DXP Enterprises, Inc. (DXPE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $185.92, DXP Enterprises, Inc. (DXPE) is priced for +15.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DXPE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDXPE
CompanyDXP Enterprises, Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$185.92/sh
CompositionService Centers 68% / Innovative Pumping Solutions 19% / Supply Chain Services 13%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.6%
Operating margin today8.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.2pp
Implied growth15.7%
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.11σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)43

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.79x5expensive
Earnings4.73x5expensive
Relative2.75x2expensive
Growth0.96x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$215.600.86xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.4%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$193.990.96xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 16.6x / 18.6x / 20.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 21.89x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 31x), scenarios: 18.1x / 21.9x / 25.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13.98x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$64.912.86xyesBV/sh $34.85, ROE (TTM) 17.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$87.432.13xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$139.241.34xyesRev $2.1B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.1x / 1.3x / 1.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$68.042.73xyesEPS $5.67, growth 8% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.92 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$34.555.38xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.14B × (1−28%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$87.712.12xyesBV $34.85 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 17.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$66.682.79xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.67 × BVPS $34.85) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.19B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$39.344.73xyesFCF $118.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$35.045.31xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.11B (FCF $0.12B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$115.571.61xyesEPS $5.67 × (8.5 + 2×7.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$15.6211.90xyesBV $34.85 × (ROIC 3.3% / WACC 7.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.14B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$67.272.76xyesEPS $5.67 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 7.9% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 11.9x
Earnings YieldEarnings$61.303.03xyesEPS $5.67 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Service Centers (SC)operatingenterprise$1.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Innovative Pumping Solutions (IPS)operatingenterprise$390.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Supply Chain Services (SCS)operatingenterprise$252.9mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$619.2m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.55x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.29x
Interest coverage2.9x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with what is being paid rather than what is being bought. Today's price works out to roughly 19 times company-wide operating profit, which requires something like 16.7% a year of operating-profit growth for five years. Written down that way it reads as a demanding assumption for a distributor. Then look at what the distributor has actually been doing, and the number stops looking like a leap.

The underlying business is one of the least glamorous in the market and one of the stickiest. DXP distributes maintenance, repair and operating products, equipment and service into general industrial, energy, food and beverage, chemical, transportation and water end markets, a line of work it has been in since its predecessor SEPCO Industries. Nobody wins in MRO distribution on product, because the product is the manufacturer's. They win on proximity, inventory and the willingness to take a problem off the customer's desk, which is exactly how the 10-K describes the offer: large buyers "are able to outsource all or most of those needs to us", while smaller ones get "one-stop sourcing without the commitment" of a full outsourcing contract.

That model spreads risk in a way the headline cyclicality obscures. The filing states plainly that "No customer accounts for 10% or more of our revenues". For a business selling into refineries, chemical plants and municipal water systems, having no single account that can move the year is a structural advantage most industrial suppliers cannot claim, and it is the reason a downturn in one end market shows up as a dent rather than a hole.

The growth engine is running on both cylinders. Service Centers sales rose 10.9 million dollars, or 3.3%, in the March 2026 quarter, which the filing attributes to gains in the Ohio River Valley, California and the South East, and the Service Centers and pumping segments together turned over approximately 456.6 million dollars in that quarter. On the acquired side, 56.3 million dollars of goodwill was assigned to the pumping segment from deals closed in the same three months, attributed to "expected synergies and the assembled workforce of the entities". Gross profit as a percentage of sales rose about 67 basis points across 2025, an improvement the 10-K credits to that same pumping segment.

The mix matters more than it looks. The pumping business builds custom pump packages and remanufactures pumps, and the 10-K notes it "also provides a comprehensive suite of products and services to the water and wastewater treatment market in the United States". Water infrastructure spending does not follow the oil cycle, and a segment that improves group gross margin while diversifying the demand behind it is the most useful thing a cyclical distributor can own. Underneath all of it sits a return on equity near 17.2% on book value of 31.29 dollars a share, which is the arithmetic that makes a five-year compounding assumption arguable rather than fanciful.

Bear Case

Being the largest distributor of rotating equipment in North America is a claim about market position, and market position in distribution is supposed to show up as margin. This is where the bear case starts, because it does not. DXP converts roughly 8.6% of revenue into operating profit. AIT earns 10.9% on sales of 4.84 billion dollars, GWW earns 14.2% on 18.38 billion, and FAST earns 20.2% on 8.44 billion while growing 10.9%. On that measure DXP sits closest to MSM, which earns 8.5% on 3.91 billion dollars of revenue growing 4.4%. Scale in this industry is supposed to buy purchasing leverage and pricing discipline. Whatever the leading position in rotating equipment is worth, it is not currently visible in the profit line.

The growth is also being bought rather than compounded. A single quarter's acquisitions added 56.3 million dollars of goodwill to the pumping segment, and behind that sits 845.9 million dollars of senior secured term loan running to October 13, 2030 with quarterly principal payments of 0.25%. Net debt stands near 3.7 times operating profit, and interest coverage near 2.8 leaves considerably less room than a lightly levered distributor would have. A roll-up borrowing to buy revenue has to keep the margin it acquired, and the most recent evidence is uncomfortable: in the March quarter sales rose 9.5% while per-share earnings on the company's own adjusted measure did not move at all.

