EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC. (EXR): what the price requires
At today's price, EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC. (EXR) is priced for +5.5% FFO growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EXR
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | EXR |
| Company | EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC. |
| Current price | $145.01/sh |
| Composition | Self-Storage Operations 89% / Tenant Reinsurance 11% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | reit |
| Implied FFO growth | 5.5% |
| Price-to-FFO | 18.1x |
| FFO yield | 5.5% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied growth ~4.1pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.44σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 71 |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 68% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 3.74x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.31x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.45x | 6 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.24x | 5 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=20)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $117.35 | 1.24x | yes | FCF base $1.4B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.1%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $133.92 | 1.08x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 17.3x / 19.3x / 21.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $215.56 | 0.67x | yes | P/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 29.3x / 35.0x / 40.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $254.52 | 0.57x | yes | DPS $6.22, g=6.6% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $115.15 | 1.26x | yes | Stage 1: 4% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $46.33 | 3.13x | yes | BV/sh $64.51, ROE (TTM) 6.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $38.75 | 3.74x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $92.56 | 1.57x | yes | Rev $3.4B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 6.7x / 8.0x / 9.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $91.92 | 1.58x | yes | FFO/share $7.66, growth 4% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median), PEG=8.18 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $13.86 | 10.46x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.21B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $37.70 | 3.85x | yes | BV $64.51 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 6.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 4.3%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $105.44 | 1.38x | yes | √(22.5 × FFO/share $7.66 × BVPS $64.51) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $151.82 | 0.96x | yes | EBITDA $2.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $29.80 | 4.87x | yes | FCF $1420.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $107.70 | 1.35x | yes | FFO/share $7.66 × (8.5 + 2×4.1%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $10.06 | 14.41x | yes | BV $64.51 × (ROIC 1.3% / WACC 8.1%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $92.96 | 1.56x | yes | Revenue $3.41B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $47.55 | 3.05x | yes | FFO/share $7.66 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 4.1% (input: historical FFO/share growth, 10y median)) → PE 6.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $82.81 | 1.75x | yes | FFO/share $7.66 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | $108.59 | 1.34x | yes | FFO/share $7.66 × 14.2x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $1.69B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 220M |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt (REIT basis) | $9.8b |
| Net debt / FFO | 5.81x |
| Funds from operations (trailing) | $1.7b |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 11.7% |
| Burning cash | no |
REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other. Interest expense is not separately reported in the cached statements, so fixed-charge coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Extra Space Storage is the largest self-storage REIT, combining owned facilities with a large third-party management platform and a tenant-reinsurance arm, where "A wholly-owned, consolidated subsidiary fully reinsures such policies and thereby assumes all risk of losses" on tenant insurance.
- The single most decisive metric is same-store revenue growth, which reaccelerated to 1.7% in the first quarter from 0.4% the prior quarter; that trajectory, more than any other number, determines whether the REIT re-rates or stalls.
- The biggest specific risk is the price against the methods: at roughly 19 times adjusted funds from operations, the valuation sits in the upper half of the REIT group, with only the growth lens reaching it.
Bull Case
The number that matters most for Extra Space just turned the right way. Self-storage is a REIT whose value is set by same-store revenue growth, and after a soft stretch, first-quarter same-store revenue accelerated to 1.7% year over year from 0.4% the prior quarter, a 130-basis-point sequential improvement, while same-store net operating income rose 1.2% and occupancy held at a healthy 93.0%. For a storage REIT, an inflection in same-store revenue is the leading indicator of FFO growth, and it lifted core FFO to $2.04 per share, up 2%. The acceleration is the evidence the bull case needs that the post-pandemic normalization in storage demand is bottoming.
The franchise underneath is a genuine scale moat in a consolidating industry. Extra Space is the largest operator, and the filing lays out why scale wins in storage: the advantages "available to small operators for acquisitions and expansions, internet marketing, call centers, and the potential for savings through economies of scale are factors that are leading to consolidation in the industry." Extra Space monetizes that scale twice, once through its owned portfolio and again through a large third-party management platform that earns fees on stores it does not own, plus a tenant-reinsurance business that captures the insurance attach on its tenant base. That asset-light fee layer is a higher-return complement to the real estate, and it grows as the platform adds managed stores.
Capital discipline rounds out the case. Management is planning only about $200 million of acquisitions and explicitly avoiding low initial-cap-rate deals in favor of asset-light joint-venture structures, which is a REIT refusing to overpay for growth at the top of the cycle. The dividend, around $6.22 per share, is well covered by FFO near $7.66, leaving room for both the payout and reinvestment. The bull case is a best-in-class operator with a fee-income kicker and a reaccelerating same-store trend, paying a covered dividend while it waits for storage demand to firm.
