CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION (CW): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $566.75, CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION (CW) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CW

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCW
CompanyCURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$566.75/sh
CompositionAerospace Defense 19% / Ground Defense 12% / Naval Defense 27% / Commercial Aerospace 12% / Power & Process 18% / General Industrial 12%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)9.1%
Operating margin today18.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-9.7pp
Must persist for6.1y
Multiple paid32x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.56σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)83

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.58x5expensive
Earnings3.87x5expensive
Relative1.43x2expensive
Growth1.12x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$433.111.31xyesFCF base $0.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$613.330.92xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 25.7x / 27.7x / 29.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 24.2x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 39x), scenarios: 20.1x / 24.2x / 28.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16.7x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$158.413.58xyesBV/sh $74.99, ROE (TTM) 19.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$227.692.49xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$506.141.12xyesRev $3.7B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.8x / 5.7x / 6.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$329.251.72xyesEPS $14.53, growth 23% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.71 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$90.406.27xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.53B × (1−22%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$221.702.56xyesBV $74.99 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$156.583.62xyes√(22.5 × EPS $14.53 × BVPS $74.99) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.81B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$146.503.87xyesFCF $625.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$139.084.07xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.60B (FCF $0.63B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$468.831.21xyesEPS $14.53 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$29.0119.54xyesBV $74.99 × (ROIC 3.4% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.65B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$493.881.15xyesEPS $14.53 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 22.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 34.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$157.083.61xyesEPS $14.53 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Aerospace & Industrialoperatingenterprise$977.2m$166.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Defense Electronicsoperatingenterprise$1.0b$278.0m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Naval & Poweroperatingenterprise$1.5b$231.3m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$813.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.52x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.19x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Deal with the price first, because it is the objection. At $750.52 the market is paying for this company's operating profit to keep compounding at the top of what it can fund from its own cash flow for something like nine years. Roughly 16% of comparable fast-growers have historically managed a run that long. So the bull case cannot be that the shares are cheap. It has to be that this particular business belongs in that 16%, and the March quarter is the place to start looking.

Sales rose 13.4% to $913.7 million in the quarter, and the growth was not evenly spread. Naval and Power, the largest of the three reporting segments, grew 20.8% to $402.6 million from $333.4 million, and lifted its operating income to $59.8 million. Aerospace and Industrial grew 12.1% to $254.9 million and pushed operating income to $38.5 million from $29.9 million, a margin improvement of nearly two full points. Defense Electronics grew more slowly, at 4.8%, but converted 27.9% of its sales into operating profit. Three segments, three different growth rates, and margins moving up in all three.

What makes the naval position unusually durable is what the products are. The company supplies "naval propulsion and auxiliary equipment, including main coolant pumps, power-dense compact motors, generators, steam turbines, valves, and secondary propulsion" systems, which is to say the mechanical core of a nuclear-powered warship. Equipment of that kind is designed into a hull class, qualified over years, and then bought for as long as that class is built and maintained. It is very hard to displace a supplier mid-programme, and the incentive to try is low relative to the risk.

The profitability comparison against the naval and defence cohort makes the point without much need for interpretation. Trailing operating margin runs 17.6%. BWXT, the closest naval-nuclear comparison, earns 12.3% on $3.376 billion of revenue. GD earns 10.2% on $53.808 billion, HII 5.1% on $12.849 billion, DRS 9.9% on $3.695 billion, LHX 10.2% on $38.694 billion. Every prime contractor in that list is larger and every one of them earns less on the sales dollar. The names that earn more, HEI at 23.5% and TDG at 46.5%, are aftermarket aerospace businesses rather than shipbuilding suppliers. This company is sitting on the profitable side of the defence supply chain rather than the volume side.

The financing has stayed conservative through all of it. Interest expense for 2025 came to $43 million, down 4% on the year after a repayment, against operating profit of $611.3 million over the trailing twelve months. Roughly seven cents of every dollar of operating profit goes to lenders. Borrowings less liquid assets run about 814 million on the funded-debt build, or about 1.04 billion once lease obligations are counted with them. Share count has drifted down roughly 1.1% a year across four years. None of that is dramatic, which is rather the point: the growth has been funded out of the business rather than out of the balance sheet.

Bear Case

Two future revenue streams are carrying most of the weight in this price, and neither of them is under the company's control. The first is commercial nuclear power. The 10-K states the dependency directly: "Market demand for, and our ability to supply products and services to the commercial nuclear industry is dependent on the continued operation of nuclear power plants globally", and it names the specific fragility, that "delays in the development of small modular reactors, could adversely affect our results of operations or future outlook". Small modular reactors are a technology whose commercial deployment schedule has moved repeatedly and is set by regulators, utilities and financiers rather than by suppliers. The second stream is the naval build rate, which is decided in an appropriations process. The filing is blunt about what that means for revenue already booked: "The U.S. Government may unilaterally modify or cancel its contracts".

That matters more than usual because of what is being paid. The price requires operating profit to compound at the ceiling of what the business can self-fund for roughly nine years. Only about 16% of comparable fast-growers have sustained a run of that length, and the multiple these shares carry sits at the very top of their peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. A demand of that shape does not need a disaster to disappoint. It needs one of those two streams to arrive two or three years later than assumed, which is a thing that happens to nuclear projects and defence programmes routinely.

