ESCO TECHNOLOGIES INC. (ESE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $274.02, ESCO TECHNOLOGIES INC. (ESE) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~9.6 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ESE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerESE
CompanyESCO TECHNOLOGIES INC.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$274.02/sh
CompositionPoint in time 55% / Over time 45%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Must persist for9.6y
Multiple paid42x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 190 peers)74

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.79x4expensive
Earnings2.69x4expensive
Relative1.24x2expensive
Growth0.83x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$331.690.83xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$331.950.83xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 58.6x / 60.6x / 62.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 28x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 22.5x / 28.0x / 33.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 32.19x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$131.372.09xyesBV/sh $62.42, ROE (TTM) 19.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$188.451.45xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$378.780.72xyesRev $1.2B, growth 29% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.7x / 5.8x / 6.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$145.681.88xyesEPS $12.14, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=15.11 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$1.30210.78xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.01B × (1−20%) / WACC 9.1% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$183.681.49xyesBV $62.42 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$130.582.10xyes√(22.5 × EPS $12.14 × BVPS $62.42) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.12B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$83.343.29xyesFCF $207.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$77.953.52xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.19B (FCF $0.21B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$391.720.70xyesEPS $12.14 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.22B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$455.250.60xyesEPS $12.14 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$131.242.09xyesEPS $12.14 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Aerospace & Defense (A&D)operatingenterprise$478.2mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Utility Solutions Group (USG)operatingenterprise$380.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Testoperatingenterprise$237.2mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$47.2m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.35x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.28x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The balance sheet is the tell. A company whose borrowings amount to about half a year of operating profit on continuing operations, with liquid assets covering half of what it owes and a share count that has drifted down slightly over four years, is a company whose management has options and knows it. Most of the credit for that goes to one decision. In July 2025 ESCO sold VACCO Industries to RBC Bearings for net sales proceeds of approximately 270 million dollars and used the money primarily to pay down debt, exiting the Space business in the process. Selling a profitable subsidiary because it does not fit is a harder decision than buying one, and the proceeds went to the least glamorous possible use.

What that cleared the way for was a rebuild of the aerospace and defence business around navy work. The 10-K sets out the order book plainly: "By operating segment, 2025 orders were $895.6 million related to A&D products (including $364.2 million of Maritime acquired backlog), $403.5 million related to USG products, and $265.7 million related to Test products". Backlog in that segment finished the year at 803.0 million dollars against 385.6 million dollars a year earlier. Backlog is the most honest forward indicator a defence supplier has, because it is signed. Roughly 69% of total firm orders sit with domestic customers, which in this business means the U.S. Navy and its primes.

Underneath the defence story the smallest segment is compounding fastest. Test net sales reached $65.5 million in the second quarter of fiscal 2026, up 27.4% from the same quarter a year earlier, with the first half up 27.1%. That business, ETS Lindgren, designs and builds the chambers and instruments that measure and control radio-frequency energy, and the 10-K describes it as "an industry leader in designing and manufacturing products and systems to measure and control RF energy" serving medical, health and safety, and electronics customers. Demand for shielded test environments rises with every new wireless standard and every new device that has to be certified. It is a quiet toll on the electromagnetic spectrum.

The utility business is the third leg and the least cyclical. Doble's diagnostics sit inside the maintenance budgets of electric utilities, which do not stop testing transformers because the economy slows. USG closed fiscal 2025 with segment backlog of 143.4 million dollars against 120.0 million dollars a year earlier, and against its own comparable set the segment's peers earn solid returns: BMI at an 18.9% operating margin, MWA at 19.2% and POWL at 19.8%. This is not a business that needs a bull market.

Which brings the argument back to the balance sheet, and to Megger. Management is using a clean capital structure to buy a business roughly a quarter of its own market value in electrical test and measurement, adjacent to what Doble already does. Whether that is a good use of the balance sheet is the open question. That the balance sheet existed to be used at all is the result of three years of deliberate decisions, and it is the strongest evidence available that management believes its own compounding story.

Bear Case

Something has been quietly slipping in the margin line while the growth headlines got better. Company EBIT reached $46.3 million in the second quarter of fiscal 2026 against $36.6 million a year earlier, a large increase. As a share of net sales, though, that was 15.0% versus 15.8%. Across the first half of the year the same pattern holds, 14.1% against 14.5%, on the company's own definition of segment EBIT in the 10-Q. Growth is arriving and it is arriving at lower incremental profitability than the business used to run at. That is what buying growth looks like on the way in.

And the growth is being bought. Of the 895.6 million dollars of aerospace and defence orders booked in fiscal 2025, 364.2 million dollars came in as acquired Maritime backlog rather than as orders the existing business won. The revenue increase in that segment leaned heavily on one end market, with a $94.1 million rise in navy revenues and a $39.8 million rise in commercial aerospace, partly offset by a $5.2 million decline in defence aerospace. Concentration in navy programmes is a real position, and it is also a single customer with a single budget process and a habit of restructuring programmes.

The accounting carries the receipts. Intangible amortization from prior deals is estimated at approximately $80 million in fiscal 2026, approximately $67 million in 2027, and approximately $46 million a year from 2028 through 2030. That is a substantial charge running through reported profit for the rest of the decade, and it exists because the earnings base was purchased rather than built. The gap between what this company earns on paper and what it collects in cash is largely that charge, and a reader deciding which number to believe should notice that only one of them reflects what was paid for the assets.

