CRANE NXT, CO. (CXT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $50.06, CRANE NXT, CO. (CXT) is priced for +5.0% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CXT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCXT
CompanyCRANE NXT, CO.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$50.06/sh
CompositionCPI - Products 43% / CPI - Services 8% / SAT - Banknotes and Security Products 36% / SAT - Authentication Products and Solutions 13%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)5.8%
Operating margin today14.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.2pp
Implied growth5.0%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.02σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)32

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.74x5expensive
Earnings1.81x4expensive
Relative0
Growth0.74x2justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$95.780.52xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 8.9x / 10.9x / 12.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.7x / 18.0x / 21.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$26.351.90xyesBV/sh $22.02, ROE (TTM) 11.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$28.721.74xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$52.420.95xyesRev $1.8B, growth 17% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.6x / 1.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$38.221.31xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.30B × (1−24%) / WACC 6.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$29.181.72xyesBV $22.02 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.2%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$34.551.45xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.41 × BVPS $22.02) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.38B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$29.341.71xyesFCF $270.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$24.472.05xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.24B (FCF $0.27B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.0224.78xyesEPS $2.41 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$7.057.10xyesBV $22.02 × (ROIC 2.1% / WACC 6.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.80B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$26.051.92xyesEPS $2.41 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Crane Payment Innovationsoperatingenterprise$846.6m$221.6m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Security and Authentication Technologiesoperatingenterprise$810.1m$97.4m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)6.40x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)4.84x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.6%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Price the company against last year's profit and the market appears to be asking for something improbable: roughly 23 times trailing operating profit, which works out to operating profit compounding at about 15.3% a year for five years. For a manufacturer of coin validators and currency paper that would be a heroic assumption. Then look at what the top line actually did last quarter. Net sales came in at 387.7 million dollars against 330.3 million a year earlier, growth of roughly 17%. The demanded rate is not a fantasy about a mature business. It is roughly what the business is currently doing, because management went out and bought it.

What they bought matters more than that they bought. During 2025 the company drew $532 million on term loans to fund the De La Rue and Antares acquisitions, folding the acquired operations into a unit that now trades under the name Crane Authentication inside the Security and Authentication Technologies segment, alongside a detection and traceability line that provides electronic equipment and associated software that leverage extensive proprietary capabilities across detection and inspection technologies for applications including the verification and authentication of payment transactions. That is the reframe worth holding onto. A company whose historic identity was cash handling has spent two years converting itself into a company that proves things are genuine, whether the thing is a banknote, a pharmaceutical package or a payment. The second market does not depend on how often people reach for paper money.

The underlying engine is genuinely profitable while this happens. Revenue of 1.71 billion dollars produces roughly 350 million dollars of EBITDA and about 246.6 million dollars of free cash flow, and the return on a book value of 21.39 per share runs near 10.5%. More telling, the share count has not moved at all across the past four years. Two significant acquisitions were financed without asking existing holders for a dollar, which means the upside from integrating them accrues to the same shares that existed before.

Against its industrial peer set the profitability is respectable and the ambition is visible. Crane NXT converts about 12.1% of revenue into operating profit, which puts it alongside TKR at 12.1% and near ESAB at 13.5%, comfortably ahead of HLIO at 9.0% and KMT at 9.4%. The relevant target, though, sits on the other side of the portfolio: specialty instrument businesses like AME at 25.9% and IEX at 20.7% show what a differentiated authentication and detection franchise earns once it is integrated and scaled. Bulls are underwriting the distance between 12% and something with a two in front of it.

One more data point, small and hard to fake. On June 12, 2026 the chief executive bought 24,000 shares in the open market for roughly 1.01 million dollars. Executives sell for many reasons and buy for essentially one.

Bear Case

In twelve months the company roughly doubled the size of its debt. The annual report records that Total debt was $1,139.5 million and $750.6 million as of December 31, 2025, and 2024, respectively, and the balance has grown again since, with borrowings now near 1.51 billion dollars gross against 228.3 million of liquid assets. The money went into acquisitions, not into the existing business, which means the interest is certain and the returns are forecast.

The stress test is not hypothetical. It already ran, in the most recent filed quarter. For the three months ended March 31, 2026, net sales rose about 17% to 387.7 million dollars while operating profit fell to 22.2 million from 37.3 million, and interest expense rose to 17.8 million from 11.5 million. Set those last two side by side: in that quarter the operating business earned barely more than the interest on its own borrowings. The trailing coverage figure of roughly three times describes a company that no longer quite exists, because the trailing period contains quarters before the debt was drawn and the acquired cost base arrived.

