DUCOMMUN INCORPORATED (DCO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $176.30, DUCOMMUN INCORPORATED (DCO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~11.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/DCO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerDCO
CompanyDUCOMMUN INCORPORATED
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$176.30/sh
CompositionMilitary and space 58% / Commercial aerospace 37% / Industrial 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Trailing margin (depressed year)-1.7%
Must persist for11.3y
Multiple paid64x mid-cycle operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.64σ

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset4.28x3expensive
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth1.40x1expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=4)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF — equity value floored at $0
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$45.733.86xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $45.73, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$41.154.28xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $45.73, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$125.711.40xyesRev $0.9B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.1x / 3.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$1.8396.34xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.03B × (1−18%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.02B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$12.4514.16xyesBV $45.73 × (ROIC 2.4% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $0.87B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Electronic Systemsoperatingenterprise0.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Structural Systemsoperatingenterprise0.5B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$237.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)6.26x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)5.15x
Share count CAGR (dilution)6.0%
Burning cashyes

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 5.3%); the trailing year was depressed.

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Look at the last twelve months and this company lost money at the operating line. Look at the last two reported quarters and it did not. Almost the whole trailing loss sits in one quarter, the third of 2025, and both quarters filed since have come back with operating profit, about 16.9 million dollars and then about 15.7 million dollars. Measured across a full cycle rather than across that one quarter, the operating margin comes out near 5.3%. Which of those two numbers describes the business is what the bull case is actually arguing about.

The company itself is unglamorous and specific. Electronic Systems "designs, engineers and manufactures high-reliability electronic and electromechanical products" that go inside defense and aerospace platforms; Structural Systems makes the metal and composite assemblies that hold aircraft together. The 10-K puts the top line plainly: "the Company's consolidated net revenues for the year ended December 31, 2025 were $824.7 million, of which the majority was recognized over time". Recognizing revenue over time means the shop books it as work progresses rather than at delivery, and it is why the balance sheet carries a large receivable-like asset for work performed but not yet billed.

That asset has been building. Contract assets stood at $249.8 million at the end of 2025 against $200.6 million a year earlier, an increase the filing attributes primarily to a net increase of products in work in process. For a build-to-print supplier, more work in process is the least ambiguous evidence available that the primes are pulling parts. The order book behind it comes largely from long-term agreements, and the filing is careful to say that "Backlog is subject to delivery delays or program cancellations", which is honest and also the standard condition of the industry.

The margin gap to the cohort is where the upside lives, and it is a large gap. ATRO, closest in size at $886.8 million of trailing revenue, runs a 10.2% operating margin. HXL runs 9.5% and DRS 9.9% while growing revenue 10.5%. A full-cycle 5.3% against those numbers is not a demand problem, because the same programs feed all of them; it is a cost and mix problem inside the four walls. The heavy restructuring spending that goes with fixing such a problem is largely behind: charges ran $2.2 million in 2025 against $31.4 million cumulative since the program began.

Time is the resource a turnaround needs most, and the refinancing bought a lot of it. "The 2025 Term Loan is a $200.0 million senior secured loan that matures in November 2030." Alongside it sits a 450.0 million dollar revolving facility running to the same date, of which 344.8 million dollars was unused at year end, and the filing states that "As of December 31, 2025, we were in compliance with all covenants required under the 2025 Credit Facilities." Nobody is forcing this management to fix the margin by next quarter. The bull case is that they get four more years to do it and the parts keep shipping while they work.

Bear Case

Here is the thing a holder has to sit with. Over the trailing twelve months this business did not earn an operating profit, and the one year it did report was subsequently restated. Everything else in the bear case is a variation on those two sentences.

Start with where the price sits against the methods rather than with what the price assumes. Peer-multiple approaches put the price roughly 64% above where that family lands. The forward-growth method that reaches closest still leaves the price about 45% above it, and it reaches even that far only because its base scenario keeps today's revenue multiple flat instead of compressing it. Book value plus profitability, the asset family, sits furthest away: the price is more than four times where that lens lands. No family of method reaches today's quote. That is not a disagreement among approaches; it is unanimity in one direction.

The peer numbers say the same thing from the other end. A full-cycle 5.3% operating margin is roughly half of what ATRO earns and roughly half of HXL. To be fair to the bull, MRCY is running a 1.0% operating margin on $967 million of revenue, so the electronics side of this cohort has broadly struggled. But the market is not pricing this name like a struggling supplier. Today's price works out to roughly 66 times what this business earns in operating income in an average year across the cycle, and it would take something close to twelve years of growth running at the fastest pace the company can fund from its own cash flow to grow into that. Only about 14% of comparable fast growers have sustained such a pace even a decade. That solve is a single indicative calculation under fixed assumptions, so treat the twelve years as a direction rather than a measurement, but the direction is not subtle.

