DAVITA INC. (DVA): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers DAVITA INC. (DVA) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-26.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DVA

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDVA
CompanyDAVITA INC.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$180.68/sh
CompositionPatient service revenues - Medicare and Medicare Advantage 49% / Patient service revenues - Medicaid and Managed Medicaid 6% / Patient service revenues - Other government 9% / Patient service revenues - Commercial 31% / Other revenues - Medicare and Medicare Advantage 4% / Other revenues - Medicaid and Managed Medicaid 0% / Other revenues - Commercial 0% / Other 1% / Eliminations of intersegment revenues -1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.4%
Operating margin today15.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.7pp
Multiple paid12x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.8% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.73σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)11

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0
Earnings3.16x3expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=3)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$341.090.53xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 6.6x / 8.6x / 10.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAssetno
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAssetno
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$187.380.96xnoRev $13.8B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$128.521.41xnoEPS $10.71, growth 8% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.81 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$195.370.92xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.78B × (1−19%) / WACC 6.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.80B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$57.223.16xyesFCF $1492.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$33.925.33xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.35B (FCF $1.49B − SBC $0.14B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$223.710.81xyesEPS $10.71 × (8.5 + 2×8.2%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $13.84B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$131.921.37xnoEPS $10.71 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 8.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 12.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$115.781.56xnoEPS $10.71 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
U.S. dialysisoperatingenterprise471.5B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Other - Ancillary servicesoperatingenterprise104.3B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Patient care costsoperatingenterprise7854.2B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
U.S. dialysis segment expensesoperatingenterprise9708.7B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Other - Ancillary services expenses (2)operatingenterprise1829.9B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$10.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.92x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.77x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-9.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

DaVita performed fewer dialysis treatments in 2025 than in 2024 and still reported earnings per share in the first quarter of 2026 that were more than 40% higher than a year before. That is not an accounting trick. It is what happens when a business with stable cash generation retires an enormous quantity of its own stock: weighted average basic shares fell from 79.4 million to 67.4 million over the year, and attributable profit rose from $162.9 million to $197.5 million. The per-share arithmetic does the rest.

Reading the price through the two available lenses gives opposite answers, and the difference is instructive rather than confusing. Measured against what comparable healthcare operators fetch on their earnings and cash flow, today's price sits below where those peer-multiple approaches land. Measured against a capitalization of current cash flow with no growth credited, the price stands more than four times what those earnings-power approaches reach. The gap is almost entirely debt. Those cash-flow capitalizations subtract about 10 billion dollars of net borrowings from the value before dividing by the shares, and they discount at a required return well above what the company actually pays on that borrowing. Whether that is conservatism or distortion depends entirely on whether you think the borrowing is safe.

The evidence says it largely is. Operating income covered the debt expense line more than three times over in 2025, and in the first quarter of 2026 income from operations of 482 million dollars carried a debt cost of 145 million dollars. This is a business with 3,262 outpatient centers serving about 296,300 patients, of which 2,666 are in the United States and 596 across 14 other countries. Demand is set by kidney failure, not by consumer preference, and the treatment is not optional. Payment comes from Medicare on a formula and from commercial insurers on a contract.

Pricing power is real even where volume is not. Revenue per treatment rose from $400.14 in the first quarter of 2025 to $417.59 in the first quarter of 2026, while patient care costs per treatment rose from $271.77 to $280.11. The spread widened by roughly nine dollars a treatment across close to 92,000 treatments a day. Operating income moved from 13.6% of revenue to 14.1% on that alone, and management raised its 2026 profit and earnings guidance ranges alongside the quarter.

There is also a second business quietly compounding. Integrated kidney care arrangements covered about 62,600 patients in risk-based contracts representing roughly $5.4 billion of annualized medical spend as of March 2026, with another 6,300 patients in other arrangements. Taking risk on the total cost of care for a population you already treat three times a week is a different business from billing per session, and it is the one place where the company's clinical data advantage converts into economics that dialysis reimbursement does not cap.

Bear Case

The defensible thing about this business was never the dialysis chair. It was the payer mix: a commercial minority paying multiples of the government rate, subsidizing the majority who do not. That subsidy is now under identifiable, dated pressure, and the company says so itself. Its own filing warns of the concentration of profits generated by higher-paying commercial payor plans for which there is continued downward pressure on average realized payment rates and of a reduction in the number or percentage of our patients under commercial plans. It then names the specific mechanism: the decision to let those enhanced premium tax credits expire at the end of 2025 may ultimately decrease the number of patients with access to health insurance. Patients who lose exchange coverage do not stop needing dialysis. They move onto government programs, at government rates.

Underneath the payer question the volume line has already turned. Dialysis treatments fell to 28,733,980 in 2025 from 29,046,346 in 2024, average treatments per day fell to 91,802 from 92,534, and normalized non-acquired treatment growth was negative 0.8% for the year. The company attributes the decline to higher mortality and missed treatments during a severe flu season, which is plausible for one year and unhelpful as a growth thesis. All of the 3.5% revenue increase in the U.S. dialysis business came from price, and part of that price increase came from phosphate binders being folded into the Medicare bundle, which brings the cost of the drugs along with the revenue.

