a divergence above 20%, which means the multiple you think you are paying depends on which base you trust. Net debt near $166 million and interest coverage around 6x leave the balance sheet workable, but a pawn lender carrying leverage into a demand downturn is the classic way a cyclical earnings peak turns into a derating.
Valuation
EZCORP is priced at about 21x company-wide operating income, which inverts to roughly 0.8% operating-income growth a year for five years at a 7% cost of capital. That is a very low bar, and the model reads it as within range. The implication is straightforward: at this price you are not paying for growth, you are paying for the current earnings level to roughly hold.
The method families line up behind that read with one dissent. The relative-multiple and growth families reach or exceed the price: relative valuation near $36, DCF exit-multiple near $54, and the discounted future market-cap method near $38. The asset family is mixed, with residual income near $23 and two-stage excess return near $22. The lone family flagging the stock as expensive is earnings power value at about $8.84, which strips out all growth and capitalizes a normalized profit; that gap is the market's tax for the cyclicality of pawn earnings.
Net the picture is a cheap-looking cyclical. The price implies almost no growth from a business currently posting record loan-book and earnings growth, and most valuation methods sit above the price. The honest caveats are the ones that keep it from being a layup: the earnings may be near a cycle peak, the share count is climbing at a double-digit rate which dilutes per-share value, and the two operating-income bases diverge by more than 20% (EDGAR about $201 million, record basis about $160 million), so the exact multiple depends on which you anchor to. The bet is that the demand cycle has more room to run than a near-zero-growth price assumes.
Catalysts
The headline catalyst is the recent earnings run. EZCORP reported second-quarter fiscal 2026 results (period ended March 31, 2026) with net income up 93% to $49.1 million, total revenues up 46% to $446.9 million, pawn loans outstanding up 33% to $349.4 million, and adjusted EBITDA up 76% to $76.9 million; the prior quarter had already shown net income up 43% to $44.3 million. Management framed the year as an exceptional start driven by sustained demand for immediate cash and affordable secondhand goods (StockTitan, StreetwiseReports).
The sector read-through is a second catalyst. Larger peer FirstCash reported first-quarter consolidated revenue above $1 billion (up 26%), EPS up 30%, and same-store pawn receivables up about 19% in the U.S., 30% in Latin America, and 29% in the U.K. The two operators posting record receivable growth at once suggests a broad demand cycle that supports EZCORP's loan-book trajectory rather than a single-company anomaly (StreetwiseReports, FirstCash 8-K).
The forward catalyst to watch is the next quarterly print, where the question is whether pawn loans outstanding keep growing at a double-digit pace and whether merchandise sales convert the larger loan book into retail margin. A continuation of the receivable trend would validate the bull thesis against a near-zero-growth price; a flattening of same-store receivable growth, or a normalization in consumer cash flow that cools pawn demand, would be the clearest sign the cycle is turning (StockTitan).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
U.S. Pawn / Latin America Pawn / Other Investments (reported)
- FCFS (FirstCash Holdings, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …incurred by AFF. Administrative expenses and amortization expense of acquired intangible assets are not included in the segment pre-tax operating income. Year Ended December 31, 2025 U.S. Pawn Latin America Pawn U.K. Pawn (1) Retail POS Payment Solutions Corporate/ Intersegment Eliminations Consolidated Revenue:…
- FY2025 10-K: As part of the settlement, the Company agreed to offer a new pawn lending product for covered members of the U.S. military and their covered dependents. Additionally, the Company will pay consumer redress in fees or principal returned to affected customers, which is estimated by the Company to be no more than $ 7.0…
- WINA (WINMARK CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: 25-09-28 2025-12-27 0000908315 2025-06-28 0000908315 2026-02-23 0000908315 2024-12-29 2025-12-27 xbrli:shares iso4217:USD iso4217:USD xbrli:shares xbrli:pure wina:item wina:customer wina:segment wina:store UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-K (Mark one) ☒ ANNUAL REPORT…
- FY2025 10-K: …exhibit to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 27, 2009. (5) Incorporated by reference to the specified exhibit to the Current Report on Form 8-K filed on October 2, 2008. (6) Incorporated by reference to the specified exhibit to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended…
- SVV (Savers Value Village, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to support their community-focused missions. We strive to positively impact our team members, customers and the communities in which we live and do business. Our leading "people" metric across our organization is team member engagement, which is scored across various areas, including overall job satisfaction, whether…
- FY2025 10-K: …and an exciting, engaging treasure hunt experience in a contemporary in-store atmosphere, which underpins strong customer loyalty. Our most engaged customers are members of our Super Savers Club ® loyalty program. As of January 3, 2026, we have 6.1 million active members enrolled in our U.S. and Canadian loyalty…
- REAL (TheRealReal, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Security Agreement dated as of July 18, 2016 by and between The RealReal, Inc. and Pacific Western Bank. S-1 333-231891 10.8 May 31, 2019 10.8# Sixth Amendment to Loan and Security Agreement dated as of September 16, 2016 by and between The RealReal, Inc. and Pacific Western Bank. S-1 333-231891 10.9 May 31, 2019…
- FY2025 10-K: …in Arizona and New Jersey. The lease to our Arizona facility expires in 2031, and leases to our three New Jersey facilities each expire in 2029, all with a right of renewal. We lease additional offices located in Los Angeles and New York City, and we have leased several retail spaces and luxury consignment offices in…
- GME (GameStop Corp.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and pedestrian areas. These locations provide easy access and high frequency of visits and, in the case of strip centers and high-traffic pedestrian stores, high visibility. We target strip centers that are conveniently located, have a mass merchant or supermarket anchor tenant and have a high volume of customers. As…
- FY2025 10-K: …pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Furnished herewith. 97.1 GameStop Corp. Dodd-Frank Clawback Policy Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 3, 2024 March 26, 2024…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.