Centuri Holdings, Inc. (CTRI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $20.54, Centuri Holdings, Inc. (CTRI) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~6.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CTRI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCTRI
CompanyCenturi Holdings, Inc.
Sector / IndustryUtilities
Current price$20.54/sh
CompositionMaster services agreements 78% / Bid contracts 22%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.2%
Operating margin today3.2%
Margin expansion (value-band)+1.0pp
Must persist for6.3y
Multiple paid29x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.5% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 70 peers)89

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset8.15x4expensive
Earnings3.52x2expensive
Relative1.58x2expensive
Growth4.27x2expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=10)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$2.697.64xyesReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.0B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 34.19x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 67x), scenarios: 27.8x / 34.2x / 40.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 15.95x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$3.306.22xyesBV/sh $8.54, ROE (TTM) 3.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$2.0410.07xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$22.660.91xyesRev $3.2B, growth 19% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.5x / 0.7x / 0.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$12.601.63xyesEPS $0.36, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.92 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.012054.00xyesNormalized EBIT (3y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.03B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$1.5413.34xyesBV $8.54 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.3%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$8.322.47xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.36 × BVPS $8.54) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.13B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$11.621.77xyesEPS $0.36 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.16B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$13.501.52xyesEPS $0.36 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$3.895.28xyesEPS $0.36 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
U.S. Gas Utility Servicesoperatingenterprise$1.3bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Canadian Utility Servicesoperatingenterprise$246.9mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Union Electric Utility Servicesoperatingenterprise$808.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Non-Union Electric Utility Servicesoperatingenterprise$599.4mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$682.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)8.58x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)6.77x
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Read the earnings line first and you will misjudge this company. Centuri does utility maintenance and construction work at a scale of roughly $3.16 billion in revenue, and it converted that into about $51 million of operating profit over the trailing year. That is a margin of 1.8%, which for a contractor is close to the line where a bad job wipes out a good quarter. But the stage matters. This is a business rebuilding its execution after a stretch of project problems, and the gross line already shows the repair: gross profit rose to 18.6% of revenue in the fiscal year ended December 28, 2025 from 15.8% the year before, an improvement the 10-K attributes to bid margins after "the prior year period was negatively impacted by performance issues on certain" projects.

The revenue underneath is unusually sticky for construction work. The filing is precise about the shape: relationships "are governed by long-term master service agreements ("MSAs"), comprising approximately 78% of our total revenue during fiscal 2025. Additionally, of the remaining 22% of our total revenue that was generated from bid contracts, 8% was generated from existing MSA customers". Put those together and nearly nine tenths of the business comes from customers already in the book. Gas distribution lines have to be inspected, replaced and made safe on a regulator's schedule. That work does not wait for a construction cycle.

Demand from the customers themselves is not in question, and their own filings say so. PWR describes "multi-year grid modernization and reliability programs, as well as system upgrades and hardening programs in response to recurring severe weather events", and PRIM reports "strong tailwinds in our power delivery business due to increased demand for electricity in the United States". Centuri sells into exactly that budget, on both the gas and electric sides.

The March quarter showed the volume arriving. Non-Union Electric revenue reached $174.6 million, up $37.4 million or 27.3% on the prior year, driven by higher volumes on new and existing MSAs, and the company reported record backlog of $6.5 billion alongside 76% growth in gross profit.

Here is the arithmetic that makes the setup interesting rather than merely cheap. Each additional percentage point of operating margin on this revenue base is worth about $32 million, against roughly $51 million of operating profit in the whole trailing year. PWR earns an operating margin of 5.7% on $30.1 billion of revenue, MYRG earns 5.2%, PRIM 4.9% and GVA 6.3%. None of those is a heroic number. Centuri does not need to become an outstanding contractor for the earnings base to change shape. It needs to become an ordinary one.

Bear Case

Start with the distance between reported profit and cash collected. Total contract assets rose $164.0 million during the fiscal year ended December 28, 2025, a figure that includes "net recovery claims and unapproved change orders". Set that against roughly $51 million of operating profit and about $30.8 million of net income for the trailing year. Growth in a contracting business often looks like this on the way up, and some of it is simply the billing lag the filing describes, where "large MSAs in which customer approval is contractually required before invoices can be issued" slow the process. But unapproved change orders are work performed that the customer has not yet agreed to pay for, and they are recorded as an asset. Free cash flow over the trailing period was not positive. A company that reports profit while its receivable-side assets grow several times faster than that profit is asking to be judged on collections, not on the income statement.

The debt is modest in isolation and unforgiving in combination with thin margins. Net borrowing runs roughly 683 million dollars, about 13.4 times operating profit on a trailing basis. The structure itself is fine: an $800 million term loan running to July 9, 2032, a $400 million revolver to July 9, 2030, and about $150.0 million of equipment term loans, with the company reporting "compliance with all of our financial covenants under the revolving credit facility". What is less comfortable is that the interest margin on the revolver moves with the net leverage ratio. Leverage is measured against earnings, so a weak stretch of project execution raises the cost of the debt at the same time it lowers the profit servicing it.

