ENSIGN GROUP, INC (ENSG): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $170.79, ENSIGN GROUP, INC (ENSG) is priced for +7.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ENSG

Headline

FieldValue
TickerENSG
CompanyENSIGN GROUP, INC
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$170.79/sh
CompositionSkilled Services 97% / Standard Bearer 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.2%
Operating margin today8.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-7.3pp
Implied growth7.3%
Multiple paid26x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 8: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.43σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)59

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.20x5expensive
Earnings2.48x5expensive
Relative1.44x2expensive
Growth0.71x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$427.110.40xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 19% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.6%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$240.180.71xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.5x / 20.5x / 22.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.7x / 18.0x / 21.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14.56x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$70.252.43xyesBV/sh $41.89, ROE (TTM) 15.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$89.841.90xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$169.101.01xyesRev $5.5B, growth 19% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$98.971.73xyesEPS $6.38, growth 16% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.69 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$21.837.82xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.34B × (1−25%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$91.761.86xyesBV $41.89 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 15.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$77.552.20xyes√(22.5 × EPS $6.38 × BVPS $41.89) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.58B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$78.752.17xyesFCF $608.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$68.362.50xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.55B (FCF $0.61B − SBC $0.06B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$205.860.83xyesEPS $6.38 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$11.4514.92xyesBV $41.89 × (ROIC 2.1% / WACC 7.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $5.49B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$148.461.15xyesEPS $6.38 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 15.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 23.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$68.972.48xyesEPS $6.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Skilled Servicesoperatingenterprise$4.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Standard Beareroperatingenterprise$126.9mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$176.5m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.51x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.38x (net cash)
Interest coverage60.0x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Every method that measures what this company earns right now says the price is too high. Only the methods that project cash years forward reach it. Read plainly, that is the market saying it is not paying for last year's profit; it is paying for a machine that has been converting bad buildings into good ones for two decades and is expected to keep doing it. The whole bull case rests on whether that machine is real, so the useful thing to do is look at what it produced.

In 2025 it produced 46 new operations, which the 10-K states directly: "During the year ended December 31, 2025, we added 46 new operations." Consolidated revenue rose 18.7% to $5,057.8 million, with the Skilled Services segment reaching $4,837.8 million from $4,076.8 million a year earlier. That is not a company nudging up prices in a stable footprint. It is a company that has industrialized the acquisition and turnaround of skilled nursing facilities, which is a genuinely hard thing to do because the asset being improved is a workforce and a clinical reputation rather than a piece of equipment.

The clinical evidence is the part most valuation frameworks cannot see at all, and it is the actual moat. Management reported that on the most recently published federal data, same-store Ensign-affiliated facilities outperformed peers in annual survey results by 22% at the state level and 31% at the county level, and outperformed on five-star quality measures by 24% nationally, noting that many of these buildings carried one- or two-star ratings when acquired. Quality ratings are not vanity in this industry. They determine which hospitals send discharges, which is what fills beds, which is what pays for everything else. Occupancy at Same Facilities and Transitioning Facilities hit record levels of 84.3% and 85.1% in the first quarter of 2026.

The second engine is the property company built inside the operating company. The 10-K notes that "Standard Bearer elected to be taxed as a REIT, for U.S. federal income tax purposes, commencing with its taxable year ended December 31, 2022.", and describes the arrangement as one where "The Company's rental revenues are primarily generated by leasing healthcare-related properties through triple-net lease arrangements, under which the tenant is solely responsible for the costs related to the property." Owning the real estate under a growing share of its own operations means the company captures the property yield as well as the operating spread, and it gives the acquisition team a second way to structure a deal when a seller wants to keep or shed the building.

Then there is the capacity to keep going. On a funded-borrowings basis the company runs a net cash position of about 450.8 million dollars, and it reported roughly 539.5 million dollars on hand plus 591.6 million dollars of undrawn credit capacity at the end of the first quarter. Operating profit covers the interest bill more than fifty times over. What the price is asking for is roughly ten percent annual growth in operating profit over five years, which is well under the pace this company has averaged. An acquirer with no financing constraint, in a fragmented industry where nonprofits and struggling operators are exiting, does not need heroics to clear that.

Bear Case

The buyers on the other side of the table have gotten better, and two different kinds of competitor are squeezing from opposite directions. PACS grew revenue about 22.2% over its trailing year while running a 7.0% operating margin, which makes it a direct and hungry bidder for the same facilities Ensign wants. Meanwhile the businesses that keep patients out of facilities altogether are growing at least as fast and earning more per dollar: AVAH expanded about 20.5% at a 10.9% operating margin and ADUS about 19.6% at 9.8%, both above the roughly eight percent this company earns. A roll-up's returns fade when the price of the next acquisition rises, and competitive bidding is exactly how that happens. The clinical turnaround skill is real; it does not set the purchase price.

Underneath the competition sits a pricing structure the company does not control. Medicaid accounted for 59.0% of skilled nursing patient days in 2025, and roughly 46.6% of skilled services revenue came from Medicaid with another 24.7% from Medicare. Seven dollars in ten are set by state and federal budgets rather than by negotiation. How quickly that can move was demonstrated in the other direction recently: the federal minimum staffing rule finalized in April 2024 was repealed on December 2, 2025. A rule that could have imposed material cost went away by administrative decision. The same mechanism can add cost, or trim rates, on the same timetable.

