CARLISLE COMPANIES INCORPORATED (CSL): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $352.14, CARLISLE COMPANIES INCORPORATED (CSL) is priced for +7.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CSL

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCSL
CompanyCARLISLE COMPANIES INCORPORATED
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$352.14/sh
CompositionNon-residential construction 80% / Residential construction 17% / Other 3%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)13.8%
Operating margin today19.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-6.1pp
Implied growth7.9%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.17σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)43

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.79x5expensive
Earnings1.91x4expensive
Relative0
Growth0.95x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$371.180.95xyesFCF base $0.9B, growth 1% (input: historical growth), terminal g 1.4%, WACC 7.8%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$436.000.81xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.4x / 13.4x / 15.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.2x / 18.0x / 20.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$197.221.79xyesBV/sh $40.72, ROE (TTM) 44.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$503.530.70xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$308.251.14xyesRev $5.1B, growth 1% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.7x / 3.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$267.351.32xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.05B × (1−23%) / WACC 7.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$315.971.11xyesBV $40.72 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 44.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$126.412.79xyes√(22.5 × EPS $17.44 × BVPS $40.72) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.21B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$179.761.96xyesFCF $866.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$170.722.06xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.83B (FCF $0.87B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$14.6224.09xyesEPS $17.44 × (8.5 + 2×-4.9%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$37.009.52xyesBV $40.72 × (ROIC 7.1% / WACC 7.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $5.10B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$188.541.87xyesEPS $17.44 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Construction Materials (CCM)operatingenterprise$3.7b$997.2m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Carlisle Weatherproofing Technologies (CWT)operatingenterprise$1.3b$101.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.83x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)2.19x
Interest coverage9.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-6.3%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Roughly six percent of the shares disappear every year. Over the four years to March 2026 the count has come down about 6.1% annually, funded out of operating cash rather than borrowing, with interest covered about 12.6 times over. That is the sort of capital allocation that only works if the underlying business throws off far more cash than it needs, and Carlisle's does. The trailing operating margin runs about 20.1%, which in this cohort is high: AWI is the only comparable at a better level, at 25.9%, while BLD sits at 14.0%, IBP at 12.7% and AAON at 10.4%.

The margin comes from a specific place. Carlisle sells the membrane, insulation and sealing systems that keep water out of commercial buildings, and the 10-K frames the strategy around what it calls the Carlisle Operating System, a manufacturing and product-rationalization program the company describes as ingrained across the business under its Vision 2030 plan. Concentrating on a narrow band of building-envelope products, rather than diversifying into everything a contractor might buy, is what allows a manufacturer of physical goods to earn software-adjacent returns on capital while its customers work on single-digit margins.

Demand has a structural leg the cycle does not touch. Commercial roofs get replaced whether or not anyone is putting up new buildings, and the company describes its market as supported by strong, long-term fundamentals including the demand for energy-efficient solutions in North America, which it calls the most attractive building-products market globally. Replacement work is a maintenance obligation for a building owner, not a discretionary purchase, and the energy-code direction adds specification content to each replacement rather than merely repeating the last one.

The valuation reflects a market that is not enthusiastic. The price sits in the lower half of the multiple range for its peer group, and the assumption embedded in it, operating profit growing around 8.1% a year for five years, is below the pace the company's own operating profit has averaged recently. That combination is the least demanding version of a bull case: it does not need a re-rating or a new business line, just a building-products cycle that stops getting worse while the buyback keeps compressing the share count against it.

Bear Case

Look closely at where the per-share progress is coming from. Revenue has been drifting backwards, not forwards, and the count of shares has been falling about 6.1% a year. Shrink the denominator fast enough and the numbers per share improve even when the business does not, which is a legitimate way to return capital and a poor foundation for a growth assumption. Today's price asks operating profit to compound around 8.1% a year for five years. Buybacks cannot supply that; they move earnings per share, not operating profit.

