Healthpeak Properties, Inc. (DOC): what the price requires
At today's price, Healthpeak Properties, Inc. (DOC) is priced for -3.0% FFO growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DOC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | DOC |
| Company | Healthpeak Properties, Inc. |
| Current price | $21.72/sh |
| Composition | Outpatient Medical 47% / Lab 31% / Senior Housing 22% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | reit |
| Implied FFO growth | -3.0% |
| Price-to-FFO | 13.3x |
| FFO yield | 7.5% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.22σ |
| cohort percentile (of 88 peers) | 40 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 8.47x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.70x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.91x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.11x | 5 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $46.01 | 0.47x | yes | FCF base $1.2B, growth 3% (input: historical growth), terminal g 2.7%, WACC 5.7%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $24.63 | 0.88x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 20.5x / 22.5x / 24.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $29.71 | 0.73x | yes | P/E 26.36x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 13x), scenarios: 22.2x / 26.4x / 30.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 20x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | $19.57 | 1.11x | yes | DPS $1.22, g=2.8% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3% |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $16.65 | 1.30x | yes | Stage 1: -3% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $3.45 | 6.30x | yes | BV/sh $11.26, ROE (TTM) 2.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $2.04 | 10.65x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $15.84 | 1.37x | yes | Rev $2.9B, growth 3% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.4x / 5.3x / 6.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Growth-Adjusted P/E | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $1.51 | 14.38x | yes | BV $11.26 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $20.26 | 1.07x | yes | √(22.5 × FFO/share $1.62 × BVPS $11.26) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $17.76 | 1.22x | yes | EBITDA $1.08B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $5.87 | 3.70x | yes | FCF $1233.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $4.14 | 5.25x | yes | FFO/share $1.62 × (8.5 + 2×-2.7%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $24.79 | 0.88x | yes | Revenue $2.87B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $17.51 | 1.24x | yes | FFO/share $1.62 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | $23.03 | 0.94x | yes | FFO/share $1.62 × 14.2x P/FFO (route cohort median, n=85); FFO $1.13B (FFO incl. D&A + impairments, FY2025, companyfacts), shares 695M |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt (REIT basis) | $9.3b |
| Net debt / FFO | 8.19x |
| Fixed-charge coverage (FFO basis) | 4.6x |
| Funds from operations (trailing) | $1.1b |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 6.5% |
| Burning cash | no |
REIT basis: leverage is read against funds from operations (FFO), not depreciation-gutted operating income. The header's implied growth runs on ADJUSTED FFO — FFO minus recurring maintenance capex — so the header's multiple and this leverage ratio use bases that differ by that capex; neither substitutes for the other.
Bullet Takeaways
- Healthpeak is the rare healthcare landlord whose rent comes from three different demand curves at once: outpatient medical buildings that fill up when doctors move out of hospitals, lab space tied to drug-development funding, and senior housing that tracks an aging population, and the March IPO of its senior-housing arm Janus Living (Healthpeak kept roughly 85% economic interest) turned part of that third leg into a separately traded position.
- The single most pressing risk is the lab portfolio, where occupancy is guided to bottom in the high-70% range before recovering late in the year, against a balance sheet carrying net debt of about $9.3 billion versus funds from operations near $1.13 billion, roughly eight times, with the share count still climbing about 6.5% a year.
- Watch the late-2026 lab-occupancy turn and the next FFO print: management raised full-year FFO guidance to $1.70 to $1.74 a share after senior housing and outpatient medical outran plan.
Bull Case
Three rent streams that rarely move together is the structural advantage here. Most landlords own one kind of building and live or die on one demand cycle. Healthpeak owns outpatient medical offices, laboratory space, and senior housing, and those three are driven by different things: doctors shifting care out of expensive hospital settings, biotech and pharma funding for lab tenants, and the slow demographic wave moving into senior living. When one leg sags, the other two can carry the dividend. That is the whole point of a diversified healthcare REIT, and it is why the outpatient-medical and senior-housing strength this year was able to offset a soft lab market and still let management raise full-year FFO guidance to $1.70 to $1.74 a share.
