EVERTEC, Inc. (EVTC): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers EVERTEC, Inc. (EVTC) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EVTC

Headline

FieldValue
TickerEVTC
CompanyEVERTEC, Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$30.35/sh
CompositionPayment Services - Puerto Rico & Caribbean 16% / Latin America Payments and Solutions 37% / Merchant Acquiring, net 20% / Business Solutions 27%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.4%
Operating margin today17.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-12.5pp
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.3% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.83σ
cohort percentile (of 190 peers)18

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.57x5expensive
Earnings1.65x4expensive
Relative0
Growth0.70x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$68.730.44xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 6.9x / 8.9x / 10.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 28.9x / 35.0x / 41.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 18.55x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$17.651.72xyesBV/sh $10.74, ROE (TTM) 15.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$22.371.36xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$31.960.95xyesRev $1.0B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$23.011.32xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.17B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$22.901.33xyesBV $10.74 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$19.351.57xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.55 × BVPS $10.74) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.32B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$20.401.49xyesFCF $208.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$14.832.05xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.18B (FCF $0.21B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1.3023.35xyesEPS $1.55 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.566.66xyesBV $10.74 × (ROIC 2.5% / WACC 5.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.00B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$16.761.81xyesEPS $1.55 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Payment Services - Puerto Rico & Caribbeanoperatingenterprise$203.2mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Latin America Payments and Solutionsoperatingenterprise$186.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Merchant Acquiring, netoperatingenterprise$162.4mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Business Solutionsoperatingenterprise$227.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)7.27x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)5.74x
Interest coverage2.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.9%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The market is paying roughly 14 times operating income for this company, which puts it in the lower half of the range its payments-processing peers trade at. That is the price of a business the market expects to go sideways. What it is buying is not obviously that.

Start with what the operation converts. EVERTEC turns about 20.1% of revenue into operating profit. Among its cohort that is a strong result rather than a middling one: FIS manages 15.9%, GPN 15.3%, ACIW 18.4%, PAYO 11.7%, FOUR 8.4%, PAY 6.8% and XYZ 4.9%. Only JKHY at 26.0%, FISV at 25.3% and SSNC at 23.1% run ahead of it, and all three are considerably larger. The trailing return on equity is about 19.8%, and the share count has come down roughly 3.7% a year over the past four years, which is the plainest evidence available that the cash generated is going back to owners rather than into empire building.

The reason the margins hold is positional rather than technological. EVERTEC operates the ATH network, Puerto Rico's own debit and ATM rails, and the 10-K describes the resulting position without much modesty: it is "the leading card issuer and core bank processors in the Caribbean and the only non-bank provider of cash processing services to the U.S. Federal Reserve in the Caribbean". Owning the network, the switch and the bank processing at once is a structure that regulators and scale have made almost impossible to assemble from scratch in a market that size. The consumer side is still growing: the Puerto Rico payments segment lifted its adjusted profitability in the March quarter on transaction growth and continued strength in ATH Movil, particularly the business version.

The more consequential change is geographic. Latin America Payments and Solutions is now the largest of the four reporting lines, and the company keeps adding to it. The Dimensa acquisition closed on April 30, 2026, extending the Brazilian footprint, following the Tecnobank purchase whose goodwill sits in that same segment, and in May the company signed a strategic agreement with Transbank, the principal card acquirer in Chile. A processor that spent a decade as a proxy for one island's economy is turning into a regional software and payments supplier, and the accounting has not yet caught up with the description.

Underneath sits an unusual tax position. EVERTEC's total effective rate was 6.35% in 2025, and the difference from a normal corporate charge is what a Puerto Rico grant on qualifying income does. Whatever one thinks of the durability of that arrangement, it means each dollar of operating profit converts to cash at a rate very few processors can match, which is how a company of this size funds acquisitions and buybacks at the same time while holding 290.9 million dollars of liquid resources.

Bear Case

The variable with the most leverage over this thesis is not a rate, a spread or a commodity. It is a government grant. EVERTEC's total effective tax rate was 6.35% in 2025, and the reconciliation shows why: income covered by a Puerto Rico tax-exemption grant took 31.23 percentage points off the rate, worth about 48.2 million dollars in that year alone. That is roughly a third of what the company reported as profit, arriving not from operations but from a policy decision. The grant carries obligations to match: maintaining at least 700 employees in the Puerto Rico data processing operations, and investing at least 200.0 million dollars in buildings, machinery, equipment or computer programs on the island across four-year cycles. Those are real commitments on a business whose growth is increasingly happening somewhere else, and a company obliged to keep hiring in one market while expanding in another is carrying a constraint its peers do not.

Concentration is the second exposure, and the filing does not dress it up. Banco Popular supplied roughly 29% of 2025 revenue under an agreement running to September 2028. The 10-K describes the relationship in language worth reading twice: "We regularly discuss with Popular the terms of the A&R MSA and the services we provide Popular thereunder and make modifications to such terms." A contract that is continually renegotiated with a counterparty that accounts for nearly a third of the revenue is not a moat. It is an annuity that has to be re-earned, and the renewal falls inside the window any buyer at today's price is underwriting.

