Leonardo DRS, Inc. (DRS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $38.38, Leonardo DRS, Inc. (DRS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.4 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DRS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDRS
CompanyLeonardo DRS, Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$38.38/sh
CompositionAdvanced Sensing and Computing (ASC) 65% / Integrated Mission Systems (IMS) 36% / Corporate & Eliminations 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.3%
Operating margin today10.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.2pp
Must persist for5.4y
Multiple paid27x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.01σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)69

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.65x5expensive
Earnings2.73x5expensive
Relative0.98x2justifies
Growth1.10x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$34.811.10xyesFCF base $0.4B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$42.150.91xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 18.4x / 20.4x / 22.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.2x / 22.0x / 25.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$13.042.94xyesBV/sh $10.50, ROE (TTM) 11.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$14.472.65xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$34.231.12xyesRev $3.8B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.2x / 2.7x / 3.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$34.701.11xyesEPS $1.19, growth 29% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.09 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$12.972.96xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.35B × (1−14%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$14.752.60xyesBV $10.50 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.5%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$16.772.29xyes√(22.5 × EPS $1.19 × BVPS $10.50) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.49B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$15.242.52xyesFCF $363.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$14.062.73xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.33B (FCF $0.36B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$38.401.00xyesEPS $1.19 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$3.7710.18xyesBV $10.50 × (ROIC 3.3% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.78B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$44.630.86xyesEPS $1.19 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$12.862.98xyesEPS $1.19 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Advanced Sensing and Computing (ASC)operatingenterprise$2.4b$240.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Integrated Mission Systems (IMS)operatingenterprise$1.3b$115.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$194.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.57x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.49x
Share count CAGR (dilution)6.4%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

There is almost no debt here, and for a defense manufacturer running long-cycle production contracts that matters more than it sounds. Net debt is about 137 million dollars on a funded-debt basis, about 0.46 times operating profit; including capitalized leases the obligation is closer to 257 million. At the end of the first quarter the company held 328 million dollars of cash with no outstanding borrowings under its credit facility, having repaid and terminated its 2022 term loan in January 2026. A contractor with a clean balance sheet can bid on programs that require it to carry working capital for years before the milestones bill. That is not a financing detail. It is a competitive one.

Management is behaving like people who believe the order book. In the first quarter they paid a 0.09 dollar per share dividend, repurchased 91,238 shares, raised full-year guidance across revenue, adjusted EBITDA and earnings, and kept increasing investment in capacity. None of those is a large gesture on its own. Taken together with no borrowings drawn, they describe a company funding growth out of its own cash rather than out of the market's patience.

The order book is what they are funding against. The 10-K puts the year in one line: "Our operating results for the year ended December 31, 2025, are highlighted by our strong $8.4 billion of backlog and over $4.2 billion of new orders, demonstrating the strong customer demand for our mission critical technologies." Funded backlog then set a record of 4.686 billion dollars at the end of March, up 8% year over year. Backlog in this industry is not a forecast. It is work already awarded that Congress has appropriated money for.

Where that work sits is the part worth understanding. The company describes itself plainly: "DRS is a leading provider of next-generation electrical propulsion systems for the U.S. Navy." Electric power and propulsion for submarines and surface ships is a decade-long qualification problem, not a procurement decision that gets re-bid every year, and it was the driver management credited for both the Integrated Mission Systems bookings of 456 million dollars in the quarter, a book-to-bill of 1.5x, and the segment's margin expansion.

Then there is the actual operating story, which is margin. Revenue rose 12.8% in 2025 to 3,648 million dollars while gross profit rose 18.1% to 869 million. In the first quarter of 2026 the sensing and computing segment took its operating margin to 7.2% from 4.9% a year earlier, and the mission systems segment to 12.5% from 11.7%, with company adjusted EBITDA up 28% on revenue up 6%. Profit is growing at roughly four times the pace of sales.

That gap is where the cohort comparison becomes interesting rather than damning. At an 8.7% trailing operating margin the company sits below TDY at 19.0%, HEI at 23.5%, CW at 18.4% and BWXT at 12.3%. The bull case is not that those peers are wrong. It is that DRS is earning half the margin on similar work and has just demonstrated, two segments at once, that the gap is closeable. If the mix keeps shifting toward naval power and infrared sensing and away from lower-margin legacy programs, the arithmetic on the rest of the decade changes without a single new customer.

Bear Case

Leonardo DRS is not, in the ordinary sense, a company its public shareholders control. Its indirect majority stockholder is Leonardo S.p.A., and because the parent is foreign the business operates under a mitigation arrangement with the US government: "we are required to mitigate FOCI through our amended and restated proxy agreement". The 10-K states the consequence without softening it: "Conflicts of interest may arise between our majority stockholder and us." Minority holders own a claim on the cash flows and very little say over what happens to them. That is a permanent discount factor, and at 44 times operating income the price is not applying one.

The share count tells the same story from a different direction. It has risen about 6.4% a year over the four years to March 2026, most of that from the merger with RADA Electronic Industries rather than from steady dilution. Against that, the first-quarter buyback retired 91,238 shares for roughly 4 million dollars. That is a rounding error against a company worth 12.9 billion dollars. Capital return here is a gesture, not a mechanism, and the reason is straightforward: with a majority owner in place there is no path by which repurchases meaningfully change who controls the business.