The senior-housing move sharpened the story. In March, Healthpeak took its senior-housing arm public as Janus Living, raising roughly $703 million while keeping about 85% economic interest, and the new shares priced at the top of the $18 to $20 range and traded up from there. The structure lets Healthpeak keep most of the demographic upside while handing the operating intensity of running senior communities to a dedicated vehicle, and Janus has since lined up further senior-living acquisitions of its own. For the parent, it is a way to crystallize value in the segment without surrendering the exposure.
On the cash the buildings actually throw off, Healthpeak looks reasonable rather than rich. Take funds from operations, then subtract the recurring spending needed to keep the buildings competitive, and what remains is the cash that funds the dividend. Against today's price near $19.56 that adjusted figure runs about a 7.75% yield. For a portfolio anchored in needs-based healthcare real estate, where the tenant is often a doctor's practice or a lab that cannot easily relocate, a near-8% cash yield is a respectable starting return before any occupancy recovery. The dividend itself, declared at monthly amounts totaling $0.305 for the first quarter, sits inside that cash generation rather than reaching past it.
The coverage gives the bet room. Fixed-charge coverage near 4.5 times means the rent and other income comfortably clear interest and preferred obligations, so the leverage is being serviced out of operations, not refinanced out of trouble. The bull does not need the lab segment to boom. It needs the lab to stop falling while the other two legs keep paying, and management's own guide points to lab occupancy bottoming in the high-70% range and turning later in the year.
Bear Case
Start with what the price is actually asking the business to do, because it is undemanding, and that is the bear's opening. At about $19.56 (June 28, 2026) the stock changes hands near 12.9 times adjusted funds from operations, a roughly 7.75% cash yield. Priced that way, the market is not betting on much growth at all. It is paying for the existing cash to hold and the dividend to keep arriving. The bear case is not that the price embeds a heroic assumption. It is that even the modest assumption baked in, that the cash stream is stable, is exposed to two things working against it: a lab portfolio still losing occupancy and a balance sheet that has been growing its share count to fund the business.
The lab segment is the soft spot. Management guides occupancy to bottom in the high-70% range before recovering later in the year, which is another way of saying it has not bottomed yet. Lab demand follows biotech and pharma funding, and when that funding tightens, tenants give back space or renew at lower rents. A near-8% starting yield looks generous until one of three rent legs is shrinking, because the headline cash figure is a blend, and a blend can mask a segment quietly eroding underneath it. If the lab recovery slips into next year, the cash that supports today's yield gets thinner before it gets thicker.
The balance sheet is the second pressure. Net debt sits near $9.3 billion against funds from operations of about $1.13 billion, so leverage runs roughly eight times the very cash the price is built on. That is not a crisis level for a REIT, and fixed-charge coverage near 4.5 times shows the obligations are being met. But eight-times leverage leaves little slack if the lab drag deepens or if refinancing costs climb, and it means a larger share of any rent increase goes to lenders before it reaches shareholders. The Janus IPO helped on this front by raising cash, but it also illustrates the funding reality: Healthpeak has been issuing equity and units, and the share count has been climbing about 6.5% a year.
That dilution is the quiet tax on this thesis. A REIT that grows its building base by selling new shares is running to stand still on a per-share basis, because the same total cash spread across more shares means each share's claim grows more slowly than the portfolio does. The bull frames the three-leg diversification as resilience. The bear reframes the same fact: three segments, one of them visibly weakening, funded in part by a steadily growing share count, priced for stability that the lab market is not yet delivering. If occupancy stays soft and dilution continues, the modest stability the price assumes is exactly the thing at risk.
Valuation
The right lens for a healthcare landlord is the cash left after the buildings are kept competitive, and on that lens Healthpeak is priced for very little. At about $19.56 the stock trades near 12.9 times adjusted funds from operations, the figure that takes funds from operations and nets out the recurring upkeep the properties need. That works out to roughly a 7.75% cash yield. Read plainly, the price is not asking for a growth story. It is paying for the existing adjusted cash to hold and the dividend to keep arriving. Funds from operations before that upkeep deduction is the gross number, near $1.13 billion in total, and it is the starting point the adjusted figure refines, not the anchor the price rests on; the buildings need real maintenance spending, and the yield that matters is the one measured after it.
