EverCommerce Inc. (EVCM): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $7.92, EverCommerce Inc. (EVCM) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EVCM

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

Bullet Takeaways

• The customer base is vast and individually tiny: EverCommerce "served more than 725,000 customers at the end of 2024", and as of December 2025 roughly 93% of them contributed under 2 thousand dollars of revenue each.
• Those customers spend a little less each year rather than a little more, with annualized net revenue retention running approximately 95% for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 against 97% a year earlier, which means growth has to be bought rather than compounded.
• Second-quarter results are due August 5, 2026, and the line to watch is cost discipline: total operating expenses took 91.5% of revenue in the March quarter against 90.0% a year earlier.

Bull Case

Take the objection first, because it is the obvious one and it is not stupid. This is a company that has bought 54 businesses since it started, borrowed against them, and reports GAAP profit so thin it barely registers next to what the market says the whole thing is worth. That is the standard shape of a roll-up nearing the end of its run. It is worth testing against the actual numbers before accepting it.

The thin profit is mostly one line. Depreciation and amortization ran 15,115 thousand dollars in the March 2026 quarter, roughly a tenth of revenue, and the great majority of that is writing off software and customer relationships the company already paid for years ago. It is a real expense in the sense that acquisitions are how this business grows. It is not a real expense in the sense of money leaving the building this quarter. Free cash flow last year came to 102.8 million dollars on revenue under 600 million, which is a conversion rate most of the cohort would recognise as healthy.

What the software does is unglamorous and quite sticky. The 10-K describes it plainly: "Our software, designed to meet the day-to-day workflow needs of businesses in specific vertical end markets, streamlines front and back-office processes and provides polished customer-facing experiences." This is scheduling, invoicing, payments and customer messaging for home-services contractors, small health practices and fitness operators. Once a plumbing business runs its dispatch and its billing through one system, moving is a project nobody wants on a Tuesday.

The portfolio has also been getting tidier rather than fatter, which is not what a roll-up chasing revenue does. The 10-K records it flatly: "On October 31, 2025, we completed the sale of our marketing technology solutions business to Ignite Visibility as part of our previously announced strategic review", and the March quarter's notes show the other side of the trade, an acquisition of ZyraTalk for about 36 million dollars on September 15, 2025, almost all of which landed as goodwill and definite-lived intangibles. Selling agency-style services revenue and buying software is the trade a management team makes when it wants the multiple, not the top line. Meanwhile the share count has come down roughly 2% a year over the last four years, which is unusual for a levered acquirer and is direct evidence of where the cash has been going.

The comparison to the cohort cuts both ways and is worth stating honestly. TYL converts 15.5% of 2.38 billion dollars of revenue into operating profit; PCTY manages 21.3%; MANH gets 25.6%; PAYC reaches 28.3%. EverCommerce, at roughly 10%, is the laggard of that group. The bull reading is that these are the same kinds of customers and the same kinds of contracts, and that the distance between 10% and the middle of that range is what integration is supposed to close. Unusually for a company at this multiple, the peer-multiple comparisons and the cash-flow projections both land at roughly today's level rather than beneath it.

Bear Case

Here is the number a holder has to sit with. Annualized net revenue retention ran approximately 95% for the quarter ended March 31, 2026, against 97% for the same quarter of 2025. Anything under 100 means the customers already signed up are worth less this year than last, in aggregate, after upsells and price increases have been counted. The installed base does not grow. It leaks. Every dollar of growth has to be purchased, from new customers, from new products, or from another acquisition, and the leak has widened rather than closed.

The customer profile explains why. Roughly 93% of EverCommerce's customers contributed under 2 thousand dollars of revenue apiece in 2025. These are one-van plumbers, two-chair salons, solo practitioners. They are wonderfully numerous and they go out of business at rates that larger software customers do not. A base of that shape churns as a matter of structure, not of product quality, and no amount of feature work changes the underlying demographics of who is buying.

Growth has meanwhile flattened while costs have not. Revenue in the March quarter rose about 3.6% on the year, and operating profit went down, not up: total operating expenses absorbed 91.5% of revenue against 90.0% a year earlier. The company is candid about the trade: "We believe that investment in technology development will contribute to our long-term growth, but may also negatively impact our short-term profitability." That is a reasonable thing to do. It is a harder thing to fund at 3.6% top-line growth.

The strategy has a stated dependency, and the 10-K lists it among the things that could go wrong: "We may not be able to continue to expand our share of our existing vertical markets or expand into new vertical markets, which would inhibit our ability to grow and increase our profitability." It also concedes the retention risk directly, warning that "we may be unable to retain existing clients or increase the usage of our solutions and services by them, which would have an adverse effect on our business, revenue and other operating results". Both of those are the bear case written by the company's own lawyers.

