DEVON ENERGY CORP/DE (DVN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $47.48, DEVON ENERGY CORP/DE (DVN) is priced for +4.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DVN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDVN
CompanyDEVON ENERGY CORP/DE
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$47.48/sh
CompositionOil, gas and NGL sales 67% / Marketing and midstream revenues 33%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Implied growth4.6%
Multiple paid12x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.44σ
cohort percentile (of 48 peers)50

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.01x4expensive
Earnings1.24x3expensive
Relative1.43x3expensive
Growth0.95x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$82.810.57xyesFCF base $2.9B, growth 3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.6%, WACC 7.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$49.950.95xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 5.4x / 10.4x / 15.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$33.551.42xyesP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 7.5x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 7.33x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$39.461.20xyesBV/sh $24.83, ROE (TTM) 14.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$49.170.97xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$30.731.55xyesRev $17.1B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.7x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$50.560.94xyesBV $24.83 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$44.781.06xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.59 × BVPS $24.83) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$21.922.17xyesEBITDA $3.59B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$38.211.24xyesFCF $2927.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$3.0115.77xyesEPS $3.59 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$33.111.43xyesRevenue $17.15B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$38.811.22xyesEPS $3.59 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
U.S. Oil & Gas (single reportable segment)operatingenterprise$17.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.6%
Burning cashno

Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.

Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

An oil producer's income statement describes last year's commodity prices at least as much as it describes the business. What is actually being bought is drillable inventory plus the machinery to convert it into cash faster than the wells already producing run down. That race between depletion and replacement is invisible in an earnings multiple. It is visible in the reserve tables, and Devon's reserve tables are concentrated.

Of the reserves added through extensions and discoveries in the latest year, 212 MMBoe sat in the Delaware Basin, with 33 MMBoe in the Anadarko Basin, 32 MMBoe in Eagle Ford, 26 MMBoe in the Powder River Basin and 19 MMBoe in the Williston. The 10-K attributes those additions to "Devon's drilling and development activities in the Delaware Basin, followed by the Rockies ( 23 %), Eagle Ford ( 12 %), and the Anadarko Basin ( 8 %)". Alongside them, 175 MMBoe converted from proved undeveloped to proved developed, which is the unglamorous part of the business working: acreage that was a spreadsheet entry became wells with pipe in the ground.

The balance sheet is built to let that continue through a bad year. The Q1 2026 filing puts 7.4 billion dollars of debentures and notes on fixed rates averaging 5.7%, alongside a 1.0 billion dollar term loan whose variable rate stood at 5.2% on March 31, 2026. Against that, roughly 1.8 billion dollars was held in cash at the end of the quarter, and the covenant test came in with a debt-to-capitalization ratio of 24.9%. At the close of 2025 the revolving facility was untouched: "Devon had no outstanding borrowings under the Senior Credit Facility and had less than $ 1.0 million in outstanding letters of credit under this facility". A producer with an undrawn revolver and cheap fixed-rate paper does not have to sell assets into a weak strip.

Capital return runs off a formula rather than a promise. The company describes "a general target of paying out approximately 10% of operating cash flow through the fixed dividend", with variable dividends and buybacks layered on top when cash allows. In February 2026 the board declared 24 cents a share for the first quarter. Tying the fixed payment to cash generation rather than to an announced growth rate is what lets a cyclical business pay through the cycle instead of borrowing to look consistent.

The methods used to triangulate this company land in an unusual place for a stock at this multiple. The asset-value approaches and the cash-flow approaches both reach today's price rather than falling short of it, and the most conservative construction in the whole set, Graham's floor built from book value per share of 24.96 dollars and 3.59 dollars of trailing earnings, reaches 44.91 dollars a share. That is within pennies of where the shares trade. When the deliberately austere method and the market agree, the argument for the bull is not that a re-rating is owed; it is that very little optimism has been paid for.

Bear Case

Producers earn what the strip pays them, and the trailing profit any of them reports is a statement about the last twelve months of oil and gas prices rather than a description of normal. That is the first thing to hold in mind here. The second is that the industry has a built-in governor working against its own good years: the 10-K notes that the costs of rigs, materials and oilfield services "will generally increase during periods of higher commodity prices" and can be worsened by inflation and supply chain pressure. Margin expansion in a strong market is therefore partly leased, not owned.

That matters because of what today's price asks for. The shares change hands at roughly 12 times company-wide operating profit, which works backward to something like 4.4% a year of operating-profit growth sustained for five years. Ask where that growth comes from and the company's own strategy statement answers uncomfortably: the Q1 2026 filing describes priorities of "moderating production growth, emphasizing capital and operational efficiencies, optimizing reinvestment rates to maximize free cash flow". Volume growth is explicitly not the plan. So the required improvement has to arrive through realized prices or through cost, and only the second of those is management's to decide.

The requirement is also unusually sensitive to what a buyer demands as a return. Raise the required return by a single percentage point and the growth the price implies moves by more than five points. A bet that swings that far on a modest change in assumed discount rate is not a precise claim about the business; it is a claim about the rate environment wearing an operating disguise.

