ECOLAB INC. (ECL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $286.75, ECOLAB INC. (ECL) is priced for +22.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ECL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerECL
CompanyECOLAB INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Defensive
Current price$286.75/sh
CompositionProduct and equipment sales 78% / Service and lease sales 22%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)19.2%
Operating margin today16.9%
Margin expansion (value-band)+2.3pp
Implied growth22.7%
Multiple paid32x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.95σ
cohort percentile (of 69 peers)83

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.51x5expensive
Earnings3.56x5expensive
Relative5.45x2expensive
Growth1.31x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$148.691.93xyesFCF base $1.9B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$251.841.14xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 23.3x / 25.3x / 27.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 26.79x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 38x), scenarios: 22.5x / 26.8x / 31.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 17.39x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$81.633.51xyesBV/sh $35.87, ROE (TTM) 21.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$122.142.35xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$219.321.31xyesRev $16.8B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.0x / 4.8x / 5.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$89.403.21xyesEPS $7.45, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=15.51 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$76.593.74xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.26B × (1−22%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$116.342.46xyesBV $35.87 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 21.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$77.553.70xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.45 × BVPS $35.87) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $3.03B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$85.493.35xyesFCF $1874.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$80.253.57xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.74B (FCF $1.87B − SBC $0.14B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$83.663.43xyesEPS $7.45 × (8.5 + 2×2.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$36.197.92xyesBV $35.87 × (ROIC 9.3% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $16.84B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$37.257.70xyesEPS $7.45 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 2.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 3.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$80.543.56xyesEPS $7.45 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Global Wateroperatingenterprise$7.7bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Global Institutional & Specialtyoperatingenterprise$6.0bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Global Life Sciencesoperatingenterprise$706.1mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$9.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.20x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.26x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.4%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The direction of travel is the argument here, not the level. In the March 2026 quarter the company reported Reported net sales increased 10% to $4,066.1 million and organic sales increased 4%. Underneath that, the Global Institutional & Specialty segment lifted its organic operating income margin by 1.8 percentage points, and the 10-Q is specific about where it came from: 2.7 points of value pricing, less 0.9 points spent back on investment in the business. Pricing did more work than volume, and it did that work while the company was funding its own expansion. Both engines running at once is rarer than it sounds.

What makes the pricing hold is the shape of the relationship. Ecolab does not sell a drum of chemistry and leave. It puts equipment into a hotel laundry, a food plant, a cooling tower or a hospital, then services it and sells the consumables that keep it running. Switching supplier means changing a process that has been validated and audited, often under food-safety or infection-control rules, which is a different decision from changing a commodity vendor. The FY2025 10-K describes the result plainly enough: Our retention rate of significant customers has aligned with our acquisition assumptions, a sentence about acquired customer bases that says the installed relationships survived the change of ownership.

The mix is also moving toward the parts that compound best. Organic sales for Global Pest Elimination increased 7% in the first quarter of 2026 driven by gains in restaurants, food retail, food & beverage and healthcare. Pest elimination is a pure service line with recurring contracts and route density that improves as the customer count rises. Meanwhile, effective January 2026 the company reorganized its reporting so that Global Life Sciences was elevated to a standalone reportable segment. That is management putting a growing, higher-margin business where investors can see it separately, which is usually a sign they expect the numbers to bear the scrutiny.

Capital allocation supports the same read. The company is not burning cash, operating income covers its interest bill about 8.8 times over, and the share count has been coming down at roughly 0.4% a year across the four years to March 2026. That is a slow retirement rather than an aggressive one, but it is real, and it means the growth the price requires is not being diluted away while it happens.

The bull case does not depend on Ecolab becoming a different company. It depends on the pricing mechanism that produced the March quarter continuing to work in a market where customers buy on validated performance rather than on unit cost, and on management keeping enough of that price after commodity costs take their share.

Bear Case

The moat is real, and it is being spent rather than banked. The clearest evidence sits in one sentence of the March 2026 10-Q: Underlying gross margin was stable as strong value pricing was offset by higher commodity costs. Strong pricing produced stability, not expansion. When a company with genuine switching costs pushes price hard and the result is a flat underlying margin, the pricing power is functioning as a defence against input inflation rather than as a source of widening returns. That is a materially different business from the one a top-of-cohort multiple implies.

Growth tells a similar story once acquisitions and currency are stripped out. Fixed currency sales were stable in 2025. In the March 2026 quarter, reported sales rose 10% while organic sales rose 4%, with acquisitions contributing 3 points and currency translation 4. Reported operating margin barely moved over the same comparison, up about a third of a percentage point. Buying growth and translating growth are both legitimate, but they are not the same asset as generating it, and the multiple is priced for the third kind.

