EMCOR Group, Inc. (EME): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $736.56, EMCOR Group, Inc. (EME) is priced for +12.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/EME

Headline

FieldValue
TickerEME
CompanyEMCOR Group, Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$736.56/sh
CompositionUnited States electrical construction and facilities services 30% / United States mechanical construction and facilities services 42% / United States building services 18% / United States industrial services 7% / United Kingdom building services 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.4%
Operating margin today10.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.0pp
Implied growth12.6%
Multiple paid17x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 10: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.00σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)34

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.09x5expensive
Earnings2.39x4expensive
Relative0.66x2justifies
Growth0.79x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$930.360.79xyesFCF base $1.4B, growth 19% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$931.800.79xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 14.4x / 16.4x / 18.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.6x / 18.0x / 21.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$352.722.09xyesBV/sh $92.47, ROE (TTM) 35.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$737.241.00xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$805.700.91xyesRev $18.6B, growth 19% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.4x / 1.7x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$1052.820.70xyesEPS $32.11, growth 33% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.69 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$200.523.67xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.15B × (1−27%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$550.191.34xyesBV $92.47 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 35.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$258.472.85xyes√(22.5 × EPS $32.11 × BVPS $92.47) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.00B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$276.452.66xyesFCF $1171.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1036.080.71xyesEPS $32.11 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$90.288.16xyesBV $92.47 × (ROIC 8.8% / WACC 9.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $18.60B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$1204.130.61xyesEPS $32.11 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$347.142.12xyesEPS $32.11 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
United States electrical construction and facilities servicesoperatingenterprise$5.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
United States mechanical construction and facilities servicesoperatingenterprise$7.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
United States building servicesoperatingenterprise$3.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value
United States industrial servicesoperatingenterprise$1.3bwithheldunresolved no unit value
United Kingdom building servicesoperatingenterprise$471.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$661.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.47x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.34x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.2%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One number carries this thesis, and everything else is commentary on it. Remaining performance obligations, which is contracted work signed but not yet built, stood at a record $15.62 billion at the end of March 2026, against $11.75 billion a year earlier. For a company that reported consolidated revenues of $16.99 billion across all of 2025, that is close to a year of work already under contract before a single new bid is won. Change that number and the verdict changes with it. Nothing else in the file has the same leverage.

The quality of the backlog matters as much as the size, and the annual report is unusually direct on the point: "We believe our reported remaining performance obligations for our construction contracts are firm and contract cancellations have not had a material adverse effect on us." The reason is economic rather than legal. A customer who cancels a half-built mechanical system in a data center does not save money; they lose a year. That asymmetry is what makes this backlog behave more like revenue than like a pipeline.

Where the work sits is the second thing worth knowing. Mechanical construction and facilities services is the largest line in the business, carrying roughly 42% of revenue and $6.93 billion of the backlog at the end of 2025, with electrical construction next at about 30% of revenue and $4.96 billion of backlog. Backlog grew $3.15 billion across 2025, of which acquisitions including Miller Electric contributed about $1.61 billion and the rest came from new awards. The annual report attributes the largest sector increases to "network and communications, predominantly as a result of several data center construction contracts", followed by institutional work for colleges and universities and by water and wastewater projects in the Southeast.

Then there is the part that separates a good contractor from a busy one. In the first quarter of 2026 operating income reached $403.8 million, or 8.7% of revenues, against 8.2% a year earlier, while selling and administrative costs fell to 9.9% of revenues from 10.4%. Volume growth in construction is easy to buy by bidding badly. Margin expansion during volume growth is the only durable evidence that the estimating discipline is real, because every point of it has to be earned on job sites where the cost was fixed before the work started.

Capital allocation has been unspectacular and effective. The share count has fallen roughly 4.1% a year across the four years to March 2026, and the balance sheet holds more cash than borrowings, so growth has been funded from operations rather than from the credit market. Management has also earned some benefit of the doubt on its own numbers: since 2007 it has raised guidance on 29 separate occasions, reaffirmed on 4 and withdrawn it once, and of the five revenue guides that can be scored against reported results, all five were delivered.

Bear Case

The competition is winning the same boom faster, and that is the uncomfortable place to start. FIX carries trailing revenue of roughly 10.1 billion dollars growing 38.4% year over year at an operating margin near 15.7%. STRL is smaller, about 2.88 billion dollars, but growing 37.0% at an operating margin close to 16.9%. PWR is larger, near 30.1 billion dollars, and still growing 21.1%. EMCOR's own trailing operating margin runs about 9%. Every one of those companies is bidding for the same electrical and mechanical scope on the same data centers, and two of them are converting it into profit at nearly double the rate.

The 10-K does not pretend otherwise. "Our industry is highly competitive. Our industry is served by numerous small, owner-operated private companies, a few public companies, and several large regional companies." And the threat is not only from other contractors: "We may also face competition from the in-house service organizations of existing or prospective customers, particularly with respect to building services." A hyperscaler that decides to bring electrical fit-out in house does not need to beat anyone on price. It just stops buying.

The backlog itself carries a concentration the headline growth rate hides. The largest increases came from network and communications, which is data centers, while the annual report notes a reduction in obligations from the high-tech manufacturing sector as certain semiconductor construction projects completed. That is what a cycle looks like from inside: one sector rolling off while another carries the number. The question is not whether data center construction is real. It is what happens to a book of business this size when the sector that built it pauses to digest.

