DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP (DECK): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $87.67, DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP (DECK) is priced for -2.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DECK

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDECK
CompanyDECKERS OUTDOOR CORP
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$87.67/sh
CompositionHOKA 47% / UGG 50% / Other Brands 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.2%
Operating margin today22.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-19.5pp
Implied growth-2.1%
Multiple paid9x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.63σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)12

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.09x5expensive
Earnings0.94x5justifies
Relative1.29x2expensive
Growth1.30x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$114.080.77xyesFCF base $1.2B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$67.631.30xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 6.6x / 8.6x / 10.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$80.431.09xyesBV/sh $16.87, ROE (TTM) 44.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$202.390.43xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$41.112.13xyesRev $5.5B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.8x / 2.2x / 2.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$84.361.04xyesEPS $7.03, growth 5% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.19 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$39.032.25xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.94B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$128.650.68xyesBV $16.87 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 44.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$51.661.70xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.03 × BVPS $16.87) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.25B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$96.870.91xyesFCF $1117.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$93.160.94xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.07B (FCF $1.12B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$113.390.77xyesEPS $7.03 × (8.5 + 2×5.4%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$19.834.42xyesBV $16.87 × (ROIC 10.5% / WACC 8.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $5.53B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$56.651.55xyesEPS $7.03 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 5.4% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 8.1x
Earnings YieldEarnings$76.001.15xyesEPS $7.03 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
HOKA brandoperatingenterprise$2.6b$911.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
UGG brandoperatingenterprise$2.7b$1.0b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Other Brandsoperatingenterprise$146.2m$16.4m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$1.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-1.62x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.28x (net cash)
Interest coverage327.8x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.8%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Footwear is not usually a good business. Columbia converts $3.4 billion of revenue into a 6.0% operating margin. Wolverine manages 8.6% on $1.9 billion. Crocs runs 3.2% and Steven Madden 4.8%; Under Armour is currently below zero at negative 3.3%. Deckers converts about 23%. That is not a rounding difference or a good quarter. It is a structurally different position inside the same industry, held while every listed comparable sits in single digits, and it is the fact the bull case is built on.

Two things produce it. The first is that neither brand competes on price. HOKA is described in the filing as "The HOKA brand is an authentic premium line of year-round performance footwear", and UGG occupies a category it effectively created. Neither is a fashion sneaker fighting for shelf space on discount. The second is channel control. The company keeps expanding the part of the business it owns, noting that it continues "to selectively expand our HOKA brand presence through additional wholesale partner locations and targeted DTC channel retail store expansion". Selling directly captures the retailer's margin and, more importantly, the decision about when to discount.

Both brands are still growing. Fiscal 2026 net sales rose 9.8% to $5.47 billion, with HOKA up 15.9% to $2.59 billion and UGG up 8.2% to $2.74 billion. The company adds that "On a constant currency basis, net sales increased by 9.0%, compared to the prior period." A currency-adjusted figure close to the headline means the growth is volume and price rather than exchange rates, which is the version that actually compounds.

The returns follow. Trailing return on shareholder equity runs about 41.0%, on a book value per share of $17.32 and trailing earnings per share of $7.02. Free cash flow came in near 1,097 million dollars against stock compensation of roughly 40 million dollars, so what the business reports is very close to what an owner would actually receive. Few consumer brands convert that cleanly.

There is also no financial engineering underneath any of it. The 10-K states that "During the year ended March 31, 2026, the Company made no borrowings or repayments under the Primary Credit Facility." Cash and equivalents stood at $1.907 billion at the same date against no drawn borrowings at all, and the share count has fallen about 3.4% a year over the four years to the end of 2025. A business earning these margins with no debt and a shrinking share count does not need anything to go right to keep compounding. It needs nothing to go badly wrong.

Bear Case

The question that decides this stock is whether last year's profit is a run rate or a high-water mark. Consumer footwear is a cyclical category dressed up as a branded one, and the cycle runs on taste rather than on GDP. Every peer in this cohort earns a single-digit operating margin. Deckers earns roughly 23%. One reading is that it has a durable position the others lack. The other reading is that the industry's normal return is the single digit, and that a company earning four times that is somewhere near the top of a demand wave it did not create and cannot schedule.

Two facts make the second reading harder to dismiss. The first is concentration. UGG and HOKA together are about 97% of revenue, and UGG alone is half. A brand that is half the company and rests on one material has a specific vulnerability, and the filing names it: "Because sheepskin is integral to the UGG brand, adverse changes in consumer preferences, regulatory requirements, or sourcing standards applicable to sheepskin could have a material adverse effect". The second is timing. Because "A significant part of the UGG brand's business has historically been seasonal, with the highest percentage of net sales occurring in the third fiscal quarter", half the company reports its verdict in one quarter of the year. A single warm autumn compresses a year's worth of judgment into a few weeks of sell-through.

