Dorman Products, Inc. (DORM): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $129.35, Dorman Products, Inc. (DORM) is priced for +6.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DORM

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDORM
CompanyDorman Products, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$129.35/sh
CompositionLight Duty 79% / Heavy Duty 11% / Specialty Vehicle 10%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.6%
Operating margin today12.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.3pp
Implied growth6.7%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.66σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)42

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.60x5expensive
Earnings2.07x3expensive
Relative0
Growth1.19x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$46.082.81xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$118.371.09xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 13.7x / 15.7x / 17.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.7x / 20.0x / 23.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$68.821.88xyesBV/sh $49.08, ROE (TTM) 13.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$80.831.60xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$108.301.19xyesRev $2.2B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$62.462.07xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.23B × (1−23%) / WACC 8.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$83.371.55xyesBV $49.08 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 13.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.4%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$82.751.56xyes√(22.5 × EPS $6.20 × BVPS $49.08) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.28B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$9.1814.09xyesFCF $70.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$1.9167.72xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.05B (FCF $0.07B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$5.2024.87xyesEPS $6.20 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.889.32xyesBV $49.08 × (ROIC 2.3% / WACC 8.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.15B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$67.031.93xyesEPS $6.20 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Light Dutyoperatingenterprise$1.7b$0 operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Heavy Dutyoperatingenterprise$232.6m$0 operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Specialty Vehicleoperatingenterprise$205.7m$0 operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$397.6m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.84x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.43x
Interest coverage10.3x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.9%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Run a screen over Dorman and the machine files it with the auto-parts suppliers, then prices it accordingly. The screen is looking at the wrong thing. On roughly $2.15 billion of trailing revenue the company converted 15.4% into operating profit. LKQ, working the same aftermarket, ran a 6.8% operating margin; BWA managed 4.4%; PHIN 7.3%; over in specialty vehicles PATK ran 7.0% and LCII 7.1%. Dorman earns about twice what the cohort earns, and it is not because it is bigger. Every one of those companies is larger by revenue.

The difference is what the company actually sells. Dorman's engineers go looking for original-equipment parts that fail in the field, redesign them so they fail less, and get a replacement to market ahead of everyone else. The 10-K counts the output directly: In 2025, we introduced 5,560 new distinct parts to our customers and end-users, including 1,608 "New-to-the-Aftermarket" parts. A part nobody else stocks carries the margin of an invention. A part everybody stocks carries the margin of a commodity. The whole company is a bet on staying in the first category, and 1,608 new-to-the-aftermarket introductions in a single year is the machine running.

The Light Duty business, which is close to four-fifths of revenue, shows what that does to profitability. Segment income from operations rose to 20.5% of net sales in 2025 from 18.2% the year before, which the filing attributes to tariff-related pricing actions, stronger customer demand in the first half, and demand for new products. A supplier that can push a tariff through to the shelf and come out with a wider margin is not a price taker.

Reach is the other half of it. The 10-K reports that As of December 31, 2025, we serviced approximately 9,000 active accounts. That is the distribution the new-part engine plugs into, and it is why a redesigned wheel bearing can be on a shelf nationally within one selling season.

The balance sheet is built for this and nothing more. Borrowings net of liquid assets sit near 398 million dollars, roughly 1.2 times operating profit, with trailing operating income covering the interest bill close to twelve times over. The credit agreement, a $600.0 million revolving facility and a $500.0 million term loan, runs to October 4, 2027, and the first-quarter filing notes that interest expense fell on lower outstanding principal after repayments across recent quarters. The share count has come down about 0.9% a year for four years. Cash is going into parts and into the register, not into leverage.

Set that against what the price actually demands. Today's level asks the company to grow operating profit roughly 2.9% a year over five years. That is materially less than the pace the recent record contains. The bull case does not need the invention machine to accelerate. It needs it to keep idling.

Bear Case

The advantage here is a head start, not a patent. Dorman gets to a broken original-equipment part first, and for a while it owns that part number. Nothing stops the second entrant except the time it takes to tool up, and the filing is unusually frank about who the second entrant might be: We also face competition from OEMs, through their dealer networks, and from some of our customers whose private-label brands compete with ours. Read that alongside the concentration disclosure and the shape of the risk sharpens. The two customers who together took roughly 40% of 2025 net sales are also running the private-label programs that sell against the branded product. They see the part, they see the volume, and they see the margin.

The price assumes that arrangement holds. Every method that values the company on what it already owns or already earns lands below where the stock trades: book value plus profitability, the capitalized-earnings lenses, and the comparable-company multiples all sit under the price. Only the forward cash-flow lens reaches it. That is the signature of a durability premium, and durability is exactly the thing a head start cannot guarantee. If the head start shortens, nothing in the static methods catches the stock on the way down, because they are already below it.

