DARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC. (DRI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $215.63, DARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC. (DRI) is priced for +1.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DRI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDRI
CompanyDARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$215.63/sh
CompositionOlive Garden 43% / LongHorn Steakhouse 25% / Fine Dining 11% / Other Business 21%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.5%
Operating margin today12.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.5pp
Implied growth1.5%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.62σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)67

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.89x5expensive
Earnings1.92x3expensive
Relative0.76x5justifies
Growth1.12x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$304.430.71xyesP/E 28x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 23.2x / 28.0x / 32.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 18x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$197.681.09xyesStage 1: 18% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$114.331.89xyesBV/sh $19.35, ROE (TTM) 54.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$355.210.61xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$186.371.16xyesRev $13.2B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$184.831.17xyesEPS $10.38, growth 18% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.15 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$70.063.08xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.32B × (1−12%) / WACC 8.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$186.411.16xyesBV $19.35 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 54.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$67.223.21xyes√(22.5 × EPS $10.38 × BVPS $19.35) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$285.180.76xyesEBITDA $2.14B × sector EV/EBITDA 18.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$334.930.64xyesEPS $10.38 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$12.8416.79xyesBV $19.35 × (ROIC 5.5% / WACC 8.3%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$521.030.41xyesRevenue $13.21B × sector P/S 4.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$277.240.78xyesEPS $10.38 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 17.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 26.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$112.221.92xyesEPS $10.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The disclosed units share an operating capital structure; consolidated cash-flow lenses remain coherent and the unit split is explanatory.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Olive Gardenoperatingenterprise$5.2b$27.6b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
LongHorn Steakhouseoperatingenterprise$3.0b$13.8b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Fine Diningoperatingenterprise$1.3b$5.7b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Other Businessoperatingenterprise$2.5b$9.4b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.49x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.18x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.5%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Read the income statement on its own and this looks like exactly what it appears to be: a large, mature restaurant operator earning a trailing operating margin of 11.7% on more than 13 billion dollars of sales, growing by opening restaurants and raising prices. The valuation methods built for that description land well below the price, and they are not wrong about the description. They are measuring the restaurants. The asset is the machine underneath them.

What Darden actually operates is a shared cost base that its brands rent. The company says so in the structure of its own reporting: segment profit captures food, labor, restaurant expenses and marketing, while "our lease-related right-of-use assets are not managed or evaluated at the operating segment level, but rather at the corporate level". Real estate, marketing reach, purchasing and systems sit above the brands and are paid for once. The 10-K puts the marketing consequence plainly: "our scale enables us to be a leading advertiser in the full-service dining segment of the restaurant industry". Olive Garden alone did 5,594.8 million dollars of sales in fiscal 2026, which is the kind of volume that buys national television at a unit cost nobody in casual dining can match.

The effect shows up where it should, in incremental profit. Olive Garden's fiscal 2026 sales rose to 5,594.8 million dollars from 5,212.9 million and its segment profit to 1,257.9 million from 1,163.9 million. LongHorn went to 3,423.0 million dollars of sales from 3,025.5 million, with segment profit to 635.1 million from 582.7 million. In both brands profit grew faster than sales. That is what happens when volume moves through a cost base that was already paid for.

LongHorn is where the live operating story sits. Same-restaurant sales rose 9.5% in the fourth quarter and 7.2% for the fiscal year, and in the third quarter that increase came from a 3.9% higher check combined with a 3.3% rise in guest counts. Traffic growth in American casual dining is uncommon enough to state without decoration: more people are choosing to eat there.

Against the cohort, the margin gap is the scale gap. Darden's 11.7% trailing operating margin compares with 10.4% at EAT, 8.0% at TXRH, 5.0% at CAKE and 3.8% at SHAK. All of them buy the same beef and hire from the same labor market. The spread is what a purchasing and marketing platform is worth when it is spread across enough restaurants.

