DHT HOLDINGS, INC. (DHT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $18.28, DHT HOLDINGS, INC. (DHT) is priced for -2.0% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DHT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDHT
CompanyDHT HOLDINGS, INC.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$18.28/sh

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)9.2%
Operating margin today45.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-35.9pp
Implied growth-2.0%
Multiple paid15x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.4pp.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~6.7%/yr; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.41σ
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.17x5expensive
Earnings1.70x4expensive
Relative1.01x5expensive
Growth0.64x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$76.550.24xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth 22% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.2%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$31.940.57xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.8x / 12.8x / 14.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$18.071.01xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.3x / 20.0x / 23.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$25.530.72xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$7.962.30xyesBV/sh $7.05, ROE (TTM) 10.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$8.442.17xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$21.850.84xyesRev $0.5B, growth 22% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.9x / 6.0x / 7.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$8.762.09xyesEPS $0.73, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=18.09 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$1.6111.35xyesNormalized EBIT (latest-period EBIT; under 3y history) $0.05B × (1−0%) / WACC 8.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$8.542.14xyesBV $7.05 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$10.761.70xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.73 × BVPS $7.05) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$18.540.99xyesEBITDA $0.25B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$16.851.08xyesFCF $279.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$23.550.78xyesEPS $0.73 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$2.806.53xyesBV $7.05 × (ROIC 3.3% / WACC 8.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$6.112.99xyesRevenue $0.49B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$27.380.67xyesEPS $0.73 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$7.892.32xyesEPS $0.73 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$349.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.56x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.55x
Interest coverage15.9x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Pricing a crude tanker owner is unlike pricing almost anything else, and the reason is arithmetic rather than mystery. The product is a voyage, quoted daily, and its price moves further in a quarter than most industries move in a decade. DHT's very large crude carriers earned $36,300 a day in the spot market in the first quarter of 2025. In the first quarter of 2026 the same ships earned $91,700, and the company estimates $162,600 a day for its spot vessels in the June quarter. Nothing about the fleet changed. Everything about what the fleet collects did.

Which is why the cost side is where the story actually sits. Vessel operating expenses ran 19.1 million dollars in the March quarter and depreciation another 25.6 million, against shipping revenues of $186.3 million. Those costs barely move with the day rate. So when the rate doubles, nearly the whole increase falls to the bottom. Shipping revenues rose to $186.3 million from $118.2 million a year earlier while profit after tax rose to $164.5 million from $44.1 million, and roughly 60.0 million of the 2026 figure came from booking gains on vessel sales rather than from carrying oil.

Those gains are the second part of the case. DHT sold two 2007-built vessels for an aggregate $101.6 million and recognised a $60.0 million gain, which means the pair sat on the balance sheet at something close to forty percent of what a buyer was willing to pay. In January the company agreed to sell a third for $51.5 million against an expected gain of $34.2 million. When a fleet's nineteen-year-old ships repeatedly change hands at multiples of their carrying value, book value is not measuring steel. It is measuring a depreciation schedule.

The third piece is where the cash goes. The stated policy is to distribute 100% of ordinary net income each quarter, and the March declaration of $0.64 a share was the 65th consecutive payment. That structure has a specific virtue in a cyclical business: owners get paid during the good part of the cycle instead of watching the proceeds reinvested at the top of it. Net debt stood at 379.1 million dollars at the end of March against 23 vessels in operation, with 77.5 million of newbuilding installments left to pay.

And the company has been converting spot strength into contracted income while the market allows it. Three one-year charters were fixed during the first quarter at $105,000, $94,000 and $90,000 a day, two more followed in May at an average of $109,000, and a three-year deal was signed in July at $75,000. About 74% of September-quarter revenue days are already booked at an average of $94,300. Whatever the spot market decides to do next, a substantial share of the next two quarters is already in hand.

The bear will say the rate is the whole company and the rate is temporary. That is the right objection, and it follows. What the bull is claiming is that a company selling ships above book, banking term coverage above cost and paying out the difference is extracting the cycle rather than merely riding it.

Bear Case

Whatever edge a tanker owner holds is not a moat in the ordinary sense. It is scarcity, and scarcity erodes on a schedule. The current scarcity is genuine enough: the company points to roughly 10% of the world's very large crude carrier fleet tied up either holding cargo while waiting to leave the Middle East Gulf or waiting to load, and to geopolitical risk premiums attaching to particular routes. Read those carefully and they are conditions rather than structures. Clear the congestion, settle the region, and the same ships are chasing the same barrels again.

The most persuasive evidence for that view comes from DHT itself. In July the company fixed the 2015-built DHT Jaguar on a three-year time charter at $75,000 per day with a global energy company, to start in September 2026. In the same update it estimated its spot vessels earning $162,600 per day for the June quarter. A five-year extension on DHT Harrier was struck at $47,500 per day, rising to $50,000 in a second optional year. When an owner with the best available view of its own market signs multi-year contracts at less than half its current earnings, and a counterparty is content to take the other side, both parties are saying the same thing about where rates settle.