The mechanism that could break it is disclosed in the 10-K in one sentence: "In many cases, we make multi-year firm, fixed-price commitments to our customers, without assurance that our anticipated production costs will be achieved." That is precisely the shape of what happened in the third quarter of 2025. When a supplier locks price for years and then discovers the cost, the correction arrives all at once and lands in a single quarter.

Who sits across the table is getting more concentrated too. The 10-K footnotes that "Boeing completed its acquisition of all of Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc.'s Boeing-related commercial operations, based on Boeing's announcement on December 8, 2025." and that TransDigm closed its purchase of the Simmonds Precision business from RTX in October 2025. Fewer, larger buyers negotiating multi-year fixed prices against a supplier that has just demonstrated it can misjudge its own costs is not a favorable trade.

Then there is the accounting itself. The restatement was not a rounding matter of presentation: "The correction for the Error impacted (i) selling, general and administrative expenses, (ii) accrued and other liabilities, (iii) other long-term liabilities, and (iv) additional paid-in capital." Four line items, including the expense line and equity. Investors underwriting a margin recovery are underwriting a set of books that has already been revised once.

The balance sheet does not amplify the risk so much as it removes the cushion. Net borrowings sit at about 5.89 times operating profit measured across the cycle, which is manageable against a full-cycle year and considerably less manageable against a trailing year that lost money. The share count has meanwhile risen about 6% a year over the four years to April 2026, so the per-share claim on any eventual recovery keeps getting a little thinner while the recovery is being waited for.

Valuation

Every family of method used to triangulate this business currently lands below the traded price, which is the simplest fact in the file and the one that frames the rest. Peer-multiple approaches leave the price about 64% above that family. The forward-growth approach, the one designed to credit tomorrow rather than yesterday, still leaves it about 45% above. The asset family, book value plus profitability, sits more than four times below. When no family reaches the price, the price is a bet standing outside what any of these standard frames encode.

What that bet requires can be stated arithmetically. Today's $176.58 works out to roughly 66 times what the business earns in operating income in an average year across the cycle, and clearing that would take on the order of twelve years of growth held at the fastest pace the company can fund from internal cash flow. Each extra percentage point of growth shortens the requirement by a little over two years, which is a useful sensitivity and also a warning about how much rests on the growth input. The band behind this calculation is low-reliability, so the twelve years is indicative rather than measured.

The basis matters here more than usual. Over the trailing twelve months the operating margin was about negative 3%, because that window still contains the third-quarter 2025 charge. On the company's own through-the-cycle economics applied to current revenue, it is about 5.3%. Those are two different questions, and the price is being asked to clear the second one, not the first. Against filed revenue of "$824.7 million" for 2025, a full-cycle 5.3% is roughly 45 million dollars of operating income. That is the profit stream the entire market value is resting on.

Cohort position sharpens it. ATRO, the nearest comparable by size, converts $886.8 million of revenue into a 10.2% operating margin. HXL manages 9.5% and DRS 9.9%. This company's full-cycle figure is roughly half of any of them, which means the peer-multiple methods are already being generous: they are applying cohort multiples to a business earning cohort-lagging economics.

Solvency sets the floor under all of it, and it is adequate rather than comfortable. Net borrowings run about 5.89 times operating profit on a full-cycle basis. The maturity wall is distant, with both the term loan and the 450.0 million dollar revolver running to November 2030, and 344.8 million dollars of that revolver was undrawn at the end of 2025 with the company reporting compliance with all covenants. What the balance sheet does not do is add anything to the value: the share count has been rising about 6% a year over the four years to April 2026, so each year of waiting costs current holders a slice of whatever the recovery eventually produces.

Catalysts

The next dated event is close. Ducommun announced on July 23, 2026 that it will hold its second-quarter conference call, with results scheduled for August 6, 2026. That print matters more than a typical quarter because it is the third consecutive period since the third-quarter 2025 charge. Two clean quarters can be a recovery or a pause; three starts to look like a trend line, and the segment margin detail inside the release is where the answer sits.

The sell side has already split on it. Citi raised its price target to $216 from $167 in early July 2026, and roughly a week later RBC Capital cut the stock to Sector Perform from Outperform. Two desks moving in opposite directions inside a fortnight, on the same public filings, is a reasonable proxy for how much of this name's value depends on which margin number one believes.

The filed record also refreshed recently. The restated annual report went in on May 8, 2026 and the first-quarter report followed on May 12, 2026, showing operating income of about 15.7 million dollars for the quarter ended April 4, 2026. Restatements typically bring remediation work and auditor attention with them, so the disclosure around internal controls in the next annual filing is worth reading closely even though it will not arrive until early next year.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Electronic Systems (reported)

Structural Systems (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 Form 10-K/A, filed May 8, 2026; Q1 FY2026 Form 10-Q, filed May 12, 2026 · Ducommun second-quarter conference call announcement, July 23, 2026 · Citi research note, July 2026 · RBC Capital research note, July 2026 · Q1 FY2026 Form 10-Q, filed May 12, 2026

View the full interactive DCO report on boothcheck