Custom Truck One Source, Inc. (CTOS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $9.20, Custom Truck One Source, Inc. (CTOS) is priced for +13.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CTOS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCTOS
CompanyCustom Truck One Source, Inc.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$9.20/sh
CompositionUnited States 98% / Canada 2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.8%
Operating margin today8.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.2pp
Implied growth13.4%
Multiple paid24x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.42σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)63

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset10.64x4expensive
Earnings5.75x3expensive
Relative0
Growth0

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=7)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$27.940.33xnoFCF base $0.2B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$12.730.72xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 14.7x / 16.7x / 18.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 39.6x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 98x), scenarios: 33.0x / 39.6x / 46.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$1.029.02xyesBV/sh $3.59, ROE (TTM) 2.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$0.5915.59xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$7.491.23xnoRev $2.0B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.0x / 1.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$3.502.63xnoEPS $0.10, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.79 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.01920.00xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.12B × (1−21%) / WACC 6.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$0.4420.91xyesBV $3.59 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.7%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$2.843.24xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.10 × BVPS $3.59) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.23B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$1.605.75xyesFCF $196.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$1.177.86xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.19B (FCF $0.20B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$3.232.85xyesEPS $0.10 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.7512.27xyesBV $3.59 × (ROIC 1.4% / WACC 6.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.04B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$3.752.45xnoEPS $0.10 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$1.088.52xnoEPS $0.10 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Equipment Rental Solutions (ERS)operatingenterprise$701.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Truck and Equipment Sales (TES)operatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Aftermarket Parts and Services (APS)operatingenterprise$147.7mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)12.83x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)10.14x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The income statement reports a loss for the trailing year. The balance sheet reports a company that spent that year getting bigger. Rental equipment at cost rose to $1,664.2 million at December 31, 2025 from $1,522.7 million a year earlier, and the fleet it belongs to averaged 2.9 years of age, which the 10-K calls among the youngest in the industry. A firm in genuine retreat does not add equipment and keep its average asset three years old. The loss is what depreciation on a young, growing fleet does to reported earnings while the fleet is still filling up.

What that fleet does for a living matters more than the accounting. The company describes its core business as equipment "utilized by service providers in infrastructure development and improvement work", sold or rented to "a diverse customer base, including utilities and contractors, for the maintenance, repair, upgrade, and installation of critical" infrastructure. Bucket trucks, digger derricks, cranes and the trailers that move them. This is the equipment that gets used when a utility replaces poles and conductors, hardens a distribution network, or connects new load. That work is not a construction cycle in the ordinary sense. It is maintenance of a grid that has to be maintained whether or not the economy cooperates.

The rental side turned in the March quarter. The latest quarterly filing attributes the increase in rental revenue to "higher fleet utilization of 3.7% for the three months ended March 31, 2026, driven by higher average OEC on rent of 11.8%". More of the fleet earning, and a larger fleet earning: those two together are the whole mechanism by which a rental business recovers, and both moved the right way in the same quarter.

Now the number that reframes the rest. Trailing operating margin sits near 5.6%. Measured across its own cycle rather than at the bottom of one, the same revenue base has produced operating margins closer to 12.8%. That is a recovery to economics this company has already demonstrated, not an ascent to some new standard it has never met. What today's quote actually asks for is modest by comparison: roughly 8% annual growth in operating profit, held for about five years. The recent record is inside that range. The demand is on persistence, not on pace.

Structure explains the margin gap against the cohort, and it is worth being precise about. URI earns an operating margin of 24.7% and MGRC earns 25.5%, but both are close to pure rental businesses. Custom Truck also builds and sells trucks, an activity that turns inventory rather than depreciating a fleet and carries structurally thinner margins on much larger revenue per unit. Reorganized as of January 1, 2026, the company now reports a rental segment and a segment named "Specialty Truck Equipment & Manufacturing ("STEM")", which makes the split visible. The rental half is the part that compounds; the manufacturing half is what lets the company build to a customer's specification and then rent the same machine if the customer would rather not own it.

Bear Case

One assumption carries this valuation, and the company did not earn it last year. Through its own cycle this business has produced operating margins near 12.8%. The trailing year produced about 5.6% and a small net loss. Every point of the gap between those two figures is an assumption that the last twelve months were the trough of something rather than the shape of the business. That assumption may well be right. It is still an assumption, and it is doing all the work.

Leverage is what makes the assumption expensive if it is wrong. Net borrowing runs roughly 1.6 billion dollars against a market value near 2.5 billion, or about 6.74x through-cycle operating profit. Measured against what the business actually earned in the trailing year rather than through the cycle, the same borrowing is several times heavier. The company has room today: borrowing availability under its asset-based facility was $248.1 million at December 31, 2025, and the filing notes that its fixed charge coverage test was "inapplicable" at that date because availability exceeded the required threshold. That covenant becomes applicable precisely when availability falls, which is to say precisely when the business is under pressure. The 2029 Secured Notes mature April 15, 2029 and the asset-based facility on August 9, 2029, so refinancing is not next year's problem. It is a problem that gets priced against whatever the operating recovery looks like by then.