Set that against what the price asks. At roughly 21 times company-wide operating profit, today's quote implies operating profit compounding about 21.3% a year for five years. The company's own recent record supports the rate; the demand is that it persists, and of comparable fast-growers, only about 36% managed five years at that pace. Management's own outlook is more modest than the price: revenues of $18.50 billion to $19.25 billion for 2026 against $16.99 billion in 2025, with an operating margin band of 9.0% to 9.4%. That is roughly a tenth of growth at the revenue line and a small step at the margin line, not a fifth compounding for half a decade.

The delivery risk is structural to the trade. The annual report explains that "Cost and scheduling estimates are based on a number of assumptions, including those about future economic conditions, commodity and other materials pricing, job-site productivity, cost and availability of labor, equipment, and materials, and supply chain efficiency, among other factors." and separately that "Trade and sanction policies (including tariffs) may also affect the pricing of such supplies and materials." On a fixed-price contract the price is agreed first and the costs arrive later. When copper, switchgear or skilled electricians reprice mid-project, the gap is absorbed by the contractor, and the industry's own competitive factor list puts availability of a skilled workforce at the top.

There is one more reading of the numbers that deserves airtime. The earnings-power approaches land far below the price, and they do so for a specific reason: they capitalise a five-year average of operating profit of about $1.06 billion rather than the trailing figure of roughly $1.54 billion. Whether that is conservatism or realism depends entirely on whether the last two years are the new base or the top of a construction cycle. Nobody knows yet, and the price has already decided.

Valuation

Price measured against operating profit is the right frame for a contractor, because book value says almost nothing about a business whose main assets are relationships, estimating skill and a fleet of roughly 14,600 vehicles. On that basis the market is paying about 21 times company-wide operating profit. Inverted, that quote implies operating profit compounding around 21.3% a year for the next five years, discounted at a 9.9% cost of capital with 4% growth assumed thereafter. The rate itself is not exotic for this company. Across the sixteen years of record behind it, the pace being asked for sits inside what has recently been delivered, and the stretch lies in how long it must persist rather than in the rate.

The disagreement among approaches splits down an interesting seam. The peer-multiple methods and the cash-flow methods both land above today's quote, meaning the price sits below what either supports. The asset-based approaches and the earnings-power approaches land well underneath, with the price roughly two and a half times above where the earnings-power group arrives. That is not the usual pattern of an expensive growth stock, where only the forward methods reach the price. It is the pattern of a business whose recent profitability is far above its own multi-year average, so approaches anchored on the average say expensive and approaches anchored on the run rate say reasonable.

That distinction is worth making concrete because it is the whole argument. One earnings-power approach capitalises a five-year average operating profit of about $1.06 billion at a zero-growth perpetuity. Trailing operating profit is roughly $1.54 billion, on a trailing operating margin near 9%. The method is not wrong; it is answering a different question, namely what the business is worth if the last two years were unusual. Management's 2026 guide of a 9.0% to 9.4% operating margin band says the company does not think they were.

Cohort position sharpens rather than settles it. FIX runs an operating margin near 15.7% on about 10.1 billion dollars of trailing revenue; STRL near 16.9% on about 2.88 billion dollars; PWR about 5.7% on roughly 30.1 billion dollars, and MTZ under 1% on about 15.3 billion dollars. The spread inside this cohort is enormous, which tells you profitability here is a function of project mix and execution rather than of the industry itself. Sitting at about 9% places this business above the large diversified contractors and below the specialists that have concentrated hardest on the highest-margin work.

The revenue base is more diversified than the backlog. Mechanical construction and facilities services carries roughly 42% of revenue, electrical construction about 30%, building services 18% and industrial services 7%, and the recurring service work inside the building services line is the part that does not depend on new construction starting. Backlog, by contrast, tilts harder toward the two construction segments, which is where the growth is and also where the estimating risk lives.

On the balance sheet there is little to argue about. Cash exceeds borrowings, the company is not consuming cash, and the share count has fallen about 4.1% a year over the four years to March 2026. That combination removes financing from the list of things that could go wrong, and it leaves the entire question resting on the one place it belongs: whether the backlog keeps converting at the margin the last two years have produced.

Catalysts

The most recent print, on April 29, 2026, was a record on both lines that matter. First-quarter revenues reached $4.63 billion, up 19.7% year over year, or 16.8% on an organic basis once acquisitions and the sale of the United Kingdom operations are stripped out. Diluted earnings came in at $6.84 per share against $5.26 a year earlier, and operating income reached $403.8 million, or 8.7% of revenues, against 8.2% in the prior-year quarter.

Backlog was the headline. Remaining performance obligations stood at $15.62 billion as of March 31, 2026, against $13.25 billion at the end of December and $11.75 billion a year earlier. The company reported increases across most of its sectors, with the largest coming from network and communications, water and wastewater, institutional and healthcare work. Chief executive Tony Guzzi described the bookings as notable for their quality and diversity and said the business was well positioned for the remainder of the year.

Guidance moved up with it. Full-year 2026 revenue guidance was raised to a range of $18.50 billion to $19.25 billion from $17.75 billion to $18.50 billion, and diluted earnings guidance to $28.25 to $29.75 per share from $27.25 to $29.25, with the operating margin band left unchanged at 9.0% to 9.4%. The margin band being held while the revenue range moved is the detail to watch. It says the company expects to grow into the backlog without paying for the growth in profitability, and the next quarterly report is the first real test of that.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

United States electrical construction and facilities services (reported)

United States mechanical construction and facilities services (reported)

United States building services (reported)

United States industrial services (reported)

United Kingdom building services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, April 29, 2026

View the full interactive EME report on boothcheck