EAGLE MATERIALS INC. (EXP): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $197.56, EAGLE MATERIALS INC. (EXP) is priced for -4.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EXP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerEXP
CompanyEAGLE MATERIALS INC.
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$197.56/sh
CompositionCement 50% / Concrete and Aggregates 12% / Gypsum Wallboard 33% / Recycled Paperboard 5%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Implied growth-4.9%
Multiple paid10x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.88σ
cohort percentile (of 78 peers)10

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.16x4expensive
Earnings1.44x3expensive
Relative0
Growth1.16x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$60.403.27xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 2% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.6%, WACC 7.3%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$204.150.97xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 183.0x / 185.0x / 187.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 26.4x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$141.881.39xyesBV/sh $48.47, ROE (TTM) 27.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$246.410.80xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$170.931.16xyesRev $2.3B, growth 2% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.2x / 2.6x / 3.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$151.211.31xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.48B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$212.750.93xyesBV $48.47 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 27.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$117.641.68xyes√(22.5 × EPS $12.69 × BVPS $48.47) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.04B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$9.1821.52xyesFCF $170.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$1.73114.20xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.15B (FCF $0.17B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$10.6418.57xyesEPS $12.69 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.32B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$137.191.44xyesEPS $12.69 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Cementoperatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Concrete and Aggregatesoperatingenterprise$283.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Gypsum Wallboardoperatingenterprise$764.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Recycled Paperboardoperatingenterprise$116.9mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.5b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.51x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.98x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-5.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Run Eagle Materials through the standard cash-flow lens and fiscal 2026 looks like a poor year. Operations threw off 614.2 million dollars; 416.7 million went straight back out to contractors, more than double the prior year's outlay. What remains is a thin residue, and any method that capitalises that residue will produce an unflattering answer. The method is not wrong. It is simply reading a construction site as though it were an operating business.

What the money is buying is described precisely, with dates and quantities. At the Mountain Cement facility in Laramie, Wyoming, the filing says the finished plant's "manufacturing capacity will increase by nearly 50% to approximately 1.2 million tons" of cement, and that "manufacturing costs will be reduced by approximately 25%", with start-up expected in late calendar 2026. At Duke, Oklahoma, a 330 million dollar programme lifts gypsum wallboard capacity by a quarter, to 1.5 billion square feet, finishing in the second half of calendar 2027. More capacity at lower unit cost, in a business whose economics turn on being the low-cost producer in a freight-limited regional market, is about as legible as a growth plan gets.

Meanwhile the business that already exists converts sales into profit at rates its usual comparisons do not reach. Gypsum wallboard produced 286.8 million dollars of segment operating earnings on 764.5 million of segment revenue in fiscal 2026, a margin above 37%. ARMSTRONG WORLD (AWI) runs a 25.9% operating margin and FORTUNE BRANDS (FBIN) 10.8%. Cement earned 328.3 million on 1.30 billion of segment revenue, better than 25%, against MARTIN MARIETTA (MLM) at 22.1% and VULCAN MATERIALS (VMC) at 20.6%. Even recycled paperboard, the smallest line, turned 199.2 million of revenue into 44.5 million of operating earnings, roughly double the margin PACKAGING CORP (PKG) reports at 11.7% and triple GRAPHIC PACKAGING (GPK) at 7.0%.

Capital return has been running alongside the building programme rather than instead of it. The diluted share count in the filed statements has fallen from 40.93 million in fiscal 2022 to 32.19 million in fiscal 2026, a fifth of the company retired in four fiscal years. Owning a fifth more of a business whose capacity is about to rise is the compounding that does not depend on a forecast.

On demand, the company is not making an aggressive claim. Its own read is that "The macroeconomic environment continues to be constructive for our products" and that cement demand should "remain steady in the near term supported by bipartisan federal, state, and local support for public infrastructure projects". Steady is enough. The bull case here does not need a construction boom; it needs the existing volumes to hold while a modernized plant takes roughly a quarter off the cost of making the product.

Bear Case

The methods disagree here in a way that is itself the argument. What the company owns, and what a peer multiple would pay for it, both land around today's price. The approach that lands well below is the one that credits no future growth at all and simply capitalises the earnings stream as it stands. For a cyclical building-materials producer whose segment earnings have fallen in each of the last two fiscal years, the conservative approach has the better claim to honesty, because it is the only one not quietly assuming the cycle turns back.

The trend is not subtle. Segment operating earnings were 716.9 million dollars in fiscal 2024, 699.5 million in fiscal 2025 and 672.5 million in fiscal 2026. Gypsum wallboard, the highest-margin line, did most of the damage in the latest year, dropping to 286.8 million dollars from 350.8 million. Corporate general and administrative expense went the other way, from 73.9 million to 89.2 million. Earnings before income taxes fell to 542.0 million dollars from 591.5 million. None of that is a crisis. All of it is the wrong direction for a company committing record sums to new capacity.

That commitment is the second problem, and the filing supplies the frame for it without meaning to. "Demand for our products is generally cyclical and seasonal, depending on economic and geographic conditions." The same document warns that prices are "subject to material changes in response to relatively minor fluctuations in supply and demand, general economic conditions, and other market conditions beyond our control", and names "Increases in the production capacity of industry participants for products such as gypsum wallboard or cement" as one of the things that moves them. Eagle is one of those industry participants, and it is adding a quarter more wallboard capacity into a wallboard market whose profit contribution just fell by 18%. Regional pricing is the mechanism by which that could go wrong, and it is not a mechanism Eagle controls.

