EVERSOURCE ENERGY (ES): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers EVERSOURCE ENERGY (ES) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ES

Headline

FieldValue
TickerES
CompanyEVERSOURCE ENERGY
Sector / IndustryUtilities
Current price$70.84/sh
CompositionRetail Tariff Sales - Residential 51% / Retail Tariff Sales - Commercial 30% / Retail Tariff Sales - Industrial 5% / Wholesale Transmission Revenues 5% / Wholesale Market Sales Revenues 9% / Other Revenues from Contracts with Customers 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid18x operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 5.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 5.5% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.3% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-1.27σ
cohort percentile (of 70 peers)29

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.73x5expensive
Earnings1.70x3expensive
Relative1.01x2expensive
Growth0.80x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$75.080.94xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.1x / 10.1x / 12.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.6x / 20.0x / 23.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowth$1005.240.07xyesDPS $3.08, g=8.9% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$109.310.65xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$41.811.69xyesBV/sh $43.38, ROE (TTM) 8.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$41.061.73xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$54.931.29xyesRev $14.1B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$46.201.53xyesEPS $3.85, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=9.16 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$31.732.23xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.51B × (1−21%) / WACC 4.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$40.931.73xyesBV $43.38 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$61.301.16xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.85 × BVPS $43.38) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $5.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.017084.00xyesFCF $297.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$124.230.57xyesEPS $3.85 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$8.628.22xyesBV $43.38 × (ROIC 1.0% / WACC 4.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $14.11B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$144.380.49xyesEPS $3.85 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$41.621.70xyesEPS $3.85 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Electric Distributionoperatingenterprise$10.0bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Natural Gas Distributionoperatingenterprise$2.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Electric Transmissionoperatingenterprise$2.3bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Water Distributionoperatingenterprise$237.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$27.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)11.49x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)9.08x
Interest coverage2.2x
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Regulated utilities are one of the few businesses where the profit is approved rather than discovered. A commission reviews the capital a utility has spent, decides how much of it was prudent, allows a return on that amount, and the company earns roughly that return for as long as it keeps investing and keeps the system running. So the analytical question is not really about demand. It is about how reliably the regulator lets the return through, and how much capital the utility can defensibly put to work. Eversource now fits that template more cleanly than it did a year ago, because it stopped being three businesses and became two.

The first quarter shows the machinery doing what it is supposed to do. The 10-Q reports that "We earned $606.8 million, or $1.61 per share, in the first quarter of 2026, compared with $550.8 million, or $1.50 per share, in the first quarter of 2025." The largest single contributor was the least glamorous piece of the company. Natural gas distribution earnings rose $76.9 million year over year, driven by base distribution rate increases effective November 1, 2025 at Yankee Gas, NSTAR Gas and EGMA, plus capital tracking mechanisms tied to continued investment in the gas system. Nobody buys a stock for a rate case. A rate case is nevertheless how this business compounds.

The recovery apparatus runs wider than periodic rate cases, and that matters more than the headline earnings number. Costs move through tariffs on a rolling basis, and the 10-K notes that these mechanisms "also include certain incentives earned, return on capital tracking mechanisms, and carrying charges that are billed in rates to customers, which do impact earnings." Translated: a large share of what the company spends comes back with a return attached, and some of it comes back without waiting for a full proceeding. That is why a utility can grow earnings while its underlying volumes barely move.

Volumes may not stay flat. The company's own description of what drives distribution investment includes "Load growth and other includes requests for new business and capacity additions on distribution lines and substation additions and expansions." New England is not the epicenter of data center construction, but interconnection requests are the mechanism by which any of that reaches a distribution utility's capital plan, and it arrives as approved spending rather than as a commodity bet.

The capital return is the part a holder can already count. Dividends totaled $3.01 per common share in 2025 against $2.86 in 2024, and on January 27, 2026 the board approved a quarterly payment of $0.7875 per share. That payout is funded by an administered earnings stream rather than a cyclical one, which is the whole argument for owning this kind of asset.

On operating profitability the company is not the laggard of its cohort. AEP earned a 24.2% operating margin and PPL 23.3% on their most recent filed figures, while ED came in at 17.2% and PCG at 19.4%. Eversource sits toward the upper end of that band, not the bottom. With Aquarion gone, roughly 1.7 billion dollars of net proceeds are pointed at reducing borrowings, which is the one lever that improves the risk profile of a levered network operator without requiring a regulator's permission.

Bear Case

Strip a regulated network down to its economics and the price is buying one thing: the durability of an approved return on a growing pile of capital. The weather, the volumes and the fuel cost all pass through to customers. Which means the fragile assumption is not demand and it is not margin. It is the allowed return, and the allowed return is not a contract. It is a number that gets re-litigated, and in March it moved the wrong way.

On March 19, 2026 the federal regulator found the New England transmission owners' base return unjust and unreasonable, reset it, and applied the new figure prospectively from October 2014. The 10-Q states that "FERC ordered refunds with interest for those historical refund periods, which are material to us, and dismissed the other three complaints." The size of the move shows up in the sequence. The complaint process began against a base return of 11.14 percent. Then "On October 16, 2014, FERC issued Opinion No. 531-A and set the base ROE at 10.57 percent and the incentive cap at 11.74 percent for the first complaint period." The 2026 order takes the base to 9.57 percent. Transmission is the highest-quality earnings stream in the company, roughly a point and a half has come off the rate it is allowed to earn, and a retroactive bill is attached.

