Cavco Industries, Inc. (CVCO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $566.19, Cavco Industries, Inc. (CVCO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CVCO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCVCO
CompanyCavco Industries, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$566.19/sh
CompositionFactory-built housing - Home sales 92% / Factory-built housing - Delivery, setup and other revenues 4% / Financial services - Insurance agency commissions received from third-party insurance companies 0% / Financial services - All other sources 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)7.1%
Operating margin today9.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-2.5pp
Must persist for6.1y
Multiple paid19x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 11.5% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.20σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)62

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.07x5expensive
Earnings2.00x5expensive
Relative3.49x2expensive
Growth0.88x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$738.280.77xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.1%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$646.850.88xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 15.1x / 17.1x / 19.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.6x / 20.0x / 23.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$254.732.22xyesBV/sh $144.41, ROE (TTM) 16.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$333.961.70xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$476.321.19xyesRev $2.3B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$275.882.05xyesEPS $22.99, growth 3% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=7.78 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$253.492.23xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.22B × (1−24%) / WACC 9.1% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$338.441.67xyesBV $144.41 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 16.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$273.312.07xyes√(22.5 × EPS $22.99 × BVPS $144.41) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.25B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$349.951.62xyesFCF $234.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$331.221.71xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.22B (FCF $0.23B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$282.782.00xyesEPS $22.99 × (8.5 + 2×3.1%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$66.578.51xyesBV $144.41 × (ROIC 4.2% / WACC 9.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.30B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$114.954.93xyesEPS $22.99 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 3.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 4.6x
Earnings YieldEarnings$248.542.28xyesEPS $22.99 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Factory-built housingoperatingenterprise$2.2t$476.3b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Financial servicesoperatingenterprise$87.1b$50.6b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$248.0m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-1.48x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.12x (net cash)
Interest coverage434.1x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-3.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

This is a mature manufacturer, and mature manufacturers are normally read on where they sit in a cycle. Cavco does not read that way, and the reason is what it sells. A factory-built home is the cheapest new detached housing available in most American markets, which means the product competes hardest exactly when affordability is worst. The site-built industry shows the contrast in its own numbers: over the trailing year LEN saw revenue fall about 7%, DHI about 6% and KBH about 18%, while SKY, the nearest factory-built comparable, grew about 7%. Demand for the cheap end of housing does not disappear in a downturn. It relocates.

The operating economics are better than the sector's reputation suggests. Trailing operating margin runs about 10.9% on roughly $2.24 billion of revenue, which is above where the nearest direct comparable sits: SKY carries an operating margin near 9.5% on a slightly larger revenue base. That gap is small in isolation and meaningful in a business where the product is a commodity and the customer is price-driven. It comes from plant utilisation and from a distribution network that is genuinely spread, with the annual filing noting that "No independent distributor accounted for 10% or more of factory-built housing revenue during any fiscal year within the three-year period ended March 28, 2026." Nobody at the other end of the loading dock has leverage over the price.

The financial services arm is the piece most investors skip. It writes insurance for manufactured-home owners and originates loans against the homes the factories build, and it grew: "Financial services segment net revenue increased 5.8% primarily due to higher insurance premiums in the current year". Insurance premiums are recurring in a way home sales are not, and they arrive whether or not a given quarter's shipments do.

Then the balance sheet, which is close to unencumbered. Net cash of $239.5 million sits against gross borrowings of $13.5 million, so the interest bill is close to irrelevant next to operating profit. The board has been putting the surplus to work in its own shares: an extra $150 million was added to the repurchase authorisation announced on May 22, 2025, and a further $150 million was announced on May 21, 2026. It is also adding capacity, with a new manufacturing facility in El Mirage, Arizona announced on May 20, 2026. A company that can fund a plant and a repurchase programme out of operating cash flow, without borrowing for either, does not need the cycle to cooperate on any particular schedule.

Bear Case

Look at where the cash goes and the business gets more complicated than a factory. Cavco does not simply build homes and sell them to independent dealers. It guarantees the floor-plan loans those dealers use to hold inventory, agreeing to buy the homes back if a dealer defaults, an obligation the annual filing describes as running "generally 18 to 24 months" and reduced by the resale value of the repurchased homes. It also lends directly, providing "funds to purchase home inventory or homes for placement in" communities under its commercial loan programmes. And it originates consumer loans it cannot readily sell, stating plainly that "we have not securitized our loan originations as a means to obtain long-term funding". Each of those is defensible on its own. Together they mean the company carries part of its own channel's credit risk, and that risk arrives at the worst point of a housing cycle rather than a random one.

