Enlight Renewable Energy Ltd. (ENLT): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $82.45, Enlight Renewable Energy Ltd. (ENLT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.0 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ENLT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ENLT |
| Company | Enlight Renewable Energy Ltd. |
| Sector / Industry | Utilities |
| Current price | $82.45/sh |
| Composition | Sale of electricity 99% / Sales of Green certificates 1% / Operation of facilities 0% / Construction services 0% / Management and development fees 0% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 22.7% |
| Operating margin today | 68.0% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -45.3pp |
| Must persist for | 5.0y |
| Multiple paid | 37x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2 years.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~7.6 years; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.94σ |
| sustained it ~5 years at this level | 35% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 6.73x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.76x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 6.08x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.28x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $38.67 | 2.13x | yes | FCF base $0.1B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.2%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $105.77 | 0.78x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 28.9x / 31.9x / 34.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $42.19 | 1.95x | yes | P/E 34.34x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 68x), scenarios: 27.5x / 34.3x / 41.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 18.67x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $13.15 | 6.27x | yes | BV/sh $15.10, ROE (TTM) 8.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $12.26 | 6.73x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $64.38 | 1.28x | yes | Rev $0.5B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $12.84 | 6.42x | yes | EPS $1.07, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=67.42 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.01 | 8245.00x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.16B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.2% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $12.12 | 6.80x | yes | BV $15.10 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.2%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $19.07 | 4.32x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $1.07 × BVPS $15.10) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $13.55 | 6.08x | yes | EBITDA $0.48B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $34.53 | 2.39x | yes | EPS $1.07 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $8.51 | 9.69x | yes | BV $15.10 × (ROIC 4.0% / WACC 7.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $9.24 | 8.92x | yes | Revenue $0.49B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $40.13 | 2.05x | yes | EPS $1.07 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $11.57 | 7.13x | yes | EPS $1.07 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.2b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 4.75x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 3.73x |
| Interest coverage | 2.0x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 7.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Selling electricity accounts for essentially all of Enlight's revenue, which reached $488.6 million in 2025 against $377.9 million a year earlier, and the 20-F describes the business exactly that narrowly: "We primarily generate revenue from the sale of electricity produced by our renewable energy facilities, pursuant to long-term PPAs."
- The growth is bought rather than earned: investing outflows ran to about 2.18 billion dollars in 2025 against 282.6 million dollars generated by operations, and the share count has compounded near 7.2% a year since the end of 2021.
- Next markers are second-quarter results on August 4, 2026 and construction progress at the CO Bar complex in Arizona, where a seven-bank syndicate committed 2,622 million dollars of construction financing in June 2026.
Bull Case
Almost every dollar this company raises goes to the same place. During 2025 about 2.18 billion dollars went out through investing activities while operations produced 282.6 million, and financing supplied roughly 2.0 billion to close the difference. That is not a company funding a shortfall. It is a company buying its own future output, because each project reaches commercial operation with a long-term electricity contract already attached, so capital spent this year turns into contracted revenue two or three years out. The 20-F states where growth comes from without decoration: "Our growth is predicated on the successful conversion of our large project development pipeline into Operational Projects."
What sits on the other side of that conversion is worth being specific about. The CO Bar complex in Arizona is five projects totaling 1,211 MW of solar generation and 4,000 MWh of storage. Enlight put a number on it in June 2026: total investment of 2,900 to 3,045 million dollars, against projected revenues of 250 to 260 million dollars in the first full year of operation, with an estimated 1,450 to 1,525 million dollars expected back as tax equity proceeds. The offtake is twenty-year power purchase and energy storage agreements with two Arizona utilities, signed before the concrete is poured. Whatever the risks in building it, guessing at demand is not one of them.
Storage is where the push has been hardest, and the reason is stated plainly in the filing. When too much solar arrives at midday, prices can go negative, and the 20-F describes the response: "To mitigate these risks, we are investing in energy storage battery projects which allow us to store the electricity we generate and sell it at optimal prices." The mature portfolio now carries roughly 17.5 GWh of battery capacity, about 9.5 GWh of it in the United States and 4.7 GWh in Europe. A battery beside a solar field converts a commodity sold at the worst hour of the day into one sold at the best. It is a margin lever rather than a volume lever, and it needs no new customer to work.
The commercial record supports the machine so far. Revenue grew about 29% in 2025, and the pace has not slowed since. Contrast that with what mature ownership of contracted generation actually pays: ORA earns roughly a 17.1% operating margin on 1.164 billion dollars of trailing revenue, which is the shape of the business Enlight is building toward, earned slowly across decades of asset life. The bull case is not that Enlight has arrived at those economics. It is that the company has demonstrated, repeatedly and with named lenders and named utilities behind it, that it can keep converting capital into assets that produce them.
Bear Case
The most consequential number in the forward disclosure arrives with a footnote about tariffs. When Enlight priced the CO Bar complex in June 2026, it gave a total investment range of 2,900 to 3,045 million dollars and then said the figure reflects only the United States tariffs known at that date, with actual costs potentially materially different. For a developer, an equipment tariff is not a line item to absorb. The revenue side of a project is fixed on the day the long-dated offtake agreement is signed; the cost side is still being decided by trade policy the company does not influence. Every point of unexpected equipment cost comes straight out of the equity return, and there is no price increase available to recover it.
