DXP Enterprises, Inc. (DXPE): what the price requires

At today's price, DXP Enterprises, Inc. (DXPE) is priced for +14.8% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.

Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DXPE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDXPE
CompanyDXP Enterprises, Inc.
Current price$159.95/sh
CompositionService Centers (SC) 68% / Innovative Pumping Solutions (IPS) 19% / Supply Chain Services (SCS) 13%

What The Price Requires (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin needed2.5%
Operating margin today8.6%
Margin compression implied-6.1pp
Implied growth14.8%
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.7pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.13σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)38
sustained it ~5 years at this level45%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.61x5expensive
Earnings5.10x5expensive
Relative1.55x5expensive
Growth1.02x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$156.761.02xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$157.431.02xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 16.2x / 18.2x / 20.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$119.831.33xyesP/E 21.52x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 30x), scenarios: 17.9x / 21.5x / 25.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13.86x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$58.162.75xyesBV/sh $31.29, ROE (TTM) 17.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$78.262.04xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$116.191.38xyesRev $2.1B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.3x / 1.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$68.842.32xyesEPS $5.34, growth 13% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.31 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$31.355.10xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.13B × (1−25%) / WACC 7.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$78.542.04xyesBV $31.29 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$61.312.61xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.34 × BVPS $31.29) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$91.181.75xyesEBITDA $0.18B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$22.127.23xyesFCF $97.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$18.038.87xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.09B (FCF $0.10B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$153.421.04xyesEPS $5.34 × (8.5 + 2×12.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$11.4813.93xyesBV $31.29 × (ROIC 2.7% / WACC 7.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$314.800.51xyesRevenue $2.06B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$103.251.55xyesEPS $5.34 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 19.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$57.732.77xyesEPS $5.34 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$638.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.93x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.70x
Interest coverage2.8x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

DXP is an industrial-distribution roll-up priced as a durable compounder: at $173.89 only the growth-DCF method reaches the price (asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple frames sit below), with an implied durability of about twelve and a half years.

The growth is acquisition-driven: Q1 2026 sales rose 9.5% to $521.7 million, but $40.7 million came from three acquisitions bought for about $126.3 million, and net income actually slipped year over year as the share count dilutes near 3.45% a year.

The operating signals are constructive (adjusted EBITDA of $57.8 million, sales per business day up 28% in the quarter, rising bookings, $213.4 million of cash for more deals), but the price leans on continued accretive M&A through cyclical industrial and energy end-markets.

Bull Case

Look at where $173.89 (June 27, 2026) lands against the valuation methods and the pattern is telling: asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple frames all sit below the price, and only the growth-DCF reaches it. That spread is the signature of a compounder whose value lives in the future rather than in a static snapshot, and DXP has earned that profile by executing a roll-up of the fragmented industrial-distribution market. The company itself describes the dynamic, noting that customers' focus on fewer suppliers has driven consolidation in a fragmented industry [DXPE FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012382], and DXP is one of the consolidators.

The operating momentum supports the durability the price assumes. Q1 2026 sales rose 9.5% to $521.7 million, adjusted EBITDA reached $57.8 million, sales per business day grew 28% between January and March, gross margins improved both sequentially and year over year, and management flagged that bookings are trending higher and backlog is healthy to higher. For a distributor, rising bookings and per-day sales are the leading indicators that demand is accelerating, not fading.

The engine underneath is the acquisition machine plus the recurring MRO base. DXP runs three segments led by Service Centers (about 68% of the mix), which sells maintenance, repair, and operating products through customized integrated service [DXPE FY2025 10-K, accession 0001628280-26-012382], a sticky, reorder-driven business. On top of that base, DXP completed three acquisitions in the first quarter, adding $40.7 million of acquisition sales for about $126.3 million invested, with $213.4 million of cash on hand to keep buying. A disciplined consolidator with a sticky distribution base, expanding margins, accelerating bookings, and dry powder for more deals is the kind of durable compounder that the static methods cannot price but the growth methods can, which is exactly why the price sits where it does.

Bear Case

The qualitative truth about DXP is that its growth is bought, not grown, and the price treats acquired growth as if it were organic and permanent. The headline 9.5% sales increase in Q1 2026 included $40.7 million of revenue that came from three acquisitions, purchased for about $126.3 million; strip out the deals and the organic picture is far more modest. A roll-up looks like a fast grower as long as it keeps doing deals, but the moment the acquisition pace slows, or the price paid for targets rises, the growth rate the market is paying for evaporates. The price embeds about twelve and a half years of sustained, elevated economics, an extraordinarily long runway to underwrite for a business whose growth depends on a continuous deal pipeline.

