Dole plc (DOLE): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for Dole plc (DOLE) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DOLE
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | DOLE |
| Company | Dole plc |
| Current price | $14.18/sh |
| Composition | Fresh Fruit 39% / Diversified Fresh Produce - EMEA 43% / Diversified Fresh Produce - Americas & ROW 18% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 0.8% |
| Operating margin today | 2.8% |
| Margin compression implied | -2.0pp |
| Multiple paid | 9x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 12, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.3% sits below it).
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.10σ |
| cohort percentile (of 76 peers) | 13 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 2.88x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.70x | 2 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.46x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.10x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=11)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0 |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $20.87 | 0.68x | yes | P/E 21.92x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 31x), scenarios: 18.1x / 21.9x / 25.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $4.93 | 2.88x | yes | BV/sh $14.37, ROE (TTM) 3.2%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $2.98 | 4.76x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $12.90 | 1.10x | yes | Rev $9.4B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.1x / 0.1x / 0.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $28.86 | 0.49x | yes | Normalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.24B × (1−21%) / WACC 5.1% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $2.22 | 6.39x | yes | BV $14.37 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.1%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $12.06 | 1.18x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.45 × BVPS $14.37) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $30.56 | 0.46x | yes | EBITDA $0.33B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $0.38 | 37.32x | yes | EPS $0.45 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $5.74 | 2.47x | yes | BV $14.37 × (ROIC 2.0% / WACC 5.1%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $245.82 | 0.06x | yes | Revenue $9.42B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $4.86 | 2.92x | yes | EPS $0.45 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $675.8m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 3.33x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 2.63x |
| Interest coverage | 4.0x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.2% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
The counterintuitive fact about Dole is that the stock trades almost exactly at its $14.37 book value while its normalized earnings-power value, the worth of its average profit with no growth, lands well above the price. The market is pricing it as if it earns nothing extra.
Revenue grew 11.6% in the first quarter to $2.34 billion, but earnings fell, with diluted EPS down to $0.33 from $0.41, as higher fruit sourcing costs from weather disruptions squeezed margins. Operating margin is thin at about 2.3%.
Management reaffirmed full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance of at least $400 million and is selling its Ecuadorian port business for about $75 million. The business is asset-heavy and exposed to weather, currency, and commodity costs it cannot control.
Bull Case
The detail that does not fit the obvious narrative is this: a boring, low-margin produce company is trading at essentially its book value, $14.01 against a $14.37 book, even though the earnings-power value of its normalized profit lands well above the price. Markets usually assign a commodity food distributor a discount to its assets only when those assets are impaired or the earnings are vanishing. Dole's are neither. The company just grew revenue 11.6% in the first quarter to $2.34 billion, 7% organically excluding currency, on robust consumer demand across all three segments. A business growing its top line at a healthy clip and trading at book value is the kind of mismatch worth examining.
The earnings dip that spooked the market was cost-driven and looks transitory rather than structural. Operating income slipped to $62 million from $68 million and EPS to $0.33 from $0.41, but the pressure came from elevated fruit sourcing costs tied to prior weather disruptions in Honduras and Costa Rica, plus currency headwinds from the Costa Rican colon. Those are real but cyclical inputs, not evidence of demand erosion or share loss. Adjusted EBITDA of $100 million was in line, and management reaffirmed full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance of at least $400 million, signaling confidence that the cost spike normalizes.
The capital-allocation story adds to the case. Dole is selling its Ecuadorian port business for about $75 million of net proceeds at a gain in the second quarter, simplifying the portfolio and freeing cash. It is weighing a $100 million automation investment targeting 12% to 15% returns against share repurchases, a disciplined framework that means capital goes to whichever creates more value. The dividend yields about 2.4%. As the world's largest fresh-produce company, Dole has scale in sourcing and distribution that smaller rivals cannot match, and at book value with normalized earnings power well above the price, the bull thesis is a defensive, scaled food business that the market is treating like a melting asset when it is simply having a high-cost year.