Cash conversion is the quiet part of the case. Operating cash flow from continuing operations was 1.28 billion dollars in the first nine months of fiscal 2026, against 1.25 billion a year earlier, and guests are effectively lending the company money at no cost: deferred gift card revenue stood at 688.5 million dollars on February 22, 2026, up from 628.8 million at the fiscal 2025 close. Gift cards are sold at Christmas and redeemed whenever, and the balance keeps growing.

Management has been returning that cash rather than hoarding it. The board lifted the quarterly dividend 8.0% to 1.62 dollars a share and authorized a new 1.5 billion dollar repurchase program on June 24, 2026. The share count has come down about 2.5% a year over the four years to February 2026. Fewer shares against a cost base that keeps absorbing volume is a slow, unglamorous compounding mechanism, and it is the one that has actually been working.

Bear Case

Name the uncomfortable thing directly: a large part of this growth is price, not people. In the quarter ended February 22, 2026, Olive Garden's US same-restaurant sales came from a 3.6% increase in average check, of which 1.3 points was off-premise catering, set against a 0.4% decline in guest counts. Fine Dining across the first nine months managed a 1.1% higher check and 0.1% fewer guests. Those two segments are more than half of revenue. Menus have been repriced; the dining rooms are not fuller.

The company's own fiscal 2027 outlook says the same thing in guidance form. Same-restaurant sales growth of 2.5% to 3.5% is set against total inflation of approximately 3.0%. Read those two lines together and the plan for next year is to sell roughly the same quantity of food for more money. That can work for a long time. It is not the same thing as a business that is growing.

This matters because of what the price is paying for it. The price sits close to twice what the earnings-power methods reach, and roughly 54% above the asset-value approaches. The most conservative of the earnings methods, which capitalizes a five-year average operating profit and assumes no growth at all, lands at about a third of the price. Peer multiples are the one lens that gets there, and it gets there by holding the sector's current multiple flat. Strip out that assumption and there is not much left holding the price up.

The balance sheet is where the discomfort compounds. In the first nine months of fiscal 2026 the company paid 521.5 million dollars of dividends and repurchased 534.4 million dollars of stock while adding 290.0 million dollars of net commercial paper borrowings, and the filing attributes the quarter's higher net interest expense to exactly those increased short-term borrowings. Net debt of about 3.9 billion dollars runs at roughly 2.6 times operating profit on a funded-debt basis, and that figure excludes the leases entirely. Operating lease right-of-use assets alone stood at 3,555.9 million dollars at the fiscal 2025 close, with total lease assets of 4,850.1 million. Restaurants are a rented business, and rent does not renegotiate downward in a soft year.

Then there is the input side, which the 10-K states without hedging: "Operating margins for our restaurants are subject to changes in the price and availability of food commodities, including beef, pork, chicken, seafood, cheese, butter and produce." The brand carrying the growth is a steakhouse. LongHorn's traffic gain is real, and it is also the segment most exposed to a beef market the company does not control, in a year the company itself guides to roughly 3.0% total inflation.

Finally, the portfolio is being pruned rather than extended. Bahama Breeze is being wound down entirely, with all locations expected to be closed or converted between the third quarter of fiscal 2026 and the fourth quarter of fiscal 2027; the Olive Garden restaurants in Canada were sold; and Chuy's is still being absorbed, with the 10-K naming retention of key employees and the integration of information and communications systems among the areas of focus. None of these is individually large. Together they are why the reported and adjusted earnings lines keep requiring a bridge, and why a buyer at this price is underwriting execution as much as demand.

Valuation

Two defensible ways of reading this company disagree by more than half, and the disagreement is the entire analytical question.

Start with what today's price requires. The market is paying roughly 20 times company-wide operating income, which works out to needing operating profit to advance about 0.6% a year over the next five years. That is a low bar, comfortably inside what the company has recently delivered, and it is why the assumption embedded in the price reads as ordinary rather than heroic. Against the sector it sits in the upper half of the peer multiple range, which is a premium, but not a startling one.