The disconnect between price and fundamentals is stark once you look past the multiple. Net income actually slipped year over year in Q1, to $19.98 million from $20.59 million, even as sales grew, because acquisitions bring integration costs, financing costs, and dilution. The share count has been diluting at roughly 3.45% a year, a meaningful drag that means per-share value grows more slowly than enterprise value, and acquisitions funded partly with stock and debt carry both interest expense and integration risk. The earnings-power frame implies the price is many times the no-growth value of the business, the asset frame says the same, and only the growth-DCF reaches the price by extrapolating the deal-fueled growth far into the future.

The cyclicality is the structural caution. DXP's Service Centers and Innovative Pumping Solutions segments serve industrial, energy, and infrastructure end-markets, and the pump business in particular tracks oil-and-gas and capital-spending cycles. Industrial distribution is a thin-margin, demand-sensitive business; when industrial activity slows, both organic volumes and the appetite for accretive acquisitions contract at the same time, exactly when the roll-up most needs them. The bear case is that a fairly run consolidator is priced for a dozen years of uninterrupted, deal-driven compounding through cyclical end-markets, with dilution quietly eroding the per-share math, and the conservative methods saying the static value is well below the price.

Valuation

DXP is a durability-premium valuation built on a roll-up, and the method spread shows how much of the price depends on the consolidation continuing. The inversion runs on a segment basis and reads the price as elevated, requiring the elevated economics to persist for about twelve and a half years to justify $173.89, with the fade signal tripped.

The method families are sharply tilted. The asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple frames all sit well below the price (the earnings-power frame in particular implies the price is several multiples of no-growth value), while only the growth-DCF reaches it. That pattern is the moat-or-durability premium signature, here underwritten not by a technology moat but by the company's ability to keep acquiring and integrating distributors accretively in a fragmented market. The blended estimate lands near $101, far below the price, which quantifies how much of the valuation is the growth assumption rather than current economics.

The practical read: this is a well-executed industrial consolidator priced for a long runway of deal-driven compounding. The operating momentum is real (sales up 9.5%, EBITDA of $57.8 million, accelerating bookings, $213.4 million of cash for more deals), and a disciplined roll-up with a sticky MRO base can deserve a premium. But the buyer at $174 is underwriting roughly twelve years of sustained, acquisition-fueled growth through cyclical end-markets, with dilution near 3.45% a year working against the per-share math. The valuation rewards continued accretive M&A and steady industrial demand, and it is exposed if the deal pace slows or the cycle turns.

Catalysts

The most recent catalyst was the Q1 2026 report in early May. Sales rose 9.5% to $521.7 million, GAAP diluted EPS was $1.22, and adjusted EBITDA reached $57.8 million, though net income eased slightly to $19.98 million from $20.59 million a year earlier. Management struck an encouraged tone, noting that bookings are trending higher, backlog is healthy to higher, sales per business day grew 28% between January and March, and gross margins improved sequentially and year over year. The mixed result (strong sales and margins, flat net income) reflects the cost of the acquisition strategy.

The acquisition pipeline is the central forward catalyst. DXP completed three acquisitions in the first quarter, adding $40.7 million of acquisition sales for about $126.3 million invested, and ended the quarter with $213.4 million of cash to fund more deals. For a roll-up, the pace, price, and integration of acquisitions are what drive the growth rate the market is paying for, so each new deal announcement and the accretion it delivers are the key markers. A slowdown in the deal cadence, or richer prices paid, would directly pressure the growth thesis.

The end-market backdrop is the offsetting catalyst. DXP's Service Centers, Innovative Pumping Solutions, and Supply Chain Services segments serve industrial, energy, and infrastructure customers, so the trajectory of industrial activity, capital spending, and oil-and-gas demand governs both organic volumes and the health of acquisition targets. Bookings and backlog trends, organic-versus-acquired growth disclosure, and the cyclicality of the pump business are the items to track quarter to quarter.

Sources: https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/DXPE/8-k-dxp-enterprises-inc-reports-material-event-45c066786f2b.html , https://www.aol.com/finance/dxp-dxpe-q1-2026-earnings-215803736.html , https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/capital-goods/nasdaq-dxpe/dxp-enterprises/news/does-dxpes-mixed-q1-2026-earnings-hint-at-a-shift-in-its-res , https://seekingalpha.com/article/4901849-dxp-enterprises-inc-2026-q1-results-earnings-call-presentation

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Service Centers (SC) (reported)

Innovative Pumping Solutions (IPS) (reported)

Supply Chain Services (SCS) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

View the full interactive DXPE report on boothcheck