So the growth in reported earnings per share is not operating growth. It is financial engineering of a defensible but finite kind. The company repurchased 3.0 million shares for $403 million during the first quarter of 2026 at an average of $133.70, and another 2.0 million for $302 million through May 5 at an average of $149.81. Meanwhile cash generation went the other way: operating cash flow for the twelve months to March 2026 was $2,027 million against $2,337 million a year earlier, and free cash flow $1,209 million against $1,444 million. Buying back stock at a falling cash-flow run rate with borrowed money works until the lenders reprice.

The balance sheet is the constraint that makes this matter. Net borrowings run near five times operating profit against a business whose volumes are flat and whose largest customer sets its own prices by regulation. Book equity has been consumed by the repurchases, which is why the asset-based valuation approaches produce nothing usable here at all: there is no meaningful equity base left to anchor them. When the only frames that value this company are ones built on current earnings and peer comparisons, a downgrade to either input moves the price directly.

Finally, the competitive picture is not static. The filing lists new entrants in the dialysis and pre-dialysis marketplace and innovative technologies, drugs, or other treatments among its named risks, alongside elevated labor costs and continued competition from other dialysis providers. Any therapy that slows progression to kidney failure removes patients from the top of this funnel years before they arrive. That is not a next-quarter risk. It is exactly the kind of slow erosion a business with negative volume growth and heavy leverage is least equipped to absorb.

Valuation

Only two families of method produce a usable reading for this company, and they point in opposite directions. Peer-multiple approaches, which compare what the market pays for comparable healthcare operators per dollar of earnings and cash flow, land above today's price. Earnings-power approaches, which capitalize current cash flow at a required return and credit no growth at all, land far below it, leaving the price standing more than four times where they settle. The asset-based approaches produce nothing at all, because years of buybacks have left too little book equity to anchor them. That absence is itself the most important fact in the section.

The reason those two readings diverge is leverage, and the arithmetic is worth spelling out. Net borrowings sit near five times operating profit. Capitalizing cash flow at a required return of roughly 9% and then subtracting about 10 billion dollars of net debt leaves very little for the equity, while the peer comparison implicitly accepts the debt as part of a normal capital structure for a business with contracted, regulated revenue. Both are defensible. The investor's question is which assumption about the borrowing they want to underwrite.

On the enterprise as a whole the price is undemanding. The market values the whole business at about 14 times trailing operating profit, which is low enough that the price already sits below what a modest annual decline in operating profit would justify at a cost of capital in the low sevens. Against its healthcare peer group the multiple is in the lower half of the range. Read on its own, the priced-in expectation is not a growth bet at all. It is closer to a value-supported one.

Peer comparison is where the operating picture gets its context. Operating margin ran 14.1% of revenue in the first quarter of 2026, which sits above UHS at 11.5%, ENSG at 8.5% and SEM at 5.8%, and below THC at 18.0%. Revenue growth is the weak column: consolidated revenue rose about 3.5% in the U.S. dialysis business last year against UHS at 10.4% and ENSG at 19.2%. This is a profitable operator with an unusually flat top line, and the multiple reflects the second fact more than the first.

Solvency is the closing consideration rather than a footnote. Operating income covered the debt expense line more than three times in 2025, and 482 million dollars of first-quarter operating income carried 145 million dollars of debt cost. Free cash flow over the twelve months to March 2026 was $1,209 million, down from $1,444 million, and management guides 2026 free cash flow to a range of $1.0 billion to $1.25 billion. That cash funds the repurchases that produce the per-share growth. The chain runs from reimbursement rates to cash flow to share count to earnings per share, and it is only as strong as its first link.

Catalysts

First-quarter results, released on May 5, 2026, were the strongest print in some time. Consolidated revenue was $3.416 billion, operating income $482 million against $439 million a year earlier, and diluted earnings per share from continuing operations $2.87 against $2.00. Operating cash flow of $321 million compared with $180 million, and free cash flow of $140 million reversed a negative figure in the prior-year quarter. Normalized non-acquired treatment growth came in at positive 0.1% against the first quarter of 2025, the first positive reading after a negative fourth quarter.

Management raised the low end of its full-year 2026 outlook alongside those results, lifting both its operating profit and its per-share earnings guidance ranges while holding free cash flow guidance at $1.0 billion to $1.25 billion. The buyback continued at pace after quarter end, with 2.0 million shares repurchased for $302 million between April 1 and May 5.

Two items sit further out. In February 2026 the company agreed to acquire a noncontrolling minority interest in Elara Caring, a home-based care provider, which extends the integrated-care strategy beyond the dialysis center. And the expiration of the enhanced ACA premium tax credits at the end of 2025 begins showing up in payer mix during 2026 rather than immediately, so the coverage effect is a 2026 and 2027 story rather than a first-quarter one. Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 4, 2026, announced on July 21.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

U.S. dialysis (reported)

Other - Ancillary services (reported)

Patient care costs / U.S. dialysis segment expenses / Other - Ancillary services expenses (2) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, May 5, 2026 · Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, filed May 2026 · company announcement, July 21, 2026

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