ENDEAVOUR SILVER CORP. (EXK): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $8.77, ENDEAVOUR SILVER CORP. (EXK) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~24.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EXK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerEXK
CompanyENDEAVOUR SILVER CORP.
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$8.77/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)14.4%
Operating margin today7.6%
Margin expansion (value-band)+6.8pp
Must persist for24.3y
Multiple paid59x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 14.3% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~3.5 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~11.1 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: elevated

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.46σ
sustained it ~10 years at this level15%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset4.41x3expensive
Earnings—0—
Relative3.27x2expensive
Growth—0—

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$5.711.54xnoReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.1B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00—noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$2.673.28xyesP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 1.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowth——no—
Two-Stage DDMGrowth——no—
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$2.213.97xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $2.21, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$1.994.41xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $2.21, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$7.901.11xnoRev $0.5B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.7x / 4.9x / 5.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00—noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowth——no—
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.05175.40xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset——no—
Graham NumberAsset——no—
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$2.693.26xyesEBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings——no—
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings——no—
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings——no—
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.008.77xyesBV $2.21 × (ROIC 3.8% / WACC 8.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$2.673.28xnoRevenue $0.47B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative——no—
Earnings YieldEarnings——no—
Funds From Operations MultipleRelative——no—
Clinical Phase NPVGrowth——no—
MertonAsset——no—
V5 Mechanical———no—

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$194.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-6.91x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-5.46x (net cash)
Interest coverage2.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)14.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the financing, because in mining that is what decides whether a company survives long enough to see its own thesis through. On December 4, 2025 Endeavour closed a 350 million dollar convertible senior notes offering and used the proceeds to repay the majority of its third-party borrowings. It ended that year holding 215.4 million dollars in the bank, and by March 31, 2026 that had grown to 231.8 million dollars. In January it closed the sale of the Bolañitos mine to Guanajuato Silver for 30 million dollars in cash, 10 million dollars in shares and up to 10 million dollars of contingent payments, recording a gain of 35.6 million dollars. A junior miner that finishes a major build with more money than it began with, and without a rescue share issue at the bottom of the cycle, has already done the part that kills most of them.

What that financing bought is now producing. Terronera reached commercial production on October 1, 2025, and in its first full quarter as a going concern it contributed 38.4 million dollars of operating earnings. More useful than the earnings is the cost: Terronera's all-in sustaining cost was 22.31 dollars per ounce in the first quarter of 2026, against a consolidated 37.03 and 48.47 at the older Guanaceví mine. A new mine that sits well below the company average pulls the whole cost curve down as it takes a larger share of output, and that is arithmetic rather than hope.

The Peruvian side is doing something similar on volume. The plant expansion at Kolpa was largely commissioned at the end of the first quarter, and second-quarter throughput reached 233,408 tonnes, a substantial step up, lifting silver production 19% above the first quarter and silver equivalent output 26%. Kolpa contributed 23.0 million dollars of operating earnings in the March quarter. Two assets improving at once is more than most companies this size manage in a decade.

The consolidated result reflects it. Revenue in the first quarter of 2026 was 209.7 million dollars against 63.5 million a year earlier, mine operating earnings were 93.5 million dollars against 12.8 million, and the company reported net earnings of 64.9 million dollars, or 0.23 dollars a share basic, against a loss of 0.13 dollars a share in the comparable quarter. For the full year 2025, silver equivalent production reached 11.2 million ounces, a 48% increase, and revenue from operations rose 99%.

Behind the operating story sits the reason silver is worth owning at all. HL's 10-K makes the demand argument better than a summary could: "Industrial demand for silver is closely linked to world Gross Domestic Product growth and industrial fabrication levels, as it is difficult to substitute for silver in industrial fabrication." HL itself is running a 43.6% operating margin on revenue of 1.57 billion dollars with revenue up 66.3%, so the whole complex is in the same upswing. Endeavour's particular version of it adds exploration optionality on top: drilling at Terronera and the adjacent La Luz system returned intervals including 1,271 grams per tonne silver over 0.94 metres and 282 grams per tonne silver with 1.80 grams per tonne gold over 8.11 metres, in the first campaign on that property since 2020.

Bear Case

Nothing about the ore body changed in the last twelve months. The rock is the same rock, the mines are the same mines, the crews are the same crews. What changed is that the price Endeavour received for its silver went from about 32 dollars an ounce in the first quarter of 2025 to about 86 dollars an ounce in the first quarter of 2026. Every improvement below that line follows from a price the company neither sets nor forecasts. Owning this equity is, in the main, a leveraged way of holding a view on the silver price, and it should be judged as one.

The disconnect between that price and the reported fundamentals is wide. Every family of standard valuation method lands below where the stock trades, several of them at a small fraction of it, and the reason is not mysterious: the trailing year they are anchored on produced a net loss of 119.1 million dollars and a basic loss of 0.42 dollars a share. Shareholders' equity was 579.1 million dollars at the end of 2025 against a market value several times that. Paying a large premium to book for a mining company is a statement that the metal in the ground is worth far more than the cost of finding and building it. That statement is true at some silver prices and false at others.

