Clearway Energy, Inc. (CWEN): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $31.82, Clearway Energy, Inc. (CWEN) is priced for +16.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CWEN

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCWEN
CompanyClearway Energy, Inc.
Sector / IndustryUtilities
Current price$31.82/sh
CompositionFlexible Generation 20% / Renewables & Storage 80%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Implied growth16.1%
Multiple paid77x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 5.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 5.5% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.5% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.27σ
cohort percentile (of 70 peers)100

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset8.16x5expensive
Earnings5.98x1expensive
Relative0
Growth0.76x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$74.930.42xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.1x / 17.1x / 19.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 33.4x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 65x), scenarios: 27.5x / 33.4x / 39.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowth$51.460.62xyesDPS $1.85, g=5.5% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$35.560.89xyesStage 1: 5% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$5.325.98xyesBV/sh $9.02, ROE (TTM) 5.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$3.908.16xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$29.861.07xyesRev $1.6B, growth 13% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.4x / 4.1x / 4.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.013182.00xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.46B × (1−21%) / WACC 4.2% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$3.738.53xyesBV $9.02 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.5%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$9.993.19xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.49 × BVPS $9.02) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.94B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.013182.00xyesFCF $671.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$0.4177.61xyesEPS $0.49 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$1.7218.50xyesBV $9.02 × (ROIC 0.8% / WACC 4.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.57B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$5.325.98xyesEPS $0.49 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Flexible Generationoperatingenterprise$291.0m$70.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Renewables & Storageoperatingenterprise$1.1b$147.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$9.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)55.44x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)43.80x
Interest coverage0.5x
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The advantage is contractual rather than technological. Clearway owns wind, solar, battery and gas generating assets, but what it actually sells is a schedule of payments agreed years before the electricity is produced. The FY2025 annual report describes energy, capacity and renewable attributes from most of the renewable fleet and certain Flexible Generation facilities as sold through long-term PPAs and tolling agreements to a single counterparty, which is often a utility. A merchant generator learns what its output is worth every hour of every day. This one already knows.

That structure shows up in the conversion rate from sales to cash. Revenue of 1.49 billion dollars produces roughly 880 million dollars of EBITDA and about 656 million dollars of free cash flow, because the cost of a wind farm is paid once, at construction, and the operating expense afterward is thin. Compare the shape to NRG, which runs a merchant and retail model at scale: NRG turns 32.4 billion dollars of revenue into a 3.2% operating margin. Clearway earns 14.7% on a revenue base a twentieth the size. The two businesses are both called power companies and they are not remotely the same trade.

Growth arrives as assets, not as market share, and there are visible assets arriving. In the March 2026 quarter the company put 228 million dollars into acquisitions net of cash acquired, against nothing in the comparable quarter a year earlier, alongside 75 million dollars of capital expenditures and 76 million dollars into unconsolidated affiliates. The same filing records that on the closing of the Goat Mountain construction financing on February 27, 2026, the company acquired assets totaling $ 106 million, consisting of $ 98 million for deposits related to the future delivery of equipment. In February 2026 it also approved the Tuolumne repowering, an existing site rebuilt with newer machines at an estimated 80 million dollars of total capital investment. Repowering is the cheapest megawatt available to anyone who already owns the land, the interconnection and the customer.

The payout is the point of the vehicle, and the company says so directly. Clearway Energy LLC intends to distribute to its unit holders in the form of a quarterly distribution all of the CAFD that is generated each quarter, less reserves for the prudent conduct of the business, and on the listed shares the filing states that comparable cash dividends will continue to be paid in the foreseeable future. The dividend behind that policy runs 1.85 per share.

The bear will point out that distributing nearly everything leaves nothing to reinvest, which is true and is exactly why the collateral matters. Contracted generation with a utility on the other side of the meter is the kind of asset lenders price cheaply, and the company's rate hedging is currently working in its favour: had all of its interest-rate swaps been terminated on December 31, 2025, the annual filing states that the counterparties would have owed the Company $116 million. Cheap capital against contracted revenue is the whole engine. It runs as long as both halves hold.

Bear Case

Sort the valuation approaches by how much of the future they are willing to assume, and a clean split appears. The asset-value methods, the earnings-power methods and the peer-multiple methods all land far beneath today's price. Only the forward-growth methods reach it. That is not a subtle disagreement, and the conservative side of it deserves a hearing, because the conservative methods are conservative for one reason: they use what the business has already earned.

What it has already earned, at the level a shareholder owns, is very little. Trailing net income was 9 million dollars on revenue of 1.49 billion dollars. Most of the difference between the two lines is depreciation on the asset base and interest, plus the share of profit that belongs to the partners who financed the projects rather than to the listed equity. Operating profit covers the interest bill about 0.5 times. Net borrowings sit at roughly 42.5 times operating profit. Those are not the ratios of a business that can absorb a surprise out of its own income statement.