Then there is the competitive question the company raises itself. The FY2025 10-K states that There can be no assurance that we will be able to accomplish our technology development goals or that technological developments by our competitors, including in the area of artificial intelligence, will not place certain of our products, technology or services at a competitive disadvantage in the future. A meaningful part of Ecolab's defensibility is the sensor-and-monitoring layer wrapped around the chemistry, the part that tells a customer their water loop or their kitchen is performing. That layer is software-shaped, and software-shaped advantages erode faster than chemistry patents do.

The external environment adds its own pressure. The same filing notes that Over the past year, changes in global trade policies, including the imposition of tariffs, import and export restrictions, and retaliatory trade actions, as well as implications of geopolitical situations in Europe, the Middle East, China, and Russia, have resulted in economic and demand uncertainty. For a business whose raw materials and finished goods cross borders continuously, that is a direct cost and volume risk, not background noise.

All of this matters because of what the price requires. Roughly 32 times company-wide operating income asks for profit growth at the ceiling the business can self-fund, sustained for about five and a half years, and only about 35% of comparable fast growers have historically held that pace over such a span. The multiple already sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. Meanwhile PG earns a 23.2% operating margin on $86.7 billion of revenue and CHD earns 17.3%, both comfortably above Ecolab's trailing operating margin of about 16.6%. If the duration assumption shortens by even a couple of years, the correction does not come out of the business. It comes out of the multiple, and the multiple is most of the price.

Valuation

Start with what the price is asking for. Ecolab's market value works out to about 32 times company-wide operating income, and running that backwards produces a requirement measured in time rather than in speed: operating profit compounding at the fastest rate the business can fund from its own cash flow, held there for roughly five and a half years. The rate itself is not the unusual part, since recent quarters have delivered it. The unusual part is the persistence, and the record on persistence is thin. Only about 35% of comparable fast growers sustained that level over a similar span.

None of the standard ways of valuing a business reaches today's price. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize what the company earns now and credit nothing further, sit at roughly a quarter of what the market pays, so the price stands at about four times that family's central estimate. The asset-value family, book value plus the return earned above the cost of equity, is about three and a half times below the price on the same reading. Peer multiples land closer, with the price at about two and a third times that family. Only the forward-growth methods come near, and the one that comes nearest does so by holding today's cash-profit multiple flat all the way out to its terminal year. Assuming the multiple never compresses is not an answer to the question the multiple poses.

The cohort comparison sharpens it. Ecolab's trailing operating margin runs about 16.6%. PG earns a 23.2% operating margin on $86.7 billion of revenue, and CHD earns 17.3%. The premium here is not being paid for current profitability, on which Ecolab trails both. It is being paid for the belief that the installed base converts into a longer runway of margin gains than a consumer-products peer can offer. Revenue mix is the one structural argument for that: in the March quarter product and equipment sales were $3,174.6 million and service and lease sales $891.5 million, and the service portion is the part that renews.

The balance sheet funds the bet without shortening it. Operating income covers the interest bill about 8.8 times over, cash generation is positive, and the share count has drifted down about 0.4% a year over four years, which is buyback deployment showing up where it cannot be faked. The debt is long and cheaply struck: the 10-Q shows long-term debt including current maturities of 8.19 billion dollars carried against a fair value of 7.35 billion dollars, the arithmetic of coupons fixed before rates moved. That combination bounds the downside on solvency. It does nothing for the duration assumption, which is where the price actually lives.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for July 28, 2026. Two lines from the March quarter set the test. The first is whether value pricing can move from holding underlying gross margin flat to expanding it, since the 10-Q attributed the March result to pricing being offset by higher commodity costs. The second is organic growth, which ran at 4% while reported sales rose 10%; the gap is acquisitions and currency, and only the organic figure speaks to the durability the price is paying for.

Sell-side positioning has moved decisively in one direction this year. Oppenheimer upgraded the shares to Outperform on ramping growth in July 2026, UBS moved to Buy from Neutral in May 2026, Citi opened a 90-day upside catalyst watch in late June 2026, and Deutsche Bank raised its target to $335 from $325 in July 2026. Those figures sit above where every standard valuation frame lands in this report, and the difference is what the street credits and these methods do not: acquisition contribution and a continuation of price-led margin gains carried forward rather than held flat.

One structural change is already filed rather than forecast. Effective January 2026 the company reorganized its reporting segments, folding its former healthcare business into Institutional and elevating Life Sciences to stand on its own. From the second quarter onward, investors get a separate line on the bioprocessing and pharmaceutical hygiene business, which the company reinforced with a new advanced development and applications centre in Korea announced in the spring. Cleaner disclosure cuts both ways: it will show the growth if the growth is there, and it will show the absence just as clearly.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Global Water (reported)

Global Institutional & Specialty (reported)

Global Life Sciences (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

earnings calendar via stockanalysis.com, July 2026 · Oppenheimer research note, July 2026 · UBS research note, May 2026 · Citi research note, June 2026 · Deutsche Bank research note, July 2026 · company announcement, April 2026

View the full interactive ECL report on boothcheck