The balance sheet is more complicated than the headline suggests, and the difference matters. Measured on funded borrowings alone, the company holds net cash of roughly 450.8 million dollars. Measured with the capitalized obligations on the facilities it leases rather than owns, the same balance sheet carries about 1.7 billion dollars of net obligations. Both figures are correct on their own basis, and the second one is the one that behaves like debt during a bad year, because rent on a leased skilled nursing facility does not fall when occupancy does. This is the structural fragility a roll-up of leased operations carries and an owner of buildings does not.

Which brings the argument to what the price actually requires. Today's level works out to roughly 28 times operating profit and embeds that profit growing about 10% a year for five years. The growth delivered so far has come with a specific fingerprint: revenue rose 18.7% in 2025 while 46 operations were added, and cost of services stayed at 79.5% of revenue against 79.3% the year before. In other words the margin did not improve; the base got bigger. That is a perfectly good way to run a business, but it means the priced-in growth is a bet on deal flow continuing at the same returns rather than on the existing estate becoming more profitable. Roughly 57% of companies growing at such a pace held it for five years, which is better than a coin flip and a long way from a certainty.

The capital return picture reinforces where the money is expected to go. The board authorized a $40 million repurchase program in May 2026 and raised it to $100 million in June. Against a market value above ten billion dollars, that is a rounding error rather than a return of capital, and the share count has drifted up at about 1.2% a year over the past four years. Shareholders here are funding growth, not receiving it.

Valuation

Ten percent a year, for five years. That is what today's price asks of operating profit, and it works out to paying roughly 28 times the current figure. Set against this company's own record the demand is not aggressive; the pace it has averaged over its recent history is meaningfully higher than what the price requires. Set against the base rate for companies generally, it is a real but unremarkable ask: roughly 57% of comparable fast growers held such a pace across five years. The unusual feature of this stock is not the growth requirement. It is how completely the methods disagree about whether that requirement is worth paying for.

Book-value approaches, earnings-power approaches and peer multiples all land below today's price, several of them at a fraction of it. The cash-flow approaches are the only ones that get there. That configuration has a plain reading: the market is paying a premium for durability, for a business it expects to keep compounding in a way that a snapshot of current earnings structurally cannot capture. It is a legitimate thing to pay for, and it is also the entire risk, because a durability premium is the first thing to disappear when the compounding stutters.

The peer group sharpens rather than settles it. On operating margin the company sits around eight percent, above SEM at 5.8% and PACS at 7.0%, below AVAH at 10.9% and ADUS at 9.8%. It is not the most profitable operator in its neighbourhood. What distinguishes it is the rate at which it adds operations and the clinical results it produces inside them, and neither of those is a margin.

The balance sheet needs two readings, and both belong in the analysis. Counting only funded borrowings, the company holds net cash of about 450.8 million dollars against liquid assets near 595.2 million, with operating profit covering the interest bill more than fifty times over. Counting the capitalized obligations on leased facilities alongside the borrowings, the position becomes roughly 1.7 billion dollars of net obligations. The first number is why the acquisition engine never has to stop. The second is what the estate actually owes each year regardless of how full the beds are. A buyer at $172.88 is underwriting both at once: an acquirer with real firepower, and an operator whose fixed rent obligations arrive on schedule whether or not the next 46 buildings turn around on time.

Catalysts

First-quarter results, reported April 30, 2026, came with raised guidance rather than the reverse. Consolidated revenue reached $1.39 billion, up 18.4% year on year, with Skilled Services revenue of $1.33 billion, also up 18.4%. Reported diluted earnings per share came to $1.67, up 21.9%, on net income of $99.7 million. Occupancy at Same Facilities and Transitioning Facilities reached what the company described as record highs of 84.3% and 85.1%, and the smaller property segment reported revenue of $36.1 million, up 27.1%, with funds from operations of $21.6 million.

On the back of that quarter and the deals announced alongside it, management raised full-year 2026 guidance to $7.48 to $7.62 of diluted earnings per share from an original $7.41 to $7.61, and full-year 2026 revenue to $5.81 billion to $5.86 billion from $5.77 billion to $5.84 billion, assuming about 60.0 million diluted shares and a 25.0% tax rate. The acquisition pace behind those figures is the number to track: 22 new operations were added during the quarter and since, including 21 real estate assets, bringing the count acquired during 2025 and after to 71. Management described a pipeline that includes larger portfolios, landlords looking to replace tenants, and nonprofits divesting post-acute assets, with further additions expected in the second and third quarters of 2026.

Two governance items round out the period. The board approved a $40 million share repurchase program on May 13, 2026, then increased it by $60 million on June 12, 2026, taking total authorized capacity to $100 million. Separately, and further back but still shaping the cost outlook, the federal minimum staffing standard for skilled nursing facilities that had been finalized in April 2024 was repealed on December 2, 2025, removing a labour cost mandate the whole industry had been planning around.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Skilled Services (reported)

Standard Bearer (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 10-K, filed February 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release, April 30, 2026 · company 8-K filings, June 10 and June 15, 2026

View the full interactive ENSG report on boothcheck