Bear Case
The qualitative problem comes before any ratio: Extra Space is a slow-growth real estate business priced like a compounder, and the gap is wide. Same-store revenue is growing in the low single digits, occupancy is high but not rising much, and full-year same-store revenue guidance spans from slightly negative to modestly positive. That is a mature, mid-cycle storage portfolio, yet the market values it at roughly 19 times adjusted funds from operations, in the upper half of the REIT group. The methods register the disconnect: the asset-based and earnings-power lenses both read the price as expensive, and only the forward-growth method reaches it. When the cheap methods and the static methods agree the price is full, the entire case rests on the reacceleration continuing.
The structural risk in storage is that the moat is real but shallow at the local level. Storage demand is driven by life events, moves, downsizing, life changes, and supply can be added relatively quickly in a strong market because a storage facility is cheaper and faster to build than most real estate. The filing flags the re-letting risk directly: "Any delay in re-letting units as vacancies arise would reduce our revenues and harm our operating results," and "lower than expected rental rates upon re-letting could adversely affect our revenues." A storage REIT lives on its ability to push rates on existing tenants while keeping occupancy high, and that pricing power softens whenever new supply arrives or the consumer pulls back on moves.
The valuation also embeds an interest-rate assumption that cuts against it. The price implies about 6.1% growth in adjusted funds from operations a year, and only about two-thirds of REITs growing at that pace sustained it for five years. As an income vehicle, Extra Space competes with bond yields; if rates stay higher for longer, the relative appeal of a roughly 4% dividend yield with low-single-digit growth diminishes, and the upper-half multiple is the part most exposed to compression. The leverage picture is also less transparent here, as the filing notes that REIT debt is tagged outside the standard corporate structure, so a clean coverage ratio cannot be computed from the cached statements. The bear case is not that Extra Space is a poor operator; it is the best in its category. It is that the best operator in a slow-growth, supply-elastic, rate-sensitive property type is priced for growth the fundamentals are only just beginning to deliver.
Valuation
A storage REIT is valued on its adjusted funds from operations, not an operating multiple, and at about 19 times that measure Extra Space implies roughly 6.1% annual growth in adjusted funds from operations. That pace is within what the company has delivered historically, but the multiple sits in the upper half of the REIT group, and only about two-thirds of REITs growing at that rate sustained it for five years. The premium is a quality premium, the market paying for the largest, best-run storage operator.
The methods divide the way they do for a high-quality REIT. The asset-based and earnings-power families read the price as expensive, which is expected for a REIT because book value is depreciated and trailing earnings are gutted by that depreciation, so those lenses systematically understate a property company. Only the forward-growth family reaches the price, which is the durability premium named honestly: the spread between the growth method and the static methods IS the premium the market pays for Extra Space's scale and its reaccelerating same-store trend. A funds-from-operations multiple comparison places the stock above the route-cohort median, consistent with a market awarding it a premium for being the category leader.
For a REIT, solvency is read against funds from operations and the dividend, and here the read is mixed by disclosure rather than by health. The dividend near $6.22 is covered by FFO near $7.66, so the payout is safe with room to spare. But the filing is candid that net debt cannot be cleanly resolved from the corporate tags because REIT and mortgage debt are tagged outside the standard ladder, so a precise leverage ratio is withheld rather than estimated from incomplete data. What can be said is that the dividend is covered and the company is not stretching for growth. The price reflects a premium for the best operator in the category, where the buyer is underwriting the same-store reacceleration continuing and rates not staying high enough to compress an upper-half multiple.
Catalysts
The first quarter of 2026 delivered the reacceleration the storage thesis needed. Extra Space reported core FFO of $2.04 per share, up 2%, with same-store revenue growth of 1.7%, up sharply from 0.4% the prior quarter, same-store NOI up 1.2%, and occupancy of 93.0%. EPS of $1.14 and revenue of $856 million both beat expectations. Management maintained full-year core FFO guidance of $8.05 to $8.35 and a same-store revenue range of negative 0.5% to positive 1.5%, signaling stable expectations.
On capital deployment, the company guided to about $200 million of acquisitions while favoring asset-light joint ventures and avoiding low-cap-rate deals, a disciplined stance at this point in the cycle. Analyst sentiment is constructive but measured, with a Buy consensus and an average target near $153.6; Truist raised its target to $148 with a Hold rating, and BofA upgraded the stock to Neutral with a $156 target. The catalysts that matter from here are the same-store revenue trajectory, whether the sequential acceleration holds, the path of storage demand and new supply, and the direction of interest rates, all of which feed the FFO growth that the upper-half multiple depends on.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Self-Storage Operations / Tenant Reinsurance (reported)
- EGP (EASTGROUP PROPERTIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AMH (American Homes 4 Rent)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MAA (MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMMUNITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KIM (KIMCO REALTY CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- REG (REGENCY CENTERS CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NNN (NNN REIT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BXP (BXP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CDP (COPT DEFENSE PROPERTIES)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 2026 results, April 2026 · analyst notes, 2026