Set against the methods used to triangulate a REIT, the price looks supported rather than stretched. Group those methods into families and a clear pattern emerges. The asset-value family, which leans on reported book value and return on equity, marks the stock as expensive, and at first glance that looks like a warning. It is not. Trailing return on equity reads low precisely because real estate accounting charges heavy depreciation against buildings that are not actually losing value the way the books pretend, and the funds-from-operations frame exists to correct exactly that distortion. Strip the accounting artifact away and the picture flips: the earnings-power lens, the peer-multiple lens, and the forward-growth methods all sit at or below the price, meaning each of those frames finds today's price defensible on the cash the portfolio generates. The only family calling the stock dear is the one a REIT analyst knows to discount.
So the spread across methods reads as a value-and-asset-supported name, not a growth bet. The income-based frames back the current price while the depreciation-distorted book-value frame objects, which is the normal shape for a stabilized healthcare REIT trading near the cash it throws off. What the buyer is underwriting at $19.56 is closer to a coupon than a growth wager: a near-8% adjusted cash yield, with upside if lab occupancy recovers from its high-70% trough and downside if it does not.
Solvency is where the caution sits. Net debt of about $9.3 billion stands against funds from operations near $1.13 billion, roughly eight times, and fixed-charge coverage near 4.5 times shows that interest and preferred obligations are met comfortably out of operations. The leverage is carryable, not alarming, but it is high enough that the lab drag and the steadily rising share count, up about 6.5% a year, both bear directly on how much of the portfolio's cash actually reaches a share. That is the reason the price sits at the cautious end of a range the income methods otherwise support.
Catalysts
The defining event of the year already happened: in March, Healthpeak took its senior-housing portfolio public as Janus Living, raising roughly $703 million at the top of an $18 to $20 range while keeping about 85% economic interest, and Janus has since teed up further senior-living acquisitions of its own. The transaction reshaped how the senior-housing exposure trades and gave Healthpeak fresh capital, and its follow-through, how the retained stake performs and how Janus deploys, is now a live input to the parent's story rather than a one-time headline.
The near-term swing factor is the lab recovery against an already-raised outlook. Management lifted full-year FFO guidance to $1.70 to $1.74 a share after senior housing and outpatient medical ran ahead of plan, while guiding lab occupancy to bottom in the high-70% range before turning later in the year. The next earnings print is the readout that matters: confirmation that lab occupancy is forming a floor would validate the raised guide, while a further slip would put the modest stability the price assumes under pressure. Analyst targets on the stock currently span a wide range, roughly $17 to $29, which is itself a sign the market has not settled on how the lab turn and the Janus structure net out.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Outpatient Medical (reported)
- HR (HEALTHCARE REALTY TRUST INCORPORATED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AHR (American Healthcare REIT, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- DHC (DIVERSIFIED HEALTHCARE TRUST)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MPT (MEDICAL PROPERTIES TRUST, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Lab (reported)
- ARE (ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUITIES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BXP (BXP, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CUZ (COUSINS PROPERTIES INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KRC (KILROY REALTY CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Senior Housing (reported)
- WELL (WELLTOWER INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- VTR (Ventas, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NHI (National Health Investors, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- SBRA (SABRA HEALTH CARE REIT, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- LTC (LTC PROPERTIES INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- OHI (OMEGA HEALTHCARE INVESTORS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Janus Living IPO, March 2026 · Healthpeak Q4 2025 release / 2026 guidance · Healthpeak 2026 guidance · Janus Living IPO, March 2026; Senior Housing News, March 2026 · Senior Housing News, May 2026 · Healthpeak dividend declaration, Q1 2026 · Healthpeak 2026 outlook · Janus Living IPO, March 2026; Senior Housing News, March and May 2026 · Healthpeak 2026 guidance and outlook · analyst estimates, 2026