Financing cost works the same way from the other direction. The CO Bar construction debt carries an all-in interest rate of 5.9%, converting to term loans that must be fully repaid five years after each project starts operating. A project developer's profit is the spread between a contracted tariff and the cost of the money used to build. Fix the tariff, and the spread becomes a pure function of rates at the moment of each financial close. Enlight closes several of those a year.
The price sharpens the exposure rather than cushioning it. At today's level the market is paying for the economics the company is running right now to hold for roughly five more years, with growth pinned at the ceiling the business can fund itself. Against Enlight's own recent record that pace is ordinary; the demand is on the persistence. Roughly a third of comparable fast growers have managed to hold such a pace over a stretch that long. Meanwhile the methods that value what has already been built rather than what is planned all land well under today's price: book value works out to roughly 16 dollars a share against a price near 87, and the peer-multiple and trailing-earnings lenses sit in similar territory. A holder is underwriting the pipeline, not the plant.
Two structural exposures sit underneath all of it. The first is where the company lives. The 20-F carries the risk in its own heading: "Political, economic and military conditions in Israel could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations." These are physical assets wired into a national grid, and the filing is direct about the limits of protection: "our commercial insurance does not cover losses resulting from war or terrorism." The second is that not all the revenue is contracted. "In select markets we sell electricity under the Merchant Model, where we carefully and strategically take on exposure to Merchant Risk but enter into short-term hedging agreements to actively manage that exposure." Short-dated hedges close that gap for a season, not for the life of an asset that runs for decades.
Then there is who pays for the building. The share count has compounded near 7.2% a year since the end of 2021, and the raising has continued through 2026: a private placement of ordinary shares in February, an expansion of the Series G notes in May, an automatic shelf registration filed in June. None of that is hidden or improper; it is how a developer of this shape funds itself. It does mean that an existing holder's claim on each new megawatt is slightly smaller than their claim on the last one, and that returns have to outrun the dilution to leave anything behind.
Valuation
At $86.86, the assumption embedded in the price is about duration more than about rate. The growth the price needs is not extraordinary. Held at the ceiling the business can fund from its own economics, that growth has to persist for roughly five years for the price to make sense at a 7.9% cost of capital. Measured against Enlight's own recent delivery, the pace itself is unremarkable. The persistence is the demand, and it is a real one: of comparable fast growers, only about 35% sustained that pace across a stretch of that length. Each additional point of growth would take roughly two years off the required runway, which says the price is not finely balanced on the growth rate. It is balanced on how many years the runway lasts.
Where the methods disagree is itself informative. None of the four families reaches today's price. The balance-sheet lenses stand furthest off, with book value near 16 dollars a share against a price near 87, and peer multiples and trailing earnings power sit in broadly similar territory. Forward-growth methods are the nearest, and the one that does clear the price gets there by holding the current cash-flow multiple flat all the way out to the exit year. Keep that multiple constant and the price is supported. Let it compress as the asset base matures and it is not. The whole question lives in that single input.
There is a mechanical reason the backward-looking lenses read so low, and it is worth understanding rather than waving away. In 2025 the company carried $150 million of depreciation and amortization and $118.7 million of net finance expenses, against revenue of $488.6 million. An owner of long-lived assets funded with project debt reports modest accounting earnings early and larger ones late, because the assets outlive the repayment schedule that built them. That does not make the trailing methods wrong. It makes them a measure of what has been completed rather than what is under construction, and at this company the distance between those two is most of the investment case. The CO Bar complex alone is projected to add 250 to 260 million dollars of annual revenue once fully operational, against a 2025 base of $488.6 million, and none of that appears in any trailing figure.
Which puts the weight on the balance sheet, where the tension is cleanest. Operations produced 282.6 million dollars during 2025 while investing consumed about 2.18 billion, and the difference was closed with external capital: bank construction facilities, Israeli institutional notes, and equity. Continuous access to that capital is not a side condition of the thesis. It is the thesis. The June 2026 syndicate, seven international banks committing 2,622 million dollars against a single Arizona complex, is evidence the access is currently open on terms the projects can carry. The price assumes it stays open, at roughly this cost, for another five years of building at this pace.
Catalysts
Second-quarter results land before the Tel Aviv market opens on Tuesday, August 4, 2026. The standard the company set for itself in May is specific. Enlight reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance of total revenues and income of $755 million to $785 million, which it framed as 32% growth over 2025, alongside full-year 2026 Adjusted EBITDA, its own non-IFRS measure, of $545 million to $565 million. First-quarter 2026 total revenues and income came in at $200 million, up 54% year on year, with cash flow from operating activities of $100 million, up 58%. The August print is the first check on how much of that annual range the second half has to carry.