Now capitalize the same operating profit differently. Assume it persists and does nothing else, discount it at a cost of capital in the low eights, and the answer lands at about a third of today's price. Widen out and the pattern is consistent: the price sits close to twice the central estimate of the earnings-power methods and roughly 54% above the asset-value approaches. Only the peer-multiple lens reaches today's price, and it does that by carrying the sector's current multiple forward unchanged rather than by finding anything new in the business.

Both frames use the same trailing operating profit. One assumes it grows slowly forever; the other assumes it simply endures. The whole gap between them is durability, which is also the only thing the segment data can speak to. Fiscal 2026 gave four segments of positive same-restaurant sales, with LongHorn at 7.2%, Olive Garden at 4.0%, Other Business at 3.9% and Fine Dining at 1.2%. That is evidence for endurance. It is thinner evidence for compounding, because the Fine Dining and Olive Garden numbers lean on check rather than covers.

The cohort places the premium rather than justifying it. Darden's 11.7% trailing operating margin against 10.4% at EAT, 8.0% at TXRH and 5.0% at CAKE is a real structural gap, and the peer-multiple lens is effectively paying for it. Whether it should pay this much for it depends on whether that gap widens or simply holds.

The balance sheet neither rescues nor threatens the case. Net debt runs at about 2.6 times operating profit on a funded-debt basis, before the lease book of roughly 4.9 billion dollars of lease assets recorded at the fiscal 2025 close. Against that, fiscal 2027 guidance calls for EBITDA of 2.26 to 2.29 billion dollars and capital spending of about 875 million, which leaves room for the dividend and the new repurchase authorization without borrowing to fund them. What it does not leave is much margin for a year in which guests decide to stay home.

Catalysts

Fiscal 2026 closed on May 31, and the results landed on June 25, 2026. Total sales rose 9.4% to 13.21 billion dollars, helped by 2.1 percentage points from a fifty-third week, with blended same-restaurant sales up 4.5% and 43 net new restaurants. Reported diluted earnings per share from continuing operations were 10.44 dollars, with the extra week contributing 0.25 dollars of that. The fourth quarter itself carried consolidated same-restaurant sales of 4.6%, and every brand was positive, with LongHorn at 9.5% and Olive Garden at 2.4%.

Two capital decisions came with the print. The board raised the quarterly dividend 8.0% to 1.62 dollars a share, payable August 3, 2026 to holders of record on July 10, and on June 24 authorized a new repurchase program of up to 1.5 billion dollars, replacing the prior authorization. The company repurchased approximately 0.7 million shares for 138 million dollars during the quarter.

The fiscal 2027 outlook is the number the next twelve months get measured against: total sales of 13.60 to 13.75 billion dollars, same-restaurant sales growth of 2.5% to 3.5%, 75 to 80 new restaurant openings, capital spending of approximately 875 million dollars, total inflation of approximately 3.0%, an effective tax rate near 13.5%, and diluted earnings per share from continuing operations of 11.10 to 11.35 dollars on roughly 114 million weighted average diluted shares. Two housekeeping items sit inside that guide: Bahama Breeze locations are expected to be closed or converted by the fourth quarter of fiscal 2027, and the annual meeting is scheduled for September 23, 2026 with a record date of July 29.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Olive Garden (reported)

LongHorn Steakhouse (reported)

Fine Dining (reported)

Other Business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q4 and full-year fiscal 2026 results, 8-K furnished June 25, 2026 · fiscal 2026 third-quarter 10-Q, filed March 27, 2026 · Q4 and full-year fiscal 2026 results, 8-K furnished June 25, 2026, and fiscal 2026 third-quarter 10-Q, filed March 27, 2026 · fiscal 2025 10-K · Q4 and full-year fiscal 2026 results, 8-K furnished June 25, 2026, and fiscal 2025 10-K

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