ELEVANCE HEALTH, INC. (ELV): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $394.43, ELEVANCE HEALTH, INC. (ELV) is priced for 12.2% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ELV

Headline

FieldValue
TickerELV
CompanyELEVANCE HEALTH, INC.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$394.43/sh
CompositionHealth Benefits 84% / CarelonRx 12% / Carelon Services 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed12.2%
Return on equity now12.9%
ROE gap-0.7pp
Price-to-book1.91x

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.3% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.53σ
cohort percentile (of 78 peers)51
sustained it ~10 years at this level69%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.45x4expensive
Earnings1.62x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthnoFCF base $6.7B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.0%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowthnoExit EV/EBITDA: 17.6x / 19.6x / 21.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 17x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.3x / 17.0x / 19.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13.57x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$247.401.59xyesBV/sh $206.96, ROE (TTM) 11.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$269.561.46xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $201.1B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.4x / 0.4x / 0.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $22.59, growth 7% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.43 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $7.95B × (1−25%) / WACC 7.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$273.831.44xyesBV $206.96 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.2%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$324.331.22xyes√(22.5 × EPS $22.59 × BVPS $206.96) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $5.45B × sector EV/EBITDA 11.0x
FCF YieldEarningsnoFCF $6289.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsnoSBC-adj FCF $6.04B (FCF $6.29B − SBC $0.24B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $22.59 × (8.5 + 2×7.1%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetnoBV $206.96 × (ROIC 2.0% / WACC 7.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $201.11B × sector P/S 0.7x
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $22.59 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 7.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 10.6x
Earnings YieldEarnings$244.221.62xyesEPS $22.59 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Health Benefitsfinancialequity$167.1bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
CarelonRxfinancialequity$24.5bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Carelon Servicesfinancialequity$7.1bwithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.7%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

What the market is asking of this company is unusually modest, and that is the whole opening argument. At roughly 1.9 times book value, the price requires a sustained return on equity of about 12.1%. The business has recently been earning about 12.9%. Stretch the window across the nineteen years of record and the long-run average has run higher still, closer to 13.3%. Slightly less than the company has actually been producing is what is being asked for. Large-cap franchises do not often trade at a level that assumes mild deterioration.

The reason the return has held is a licence, not a product. The annual report describes the company as "one of the largest health insurers in the United States in terms of medical membership", and reports that "As of December 31, 2025, we provided health benefit and other healthcare services to approximately 34 million Blue Cross and/or Blue Shield enrollees." Blue Cross rights are granted by geography and cannot be bought into. A competitor with a better product and more capital still cannot put the Blue on a card in Indiana or California. That is a strange sort of moat, defended by a trademark association rather than by technology, and it has proven remarkably durable.

Bolted onto that is the part investors tend to underweight. Carelon, the pharmacy and care-services arm, generated $19.2 billion of operating revenue in the second quarter, up 6% on the prior year, on an operating margin of 4.9% against 2.1% in the insurance segment. The services arm turns each revenue dollar into more operating profit than the insurance arm it grew out of, and it is growing faster. The 10-K is direct about why the two belong together, noting that the Health Benefits segment "benefits from working with our Carelon businesses, which support medical and pharmacy cost management, care coordination" and related functions. Cost management sold to your own insurance arm converts an expense line into a revenue line.

Scale matters here in a way it does not in most industries, because the cohort is currently sorting itself out on exactly that dimension. CNC carries trailing revenue of about 198 billion dollars, close to this company's own base, and is running a negative operating margin. MOH operates at roughly a 1% operating margin and HUM at about 1.8%, while UNH, the sector's standard-setter, runs near 4.2%. Elevance's consolidated operating margin of 3.5% in the second quarter puts it in the upper half of that spread during a period when two of its closest competitors are struggling to stay above water.