Which makes the funding policy the load-bearing risk rather than a footnote. The annual filing is explicit that the Company's ability to grow and make investments and acquisitions through cash on hand is limited, and that it expects to lean primarily on outside financing instead. That is a fine arrangement while capital is cheap and equity trades well. It is a vice when neither is true, because the same document warns that debt covenants can prevent the Company from paying cash dividends and that a failure to comply with those and other covenants could result in an event of default which, if not cured or waived, may entitle the related lenders to demand repayment or enforce their security interests. A yield vehicle that cannot pay its yield has no reason to exist at its current price.

The outside money also arrives in the form of new shares. Under the direct stock purchase plan alone, during 2025 the company issued 793,202 shares of Class C common stock under the DSPP for gross proceeds of $ 25 million. That is a small number by itself and a revealing one in context: the growth is bought, and holders pay part of the price.

Underneath all of it sits a growth requirement the price embeds. Today's level implies operating profit compounding at roughly 15.4% a year for about five years, and among companies that have historically grown at that pace, only about 48% kept it up that long. Contracted revenue makes the near-term rate more believable here than it would be for most. It does not make the duration more believable, and duration is where this kind of assumption usually breaks.

The floor under all this is not zero. The company holds about 362 million dollars of equity interests sitting outside the operating business, a little over five percent of its market value, and those retain value even if the operating thesis disappoints. It is a floor, not a cushion, and it is small next to what the price is paying for growth.

Valuation

Today's price values the whole enterprise at about 18.4 times EBITDA, the multiple the exit-multiple cash-flow method carries into its terminal year held flat at today's level. That sits comfortably above the benchmark multiple the peer-multiple approach applies to the sector, which is another way of saying buyers are paying a premium for contracted cash flow. The question is how large a premium, and for how long it has to be earned back.

Inverted, the price is paying for company-wide operating profit to compound at roughly 15.4% a year for about five years, on top of a business currently converting 14.7 cents of each revenue dollar into operating profit. That figure comes from a single solve and should be read as an order of magnitude rather than a forecast. The direction is the useful part: the price wants growth, and it wants it sustained.

The methods split cleanly on whether it gets it. The dividend approach that grows the payout at half a percent a year, the pace the company's current returns and retained earnings actually support, puts the price at roughly one and a half times where it lands. The two-stage version, which assumes 5% growth for five years and 3.5% in perpetuity after that, arrives essentially at today's price. Everything separating those two outcomes is an assumption about drop-downs, repowerings and how cheaply the next asset can be financed. Peer-multiple methods sit far below the price as well, and the asset-value lens further below still, which is the ordinary result when a company's book value has been depreciated against contracted revenue that continues to arrive.

Against its cohort, the operating margin is unremarkable rather than weak. Clearway converts 14.7% of revenue into operating profit. ORA, closest in size at about 1.16 billion dollars of revenue, runs 17.1%. VST runs 18.4% on a far larger revenue base, and NEE, the largest comparable in the renewables cohort, runs 29.5%. The margin does not explain the multiple; the contract length and the growth pipeline are what the premium is being paid for.

The balance sheet is where the caveat lives. Liquid assets of 325 million dollars sit against gross borrowings of roughly 9.55 billion, most of it raised at the individual project level rather than at the parent, secured by the specific asset and the specific contract behind it. The annual filing describes interest-rate hedges that amortize in proportion to their respective loans on that facility-level debt, which is the shape of borrowing designed to be repaid by a known revenue stream rather than refinanced forever. That structure is why a coverage ratio of 0.5 does not mean what it would mean at an industrial company. It is also why the listed equity is the residual claim standing behind nearly ten billion dollars of other people's capital, and residual claims are levered in both directions.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 5, 2026. The line worth reading first is not revenue but the cash the projects actually distributed upward, since that is what funds the dividend and what the payout policy is written against.

The capital committed earlier in the year is the other thing to watch, because it has been committed but not yet earned on. The Goat Mountain construction financing closed on February 27, 2026, and in connection with it the company took on 106 million dollars of assets, 98 million of that being deposits for equipment still to be delivered. The Tuolumne repowering was approved in February 2026 at an estimated 80 million dollars of total capital investment. First-quarter acquisitions ran 228 million dollars net of cash acquired against nothing in the comparable quarter a year before. Equipment deposits and construction financing are the early half of a cycle whose late half is contracted revenue, and the lag between the two is where a yield vehicle's growth story is either confirmed or delayed.

One structural change has already gone through. Following the Class A conversion, the Class A common stock was delisted from the NYSE and the Class C shares now trade as the single listed class under the CWEN symbol. On the sell side, Truist began coverage on July 19, 2026 with a buy rating, and CIBC trimmed its price objective by one dollar on July 24, 2026 while keeping an outperform rating. Neither changes a contracted cash flow; both indicate the debate is about the growth rate rather than the asset base.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Flexible Generation (reported)

Renewables & Storage (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement, July 16, 2026 · Q1 2026 Form 10-Q, accession 0001628280-26-032385 · FY2025 Form 10-K · Q1 2026 Form 10-Q · Truist Securities initiation, July 19, 2026 · CIBC research note, July 24, 2026

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