ERO COPPER CORP (ERO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $30.45, ERO COPPER CORP (ERO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.2 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ERO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerERO
CompanyERO COPPER CORP
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$30.45/sh
CompositionCopper concentrate 79% / Gold 21%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)11.8%
Operating margin today34.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-22.6pp
Must persist for5.2y
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 6: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 12.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~1.6 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~4.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.07σ
sustained it ~5.2 years at this level33%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.09x5expensive
Earnings1.99x4expensive
Relative0.99x5justifies
Growth0.88x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$34.570.88xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 16% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$38.530.79xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.9x / 13.9x / 18.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$30.750.99xyesP/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.5x / 14.0x / 16.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 9.76x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$27.831.09xyesBV/sh $9.05, ROE (TTM) 28.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$49.920.61xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$30.890.99xyesRev $0.8B, growth 16% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.0x / 4.0x / 4.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$88.900.34xyesEPS $2.54, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.34 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$10.622.87xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.18B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$42.080.72xyesBV $9.05 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 28.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$22.741.34xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.54 × BVPS $9.05) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$15.022.03xyesEBITDA $0.27B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$7.823.89xyesFCF $132.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$81.960.37xyesEPS $2.54 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$15.431.97xyesBV $9.05 × (ROIC 14.0% / WACC 8.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$11.372.68xyesRevenue $0.79B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$95.250.32xyesEPS $2.54 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$27.461.11xyesEPS $2.54 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$501.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.30x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.85x
Interest coverage8.1x
Share count CAGR (dilution)4.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The most interesting number in the March quarter is not the copper price. It is the gap between two mines. Tucumã, the newest operation, produced 8,461 tonnes of copper in concentrate at a first-tier cash cost of 1.97 dollars per pound. Caraíba, the flagship the company was built around, produced 8,826 tonnes at 2.79 dollars per pound. The junior asset has quietly become the low-cost one, and it is doing so while still ramping. That is the opposite of the usual mining pattern, where the newest mine is the expensive one until it finds its rhythm.

It matters because cost position is the only durable advantage available in a commodity business. Nobody in copper sells a differentiated product; a tonne of concentrate is a tonne of concentrate. What separates a good producer from a bad one is where it sits on the cost curve when the metal price falls, because the marginal producer stops first. A mine running at under two dollars a pound has room that a mine running near three does not.

There is more capacity coming at the cheaper mine, and it is not in the numbers yet. The company is expanding tailings filtration capacity at Tucumã, on track for the fourth quarter of 2026, and states plainly that the associated throughput benefit has not been incorporated into full-year 2026 guidance. Guidance that excludes a known expansion is the rare kind of conservatism an investor can actually verify later.

The balance sheet has been moving the right way at the same time. Net debt stood at 490.7 million dollars at the end of March 2026, down roughly 71.1 million dollars from a year earlier, alongside 146.2 million dollars of available liquidity including 91.2 million dollars of cash. Cash from operations was 92.8 million dollars in the quarter. Management has been explicit that deleveraging is the top capital-allocation priority, and the trajectory backs the statement rather than merely accompanying it.

Then there is Furnas, which is the reason this is a growth story rather than a cash-harvest story. The company is earning into 60% of the copper-gold project through a definitive agreement with Vale Base Metals, completed over 12,000 metres of a planned 50,000-metre 2026 drill programme in the first quarter, and published an initial economic assessment during the same period. June drilling extended mineralisation about 115 metres down-dip beyond the known limit in one zone and found a new intercept more than a kilometre west of the main high-grade zone. Exploration results are not earnings, and nobody should treat them as such. But a producer with two operating copper mines, falling debt and a large undeveloped deposit next door has a specific kind of optionality that a pure explorer cannot fund and a mature miner does not have left.

Bear Case

The ore is getting worse. At Caraíba, processed grade fell to 0.93% copper in the March 2026 quarter from 1.18% a year earlier, and the plant put through 1,072,209 tonnes of ore against 692,901 tonnes to produce 8,826 tonnes of copper against 7,357. Read those two lines together. Throughput rose by more than half; copper output rose by a fifth. Every additional tonne of rock has to be drilled, hauled, crushed and ground whether it carries metal or not, which is why the cash cost at that operation ran at 2.79 dollars per pound in the quarter against 2.27 in the prior one. This is the oldest problem in mining, and it does not reverse on its own.

The gold mine tells a version of the same story. Xavantina spent the quarter installing ventilation and cooling upgrades because the workings are advancing deeper, and produced 5,495 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of 4,441 dollars an ounce. Deeper mines need more air, more cooling and more development metres per ounce recovered. The upgrades were necessary and the company says they will support higher rates, which may well be true. The structural fact underneath is that the easy part of both deposits has been mined.