Supply is being added, including by this company. DHT has four newbuildings in its program, three delivered during the March quarter, with 444.2 million dollars paid to date and 77.5 million still to come. Every owner is reading the same day rates and running a version of the same calculation, and ships ordered into a strong market arrive two to three years later, which is reliably the wrong moment. The company's own list of longer-term catalysts contains the mechanism in reverse: it expects sanctions relief on Venezuelan and Iranian crude to move volumes from the shadow fleet toward compliant operators. That is helpful on the demand side. It also hands the compliant fleet a set of competitors it does not currently have to price against.

The distribution policy amplifies whatever the cycle does. Paying out all ordinary net income leaves no retained buffer, and the dividend has already demonstrated the range: $0.15 a share for the first quarter of 2025 against $0.64 for the first quarter of 2026. That is a four-fold move inside twelve months, and the mechanism runs in reverse with exactly the same speed. Anyone buying for the current yield is buying a number that is a direct function of the spot rate, and that rate was $36,300 a day as recently as early 2025.

Exposure to it is deliberate and large. Spot days were 57.3% of operating days in the March quarter and 59.9% across 2025. The term charters cut into that but do not remove it, and the term book is being assembled at rates well beneath spot, which means the protection costs real money in exactly the quarters that look best. Both sides of that trade are visible inside the same fleet at the same time.

Set against all this, the price sits about 2.2 times above where the asset-value methods land and about 1.7 times above the earnings-power methods. By the standards of most equities neither gap is dramatic. For a business whose earnings can halve in two quarters without anything unusual happening, neither is small.

Valuation

The hardest problem in pricing this company is deciding what belongs in the denominator. Today's $18.45 sets the operating business at about 24 times trailing operating income, and that trailing figure was earned across a period when the fleet's spot vessels averaged well under half of what they earn now. The comparison is stark: $36,300 a day in the spot market in the first quarter of 2025 against $91,700 in the first quarter of 2026. A multiple struck against a trough describes the trough.

Inverting the price still produces a specific demand. Company-wide operating profit growing about 11.2% a year for five years, computed at a cost of capital just under eight percent. Measured against that depressed base it is not a heroic requirement, and around 52% of comparable fast-growers sustained a pace like it for a comparable stretch. Measured against the current run rate the requirement looks closer to an assumption that rates do not revert at all. Both readings are available from the same number, and the distance between them is the entire investment question.

The methods split the way you would expect. Peer-multiple methods and the forward cash-flow methods both land above today's price, which is what happens when a frame extrapolates from a rising trailing rate. The price sits about 2.2 times above where the asset-value methods land and about 1.7 times above the earnings-power methods. The asset gap deserves a caveat rather than a conclusion, because those methods run off book value per share of $7.05, and book value here is depreciated historical cost. Two 2007-built vessels sold for $101.6 million produced a $60.0 million gain, and a third sold for $51.5 million carries an expected gain of $34.2 million. The ships are worth several times their carrying amounts, so the asset lens is reading the ledger rather than the fleet.

The concrete test is contracted coverage against spot. Roughly 74% of September-quarter revenue days are already booked at an average of $94,300 per day, including 48% of spot days averaging $139,700 per day. Two quarters of earnings are therefore largely settled. Beyond that window the term book is the better guide, and it is being built well below spot: $75,000 a day for three years on DHT Jaguar, $47,500 for five years on DHT Harrier. Those are the numbers to carry into the years a five-year assumption is reaching for, not the spot rate printing today.

The balance sheet is unusually plain for a shipping company, and that is the point of it. Interest bearing debt was 505.3 million dollars at the end of March against 126.2 million of cash, leaving net debt of 379.1 million, up from 349.7 million at the year end as newbuilding installments came due. Set against 23 vessels whose recent sale prices ran at several times their carrying value, that is a light claim on the assets. Tanker owners fail when the borrowings outlive the rate cycle. This one has arranged matters so that they do not have to.

Catalysts

The July 13, 2026 business update did most of the work of a quarterly report. DHT estimated time charter equivalent earnings of $126,700 per day for the June quarter across 2,012 revenue days, comprising $162,600 for vessels trading spot and $90,800 for those on time charter. That is roughly 60% above the combined rate the fleet achieved in March. The second-quarter report that formalises those figures is the next scheduled event, and the surprise element in it is small by design.

Forward coverage is unusually visible for a cyclical business. About 48% of September-quarter spot days are booked at an average of $139,700 per day, and 74% of total revenue days at $94,300. The same update disclosed a three-year charter for the 2015-built DHT Jaguar at $75,000 per day with a global energy company, commencing in September. The gap between new fixture rates and prevailing spot is worth tracking across the next few updates. It is the cleanest read available on whether owners and charterers believe the current environment persists, and right now that gap is wide.

One asset transaction remains outstanding. The company agreed in January to sell DHT Bauhinia, built in 2007, for $51.5 million, with delivery expected during June or July 2026 and a gain of $34.2 million anticipated. The vessel carries no borrowings, so the proceeds arrive whole. Two items follow behind it: the final newbuilding delivery, with 77.5 million dollars of installments still outstanding, and the quarterly dividend, which under a policy of distributing all ordinary net income will simply track whatever the June and September quarters turn out to have earned.

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

DHT business update, July 13, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, May 5, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, May 5, 2026; DHT business update, July 13, 2026

View the full interactive DHT report on boothcheck