The balance sheet is where the two threads meet. Interest expense, net rose about 15% in fiscal 2026, to 46.5 million dollars, driven mainly by 5.000% senior unsecured notes due May 2036 issued in November 2025 and a larger term loan. Borrowings stood at 1.78 billion dollars against 297.9 million of liquid assets at the fiscal year end. That is comfortable at present earnings and would stay comfortable through an ordinary downturn. It is less comfortable if the wallboard slide continues while the Oklahoma project still has more than a year of spending ahead of it, because the spending is contracted and the earnings are not.

Which leaves the requirement embedded in today's price. Value the enterprise against the operating profit the fiscal 2026 statements actually show, after corporate overhead, and the price is not pricing a decline into the business. It is paying for the current level of earnings to hold and then improve, at a moment when the reported direction has been down for two consecutive years and the improvement depends on two plants that are not yet running. The bear case is not that Eagle is a poor business. It is that a good cyclical business, priced for the recovery leg, offers no discount for arriving at the wrong point in the cycle.

Valuation

Begin with what the buyer is capitalising. Eagle's four segments produced 672.5 million dollars of operating earnings in fiscal 2026; corporate overhead of 89.2 million comes out of that, leaving operating profit of 583.4 million before interest and tax. The whole enterprise, equity plus borrowings less liquid assets, is being valued at roughly fourteen times that figure. For a producer of cement and wallboard, whose earnings swing with construction cycles, that is a price paid for the current earnings level to persist rather than for it to be discounted.

The methods split along a clean line. Book value plus profitability, peer multiples, and the forward cash-flow approaches all land at or above the current quote, which is why this reads as an asset-supported name rather than a growth bet. The approach that lands well beneath it is the one that credits no growth whatever and capitalises today's earnings stream in perpetuity. That single disagreement is the whole valuation question: the price is defensible if the current earnings level is a fair representation of the business, and stretched if fiscal 2026 sits above what the cycle delivers on average.

The cohort does not resolve it, but it does frame it. MARTIN MARIETTA (MLM) grew revenue 10.1% at a 22.1% operating margin; VULCAN MATERIALS (VMC) grew 7.4% at 20.6%; UNITED STATES LIME (USLM) grew 9.5% at 41.6%. Eagle's cement line earns better than 25% and its wallboard line better than 37%, so the margin comparison flatters it. The growth comparison does the opposite: consolidated revenue moved from 2.26 billion dollars to 2.31 billion between fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2026, roughly 2%, while the aggregates majors grew several times faster. A buyer is paying a mid-cohort valuation for above-cohort margins and below-cohort growth.

One number explains most of the cash-flow disagreement. Capital spending was 416.7 million dollars in fiscal 2026 against 195.3 million the year before and 120.3 million the year before that. Depreciation, depletion and amortisation ran 164.7 million. Spending two and a half times the depreciation charge is what expansion looks like on a cash-flow statement, and it is why methods anchored on free cash flow read this business as substantially weaker than the earnings statement does. Neither reading is wrong; they are measuring different years.

Solvency is not the constraint. Borrowings stood at 1.78 billion dollars against 297.9 million of liquid assets, and interest expense of 46.5 million is covered better than twelve times over by fiscal 2026 operating profit. The company generates rather than consumes cash. What the balance sheet cannot do is shorten the wait: the Oklahoma project runs into the second half of calendar 2027, and until both plants are running, the earnings the price is capitalising are the earnings the current asset base can produce.

Catalysts

The first quarter of fiscal 2027 reports on July 29, 2026, a date the company confirmed in a scheduling release on July 15, 2026. The quarter it follows was better than the street expected: fourth-quarter earnings of 1.91 dollars a share against a fourth-quarter consensus near 1.54 dollars, reported May 19, 2026. What the July print should show for the first time is a full quarter of the seasonally strong spring build, set against wallboard comparisons that have been falling.

Two brokers moved on the same day and arrived at the same place from opposite directions. On July 8, 2026 Wells Fargo cut its target to 240 dollars from 246 while keeping an Overweight rating, and Citi raised its target to 240 dollars from 217 while keeping a Neutral one. Both sit above the current quote, and the split in rating with no split in number is a reasonable summary of where the debate stands: nobody disputes the asset quality, and the disagreement is entirely about what the cycle does next.

The operational milestones matter more than either. Start-up of the modernized Laramie cement plant is expected in late calendar 2026, which would put the first meaningful contribution into the fiscal year ending March 2027. The Oklahoma wallboard expansion runs until the second half of calendar 2027, so capital spending stays elevated through the intervening quarters. Between now and then, the reported numbers will keep showing the cost of the build without the output from it, and that gap is the thing most likely to be misread.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Cement (reported)

Concrete and Aggregates (reported)

Gypsum Wallboard (reported)

Recycled Paperboard (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Eagle Materials fiscal 2026 annual report · Eagle Materials annual reports · Eagle Materials earnings scheduling release, July 15, 2026 · Eagle Materials fourth-quarter fiscal 2026 results, May 19, 2026 · broker research notes, July 8, 2026

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