Now put that against what the price assumes. At roughly 12 times company-wide operating profit, today's quote embeds something like 18.6% annual growth in operating profit sustained for five years, approximately and under one set of discount and fade assumptions. Of companies that have grown at comparable rates, only about 45% kept it going for five years. That requirement is not absurd for a miner bringing a new operation up and a project behind it. But it is a requirement, and the two producing assets described above are currently pushing the other way. The growth has to come from Tucumã ramping and from Furnas arriving, not from the existing base.

Furnas is where the bear case gets uncomfortable rather than dramatic. It is an earn-in on 60% of a project that is still drilling toward a resource, with engineering, environmental and permitting workstreams in progress. Full-year capital spending is guided at 275 to 320 million dollars against a company producing copper at current scale, so the build is a large claim on cash while net borrowing is still near half a billion dollars. A project update is promised for mid-2026 and drill results in June were genuinely good. None of that is production, and the gap between a promising intercept and a mine is measured in years and permits.

Finally, the discount rate deserves a mention because it moves the whole argument. This equity moves at roughly twice the amplitude of the broad market, which pushes the required return high, and each additional percentage point of required return raises the growth the price implies by around six points. That sensitivity is the honest bear observation on valuation: the market's assessment of what this business must deliver is not a stable number, and it stiffens sharply in exactly the environments, falling copper and rising risk premia, where the business would find delivery hardest.

Valuation

Twelve times operating profit sounds undemanding for a producer with two mines running and a third project drilling. Work the arithmetic backwards and it is less relaxed than it looks. The price is consistent with operating profit compounding at roughly 18.6% a year for five years, on approximate terms and a single set of assumptions, and the historical record says only about 45% of companies that reached that pace held it that long. The company's own recent record does contain growth at that rate, so the demand is not out of character. What the price is really betting on is duration rather than velocity.

One number should temper any precision here. The required return used in that calculation is high because the shares move about twice as much as the market, and each additional percentage point of required return lifts the implied growth by roughly six points. A reader should treat 18.6% as the centre of a wide band rather than as a measurement.

The methods split in an informative way. The asset-value lens, the peer-multiple lens and the cash-flow methods all land at or above today's price. Only the earnings-power lens lands below it, with the price sitting about 1.66 times above where that family arrives. That lens works by capitalising a normalised, no-growth earnings stream forever, which is a reasonable frame for a mature manufacturer and the wrong frame for a miner mid-build. It cannot see a mine that is not producing yet, and it treats a depleting orebody and a growing one identically. The pattern to take away is that the price is not a stretch against the assets or against comparable companies; it is a stretch only against the assumption that nothing changes.

Operating margin ran above a third on the last reported full financial year, which is what a mid-cost copper producer earns when the metal price is constructive, and it is worth remembering which half of that sentence the company controls. On the balance sheet, the filed position at the end of March 2026 showed net debt of 490.7 million dollars, down about 71.1 million dollars over twelve months, with 146.2 million dollars of available liquidity behind it. Against that, full-year capital spending is guided at 275 to 320 million dollars. Deleveraging and building are competing for the same cash, and the pace of both depends on a copper price nobody at the company sets.

What a buyer is acquiring at this price, then, is a low-cost mine still ramping, an older mine working through declining grade, a deep gold operation, and a large undeveloped copper-gold deposit. The valuation does not require all four to go right. It requires the two that are growing to outrun the one that is depleting.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 5, 2026 after market close, with a call the following morning. Two things make this print more informative than most. Production guidance for the full year is weighted to the second half at all three operations, so the June quarter is the first test of whether the promised improvement is arriving on schedule. And the March quarter's gold sales were held back by rain: concentrate drying times stretch during the wet season, with quarterly rainfall at Xavantina running around 650 to 700 millimetres in the first quarter against roughly 60 millimetres in the second and third. Dry weather should release sales volume that was produced but not shipped.

Furnas supplies the other line of news. Drilling in June returned intercepts including 45 metres at 0.98% copper with gold and silver credits, extending mineralisation roughly 115 metres beyond the known down-dip limit in the southeast zone, and a separate hole more than a kilometre west of that zone suggesting continuity the current resource does not capture. The company has committed to a project update in mid-2026 covering exploration results since the initial economic study. That update is the event that converts drill metres into a revised view of scale.

The slower variable is cost. Management has acknowledged industry-wide cost pressure while reaffirming full-year production, operating cost and capital spending guidance, with capital expenditure held at 275 to 320 million dollars. Reaffirmed guidance after a quarter of declining grade at the largest operation is a claim about the second half, not a description of the first, and August is when it gets marked.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results release, May 4, 2026 · Furnas drill results release, June 9, 2026 · company scheduling release, July 2, 2026

View the full interactive ERO report on boothcheck