That is the fact to hold against what the price assumes. Roughly 16.7% a year of operating-profit growth for five years is the requirement, and only about 42% of comparable fast growers held a pace like that for five years. Worse, the requirement barely survives contact with a different discount rate: adding one percentage point to the return a buyer demands moves the implied growth by nearly seven points. There is not much distance in that arithmetic between a compounder and a leveraged cyclical distributor, and the price is firmly on one side of it.

The end markets supply the mechanism by which the assumption fails. The 10-K is candid that certain served industries "such as the oil and gas industry, are subject to volatility driven by a variety of factors" while others "such as the petrochemical industry and the construction industry, are cyclical and materially affected by changes in the U.S. and global economy". Where sales have fallen, the filing points directly at reduced activity among oil and gas customers. A downturn in industrial capital spending does two things at once here: it compresses the operating profit that the growth assumption is measured against, and it raises the leverage ratio measured against that same shrinking number.

None of this is a solvency alarm. No customer represents a tenth of revenue, the term loan does not mature until 2030, and the covenant is a secured leverage test rather than a coverage trigger. The bear case is narrower and more likely than a crisis: that a good distributor bought at a compounder's multiple turns out to be a good distributor.

Valuation

The methods split about as cleanly here as they ever do. Only the forward-growth approaches reach today's price. The asset-value family, the peer-multiple family and the earnings-power family all land below it, the last of those by the widest distance. When the static frames sit under the price and only the growth lens defends it, the premium being paid is for durable compounding that a backward-looking method structurally cannot see. Naming that honestly is more useful than arguing about which method is right.

The assumption itself is specific. Roughly 19 times company-wide operating profit works backward to about 16.7% a year of operating-profit growth sustained for five years. Of the comparable fast growers this can be measured against, about 42% held a pace like that for five years. So the bet is not outlandish, and it is not comfortable either. It is close to a coin flip on the base rate, priced as though it lands.

The earnings-power reading is worth understanding rather than waving away, because the reason it sits so far below the price says something real. It capitalizes a five-year average operating profit near 0.13 billion dollars, with no growth credited at all, against roughly 0.173 billion earned on a trailing basis. For a company that has grown by buying other companies, a five-year average understates the current business by construction. That is the point: the price needs the acquired growth to be permanent, because the version of this company that stops acquiring is valued somewhere else entirely.

Peer economics explain why the multiple lens also falls short. AIT earns a 10.9% operating margin on revenue of 4.84 billion dollars growing 7.5%, and MSM earns 8.5% on 3.91 billion growing 4.4%. DXP's roughly 8.6% trailing operating margin sits comfortably inside that band. What sits outside it is the multiple, and no peer number in the cohort closes that gap on its own.

Solvency sets the outer boundary and is more relevant here than in most distribution names. At the end of 2025, 845.9 million dollars was outstanding under the senior secured term loan, amortizing at 0.25% quarterly with the balance due October 13, 2030, against liquid assets near 213 million dollars. Net debt runs about 3.7 times operating profit and interest is covered around 2.8. The covenant is a secured leverage ratio measured against consolidated secured debt net of unrestricted cash, and the filing caps the cash credited in that calculation at 330 million dollars. What all of that means in practice is straightforward: the interest bill is fixed and the operating profit it is measured against is cyclical, so the leverage ratio moves whether or not the company borrows another dollar.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 6, 2026. The comparison they land against is a March quarter reported on May 7 with revenue of $521.7 million against $476.6 million a year earlier. Full-year 2025 results, reported February 26, 2026, were presented as record sales for the company.

Deal flow has not slowed. Three acquisitions closed inside the March quarter, and on June 17 the company completed the purchase of General Repair Service, a Minnesota business founded in 1955 operating in repair services. Each of these is small on its own. Collectively they are the growth strategy, which is why the goodwill assigned per quarter and the margin the acquired businesses carry are the numbers to follow rather than the deal count.

Financing capacity is the enabling condition, and it moved in July. On July 9 the company announced a new asset-based lending revolver. The Q1 filing describes the asset-based facility and the term loan together as what funds capital expenditure and strategic acquisitions, so a refreshed revolver is less a headline than a statement about how much more acquiring the balance sheet is expected to do. The August print is where the answer starts showing up, in the margin the acquired revenue arrives with.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Service Centers (SC) (reported)

Innovative Pumping Solutions (IPS) (reported)

Supply Chain Services (SCS) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

DXP Enterprises Q1 2026 results, reported May 7, 2026 · DXP Enterprises earnings date listing, stockanalysis.com, July 2026 · DXP Enterprises FY2025 results, reported February 26, 2026 · DXP Enterprises announcement, June 17, 2026 · DXP Enterprises announcement, July 9, 2026

View the full interactive DXPE report on boothcheck