Capital allocation has been quietly relentless. The share count has fallen roughly 2.6% a year over the four years to March 2026, and about 73% of earnings has been returned as dividends plus buybacks. In the second quarter the company bought back 0.7 million shares for 234 million dollars, a weighted average of 344.62 dollars per share, which is below where the stock trades today, and it declared a third-quarter dividend of $1.72 per share on July 14, 2026 with about 5.3 billion dollars of repurchase authorisation still available. A required return of 12.1% is a much easier thing to deliver when the equity base is shrinking underneath it.

The forecasting record supports the benefit of the doubt. Since 2006 management has raised guidance on 23 separate occasions, cut it on 2, reaffirmed it on 73 and withdrawn it once. That is not a company that has repeatedly had to explain itself.

Bear Case

The variable with the most leverage over this thesis does not work for a competitor. It works for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and for fifty state Medicaid agencies. The 10-K describes the mechanism without editorial: "Our revenue from Medicare policies is based on bids submitted to CMS six months prior to the start of the contract year." and "CMS has explicit gain and loss margin requirements within the bids, as well as contract-specific federal MLR annual requirements." Read that as a business model. The price is committed half a year before the cost is known, inside margin bands somebody else sets. When medical utilisation runs above the assumption, there is no mid-year repricing available. The loss is simply taken.

That is not hypothetical, because it is happening. The benefit expense ratio reached 89.7% in the second quarter of 2026, up 80 basis points on the prior year, which management attributed to elevated medical cost trend in the Government businesses. The annual report said the same thing about the prior year: "Our benefit expense ratio increased primarily as a result of higher medical cost trend across all lines of business within our Health Benefits segment, principally within our ACA business." When roughly ninety cents of every premium dollar goes back out as claims, one point of unexpected cost trend eats a large fraction of what is left. Health Benefits operating gain fell to $0.9 billion in the quarter from $1.6 billion, and that segment's operating margin to 2.1% from 3.8%.

Meanwhile the mix is drifting the wrong way. Medicare Advantage membership fell 15.9% year over year, Medicaid 4.3%, and commercial risk-based membership 4.6%, while employer group fee-based membership rose 1.7%. Fee-based business earns an administration fee; risk-based business earns the spread between premium and claims. Losing the second while holding the first shrinks the earnings base even when the headcount looks stable, and total medical membership still slipped by 469 thousand in a single quarter.

Now put that against what the price requires. At about 1.9 times book, today's quote needs a sustained return on equity near 12.1%, against roughly 12.9% currently earned. That gap reads as comfortable until two things are added. First, persistence: of companies earning at this level, only about 69% held it for a decade. Second, the discount rate. The calculation runs on an 8.3% cost of equity, and each additional percentage point on that input raises the required return by roughly 1.9 percentage points. Add a point and a half to the cost of equity and the return required moves above what the business currently produces. If the return does not hold, the price-to-book multiple it supports compresses, and the compression arrives on the whole equity base at once rather than segment by segment.

The cohort is the evidence that this is not a company-specific worry. CNC, operating at roughly the same revenue scale, is currently running an operating loss, and MOH is holding an operating margin near 1%. HUM sits close to 1.8%. Same regulatory calendar, same cost trend, same bid mechanics, materially different outcomes on the income statement. Whatever is squeezing the sector is not squeezing every balance sheet equally, but the pressure itself is general, and this company is inside it rather than outside.

One further item belongs on the list. The Blue Cross franchise cuts both ways, because the licence carries obligations as well as rights. The 10-K notes that "Each BCBSA licensee is an independent legal organization and is not responsible for obligations of other BCBSA member organizations." and that licensees must perform administrative services for members of other licensees. The arrangement that protects the territory also binds the company into a shared system whose rules it does not set alone.

Valuation

An insurer is read on the capital it holds and the return it earns on that capital, not on a multiple of operating profit, which is why the relevant frame here is book value. At roughly 1.9 times book, the price on July 25, 2026 embeds a specific expectation for return on equity: about 12.1%, sustained. The business has recently been earning about 12.9%. Mild deterioration from there, in other words, rather than improvement. The arithmetic behind that comparison runs a five-year stage discounted at 8.3%, with long-run growth of 4% thereafter, and it places this book multiple in the upper half of the peer group without demanding the peer group's best economics.