The backlog does not provide the reassurance the multiple implies. Total backlog was approximately $4.1 billion at the end of December 2025 against annual revenue near 3.61 billion, so a little over a year of work is booked, and the filing adds its own qualifier: "Backlog is subject to fluctuations and is not necessarily indicative of future sales". In the prior fiscal year, new orders in one segment "decreased $82 million as compared to the prior year, primarily due to the timing of orders on aerospace and ground defense equipment". Orders in this business arrive lumpy, and a company priced for nine years of uninterrupted compounding gets no credit for lumpiness.

Commercial aerospace is the third exposure, and it is straightforwardly cyclical. The filing ties growth there "to the anticipated growth in aircraft production rates" on specific narrow-body and wide-body programmes, and lists among the risks labour strikes at a major airframer, geopolitical conflict, and cost inflation. That segment is 12% of revenue. It is not the thesis, but it is the piece most likely to move first and fastest against the company in a downturn.

Underneath all of it, the accounting value of the equity is thin relative to the price. Book value works out to about $71.02 a share against $750.52 in the market. That gap is the correct outcome for an asset-light business earning strong returns on capital, and it is also the reason the downside has no floor to speak of. When a price rests entirely on the durability of future earnings, and the earnings-power and asset-value methods both land far beneath it, the whole position depends on the durability holding. There is nothing else beneath it to catch the fall.

Valuation

Nine years is the number to hold on to. That is roughly how long today's price requires this company's operating profit to keep compounding at the ceiling of what it can fund from its own cash flow before the arithmetic stops working. The pace itself is not the demanding part; this business has recently delivered it. The persistence is. Around 16% of comparable fast-growers have historically kept a run going that long, and the assumption is sensitive besides: each percentage point of growth moves the required horizon by about two years, so the answer travels a long way on inputs nobody can observe in advance.

Notably, the price does not require a better margin than the company already earns. The margin embedded in it sits below the 17.6% the trailing year produced. So the bet is purely on duration, which is a cleaner question than most: not whether this business can get better, but whether it can stay this good for the better part of a decade.

Of the four families of method applied here, only the forward-growth approaches reach $750.52. Asset value, earnings power and peer multiples all land well beneath it, and the distances are not small. Book value per share is $71.02. Capitalize the trailing $13.65 of earnings per share at a shareholder's required return and the result is a fraction of the quote. Apply the sector's enterprise-value-to-EBITDA reference of twelve to the 0.79 billion of EBITDA the business produced and the same thing happens. Even the peer-multiple approach that blends a trailing price-to-earnings figure near 54 against a sector reference near 18 settles at 28.93, which still leaves the price roughly 80% above where that comparison lands. Only a model that projects the recent 12% growth rate forward and holds the exit multiple flat at today's 36.7 in its base case, compressing to 34.7 in the bear scenario and expanding to 38.7 in the bull, arrives anywhere near the current level.

Cohort position confirms rather than softens that read. The multiple these shares carry sits at the very top of the range their peers occupy, well beyond the upper quartile. The operating margin partly earns it: 17.6% on a trailing basis against BWXT at 12.3% on $3.376 billion of revenue, GD at 10.2% on $53.808 billion, DRS at 9.9% on $3.695 billion and HII at 5.1% on $12.849 billion. The company is genuinely more profitable than the primes it supplies. Whether it is that much more profitable is the question the top-of-range multiple asks.

The balance sheet is the part of this file with no drama in it. Interest expense for 2025 was $43 million against trailing operating profit of $611.3 million, and borrowings net of liquid assets run about 814 million on the funded-debt build, or about 1.04 billion once lease commitments are counted with them. Free cash flow of $590.8 million covers all of that several times over, and the share count has come down about 1.1% a year. Solvency simply is not the variable here. The variable is time, and the price has already spent nine years of it.

Catalysts

Second quarter results are due after the close on August 5, 2026. The May report raised full-year guidance for sales, operating margin and free cash flow at once, which sets a specific bar for August: a company priced for many years of compounding gets very little credit for meeting a raised number and a great deal of punishment for missing it. The line worth watching is Naval and Power, which grew 20.8% in the March quarter and is now large enough that the consolidated growth rate largely follows it.

Capital is going into that same segment. On July 1, 2026 the company announced an 80 million dollar multi-year investment to expand its Cheswick, Pennsylvania operations. Capacity spending in naval and nuclear work is a slow signal but an informative one, because the equipment is qualified to programmes years before it ships and the investment is not easily redirected. It tells you what management expects the order book to look like well past the current backlog, which stood at roughly $4.1 billion at the end of December.

Broker views moved up ahead of the print without agreeing on much. Morgan Stanley raised its target to $860 from $760 on June 24 with an overweight rating, and Stifel raised its target to $768 from $724 on June 19 while keeping a hold. The spread between those two is the disagreement in miniature: both accept the operating story, and they differ on how many years of it the current price has already collected. The trailing and asset-based measures described above answer only the first half of that question.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Aerospace & Industrial (reported)

Defense Electronics (reported)

Naval & Power (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcements, May 7 and June 30, 2026 · company announcement, June 30, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, May 7, 2026 · company announcement, July 1, 2026 · broker research notes, June 19 and June 24, 2026

View the full interactive CW report on boothcheck