Now the demand side, which is where the recent numbers have started to wobble. Bookings fell to 885 million dollars in the first quarter from 991 million a year earlier, and the sensing and computing segment, the larger of the two, booked 429 million against 669 million, a book-to-bill of 0.8x versus 1.3x. One quarter is not a trend. It is also the exact metric the whole thesis rests on, and it went the wrong way while the multiple did not.

Understand what backlog does and does not promise. The 10-K is explicit that "at the outset of a major program, the contract is typically only partially funded, and additional funds normally are committed to the contract by the procuring agency only as appropriations are made by Congress for future fiscal years". A substantial share of the total backlog is unfunded on the company's own definition, meaning the orders are firm but the money is not yet voted. The margin structure carries the same tension: "cost-type contracts have less financial risk associated with unanticipated cost growth but generally provide lower profit margins than fixed-price contracts". The company can have the safety or the margin, and the mix decides which.

The valuation consequence is arithmetic rather than opinion. At today's price the market pays roughly 44 times company-wide operating income, and the multiple sits at the very top of the peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. For that to work, operating profit has to grow at the fastest rate the business can self-fund and keep doing it for something like nine years. Roughly 15% of comparably fast-growing companies have sustained that pace over such a stretch. Meanwhile the company earns an 8.7% trailing operating margin against 19.0% at TDY, 18.4% at CW and 12.3% at BWXT. The price is paying a top-of-cohort multiple for a bottom-half margin, on the expectation that the margin travels. If it stalls anywhere short of that, there is no second lens holding the price up.

Valuation

Forty-four times operating income is the number to sit with, because everything else in this report is a way of asking whether it is defensible.

Take today's price and work backward. It requires operating profit to compound at the fastest pace the business can fund out of its own cash, and to keep doing so for roughly nine years. That is not a rate problem: the company has recently grown at about that pace. It is a duration problem. Of comparable fast-growing companies, only around 15% held the pace that long, and the multiple itself sits at the very top of the peer distribution, past the upper quartile rather than inside it.

The methods split cleanly on that question. Only the forward cash-flow approaches reach today's price, and the price still sits about 12% above their central estimate. Everything backward-looking is far below: about 75% above where peer multiples land, about 288% above the asset-value approaches, and about 303% above the earnings-power methods. That is not a report of a company being mildly expensive. It is the signature of a price paying for durable compounding that static frames structurally cannot price, The single method that does land on today's price arrives there on one assumption: that six years from now the market still pays the same multiple of cash earnings for this business as it pays this morning. Whether that is an assumption or an answer is the reader's call.

The operating evidence for the compounding case is real and recent. Revenue grew 12.8% in 2025 to 3,648 million dollars while gross profit grew 18.1% to 869 million, and the first quarter of 2026 delivered operating margins of 7.2% in sensing and computing against 4.9% a year earlier, and 12.5% in mission systems against 11.7%. Full-year guidance now calls for revenue of 3,900 to 3,975 million dollars and adjusted EBITDA of 515 to 530 million. The direction is not in dispute.

The cohort is what makes the multiple hard to place. DRS earns an 8.7% trailing operating margin. TDY earns 19.0%, HEI 23.5%, CW 18.4%, BWXT 12.3%, GD 10.2% and LHX 10.2%. Growth does not resolve it either: DRS grew 12.8% in 2025 against 21.4% at BWXT, 21.8% at KTOS and 18.8% at HEI. On both of the axes a premium usually rests on, this company is mid-pack, and the multiple is not.

The balance sheet neither justifies nor endangers the price; it simply removes one worry. Net debt of about 137 million dollars runs at about 0.46 times operating profit on a funded-debt basis, or nearer 257 million once capitalized leases are included, against 328 million dollars of cash and an undrawn credit facility. Free cash flow was negative 95 million dollars in the first quarter, which is normal for a business that bills on milestones rather than months. What the balance sheet cannot do is shorten the nine years.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for July 30, 2026, and the first quarter set a high bar. Reported on May 5, revenue rose 6% to 846 million dollars, net earnings 24% to 62 million, adjusted EBITDA 28% to 105 million, and diluted earnings per share to 0.23 dollars from 0.19. Management attributed the revenue growth to tactical radars, infrared sensing and electric power and propulsion, and the margin expansion largely to execution on Columbia Class work.

The company raised its full-year outlook alongside that print: revenue of 3,900 to 3,975 million dollars against a prior 3,850 to 3,950 million, adjusted EBITDA of 515 to 530 million against a prior 505 to 525 million, and adjusted diluted earnings per share of 1.26 to 1.30 dollars against a prior 1.20 to 1.26, on roughly 269 million diluted shares and an 18.5% tax rate. Bookings are the line that did not cooperate: 885 million dollars against 991 million a year earlier, with the sensing segment at a book-to-bill of 0.8x and mission systems at 1.5x. Funded backlog nonetheless set a record at 4.686 billion dollars.

Two dated items sit between the prints. On May 19, 2026 director Reuben Jeffery III bought 25,000 shares on the open market for approximately 1.07 million dollars, his first reported position in the company. And on July 15, 2026 the company was reported to have secured a blanket purchase agreement covering up to 50,000 thermal imaging cameras. The dividend remains 0.09 dollars a share quarterly, most recently paid June 2, 2026.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Advanced Sensing and Computing (ASC) (reported)

Integrated Mission Systems (IMS) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 results, 8-K furnished May 5, 2026, and fiscal 2025 10-K · Q1 2026 results, 8-K furnished May 5, 2026 · fiscal 2025 10-K · Form 4 filed May 19, 2026 · press coverage reported on stockanalysis.com, accessed July 2026

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