The demand side is not fully in the company's hands either. Its own risk disclosure is direct about it: "Our business may be impacted by government spending. A number of our customers are impacted by government funding of infrastructure projects", and separately that "Regulatory, technological advancement, or other changes in our core end-markets may affect our customers' spending on the products and services we provide". Utility capital budgets are set by regulators and rate cases, not by demand, and they can be deferred without anything visible breaking. A fleet is a fixed cost that keeps depreciating while customers wait.

The cohort supplies the cautionary version. WSC runs a rental business of comparable revenue scale and saw revenue fall 4.1% with a negative net margin over the trailing period, on an operating margin of 7.0%. That is what the down leg looks like in an asset-heavy rental model: the fleet does not shrink as fast as the revenue does, and the depreciation shows up regardless.

The last thing to hold in view is how sensitive the comfortable-looking arithmetic is. Each additional percentage point of required return moves the growth the price demands by roughly 6.6 percentage points. For a company with this much borrowing, the required return is not a settled input. A modestly higher cost of capital turns an 8% growth requirement into something the company has no recent record of delivering. None of the standard frames reach today's quote to begin with: it runs about twice what the earnings-power methods reach and about 3.2 times the asset-value methods.

Valuation

What the price assumes here is unusually mild for a company that reported a loss. Enterprise value works out to about 17 dollars for every dollar of operating profit measured through the cycle rather than at the trough, and inverting that leaves a requirement of roughly 8% annual growth in operating profit sustained for about five years. The company's recent pace is inside that band. The stretch is in how long the pace has to persist, not in the pace itself.

Two things are worth saying plainly about how that figure is built. The first is that it rests on normalized economics: the company's own through-the-cycle operating margins near 12.8% applied to today's revenue, rather than the roughly 5.6% the trailing statements show. The second is the discount rate. It is set at 8.6%, and each further percentage point of required return raises the growth demand by roughly 6.6 percentage points. That is an unusual amount of movement from a single input, and it is a fair description of what it means to value an asset-heavy business carrying this much borrowing.

Set against the methods, the price still sits above all of them. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize today's cash generation and credit no growth at all, reach about half the price. The book-value lens reaches less still. Shareholders' equity works out to $3.55 a share on the latest reported figures, which is all the asset-value methods have to work with, and against those methods the quote sits about 3.2 times higher. Peer multiples come closest, at about 1.76 times what the peer-multiple methods reach. No family gets there, which is another way of stating what the normalized framing already said: what is being paid for is an earnings base the trailing statements do not yet show.

The cohort makes the position legible rather than flattering. URI earns a 24.7% operating margin on $16.4 billion of revenue growing 5.0%, and MGRC earns 25.5% on $947 million growing 3.1%. Custom Truck's blended margin is far below both, but roughly half of what it does is selling and building trucks rather than renting them, and that mix carries thinner margins by construction. On the multiple itself the company sits in the lower half of its peer range, which is the more relevant comparison and is the reason the priced-in demand comes out modest.

Borrowing is the constraint that bounds all of it. Roughly 1.6 billion dollars of net borrowing against a market value near 2.5 billion means the equity is the thin slice on top of the fleet. The company had $248.1 million of availability under its asset-based facility at December 31, 2025, its 2029 Secured Notes run to April 15, 2029, and the facility itself to August 9, 2029. The recovery has roughly three years to show up in cash before the capital structure has to be renegotiated against whatever the numbers look like then.

Catalysts

First-quarter results landed on April 28, 2026, and the company reported record first-quarter revenue along with raised full-year 2026 guidance. The filed detail behind that print is the more useful part: the quarterly report attributes higher rental revenue to "higher fleet utilization of 3.7% for the three months ended March 31, 2026, driven by higher average OEC on rent of 11.8%". Utilization and the amount of fleet out on rent are the two levers that carry a rental recovery, and both moved together.

Two smaller items followed. In May the company was awarded a Sourcewell cooperative purchasing contract, which is the mechanism public agencies use to buy equipment without running their own tenders. Two brokers raised their price targets on the stock the same month. Neither changes the operating picture on its own, but the cooperative contract is the kind of channel that shows up in orders rather than in a press cycle.

The next scheduled report is August 3, 2026. The specific things to read in it are whether utilization kept climbing, whether average original equipment cost on rent grew again, and whether the guidance raised in April survived a second quarter. A rental recovery either compounds across consecutive quarters or it was a seasonal artifact, and one more print is what separates those two readings.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Equipment Rental Solutions (ERS) / Truck and Equipment Sales (TES) (reported)

Aftermarket Parts and Services (APS) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q1 2026 earnings release, April 28, 2026 · Q1 2026 10-Q · company announcement, May 27, 2026 · broker notes, May 2026 · company earnings announcement, July 20, 2026

View the full interactive CTOS report on boothcheck