What has to fund all of it is lumpy by nature. Half the revenue sits in a segment whose results, in the company's own words, are subject to significant variability due to the timing and size of contract awards by central banks for banknote production and actual order rates, particularly with the U.S. government. A government deciding to defer a currency order does not reduce revenue gradually; it removes a contract. Leverage taken against smooth cash flow is one thing. Leverage taken against a procurement calendar is another.

Integration is consuming real money on top of that. The company recorded $12.1 million of restructuring expense in the SAT segment, predominantly related to severance charges, associated with the integration of the DLR and OpSec businesses, and further acquisition-related costs are running through selling and administrative expense in the current year. Those charges are the reason a 17% sales increase produced a 40% profit decrease, and they are, by the bull's own argument, temporary. The bear's question is simply how many quarters of temporary a balance sheet at this size can absorb.

Underneath sits the slower problem. The historic core sells equipment that counts, validates and moves physical currency, and the long-run direction of physical currency use in developed markets is not favourable. The company is buying its way out of that exposure, which is the correct response, but each purchase adds goodwill to the balance sheet and interest to the income statement while the payoff stays in the forecast. That is why the asset-based and earnings-power approaches both stop well short of today's price, at something near half of it: the first sees a book value increasingly composed of what was paid for other companies, and the second sees the profit those companies are currently producing. Today's price requires operating profit to compound near 15.3% a year for five years, a pace that only about 44% of comparable fast growers held for that long, and the multiple already sits in the upper half of its peer group before any of it is delivered.

Valuation

Two things about the price are worth separating. The market values the enterprise at roughly 23 times trailing operating profit, and at about 12.6 times EBITDA, the level the exit-multiple cash-flow method holds flat rather than compressing into its terminal year. The first number looks demanding for an industrial manufacturer. The second looks ordinary. The difference between them is depreciation, amortization of recently acquired intangibles, and the restructuring charges of a company mid-integration.

Inverted, the price asks for company-wide operating profit to compound at roughly 15.3% a year for about five years, from a business currently converting about 12.1% of revenue into operating profit. That solve is computed at an 8.47% cost of capital and moves substantially with it: a percentage point on the discount rate shifts the implied growth demand by something like seven and a half points, so the figure is a direction rather than a measurement. The direction is that the price has already credited the acquisitions with working.

The methods divide along exactly that line. Peer-multiple approaches sit close to today's price and the forward cash-flow approach reaches it. The earnings-power approaches and the book-value approaches settle near half of it. The earnings-power gap has a specific and honest cause: those methods capitalize normalized operating profit with no growth credited at all, which is the correct way to value a business that has stopped changing and the wrong way to value one that has just absorbed two acquisitions. The asset-based gap has a different cause, namely that a growing share of the book is goodwill created by paying for other companies.

The cohort places the premium precisely. Crane NXT's 12.1% operating margin sits mid-pack among diversified industrials: TKR at 12.1%, ESAB at 13.5%, GTES at 13.1%, with CW at 18.4% above and HLIO at 9.0% below. On the instrument and detection side of the comparison, AME converts 25.9% and IEX 20.7%. The multiple this company carries sits in the upper half of its peer range while the margin sits in the middle of it, which is a coherent position only if the second number is heading toward the specialty group rather than staying with the general one.

Solvency is where the timing risk concentrates. Net borrowings of roughly 1.28 billion dollars stand at about 6.76 times operating profit, and liquid assets run near 228.3 million. The trailing interest coverage of about 3.1 times is real but backward-looking; in the March 2026 quarter operating profit of 22.2 million covered interest of 17.8 million and not much else. Set against that, the share count has been flat for four years, so nothing about the risk has been transferred to existing holders through dilution. The entire bet was financed with borrowed money, which is the cleanest possible description of where a disappointment would land first.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results arrive on August 5, 2026, with the date announced on July 9, 2026. It is the first full quarter with Antares Vision inside the reported numbers, which makes it the first clean look at what the acquired revenue costs to run.

The March quarter, reported on May 7, 2026, was the transition print: the Antares Vision acquisition completed, sales up sharply, and profit down on integration and restructuring charges. Management left its full-year outlook in place at that report rather than trimming it, which sets a specific and checkable expectation for the second half. The segment reporting also began separating a detection and traceability line, so the next several prints will show, for the first time, whether authentication and traceability carry the margins that justified buying them.

On June 12, 2026 chief executive Aaron Saak purchased 24,000 shares in the open market for approximately 1.01 million dollars. Coming weeks after a quarter in which reported profit fell by 40%, the timing is the informative part: it is a bet by the person with the most detailed view of the integration schedule that the current earnings depression is a phase rather than a level.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Crane Payment Innovations (reported)

Security and Authentication Technologies (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement, July 9, 2026 · Form 4 insider transaction, June 12, 2026 · Q1 2026 results release, May 7, 2026

View the full interactive CXT report on boothcheck