The margin is already under external pressure. Discussing the UGG brand, the filing attributes an operating profit increase to higher net sales "partially offset by slightly lower gross margins driven by tariffs", alongside higher advertising and marketing as a share of net sales. Tariffs are a cost the company does not control and cannot design around quickly. Marketing spend rising as a percentage of sales is a different signal, and a more uncomfortable one: it suggests growth is now costing more per dollar than it used to.

HOKA's position is the part most exposed to competition. Performance running is the single most contested category in footwear right now, with every major athletic brand and a wave of newer entrants pushing into cushioned trainers. The filing's own framing is that "The footwear, apparel, and accessories industry is highly competitive and subject to rapidly changing consumer preferences." HOKA grew 15.9% in fiscal 2026, which is good, and which is also slower than the pace that built its reputation. Deceleration in the growth brand while the seasonal brand carries half the revenue is not a crisis. It is the shape a peak takes on the way in.

To be fair to the bull, the price is not asking for much. That is precisely the trap worth naming: a low bar looks cheap only if the base it is measured from is the right one. If trailing operating profit is a cycle peak, the multiple on normalized profit is a good deal higher than the multiple on the trailing figure, and the balance sheet, which is genuinely strong, does not change that arithmetic at all.

Valuation

The bar this price sets is unusually low, and it is worth stating before anything else. Today's $96.15 works out to about 9.4 times a year of company-wide operating profit, and clearing that requires operating profit to grow roughly 0.4% a year over five years. Not 4%. Under half of one percent. Against a business that grew net sales 9.8% in its last fiscal year, that is a requirement the company would have to actively fail to meet.

The methods mostly agree with that read. The earnings-power approaches land essentially at the price. Peer multiples land above it, and the forward-growth approaches land well above it. Only the asset lens, book value combined with profitability, leaves a gap, with the price about 25% above where that family sits, which is what happens when a highly profitable brand company carries very little book value per share. Three of four families support the current quote. This is a value read, not a growth read.

The honest complication is the base. Every one of those methods runs off trailing profit, and trailing profit here reflects an operating margin near 23% in an industry where the listed comparables earn single digits. COLM converts $3.4 billion at 6.0%, WWW converts $1.9 billion at 8.6%, CROX runs 3.2% and SHOO 4.8%. If the right normalized margin for a premium footwear brand is closer to the middle of that range than to today's figure, then the multiple on sustainable earnings is meaningfully higher than the multiple on last year's, and the cheapness thins out. This section cannot settle that, and pretending otherwise would be the wrong kind of confidence.

Against the sector the shares sit in the lower half of the peer multiple range, which is consistent with a market that has already discounted some of that concern rather than ignored it. The calculation is also sensitive in the usual way: a single percentage point of movement in the cost of capital shifts the required growth rate by nearly four points, which is a reminder that a 0.4% requirement is a soft number rather than a precise one.

The balance sheet is the cleanest part of the file and it genuinely bounds the downside. Cash and equivalents stood at 1.907 billion dollars on March 31, 2026, the company reports "During the year ended March 31, 2026, the Company made no borrowings or repayments under the Primary Credit Facility.", and free cash flow ran near 1,097 million dollars against fiscal 2026 net sales of $5.47 billion. Roughly one dollar in seven of the market value is cash, with nothing owed against it. A brand cycle turning would hurt the earnings; it would not threaten the company.

Catalysts

The most recent print landed on July 23, 2026 and cleared its bar. Deckers reported first-quarter earnings per share of $0.94 against a Q1 consensus of $0.88, and passed $1 billion of first-quarter revenue for the first time. For a company whose largest brand books most of its sales in the autumn and winter, a record first quarter matters less for its size than for what it says about HOKA carrying the off-season.

Guidance moved with it, though barely. Management raised its fiscal 2027 earnings-per-share range to $7.35 to $7.50 from $7.30 to $7.45. A five-cent increase at both ends is a small revision, and it is the kind that says the year is tracking rather than accelerating. Set against trailing earnings per share of $7.02, that guidance range implies growth in the mid single digits, which is well ahead of what the current price appears to require.

The sell side read the same release less warmly. Telsey Advisory Group cut its price target to $105 from $113 the following day, and several other firms trimmed targets at the same time. Beating on earnings while targets come down usually means the debate has moved off the current quarter and onto margins, and the tariff commentary in the annual filing is the most likely reason. The next scheduled event that resolves any of it is the second-quarter report in the autumn, which is also the run-up to the UGG selling season.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

HOKA brand (reported)

UGG brand (reported)

Other Brands (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 fiscal 2027 earnings release, July 23, 2026 · company guidance update, July 23, 2026 · Telsey Advisory Group research note, July 24, 2026

View the full interactive DECK report on boothcheck