The valuation approaches split in a specific and informative way. Only the cash-flow methods reach the price. The earnings-power methods land where the price sits roughly 48% above them, and the peer-multiple methods leave the price about a third above what they support, while the book-value-and-profitability approaches also fall short. When the static frames all land under the quote and only the long-horizon cash-flow methods clear it, the premium being paid is for durability rather than for anything visible in a trailing period.

It is worth being precise about how those cash-flow methods get there, because the mechanism matters. The perpetual-growth version starts from a free-cash base of about $6.8 billion growing 9%, discounts at 6.9%, and assumes 4% growth forever after. With less than three points between the discount rate and the assumed perpetual growth rate, the terminal value carries most of the answer. That is not a reason to dismiss the result; it is a reason to read it as a statement about the far tail rather than about the next five years.

The revenue split and the profit split do not match, which is the more useful lens on the business. Health Benefits carries about 84% of revenue, CarelonRx 12% and Carelon Services 4%, and the annual report identifies the drivers of the first as "membership levels and the health status of our members, premium pricing, medical cost trend, network performance, risk adjustment accuracy, quality ratings, and operating efficiency". Yet in the second quarter of 2026 the Carelon side produced an operating margin of 4.9% against 2.1% for Health Benefits. A blended multiple on this company is a weighted average of two different economics, and the smaller weight currently carries the better one.

Among peers the spread is wide enough to make cohort position meaningful rather than decorative. UNH runs an operating margin near 4.2% on trailing revenue of roughly 450 billion dollars; CNC, at about 198 billion dollars of revenue, is operating at a loss. The consolidated operating margin here was 3.5% in the second quarter. A book multiple in the upper half of the group is therefore a wager on staying among the operators that hold margin through this cost cycle, not a wager on the group as a whole.

The balance sheet question for a company funded by premiums and float is not leverage or coverage; it is how much capital can be sent to shareholders and how reliably. About 73% of earnings has gone out as dividends plus buybacks, the share count has fallen roughly 2.6% a year over four years, and parent-company cash and investments stood near 2.1 billion dollars at the end of June with about 5.3 billion dollars of repurchase authorisation left. That machinery is the quiet reason a 12.1% required return is achievable without heroic growth. It also means the denominator, not the numerator, is doing a meaningful share of the work.

Catalysts

The second-quarter print landed on July 15, 2026 and moved the guidance up. Operating revenue was $49.8 billion, an increase of 0.8% on the prior-year quarter, and diluted earnings came in at $6.71 per share. Full-year 2026 diluted earnings guidance was raised to at least $20.10 per share and full-year operating cash flow guidance to at least $6.0 billion. Management framed the quarter as the base for a return to at least 12% growth in its adjusted earnings measure in 2027.

The operating detail underneath is more mixed than the headline. The benefit expense ratio rose 80 basis points to 89.7%, and the consolidated operating margin fell to 3.5% from 4.9% a year earlier, with the adjusted operating expense ratio up 100 basis points to 11.0% on what the company describes as targeted investments in workforce and capabilities. Days in claims payable stood at 45.4 as of June 30, 2026, down 1.2 days from March 31 and up 2.9 days on the prior year. Total medical membership was approximately 44.9 million, a sequential decline of 469 thousand driven by a known commercial fee-based customer transition and anticipated attrition in Individual ACA and Medicaid.

Capital return continued on schedule. The company repurchased 0.7 million shares during the quarter for 234 million dollars, a weighted average of 344.62 dollars per share, leaving roughly 5.3 billion dollars of board-approved authorisation. On July 14, 2026 the audit committee declared a third-quarter dividend of $1.72 per share, payable September 25, 2026 to shareholders of record on September 10. The next visible test is whether the cost trend in the Government lines behaves well enough for the raised full-year figure to hold through the back half.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Health Benefits (reported)

CarelonRx (reported)

Carelon Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 earnings release, July 15, 2026

View the full interactive ELV report on boothcheck