CVS HEALTH Corp (CVS): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers CVS HEALTH Corp (CVS) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CVS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCVS
CompanyCVS HEALTH Corp
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$93.07/sh
CompositionPharmacy 57% / Front Store 5% / Premiums 34% / Net investment income 1% / Other 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.0%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)5.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.8pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)2.0%
Multiple paid8x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.21σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)9

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.75x5expensive
Earnings1.98x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.26x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$138.960.67xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 12.2x / 14.2x / 16.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 26.17x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 41x), scenarios: 21.8x / 26.2x / 30.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowth$51.131.82xyesDPS $2.75, g=3.7% (sustainable: ROE (TTM) × retention; not the terminal-growth assumption), ke=9.3%
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$-33.91noStage 1: -200% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$24.803.75xyesBV/sh $62.32, ROE (TTM) 3.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$15.486.01xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$73.911.26xyesRev $415.1B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.3x / 0.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$59.221.57xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $11.22B × (1−25%) / WACC 6.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$11.717.95xyesBV $62.32 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.4%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$56.131.66xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.25 × BVPS $62.32) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $12.81B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$50.111.86xyesFCF $11758.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$44.072.11xyesSBC-adj FCF $11.04B (FCF $11.76B − SBC $0.71B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$1.8849.51xyesEPS $2.25 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$25.823.60xyesBV $62.32 × (ROIC 2.5% / WACC 6.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $415.09B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$24.303.83xyesEPS $2.25 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Health Care Benefitsoperatingenterprise$143.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Health Servicesoperatingenterprise$190.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Pharmacy & Consumer Wellnessoperatingenterprise$139.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$51.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.84x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.14x
Interest coverage7.8x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.6%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 5.8%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Set the standard yardsticks against a $107.73 share and the picture is uniformly unflattering. The asset lens sits below the price. So does the earnings-power lens, by a wide margin, and so does the peer-multiple comparison. Only the forward cash-flow approach lands anywhere near it. That should be the end of the argument, and it is not, because of what those yardsticks are reading. Every one of them measures a period in which reported operating income fell to $4,660 million from $8,516 million the year before and $13,743 million the year before that, and the filing says the drop came "primarily due to a $5.7 billion goodwill impairment charge". Writing down goodwill is an accounting statement that a past acquisition cost more than it was worth. It takes nothing out of this year's cash and nothing out of next year's.

Underneath the accounting, volume moved the other way. Prescriptions filled reached 1,808.8 million on a 30-day equivalent basis in 2025, up 5.4% after 4.0% the year before, dispensed across roughly 9,000 retail locations. The benefits arm covered an estimated more than 37 million people at the end of December. Neither of those is a business losing customers. They are businesses earning less per customer, which is a different problem with a different remedy.

The structural argument is about where profit can be moved rather than where it currently sits. The retail arm "provides pharmacy fulfillment services to support the Health Services segment's specialty and mail order pharmacy offerings", and the insurance arm buys drug management from the same house. When a regulator or a client squeezes one link, an owner of the whole chain has somewhere to put the pressure. That optionality never appears in any individual segment's margin, which is exactly why reading this company one segment at a time understates what the combination can do.

Thin margins deserve their industry context before they are treated as a verdict. HUM runs a 1.8% operating margin on $137.2 billion of revenue, MCK 1.5% on $403.4 billion, CAH 1.0% on $244.7 billion, and COR 0.85% on $328.7 billion. Moving medicine at national scale is a business of pennies on large numbers, and it always has been. The relevant question is not whether the margin is small but whether it is smaller than it should be, and 2025 answered that with a one-time charge rather than with a structural one.

Cash arrived regardless of what the goodwill line said. Free cash flow ran $7.394 billion over the trailing year, the dividend has continued, and the share count has drifted down about 0.9% a year across four years. A company that writes off five point seven billion of an old purchase price and still generates that much cash in the same twelve months is telling the reader something about the difference between accounting profit and the money the business actually throws off.

Bear Case

The clearest evidence of competitive pressure is in the company's own volume disclosure, and it points the wrong way. Pharmacy claims processed fell 0.9% on a 30-day equivalent basis in 2025 while retail scripts grew. The 10-K explains the mechanism without varnish: "PBM clients are generally well informed, can move between us and our competitors and often seek competing bids prior to expiration of their contracts", in an industry that "has been experiencing price compression as a result of competitive pressures and increased client demands for lower prices". The two rivals that matter most are not independent firms that can be outlasted. They sit inside UNH and CI, which earn 4.2% and 3.4% operating margins on $449.7 billion and $277.9 billion of revenue respectively, against about 1.8% here on a trailing basis. When three vertically integrated giants compete on price, the winner is whoever can live on the thinnest spread, and on current figures that is not this one.

Retail faces a different kind of attacker. WMT's own filing names among its risks "competitors offering online retail pharmacy options and/or home delivery options" and "further consolidation and strategic alliances among third-party payers, PBMs or purchasers of drugs". WMT earns a 4.2% operating margin on $725.3 billion of revenue and COST 3.8% on $293.6 billion, both while dispensing the same medicines. A competitor whose margin is earned somewhere other than the pharmacy counter can price that counter with a freedom this company does not have.