Two of the four segments are already going backwards. Business Solutions revenue fell to 59.5 million dollars in the March quarter from 65.6 million a year earlier, and the merchant acquiring line saw its adjusted profitability slip on a narrower spread. Spread compression in merchant acquiring is the industry's oldest and most reliable trend, and the 10-K names it among the pressures on its own clients: the entrance of non-traditional competitors and "the compression of margins on traditional products". A company earning 20.1% operating margins in a business where margins compress structurally is describing a starting point, not a steady state.

Operational risk showed up in May. The company disclosed that it had identified unauthorized access to customer data and activated its incident response procedures. For a processor whose entire commercial value rests on banks trusting it with cardholder records, the financial consequence is rarely the direct cost. It is the renegotiation leverage it hands to a client already discussing terms.

And the price is not as undemanding as the headline multiple suggests. Roughly 14 times operating income does sit in the lower half of the peer range. But the methods that capitalise what the business currently earns, rather than what it might earn, put today's level about 32% above where they centre, and the book-value-and-returns approaches are about 30% above theirs. Cheap against multiples, less so against capitalised earnings. Net borrowings run about 4.3 times operating profit with the interest bill covered about 2.8 times, and about 32.4 million dollars of equity stakes sit outside the operating business as a floor under the downside. That floor is small relative to what a lost anchor client would cost.

Valuation

Four reporting lines, one island, and one bank. That is the shape to hold in mind before any multiple. Latin America Payments and Solutions is the largest at 37% of revenue, Business Solutions supplies 27%, merchant acquiring 20% and the Puerto Rico and Caribbean payments segment 16%. Cutting across all of them, roughly 29% of the revenue comes from a single institution, which means the segment chart understates how concentrated the risk actually is.

Today's level pays about 14 times the company's trailing operating income, in the lower half of the multiple range its payments peers command. Inverting that gives a bound rather than a forecast, and the bound is undemanding: the price already sits beneath what a steady annual decline in operating profit of around 5% would warrant. That is a description of low expectations rather than a claim about the future, and it is the most defensible thing the arithmetic has to say here.

The methods split according to what they measure, and the split is narrower than at most companies. Peer-multiple comparisons and the cash-flow projections both support the current level. The approaches that capitalise trailing earnings power put the price about 32% above their centre, and the ones built on book value and the returns earned on it come out about 30% above theirs. A spread that modest across four different lenses is what a fairly-priced business looks like from the inside, which is a different and duller conclusion than either the bull or the bear would prefer.

Two filing-sourced inputs carry more weight than any of that. The first is the customer mix: "For the year ended December 31, 2025, approximately 29% of our revenue was attributable to Banco Popular", under a contract expiring in September 2028. The second is the tax position, a total effective rate of 6.35% in 2025 created by a Puerto Rico grant on qualifying income. Change either one and the earnings this valuation rests on move materially, in a way no revision to a growth assumption would.

The balance sheet neither rescues nor threatens the thesis. Borrowings of about 1,104.8 million dollars sit against 290.9 million of liquid resources, leaving net borrowings near 4.3 times operating profit, with interest covered about 2.8 times. That is more leverage than a software company carries and less than a leveraged roll-up, and it is comfortably serviced by a business converting 20.1% of revenue into operating profit at a single-digit tax rate. The share count falling roughly 3.7% a year is where the surplus has been going, and at a multiple this modest, retiring stock is a more defensible use of the money than most alternatives available to management.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 4, 2026, and the board declared its regular quarterly dividend of 5 cents a share on July 23. The dividend is small by design; the capital return here happens through buybacks, and the share count is the line that shows it.

Two Latin American moves will start showing up in the reported numbers this quarter and next. The Dimensa acquisition closed on April 30, 2026, extending the company's position in Brazilian financial-sector software, and on May 18 the company announced a strategic agreement with Transbank, Chile's principal card acquiring operator. Both build the segment that is already the largest revenue contributor, and both make the coming quarterly comparisons describe a changing portfolio as much as an underlying growth rate. Reported growth over the next few prints will need to be read with that in mind.

The item that could overshadow the rest is a security matter. In May 2026 the company disclosed that it had identified unauthorized access to customer data and initiated its incident response procedures. Incidents of this kind rarely produce a large immediate charge. What they produce is a longer conversation with regulated clients about controls and indemnities, and with the anchor bank contract running to September 2028 and terms under continual discussion, the timing is more awkward than the headline suggests.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Payment Services - Puerto Rico & Caribbean (reported)

Latin America Payments and Solutions (reported)

Merchant Acquiring, net (reported)

Business Solutions (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

EVERTEC Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 · company announcement, April 2026 · company announcement, May 2026 · EVERTEC Form 10-K for fiscal 2025 · company disclosure, May 2026 · EVERTEC results-date announcement, July 21, 2026 · company announcement, July 2026

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