Now the same machine is being pointed at something four times larger than anything before it. Megger costs 2.35 billion dollars, of which 922 million dollars is cash and the rest is 5.10 million newly issued shares, a share count that has been flat for four years suddenly rising by close to a fifth. Funding the cash half required a new credit agreement providing a 500 million dollar secured revolver, a 500 million dollar term loan A and a term loan B expected to reach a further 500 million dollars, all secured by a first-priority lien on the assets. A company that has spent three years earning an unlevered balance sheet is about to spend it, and the facility that replaces the old one is secured where the old one was not. That is the lenders' opinion of the new risk, expressed in collateral.

None of this would matter much at a modest price. It matters here because the price is not modest. Today's valuation requires this business to hold growth at the fastest rate it can self-fund for roughly eleven straight years, and the multiple sits at the very top of its peer distribution. History is unkind to that: only about 15% of comparable fast-growers held such a pace even a decade. The bear case is not that ESCO is a poor business. It is that the price already assumes flawless serial acquisition for a decade, at the precise moment the company is levering up and diluting to make the largest and least tested acquisition it has ever attempted.

Valuation

Eleven years is a long time to hold a growth rate. That is roughly what today's price asks for: operating profit compounding at the fastest pace the business can fund out of its own cash flow, sustained for about eleven years, which works out to the market paying about 51 times company-wide operating income on last fiscal year's continuing-operations figure. The calculation runs at a 9.8% cost of capital, and it is not hair-trigger sensitive: a percentage point more of required return trims the horizon by a modest amount rather than collapsing it. The demand is the duration, not the rate.

Two references make that demand concrete. Against its own peer group the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution, well past the upper quartile. Against history, only about 15% of comparable fast-growers sustained a pace like this for as long as a decade. Neither number says the outcome is impossible. Both say it is the exception rather than the pattern.

The methods split the way they usually do when a price is carrying a long duration. Peer-multiple approaches land closest, with the price about 21% above them, and the cash-flow methods land above today's price by carrying the growth rates the business has recently posted across a long explicit forecast. The static methods do not come near: the price sits about 119% above where the asset-value family lands and about 213% above the earnings-power family. Those lower readings are capitalizing what the business currently produces, with no growth credited at all. The distance between them and the price is the entire forward bet, stated in one number.

There is a wrinkle in the reported profit worth understanding before comparing multiples to peers. Fiscal 2025 net income includes the gain on the VACCO sale, which was accounted for as a discontinued operation, while operating profit reflects only continuing businesses. The two lines are not on the same basis, and pairing them produces an effective tax rate that cannot be real. On the continuing-operations basis that matters for valuation, the first half of fiscal 2026 produced $84.6 million of EBIT on the company's own definition.

Against the cohort the operating economics are respectable rather than exceptional. Inside the aerospace and defence comparison set HEI earns a 23.5% operating margin and CW 18.4%, with TDG far above at 46.5%, while in the utility set BMI runs 18.9% and KEYS 18.2%. ESCO's reported profitability sits below the best of those on a continuing-operations basis, which makes the top-of-distribution multiple harder to defend on current economics alone.

The balance sheet is the one place where the reading is unambiguous, and it is about to change. Borrowings amount to about half a year of operating profit on continuing operations, liquid assets cover roughly half of what is owed, and the share count has been flat to slightly lower over four years. On closing of the Megger transaction, the company takes on secured term debt and issues 5.10 million shares. Every leverage and per-share figure in the trailing record describes a company that will not exist in that form after the deal closes.

Catalysts

The largest transaction in the company's history is signed and has not closed. On April 15, 2026, ESCO agreed to buy the entire share capital of Megger Group Limited from TBG AG for approximately 2.35 billion dollars, consisting of 922 million dollars in cash and 5.10 million shares of common stock, with a post-closing adjustment for net debt and working capital payable in cash. Closing is conditioned on Hart-Scott-Rodino clearance, approval from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, clearance from the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and foreign merger-control approvals, with an outside date of April 15, 2027. Management has guided to a fiscal first-quarter 2027 close and roughly 60 million dollars of expected cost synergies.

The financing is already arranged. On May 29, 2026 the company entered a new credit agreement led by JPMorgan Chase providing a 500 million dollar senior secured revolving facility, a 500 million dollar term loan A, and a term loan B expected to be up to a further 500 million dollars once syndicated, all effective only upon the acquisition closing and replacing the existing unsecured agreement. Watching the term loan B syndication is the cleanest available read on what the credit market thinks of the combined company.

Third-quarter fiscal 2026 results are scheduled for release after the close on August 6, 2026. The two things worth watching in that report are whether Test can hold the growth rate it posted in the March quarter, when net sales rose 27.4% year over year, and whether the EBIT margin stabilizes after two consecutive periods of running below the prior year on the company's own segment definition.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Aerospace & Defense (A&D) (reported)

Utility Solutions Group (USG) (reported)

Test (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

ESCO 8-K filings, April 16 and June 3, 2026 · company earnings calendar, July 2026 · ESCO 8-K, April 16, 2026 · ESCO 8-K, June 3, 2026 · company transaction announcement, April 2026

View the full interactive ESE report on boothcheck