Backlog is doing more narrative work than it can support. The 10-K says plainly that "Generally, customers are not contractually committed to specific volumes of work under MSAs, and MSAs may be terminated by either party upon notice", and that backlog "tends to fluctuate based on the timing of MSA renewals". A record backlog figure in this business is an estimate of work over the contractual life of agreements that carry no volume commitment. It is a reasonable planning number and a poor promise.

Earnings quality has the same softness in the most recent quarter. Gross profit was "positively impacted by a favorable change in estimated cost to complete on an offshore wind project that is nearing completion". Revising down the expected cost of finishing a job is a legitimate accounting act and also the single easiest lever in percentage-of-completion accounting. When a recovery story leans on estimate revisions, the recovery deserves another quarter of proof.

All of which meets a valuation that has already assumed the repair works. Enterprise value sits at roughly 72 times trailing operating profit, and holding that requires operating income to compound at the 25% ceiling its own returns can fund, sustained for something like fifteen years. Only about 14% of comparable fast growers have held such a pace even ten years, and the multiple sits at the very top of its peer group, well beyond the upper quartile. The bull argument that profitability normalizes toward what PWR, MYRG and PRIM already earn is entirely reasonable. It is also already in the price, several times over.

Valuation

The headline multiple looks impossible until you notice which number is moving. Enterprise value of roughly 3.7 billion dollars against about $51 million of trailing operating profit works out near 72 times, and inverted that demands operating income growing at the 25% ceiling its own returns on capital can finance, held for roughly fifteen years. Read literally, that is an extraordinary bet. Read structurally, it is mostly a statement about the denominator: a 1.8% operating margin on $3.16 billion of revenue is a depressed earnings base, and any multiple struck against a depressed base looks extreme.

That distinction matters because it changes what the buyer is actually underwriting. It is not a bet that this contractor keeps compounding at 25% a year for fifteen years. It is a bet that profitability returns to something like what the rest of the industry earns, and that a full multiple keeps being paid on the way. PWR earns 5.7% while growing 21.1%, MYRG 5.2% while growing 13.1%, PRIM 4.9% while growing 13.4%, and at the top of the range STRL earns 16.9% growing 37.0%. Centuri's 1.8% is the outlier in that group. Its own gross line has already moved to 18.6% of revenue from 15.8% the prior year, so the recovery case is plausible on the evidence so far. The multiple assumes it is close to certain.

The methods spread out accordingly, and none of them reaches the price. The peer-multiple methods come closest, with the price about 2.05 times what they support. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize what the company earns now with no growth credited, sit far below that. Furthest away is the asset-value lens, roughly 10.9 times under the price, and the reason is specific rather than mysterious: book value works out to $8.55 a share while return on equity runs about 3.6%, well under the cost of that equity, so any method that values a company off its book penalizes it for earning less than its capital costs. That is the same 1.8% margin problem wearing a different coat.

Borrowing bounds the downside without threatening it near term. Net debt near 683 million dollars is roughly 13.4 times operating profit measured on the trailing year, which sounds alarming and is really another expression of the depressed denominator. The maturities are long, in 2030 and 2032, and the company reports compliance with its covenants. There is no refinancing cliff to force the issue. What there is instead is a clock: the margin recovery has several years of runway to arrive on its own terms, and the current valuation has already spent them.

Catalysts

Two things landed in July. On the 20th the company announced the acquisition of J.J. White, adding industrial and union electric capability to the existing book. Two days earlier JPMorgan cut its target to 26 dollars from 29 and kept an Underweight rating. The pairing is worth noticing on its own: the operating business is buying capacity while at least one house on the street thinks the equity is ahead of the fundamentals.

The operating news before that ran the other way. First-quarter results on May 7, 2026 carried 76% year-over-year gross profit growth and a record backlog of $6.5 billion. In June the company announced more than $360 million of new customer awards. The filed quarterly detail behind the print shows Non-Union Electric revenue of $174.6 million, an increase of 27.3%, on higher volumes under new and existing MSAs.

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 4, 2026. The line that matters most is not revenue, which the awards and the backlog have already signalled. It is whether gross margin holds without help from favorable revisions to project cost estimates, and whether the contract-asset balance stops growing faster than profit. Those two together are what would turn a volume recovery into a cash one.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

U.S. Gas Utility Services / Union Electric Utility Services (reported)

Canadian Utility Services / Non-Union Electric Utility Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, May 7, 2026 · company announcement, July 20, 2026 · broker note, July 18, 2026 · company announcement, June 22, 2026 · Q1 FY2026 10-Q · company earnings announcement, July 22, 2026

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