The largest dated development since is the June 25, 2026 financial close on CO Bar. Construction financing commitments of 2,622 million dollars came from a syndicate of Wells Fargo Securities, BNP Paribas Securities, Credit Agricole CIB, Natixis, Societe Generale, MUFG Bank and Norddeutsche Landesbank, at an all-in interest rate of 5.9%. Construction of the first three projects is fully mobilized, with the remaining two expected to mobilize in the second half of 2026 and commercial operation dates spread across the second half of 2027 and the first half of 2028. Enlight expects to sign a tax equity partner during 2027 and expects each project to qualify for the 10% energy community bonus credit, with the domestic content bonus pursued on two of the five.
Funding activity has been continuous rather than episodic. In May 2026 the company completed an expansion of its Series G unsecured notes on the Tel Aviv exchange, raising about $349 million maturing in September 2033, with the entire allocation taken by Israeli institutional and classified investors. In June it filed an automatic shelf registration in the United States. Earlier in the year it closed project financing at Crimson Orchard in March and placed ordinary shares privately in February. For a business that converts capital into contracted generation, the terms on which capital arrives are as much a fundamental as the megawatts.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- LPG (DORIAN LPG LTD.)
- FY2025 10-K: …as well, and include: ● location of the vessel; ● attractiveness of the contractual terms of the voyage charter agreement; and ● competitiveness of the charter rate offered. 33 Table of Contents VLGCs operate in a highly competitive market and we expect substantial competition for providing transportation…
- FY2025 10-K: U.S. dollars but incur a portion of our expenses in other currencies, exchange rate fluctuations could adversely affect our results of operations. ● If we fail to manage our growth properly or effectively time investments, we may incur significant expenses and losses and prevent the implementation of our business…
- NBIS (Nebius Group NV)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WGS (GeneDx Holdings Corp.)
- FY2025 10-K: …in rapidly changing and competitive industries and our projections are subject to the risks and assumptions made by our management with respect to these industries. Operating results are difficult to forecast, as they generally depend on our assessment of the timing of adoption of our current and future products and…
- FY2025 10-K: …data in a changing regulatory environment at a time when the public is growing increasingly concerned about privacy. Our revenue growth rate could decline over time, and it may experience downward pressure on our operating margins in the future. Our revenue growth rate could decline over time as a result of a number…
- CORZ (Core Scientific Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …dependent on numerous factors, including credit availability from banks and other financial institutions, investor confidence in us and the regional markets in which we operate, maintenance of acceptable credit ratings or our financial performance and level of indebtedness. Other companies with which we compete may…
- FY2025 10-K: …and results of operations. We may not be able to compete effectively against our current and future competitors, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. The businesses in which we currently operate and the high-density colocation business in which we…
- APLD (Applied Digital Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: 07 4,811 Segment profit (loss) $ 4,812 $ ( 4,811 ) Fiscal Year Ended May 31, 2023 Data Center Hosting Business HPC Hosting Business Revenue $ 40,984 $ - Related party revenue 14,408 - Total segment revenue 55,392 - Costs and expenses Cost of revenues 44,374 - Selling, general and administrative 29,200 246 Total costs…
- FY2025 10-K: …• Failure to attract, grow and retain a diverse and balanced customer base, including key anchor customers, could harm our business and operating results. • We are continuing to invest in our expansion efforts but may not have sufficient customer demand in the future to realize expected returns on these investments.…
- SNDA (Sonida Senior Living, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …with funds necessary to meet our financial obligations. We are a holding company with no material direct operations. Our principal assets are the equity interests we directly or indirectly hold in our operating subsidiaries. As a result, we are dependent on loans, distributions and other payments from our…
- FY2025 10-K: …expect to continue to experience increases tied in to overall inflationary pacing. Historically, labor costs have comprised of approximately two-thirds of our total operating expenses. We began to experience pressures associated with the intensely competitive labor environment during 2022, which continued throughout…
- DAVE (Dave Inc./DE)
- FY2025 10-K: …flexibility and otherwise adversely affect our financial condition. Risks Related to Our Business and Industry The industries in which we operate are highly competitive, which could adversely affect our results of operations. The industries in which we compete are highly competitive and subject to rapid and…
- FY2025 10-K: …wage access providers are sponsoring federal and state legislative efforts that would provide support for the non-recourse earned wage products that they offer. If we are unable to differentiate our products and platform from and successfully compete with those of our competitors, or if our competitors adopt business…
- GLNG (Golar LNG Limited)
- FY2025 20-F: …or if a customer exercises its right to terminate the contract or charter, we may be unable to acquire an adequate replacement which could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, cash flows and financial condition. The temporary reduction in earnings between the maturity of the FLNG Hilli LTA in…
- FY2025 20-F: .5 ) 2026 SOFR plus margin ( 120.0 ) ( 194.5 ) Repayable on demand Fixed rate (1) (1) In 2024, the previously non-interest bearing loan with the CSSC entity began accruing interest at a fixed rate. Debt restrictions Certain of our debts are collateralized by vessel liens. The existing financing agreements impose…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
company 6-K, June 25, 2026 · FY2025 20-F, filed March 2026 · company 6-K, July 8, 2026 · Q1 2026 earnings release, May 5, 2026 · company 6-K, May 13, 2026 · Form F-3ASR filed June 23, 2026 · company 6-K filings, February 19 and March 16, 2026