The regulator is the third front, and it is now on the record. CVS Caremark finalized a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission on July 14, 2026 covering its approach to transparency and affordability. The 10-K had already listed the exposures in detail: pricing spread between what a plan sponsor is charged and what the dispensing pharmacy is paid, rebate sharing, guarantee reconciliation, disclosure of data. Each of those is a place where a rule change removes revenue that costs nothing to remove.

The financial position leaves less room than the revenue line suggests. Borrowings less liquid assets come to roughly 54 billion dollars on the funded-debt measure and roughly 76 billion once lease obligations are counted alongside them. Interest expense has risen in each of the last three years, to $3,119 million in 2025 from $2,958 million and $2,658 million before it, while operating income moved the opposite way over the same span. In 2023 the operating line was $13,743 million against $2,658 million of interest. In 2025 it was $4,660 million against $3,119 million. The cushion between what the business earns and what it owes the lenders has largely gone, and it went in three years.

The goodwill charge deserves a second reading from this side. A five point seven billion dollar impairment against the health insurance business is management's own written statement that the price paid for that business will not be recovered. The bull is right that the entry moved no cash and constrains no future year. Both readings hold at once. It is a non-cash accounting entry, and it is an admission, and the segment it was taken against is the one now competing hardest on price.

Valuation

Buy the shares at $107.73 and the equity is a claim on a business the market values at about 213.5 billion dollars once borrowings are added alongside the 137.8 billion of stock. More than a third of the enterprise belongs to lenders before a shareholder sees anything. That is the single most important fact about how this security behaves, and it explains most of what follows.

A capital structure of that shape turns a modest change in operating profit into a large change in what reaches the equity. Which is why the backward-looking measures, all of them reading a year carrying a five point seven billion dollar write-off, land so far under the price, while the forward cash-flow approach lands close to it. The peer-multiple comparison is the least distorted of the group and worth quoting for that reason: on enterprise value against EBITDA the sector reference sits near fourteen, and applied to the 10.53 billion of EBITDA this business produced, the price stands roughly 70% above where that peer-multiple reading lands.

The cleanest earnings reference available is the five-year average operating profit with one-time charges added back, which comes to about 11.12 billion dollars. Capitalizing that with no growth assumed at all still leaves a figure well beneath today's quote. Stated without the arithmetic: the price requires the operating line to recover, not merely to stop falling. That line went $13,743 million, then $8,516 million, then $4,660 million across 2023, 2024 and 2025. Two thirds of it disappeared in two years, and the price is paid on the assumption that a good part of it comes back.

Cohort position is the more reassuring half of the picture, and it is worth being precise about. Measured against the multiple range its peers occupy, this name sits in the lower half rather than the top. UNH earns a 4.2% operating margin on $449.7 billion of revenue growing 9.7%; CI earns 3.4% on $277.9 billion growing 8.8%; ELV earns 3.1% on $200.4 billion growing 9.3%. This company earns about 1.8% on a trailing basis on $407.9 billion. Nobody is paying a premium multiple here. They are paying an unremarkable one for a company whose reported profit has fallen by two thirds, and the entire question is which of those two facts is the more durable.

Solvency is the constraint to watch rather than the danger to fear. Liquid assets of 11.802 billion dollars sit against borrowings of 65.896 billion, leaving net obligations near 54 billion on the funded-debt build and near 76 billion once leases are included alongside them. Free cash flow of $7.394 billion over the trailing year services the $3,119 million interest bill and the dividend with room to spare, so the position is workable at today's depressed earnings rather than dependent on the recovery. What the price is arguing about is therefore neither the balance sheet nor the multiple. It is whether $4,660 million was the floor of the operating line or a waypoint on the way down.

Catalysts

Second quarter results are due on August 5, 2026. Two lines carry more information than the headline. The first is the medical benefit ratio in the insurance segment, which the filing defines as health care costs divided by premium revenue and which is the direct measure of whether the pricing taken on this year's Medicare and commercial books was adequate. The second is pharmacy claims processed, the volume figure that fell 0.9% on a 30-day equivalent basis last year. One tells you whether the insurance business is repaired. The other tells you whether the drug-benefit business is still shedding clients.

The regulatory picture moved in July. CVS Caremark finalized a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission on July 14, 2026 addressing its approaches to transparency and affordability. Settlements of this kind close a specific exposure and leave the underlying commercial question open, since the pricing practices at issue are the same ones the 10-K lists as competitive battlegrounds. On the sell side, UBS raised its target to $122 from $115 on July 23 while keeping a buy rating. That figure sits above the current quote and reflects a view on the earnings recovery rather than on the trailing numbers, which are what the measures used above describe.

Two smaller items are worth noting because they show where management is spending attention. The quarterly dividend was declared at $0.665 a share on July 10, which is a continuation rather than a change and a signal that the payout is not currently under review. And on July 21 the company began dispensing common pet medications through its roughly 9,000 locations. That will not move a company with revenue near $407.9 billion by itself. It is worth watching as an example of the strategy in the retail arm, which is to defend the traffic that pays for the store base by widening what the store base can dispense.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Health Care Benefits (reported)

Health Services (reported)

Pharmacy & Consumer Wellness (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcements, July 2026 · company announcement, July 14, 2026 · company earnings calendar, July 2026 · UBS research note, July 23, 2026 · company dividend declaration, July 10, 2026 · company announcement, July 21, 2026

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