What the price asks for makes that matter. Near 17 times company-wide operating profit, the market is paying for operating profit to compound at the fastest rate the business can fund out of its own cash flow, roughly 25% a year, and to keep doing it for about six years. Of the comparable fast growers on record, only about 28% held a pace like that for even five and a half years. Note where the stretch is. The rate is inside what this company has recently delivered; the duration is what history rarely grants.

The order book is not currently arguing for six years of compounding. Backlog stood near $195 million in wholesale sales values at the end of fiscal 2026, down $2 million against the prior year, and the filing is careful to say why that figure should not be over-read: "until production of a particular home has commenced, we do not consider order backlog to be firm orders". A flat, soft-edged backlog is a normal thing for a manufacturer. It is a strange thing to find underneath a multiple that assumes several years of acceleration.

The valuation methods split sharply on this. The asset-value lenses put the price at more than twice where they land, and the earnings-power methods, which capitalise current profit without assuming growth, put it about 75% above them. Only the forward cash-flow methods land above the price, and they get there by projecting the recent growth rate forward for six years. That is not a disagreement about the company. It is a disagreement about how long good conditions last.

The concession the bear owes is a real one: this balance sheet cannot fail. Net cash covers every dollar of borrowing many times over, and the buyback authorisation is funded from operating cash rather than from debt. The bear case is not about survival. It is that a business earning about a 10.9% operating margin in a cyclical trade is being valued as though the next six years are already known.

Valuation

Today's price works out near 17 times the company's operating profit across all of its lines. Run that backwards and the assumption becomes visible: operating profit compounding at roughly 25% a year, the fastest pace the business can fund without outside capital, sustained for about six years. The rate is not the unusual part, since it sits inside what Cavco has recently produced. The persistence is. Of comparable fast growers, only about 28% kept that pace for five and a half years. The answer is also sensitive to what buyers demand: shift the required return by one point and the implied number of years moves by about 1.6.

The methods spread out from there. Only the forward cash-flow approaches land above the price, projecting recent growth ahead six years to get there. Peer multiples put the price about 17% above where they land. The earnings-power methods, which capitalise today's profit with no growth at all, sit about 75% below the price, and the asset-value lenses more than half below it. That shape is the signature of a durability premium: nothing static reaches the price, and the only frames that do are the ones allowed to assume the next several years look like the last few.

Against the sector the multiple is not the outlier the spread implies, sitting in the lower half of the peer multiple range. That is partly a comment on the peers. Homebuilders have been shrinking, with LEN and DHI both posting revenue declines over the trailing year, while the factory-built product has been taking share of the affordable end. A multiple in the lower half of a de-rating cohort is a weaker endorsement than it first appears.

Solvency barely needs a paragraph, which is itself the point. Net cash of $239.5 million sits against gross borrowings of $13.5 million, operating profit dwarfs the interest bill, and the trailing operating margin is about 10.9%. The filed inputs underneath all of that are unremarkable in a useful way: an order backlog near $195 million at fiscal year end, a distribution network in which no single independent distributor reached 10% of factory-built housing revenue in any of the last three years, and a financial services arm whose net revenue rose 5.8% on higher insurance premiums. The company is not fragile. The multiple simply has more of the future written into it than the backlog currently confirms.

Catalysts

Fiscal first-quarter results are due July 30, 2026, and they are the first read on the new year after fiscal 2026 closed on March 28. The prior report, released May 21, 2026, set the baseline the market is now extrapolating, including the order backlog near $195 million in wholesale sales values that was roughly flat year over year.

Capacity is the live strategic item. On May 20, 2026 the company announced a new manufacturing facility in El Mirage, Arizona. New plant capacity in a factory-built housing business is a multi-quarter commitment made against expected demand rather than booked demand, so the decision itself is management's clearest published statement about where it thinks volumes are heading. Watch whether the plant timeline and the backlog move in the same direction over the next two prints.

Capital return continues alongside it. The board authorised an additional $150 million for share repurchases on May 21, 2026, following an identical $150 million addition announced on May 22, 2025. Both were funded without borrowing, which is worth noting for a company whose gross debt is a rounding error. A proxy statement was also filed on June 16, 2026, the routine annual governance item rather than a signal.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Factory-built housing (reported)

Financial services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2026 10-K · company announcement, May 20, 2026 · company fiscal 2026 fourth quarter and year end results, May 21, 2026 · company proxy filing, June 16, 2026

View the full interactive CVCO report on boothcheck