The equity itself has been growing, which dilutes whatever is true. Weighted average shares outstanding rose from 242.2 million in 2024 to 283.1 million in 2025, an increase of 17% in a single year. On top of that sits 231.2 million dollars of convertible senior notes, which by construction turn into more shares if the equity performs. The bull case and the dilution are the same event.

Then there are the positions that move against the company exactly when a holder expects to be paid. At December 31, 2025 the balance sheet carried 94.1 million dollars of current derivative liabilities and 36.2 million dollars of non-current derivative liabilities, alongside a copper stream obligation to Versamet split 7.7 million current and 37.0 million non-current. In the March 2026 quarter a loss on derivative contract revaluations of 24.2 million dollars passed through pre-tax earnings. Rising metal prices are supposed to be good news. Part of the balance sheet disagrees.

Costs are climbing with the price, too, which is the oldest pattern in mining. All-in sustaining cost per ounce went from 23.88 dollars in 2024 to 31.52 in 2025 and 37.03 in the first quarter of 2026, with the company attributing part of the rise to royalties, third-party material costs and special mining duties that scale with the metal price itself. Some of the increase is mix, and Terronera pulls the other way. But margins in this business never widen as fast as the headline price suggests, and the operating record from before this upswing, a loss in 2024 and a larger one in 2025, is the honest picture of what these assets earn when silver is ordinary.

Valuation

The methods used to triangulate a value here are all anchored to a year that no longer describes the company, and that is the first thing to understand about the numbers. Every family of approach, asset-based and multiple-based alike, lands below the market price, several at a small fraction of it. The reason is on the calendar rather than in the analysis: through most of 2025 the company's largest mine was still being built, and the consolidated result for that year was a loss.

Read literally, the price embeds a demanding assumption. It requires operating profit to compound at the top of the pace the business can fund from its own cash flow, and to hold that pace for roughly 24 years. Of companies that have grown that fast, only about 15% sustained it even a decade. That is a genuine caution and it should not be waved away.

It should, though, be labelled correctly. That read rests on an annual figure from a transition year, and the company's own quarterly reporting since then describes a different business. For the three months ended March 31, 2026, revenue was 209.7 million dollars against 63.5 million a year earlier, mine operating earnings were 93.5 million dollars against 12.8 million, and operating earnings were 83.8 million dollars against 4.1 million. Which of those two bases the price should be measured against is the entire valuation question here, and it resolves into a question about the silver price rather than about the mines.

The balance sheet gives the more stable reference point. Total assets were 1,235.7 million dollars at December 31, 2025 against shareholders' equity of 579.1 million dollars, with mineral properties, plant and equipment carried at 785.9 million dollars, up from 506.2 million a year earlier as Terronera was capitalized. On the other side sit 231.2 million dollars of convertible senior notes issued in December 2025, loans payable of 12.7 million dollars, and a copper stream obligation of 44.7 million dollars across current and non-current. Against 215.4 million dollars of money in the bank at year end, that is a company close to square rather than one sitting on a cushion.

For a peer reference, HL earns a 43.6% operating margin on revenue of 1.57 billion dollars with revenue up 66.3% year over year, which is the same tide lifting the same boats and a reminder that recent results across this sector are a metal-price event rather than a series of independent operating achievements. What is genuinely company-specific is the cost position of Terronera at 22.31 dollars per ounce in the March quarter, well under the consolidated figure. If that asset keeps taking a larger share of output, the average follows it down, and the average is what determines how much of a lower silver price this company could absorb.

Catalysts

Endeavour reports its ounces before it reports its money, and the July 8, 2026 release covered the ounces. Second quarter production was 1,943,955 silver ounces and 10,474 gold ounces, 3.4 million ounces on a silver equivalent basis, bringing the year to date to 3,819,329 silver ounces and 22,215 gold ounces, or 6.8 million silver equivalent ounces. Kolpa was the standout, with throughput of 233,408 tonnes after its plant expansion and silver output 19% above the prior quarter, while Guanaceví came in below plan on lower grades and Terronera tracked its planned first-half ramp with improving recoveries. The company sold 2,086,717 silver ounces and 10,823 gold ounces during the quarter.

The financial picture behind those ounces was last updated on May 6, 2026. First quarter revenue was 209.7 million dollars, net earnings 64.9 million dollars or 0.23 dollars a share basic, and cash at quarter end 231.8 million dollars. All-in sustaining costs of 37.03 dollars per ounce were down from 41.19 in the fourth quarter of 2025, which management attributed to the Terronera ramp and efficiencies gained. The Bolañitos sale closed on January 15, 2026 and produced a gain of 35.6 million dollars.

Two developments further out are worth tracking. The feasibility study at Pitarrilla is advancing, with 6.2 million dollars of exploration cost and 2.8 million dollars of evaluation and non-capital spending incurred on it during 2025. And the first exploration drilling at Terronera since 2020 returned intervals including 574 grams per tonne silver with 23.92 grams per tonne gold over 1.06 metres true width, and 1,271 grams per tonne silver over 0.94 metres, from the La Luz system adjacent to the operating mine. Neither shows up in earnings for years. Both bear on how long these mines run.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results release, May 6, 2026 · Q2 2026 production release, July 8, 2026 · FY2025 consolidated financial statements, February 27, 2026 · FY2025 results release, February 27, 2026 · Terronera drill results release, June 18, 2026

View the full interactive EXK report on boothcheck