The first quarter of 2026 gave a preview of how quickly the earnings line can move even when the top line does not. Net sales rose to $528.8 million from $507.7 million a year earlier, and diluted earnings per share fell to $1.43 from $1.87. More product went out the door and less profit came back, which is what absorbing import duty looks like before the pricing catches up.

Underneath the headline, two of the three businesses are thin. Heavy Duty net sales grew $6.1 million, or 11.9%, in the quarter on tariff-related pricing, and the segment still earned 0.8% of net sales, which counted as an improvement of 110 basis points. Specialty Vehicle segment income slipped to 13.1% of net sales in 2025 from 15.2% in 2024 on fixed-cost deleverage and higher duty costs. Roughly a fifth of the company is running at margins that a soft year would erase, and Light Duty is carrying the consolidated number more or less alone.

Cash conversion deserves a second look too. The 10-K describes operating cash flow being consumed by inventory built to meet demand and to pay increased tariffs on imports, offset in part by higher proceeds from selling accounts receivable under customer-sponsored programs. Those programs belong to the same concentrated customers. A supplier that funds part of its working capital through facilities its largest buyers sponsor has one more thread running back to the same two counterparties.

None of this makes the balance sheet fragile. Borrowings are modest and interest is covered many times over. But the borrowings float, at a weighted average 5.09% on the credit facility as of March 28, 2026, and the agreement matures on October 4, 2027, which puts a refinancing inside the window the price is asking the business to compound through.

Valuation

Start with the demand the price makes, because it is a small one. The market is capitalizing the company at roughly fourteen times the operating profit of the last twelve months, and inverting that gives an assumption of about 2.9% annual operating-profit growth sustained over five years. Measured against what this business has recently delivered, that is a modest ask. The pace is not the stretch here. The duration is.

Where it gets interesting is that the methods do not agree about whether even a modest ask is already paid for. The forward cash-flow lens reaches the price. Nothing else does. Book value plus profitability lands below it, the capitalized-earnings lenses land well below it, and the comparable-company multiples land below it too. The reason is basis rather than disagreement about the facts: the earnings-power read takes a five-year average of operating income, about $0.23 billion, and capitalizes it with no growth at all, so it prices the company as if the last five years were the future. The forward read credits the recent run rate instead. The gap between those two numbers is the entire argument about Dorman, and it is a question about persistence rather than about arithmetic.

One caveat sits under all of it. The implied growth figure is unusually sensitive to the discount rate used: each additional percentage point of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth requirement by about 5.9 percentage points. That is a wide swing for a small input, and it means the "2.9%" should be read as a neighborhood rather than a measurement.

The cohort comparison cuts a particular way. Dorman turned 15.4% of trailing revenue into operating profit. In the light-duty cohort LKQ managed 6.8% and BWA 4.4%; GNTX, the one genuine margin peer, ran 18.4%. Among specialty-vehicle names PATK earned 7.0% and LCII 7.1%. Yet the multiple the market pays sits in the lower half of that peer group's range. A below-average valuation on an above-average margin is either an opportunity or a verdict that the margin is borrowed from tariff pricing the filings say drove much of last year's Light Duty gain. Nothing in the trailing record decides between those two readings.

The balance sheet does not press on the answer. Borrowings net of liquid assets stand near 398 million dollars, about 1.2 times operating profit, with interest covered close to twelve times by trailing operating income. The company is not consuming cash, and the share count has fallen about 0.9% a year across four years. What that buys is time, which is precisely the input the durability question needs.

Catalysts

The tariff refund is the live variable and it is not in anyone's model yet. The first-quarter filing sets out the sequence: in February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled against certain duties previously imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the ruling did not address refunds of duties already paid, and in March 2026 the Court of International Trade ordered U.S. Customs and Border Protection to begin the refund process for all importers subject to those duties. Dorman is the importer of record for products that carried those duties and says it intends to pursue refunds, while noting the trade court's order may face a government challenge and that there is no assurance of receiving all or any portion of the money. The company spent a year pushing duty costs into prices. If a slice of that cost comes back, it comes back against prices that have already moved.

The March quarter itself showed the cost side still winning. Net sales reached $528.8 million against $507.7 million in the comparable quarter, with U.S. customers accounting for $489.1 million of the total, while diluted earnings per share came in at $1.43 versus $1.87. The effective tax rate for the quarter was 22.5%. Heavy Duty was the growth story, up 11.9% on tariff-related pricing actions, though from a segment margin of 0.8% that says more about pricing than about demand.

Debt is the quieter clock. The weighted average interest rate on credit facility borrowings was 5.09% as of March 28, 2026 against 5.07% at the December year end, and interest expense fell year over year on lower outstanding principal after repayments across several quarters. The facility matures in October 2027, so the pace of repayment between now and then determines whether that maturity is an event or a formality.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Light Duty (reported)

Heavy Duty (reported)

Specialty Vehicle (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 FY2026 10-Q, filed May 2026

View the full interactive DORM report on boothcheck