The financing sits underneath all of it. Borrowings of 522.2 million dollars stand against liquid holdings of 129.3 million, leaving net borrowings around 6.7 times operating profit, and operating profit covers the interest bill only about 1.7 times over. That is a workable structure for a business compounding nicely and a tight one for a business whose revenue grew 3.6% last quarter. If retention keeps slipping, the acquisitions that replace the leaked revenue have to be funded from somewhere, and the two obvious somewheres are more borrowing or more shares.

And the price is not pricing any of that. Around 43 times trailing operating income puts this in the upper half of the peer multiple range, and inverting it requires growth to run at its self-funding ceiling for about nine years running. Only about 17% of comparable fast growers have managed that. VERX is currently running a negative operating margin and BLKB shrank its revenue slightly last year, so the vertical-software cohort is not uniformly compounding either. The bet is that EverCommerce is the exception, held for the better part of a decade.

Valuation

One accounting line explains almost everything about how this company gets valued, and it is worth walking through before any of the numbers. EverCommerce grew by buying 54 businesses. Every purchase created intangible assets, and those assets get written off against profit over the following years. Depreciation and amortization took 15,115 thousand dollars out of the March 2026 quarter, close to a tenth of revenue. Profit measured after that charge is small. Cash flow measured before it is not. Whichever number a method starts from determines where it lands, and on this company the two are very far apart.

That produces an unusual split. The peer-multiple comparisons and the cash-flow projections, which run off revenue and earnings before those write-offs, both land at essentially today's level. The methods built on reported book value and on reported earnings power land nowhere near it, several multiples below. The spread between those two groups is not a disagreement about the business. It is a disagreement about whether money spent on acquisitions years ago should still be counted against this year.

The bet that the price makes is about persistence rather than pace. Inverted, today's level asks for growth held at the fastest rate the business can fund from its own cash flow, and asks for it to hold there for about nine years. History is not generous here: only around 17% of comparable fast growers sustained a run of that length. Roughly 43 times trailing operating income places this in the upper half of the peer multiple range rather than at its extreme, so the demanding part of the assumption is duration, not the starting rate.

Against the cohort the operating economics are the weak point rather than the strength. EverCommerce converts about 10% of revenue into operating profit. SPSC gets 15.3% and TYL 15.5%; ACIW manages 18.4%, BLKB 19.5%, PCTY 21.3%, MANH 25.6% and PAYC 28.3%. Only VERX, currently running a negative operating margin, sits below. Nine years of ceiling-rate growth is a lot to ask of the least profitable member of a group, and the roughly 95% net revenue retention rate in the March quarter is the mechanism by which that ask would fail.

Borrowings of 522.2 million dollars against 129.3 million of liquid holdings leave net borrowings near 6.7 times operating profit, with the interest bill covered about 1.7 times. That is not a distressed structure, and the company is not consuming cash. It does mean the equity sits behind a meaningful claim, and it means the acquisition engine that produces the growth the price requires competes for the same cash flow that services the debt. The share count falling roughly 2% a year says management has been choosing buybacks alongside deals rather than instead of them.

Catalysts

The next scheduled event is second-quarter results on August 5, 2026. The March print set a low bar in one sense and a high one in another: management reported first-quarter revenue and adjusted profitability above the midpoint of its own guidance, while operating expenses still took a larger share of revenue than a year earlier. The retention figure disclosed alongside the revenue line is the more informative of the two, and it has moved the wrong way for two consecutive first quarters.

Two portfolio moves from late 2025 are still working through the reported numbers. The 10-K reports that "On October 31, 2025, we completed the sale of our marketing technology solutions business to Ignite Visibility as part of our previously announced strategic review", which removes services revenue of lower quality than the subscription base. The ZyraTalk acquisition closed on September 15, 2025 for 35,971 thousand dollars, of which 29.0 million was goodwill and 6.9 million definite-lived intangibles. Both flow through the comparisons for another two quarters, so headline growth rates over that stretch will describe a portfolio that has changed shape as much as a business that has grown.