Well results supply the concrete version of the risk. Devon recorded downward reserve revisions in the Williston Basin of 19 MMBoe "due to reduced well performance compared to previous estimates", offsetting modest upward revisions elsewhere. Shale inventory is not uniform, and the difference between a good bench and a mediocre one shows up years after the acreage is bought. The price swings on top of that are large: CHRD disclosed a realized natural gas price in the Williston of 3.15 dollars per thousand cubic feet in 2025 against 1.78 dollars the prior year, a move driven by the market rather than by anything either operator did.

Concentration completes the picture. The Delaware Basin supplies most of the reserve growth, which is a strength in a good rock cycle and a single point of exposure in a bad one, whether the shock is geological, regulatory or takeaway-related. On the customer side, the filing's reassurance is telling in its own way: if several large buyers stopped purchasing abruptly, the company "believes it would have the resources needed to access alternative customers". The balance sheet, in fairness, is not the fragile part of this story, and at a quarter of capitalization the debt load is not what would force management's hand. Producers rarely fail on leverage. They disappoint on price.

Valuation

Today's price works out to roughly 12 times company-wide operating profit. Run that backward and it embeds about 4.4% a year of operating-profit growth for five years, discounted around 10% with 4% growth assumed to persist beyond it. For a cyclical producer that is not a demanding rate; it sits inside what the business has recently delivered. The stretch is in duration, not in pace.

The methods disagree in a direction worth noticing. Asset-value approaches and the cash-flow approaches both reach today's price. The earnings-power methods sit under it, with the price about 17% above where that family lands, and the peer-multiple family is furthest away, the price sitting roughly 35% above it. Nothing in that spread describes a growth bet. It describes a name supported by what it owns and what it currently earns, priced above what a static sector multiple would pay for those earnings.

Two individual constructions carry the point. The cash-flow method that reaches the price does so by assuming the multiple a buyer pays for the cash flow in year five is the same one buyers pay today, which is an assumption about market conditions rather than about Devon. The severest method in the set moves in the opposite direction: Graham's conservative floor, built from book value per share of 24.96 dollars and 3.59 dollars of trailing earnings, arrives essentially where the shares trade. When the intentionally pessimistic construction meets the tape, the interesting question stops being whether the stock is cheap and becomes what commodity price the earnings behind it assume.

Cohort comparison here is coarser than it looks, because realizations differ enormously by where the barrels come out of the ground. OVV reported total production of 614.5 MBOE/d in 2025 against 585.0 the year before, but its USA operations realized 39.54 dollars a barrel of oil equivalent while its Canadian operations realized 23.73 dollars. One company, one year, and a gap between its own two regions wider than the gap between most producers' headline multiples. Cohort medians compress that dispersion into a single number, which is why the peer-multiple read should be treated as the crudest of the four rather than the most authoritative.

Solvency bounds the downside rather than adding to the value. The Q1 2026 filing shows 7.4 billion dollars of fixed-rate debentures and notes averaging 5.7%, a 1.0 billion dollar term loan at 5.2%, roughly 1.8 billion dollars held in cash, an undrawn revolver as of the last annual report, and a debt-to-capitalization ratio of 24.9% against a covenant the company was comfortably inside. Cheap, long, fixed-rate debt against a hard asset base is the configuration that lets a producer wait out a bad two years rather than transact in the middle of one.

Catalysts

The next scheduled information event is second-quarter results on August 4, 2026, after the close. Two things will be read closely in that print: the realized price line, which does most of the work in a producer's quarter, and how the board handles capital return now that the repurchase authorization described in the FY2025 annual report has passed its stated June 30, 2026 expiration date.

Portfolio reshaping is the live corporate story. Press reporting in July 2026 described the company as exploring a sale of its Eagle Ford and Powder River positions, with a figure above 4 billion dollars attached to the combined package. Nothing has been filed, and reported deliberations are not deals. It is worth noting only because those two areas are the ones the reserve disclosures show as secondary to the Delaware Basin, so a sale would sharpen a concentration that is already pronounced. The Eagle Ford footprint has already been rearranged once recently: the company and BPX Energy dissolved their partnership on April 1, 2025 and divided the Blackhawk acreage in DeWitt County, Texas.

Sell-side opinion is unusually split in the run-up. Susquehanna raised its target on July 21 and UBS lowered its own on July 17, which is what happens when the variable driving the model is a commodity price nobody at either firm can forecast. Beyond the print, the operational item to track is the stated ambition of capturing 1.0 billion dollars in sustainable annual synergies following the Grayson Mill transaction, which the company reiterated in its Q1 2026 filing.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

U.S. Oil & Gas (single reportable segment) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Bloomberg News report, July 2026 · Devon Energy Q2 2026 earnings date listing, stockanalysis.com, July 2026 · Bloomberg News report, July 20 and July 24, 2026 · analyst action listings via stockanalysis.com, July 2026

View the full interactive DVN report on boothcheck