State regulators have been reaching backwards too. A joint settlement approved in Massachusetts on December 1, 2025 produced a charge to earnings for customer credits, one of the named reasons quarterly earnings moved the way they did. In Connecticut the company has been arguing about the standard itself, telling the courts that "the correct legal standard PURA must use in determining whether costs can be recovered through customer rates is the longstanding prudence standard, which evaluates the prudence of management decision-making as of the time the utility made the decision to incur costs; PURA cannot use improper hindsight analysis to evaluate prudence." Having to litigate the principle that spending should be judged on what was knowable at the time tells you which direction the proceedings have been running.

Underneath the regulatory friction sits the customer bill. The 10-K lists customer affordability concerns alongside siting difficulties and rights-of-way problems as constraints on the company's own strategic objectives, and notes that supply constraints across New England have driven significant increases in commodity costs. Affordability is the political input that turns a routine rate filing into a contested one, and it is the reason a capital plan can be approved on paper and slowed in practice.

The equity absorbs all of this with leverage in front of it. Operating profit covers interest about 2.6 times, unremarkable for a regulated network and also a reminder that a modest compression in approved returns lands disproportionately on the residual. Meanwhile the share count has grown about 2.2% a year since March 2022. That is the funding model in plain view: the rate base expands, existing holders pay for part of the expansion through dilution, and the dividend hands some of it back out the other side.

The honest counterweight is that the market already knows. Peer-multiple methods and the growth-based cash-flow methods both land above today's price, so this is not a stock priced for perfection. That makes the bear argument narrower and harder to dismiss, not weaker: the discount exists because the approved return is genuinely in play, and over the last nine months the regulators have been resolving that question one order at a time, mostly not in the company's favour.

Valuation

Today's price puts the market at roughly 17 times company-wide operating income. That figure is low enough that the price sits below what even a sustained 5% annual decline in operating profit would warrant, which is a bound on what the market is insisting on rather than a solved expectation, and the arithmetic behind it does not carry much conviction for a business whose returns are set administratively. Read it as a statement about how little growth is being demanded, and not as a valuation.

The methods disagree in a shape that fits a regulated network carrying a lot of capital. Peer-multiple methods land above today's price, and so do the growth-based cash-flow approaches. The methods anchored on book value and profitability do not: the price sits about 39% above where the asset-value family lands. The earnings-power methods land furthest below, with the price about 48% above them. That spread is the whole picture, and the reason for it is structural rather than mysterious.

The earnings-power reading normalizes five years of operating income, taxes it, and capitalizes it forever with no growth at all. For a company whose entire model is to spend capital, get it approved into the rate base and earn a return on it, a no-growth capitalization removes the one thing that makes the business work. It describes the existing system, not the enterprise. The cash-flow method that reaches above the price gets there the opposite way, assuming the enterprise multiple the shares trade on now still applies at the end of the projection period, held flat, with the bear scenario compressing it and the bull expanding it. Neither assumption is exotic for a rate-regulated utility. Between them they bracket the real question, which is whether the approved-return model keeps working.

Against the cohort the gap is in the multiple rather than in the operations. AEP earned a 24.2% operating margin and AEE 24.0%, both from their own filed figures, and Eversource's trailing operating profitability sits alongside them rather than below. What separates these names is what investors will pay for the same administered earnings, and Connecticut has been the most contested regulatory jurisdiction in the group.

Management's stated arithmetic runs well above what the price is demanding. The company expects cumulative long-term earnings per share growth in a range of 5 to 7 percent a year through 2030, with annual growth reaching the upper half of that range by 2028.

The balance sheet explains why the discount is not free money. Net borrowings run about 8.7 times operating profit, interest is covered 2.6 times, and the share count has climbed about 2.2% a year over the last four years, which is how the capital program gets funded. The Aquarion sale changes that arithmetic at the margin rather than transforming it: about 1.7 billion dollars of net equity proceeds go toward displacing borrowings, and the water business's earnings leave with it. What the price cannot yet reflect is where the transmission return finally settles, because that proceeding is still producing orders.

Catalysts

The Aquarion sale closed on June 30, 2026 for a total purchase price of 2.4 billion dollars in cash, with adjusted net equity proceeds of roughly 1.7 billion dollars earmarked to displace borrowings. Connecticut's utility regulator had denied an earlier version of the transaction on November 19, 2025 on managerial suitability grounds before approving it on March 25, 2026, so the closing removes a long-running overhang as well as a business line. The immediate cost is visible: the company expects an after-tax non-cash charge of about $115 million, or $0.31 per share, in the second quarter.

Second-quarter results are scheduled for July 30, 2026. That print is the first to show the shape of the company without the water business, and the first full quarter after the federal transmission return order of March 19, 2026, which set a lower base return and ordered refunds with interest for the historical refund periods. The refund obligation is a one-time cash item and the lower prospective return is permanent; the quarter should begin to separate the two.

On the capital return, the board approved a quarterly common share dividend of $0.7875 in January 2026, up from $0.7525 through 2025. Management has kept a long-term earnings growth range of 5 to 7 percent a year through 2030 in place alongside the divestiture, and expects to reach the upper half of that range by 2028. Those commitments now have to be met by a smaller company carrying less debt, which is the trade the sale actually made.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Electric Distribution (reported)

Natural Gas Distribution (reported)

Electric Transmission (reported)

Water Distribution (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Eversource 8-K and news release, June 30, 2026 · Eversource news release, June 30, 2026 · FY2025 10-K, filed February 17, 2026 · company earnings calendar, July 2026 · FY2026 first-quarter 10-Q, filed May 7, 2026

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