Bear Case
The structural truth a Dole holder has to face is that this is a low-margin commodity business with little control over its own costs, and the cheapness reflects that, not a mispricing. Operating margin is about 2.3% and net margin barely above zero, which means a small move in input costs swings the bottom line hard, exactly what just happened. The first quarter showed it plainly: revenue grew double digits while operating income and EPS fell, because the price of the fruit Dole buys rose faster than the price it could charge. Trading near book value is the market's honest verdict on a business whose returns on equity, about 3.2%, sit far below its cost of capital, which is why the asset-based excess-return models land in the low single digits, well under the price.
The inputs that hurt this quarter are not one-offs; they are the permanent condition of the business. Dole sources fruit from regions exposed to extreme weather, crop disease, and currency swings, and the weather disruptions in Honduras and Costa Rica that lifted sourcing costs are the kind of event that recurs. The company is a price-taker on both ends: it cannot dictate banana and produce prices to retailers, and it cannot control the climate or the currencies in its sourcing countries. Free cash flow is negative, weighed down by the working capital and capital intensity of a global perishable-goods supply chain, which is why the cash-flow valuation methods floor at zero entirely.
The earnings-power value that looks attractive in the bull case rests on a low discount-rate assumption and on the normalized margin holding, and a few more high-cost years would erode it. The price already embeds essentially no growth, the inversion floors at the current level, so the stock is not obviously expensive, but the reason it is cheap is that the business struggles to earn its cost of capital and faces persistent cost pressure. The bet at $14 (June 27, 2026) is that input costs normalize and the automation investments lift margins, and the bear case is that a thin-margin, weather-exposed produce company at book value is cheap precisely because the deterioration in returns is structural, not because the market has missed something.
Valuation
Operating margin is about 2.3%, and the implied margin fades toward 0.8%, so the price assumes the business roughly treads water rather than expands. The composite read is within range on that undemanding basis.
The model X-ray is split and instructive. The cash-flow DCFs floor at zero because trailing free cash flow is negative, a function of the working-capital and capital intensity of a perishable supply chain. The asset-based excess-return methods land in the low single digits because return on equity, about 3.2%, is well below the cost of equity, which signals the business is not earning its capital cost on book value. Yet the Graham number lands near $12 and the earnings-power value, capitalizing normalized operating income at a low discount rate, lands near $32, the highest of the set, which is the source of the counterintuitive cheapness. The relative methods straddle, with the sector P/E near $21 above the price and EV/EBITDA near $31, while the price-to-sales method is meaningless on a high-revenue, low-margin business.
The pattern is a stock priced at book value where the no-growth earnings-power value sits above the price but the return-on-equity-based methods sit below it, reflecting honest disagreement about whether the normalized earnings are durable. The bet at $14 is that the high-cost period is temporary and the normalized earnings power, plus the automation investment, lifts returns back above where book-value methods value them, not that the shares compound, which the price does not assume.
Catalysts
First-quarter 2026 results, reported in early May, were the most recent catalyst. Revenue rose 11.6% to $2.34 billion, 7% organically, with growth across all three segments, but operating income fell to $62 million from $68 million and diluted EPS to $0.33 from $0.41, as elevated fruit sourcing costs from weather disruptions in Honduras and Costa Rica and Costa Rican colon currency headwinds pressured the Fresh Fruit segment. Adjusted EBITDA of $100 million was in line, and management reaffirmed full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance of at least $400 million.
The forward catalysts center on cost normalization and portfolio actions. The sale of the Ecuadorian port business is expected to generate about $75 million of net proceeds at a gain in the second quarter, and the company is evaluating a $100 million automation investment targeting 12% to 15% returns against share repurchases. The watch items are whether fruit sourcing costs ease as the weather-driven disruptions pass, banana and produce pricing against those costs, the pace of margin recovery toward the EBITDA guidance, the use of the port-sale proceeds, and continued currency and weather exposure in the sourcing regions. Analyst sentiment is bullish with a median target near $18.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Fresh Fruit / Diversified Fresh Produce - EMEA / Diversified Fresh Produce - Americas & ROW (reported)
- FDP (FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCE INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CALM (Cal-Maine Foods, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.