The broader question the next few prints will settle is whether the strategic review is finished or continuing. A management team that sells one business unit, buys a smaller software asset, and keeps retiring stock is signalling that it thinks the market is undervaluing what remains. If retention keeps sliding while the multiple stays where it is, that signal becomes harder to sustain on cash flow alone.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

EverCommerce (consolidated vertical SaaS) (reported)

• TYL (TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: ES $ 534,864 $ 572,224 PT 416,998 416,635 Corporate 4,687,046 4,191,156 Total consolidated $ 5,638,908 $ 5,180,015 Segment assets primarily consist of net accounts receivable, prepaid expenses and other current assets, and net property and equipment and software development costs, net. Corporate assets primarily…
• FY2025 10-K: …for initial periods of one to three years . Nearly all of our on-premises software clients contract with us for maintenance and support. Maintenance and support are generally provided under auto-renewing annual contracts or multi-year contracts. We consider all other revenue categories to be non-recurring revenues.…
• BLKB (Blackbaud, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …extent contracts include embedded annual price escalators, the total fees attributable to the subscription-based software solutions are recognized on a straight-line basis over the term of the arrangement, resulting in a more even pattern of revenue recognition over longer periods. Accordingly, period‑over‑period…
• FY2025 10-K: …the full spectrum of our current solutions and our ability to deliver future solutions make us a strong competitor. We expect to continue to see new entrants as focus on social investment solutions increases to satisfy Millennial and Gen Z donors, customers and employees, the barriers of entry continue to decline…
• SPSC (SPS COMMERCE, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …for selective acquisitions. We plan to continue to evaluate potential acquisitions based on the number of new customers, revenue, functionality, or geographic reach the acquisition would provide relative to the purchase price, and our ability to integrate and operate the acquired business. In 2025, we acquired…
• FY2025 10-K: …orders, shipments, and inventory gained by automating trading relationships on the SPS Commerce supply chain network is critical to their success and offers a competitive advantage. • Consumers want new products - Retail assortments are ever-changing with seasonality shifts and new product introductions from…
• MANH (MANHATTAN ASSOCIATES, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …Omnichannel Commerce and Digital Supply Chain solutions to drive revenue and earnings growth. In addition for 2025, we repurchased $274.5 million of Manhattan Associates' outstanding common stock under the share repurchase program approved by our Board of Directors. In January 2026, our Board of Directors replenished…
• FY2025 10-K: …on Microsoft's Azure platform. Through this platform, Manhattan Active SCALE customers receive new capability on an annual basis and enjoy full configurability and elements of technical extensibility even when delivered on Azure. We continue to offer SCALE on premise via perpetual licenses. Omnichannel Solutions As…
• VERX (Vertex, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …grow and scale our enterprise and mid-market revenues. Our partner ecosystem is a differentiating, competitive strength in both our software development and our sales and marketing activities. We integrate with key technology partners that span ERP, CRM, procurement, billing, POS, and eCommerce. These partners…
• FY2025 10-K: …to product taxability or configuration, and natural-language driven tools that simplify the creation and management of tax rules. Together, these capabilities are designed to reduce manual effort, improve consistency, and help customers maintain compliance in an environment of constantly changing regulations. ​ In…
• ACIW (ACI WORLDWIDE, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …The conclusions reached can impact the allocation of the transaction price to each performance obligation and the timing of revenue recognition related to those arrangements. Software as a Service ("SaaS") and Platform as a Service ("PaaS") Arrangements. The Company's SaaS-based and PaaS-based arrangements, including…
• FY2025 10-K: …2024. • Adjusted for the impact of foreign currency, total revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025, increased $156.6 million, or 10%, as compared to the same period in 2024. 33 Table of Contents Software as a Service ("SaaS") and Platform as a Service ("PaaS") Revenue The Company's SaaS arrangements allow…
• PCTY (PAYLOCITY HOLDING CORPORATION)
• FY2025 10-K: …methods including on-demand and webinars, all of which are available via our mobile app. Our clients can create a variety of content for their employees including via a Sharable Content Object Reference Model (SCORM), embedded video and various document types. Custom content is supplemented by a library of hundreds…
• FY2025 10-K: …product suite that helps businesses streamline and automate HR, payroll and spend management processes, attract and retain talent, and build culture and connection with their employees. We are expanding the spend management capabilities of our platform beyond expense management to include accounts payable automation,…
• PAYC (Paycom Software, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …HCM solution delivered as Software-as-a-Service. Our payroll application is the foundation of our solution and is based on a core system of record to maintain a single database for all HCM functions. The Company derives revenue primarily in North America and manages the business activities on a consolidated basis. No…
• FY2025 10-K: …assistance from trained specialists. Service specialists are assigned to specific clients and are trained across all of our applications, ensuring they provide comprehensive, expert-level service. Our Quality Management System is ISO 9001:2015 certified on the basis of its quality and consistency. We strive to…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.