Customer concentration is where the fragility is genuinely structural, and the filing does not soften it. Beacon Roofing Supply accounted for approximately 16.7% of consolidated revenues in 2025 and ABC Supply for approximately 16.3%, together the two largest customers represented 33% of the Company's consolidated revenues, and the 10-K states plainly that The loss of either of these customers could have a material adverse effect on the Company's consolidated revenues and operating income. Two distributors standing between a manufacturer and its end market is a permanent negotiation about price, conducted by counterparties who know exactly how much of the factory they fill.

The cycle underneath is not cooperating either. The company acknowledges its segments are susceptible to downturns in the commercial construction industry, particularly in the construction repair and replacement sectors, and the cohort shows what that looks like in practice: OC, the largest name in the comparison group, ran a 0.7% operating margin on revenue that fell 5.1%, and GFF and FBIN both saw revenue decline. A repair-and-replacement business is more defensive than new construction. It is not immune, and building owners defer roofs when money is expensive.

Then there is the acquisition question, which has just become concrete. The 10-K already flags that The Company's growth strategy is partially dependent on the acquisition and successful integration of other businesses. In late June the Wall Street Journal reported that Carlisle had made unsolicited offers for Owens Corning at a significant premium. Set aside whether the approach succeeds. A company whose entire investment case rests on a 20.1% operating margin, earned by staying narrow, pursuing a target several times its size that currently converts revenue into almost no operating profit is a material change in what the shareholder owns. The margin profile that justifies the multiple is precisely the thing a transaction of that shape would dilute.

The static methods have been saying something similar for a while. Both the asset-value approaches and the earnings-power approaches land well below the current price, which sits about 76% above where the asset-value methods land and about 79% above the earnings-power ones. Only peer comparison and forward-growth projection reach today's level. For a manufacturer with a concentrated customer base in a soft cycle, being defended mainly by what other people pay for similar companies is a thinner support than it looks.

Valuation

The requirement embedded in this price is unusually modest for a report of this kind. At $336.22 the market is paying roughly 16 times what the business earns before interest and tax, and inverting that gives operating profit growth of about 8.1% a year for five years. Carlisle's own operating profit has averaged a faster pace than that in recent years, and the multiple sits in the lower half of its peer group's range. Keep the figure approximate, since it is one solve under fixed assumptions, but the direction is clear enough: the market is not asking for heroics here.

What it is asking for is stability in the discount rate, and that is where the fragility hides. Each additional percentage point of cost of capital moves the implied growth requirement by roughly 6.3 percentage points. For a cyclical manufacturer whose customers borrow to fund the projects that generate its orders, the rate environment is not a background variable. It sets both the numerator and the denominator, and a modest repricing of risk turns an undemanding assumption into a stretching one without a single order being lost.

The methods disagree in a familiar pattern for a good business at a full-but-not-extreme price. Peer comparison and the forward-growth approaches both reach today's level, the first landing close underneath it and the second essentially at it. The asset-value and earnings-power approaches land well below: the price sits about 76% above the asset-value methods and about 79% above the earnings-power methods. The gap between those two groups is the market paying for the margin structure to persist rather than mean-revert, since the earnings-power calculation credits the average profit of the last five years and no growth at all.

Where peers sharpen the picture is on margin rather than multiple. Carlisle's trailing operating margin of about 20.1% is second in its cohort only to AWI at 25.9%, and sits far above OC at 0.7%, CARR at 8.2% and GFF at 8.3%. That spread is the whole investment case in one line: the same end markets, the same weather, very different conversion of revenue into profit. Anything that narrows the spread, whether a soft cycle, distributor pressure, or an acquisition of a lower-margin business, removes the reason the multiple is where it is.

The balance sheet is not the constraint. Interest is covered about 12.6 times, liquid assets sit near 771 million dollars, and the company has funded a substantial buyback and a rising dividend out of operations, with the most recent declared payment made on March 2, 2026 to holders of record in February. This is a well-run cash generator whose downside is about earnings power rather than solvency, and whose price today is a bet that a 20% operating margin is a permanent feature rather than the top of a cycle.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are due on July 29, 2026, a date the company confirmed in mid-July. The first quarter, reported April 23, 2026, delivered Q1 2026 earnings per share of $3.63 against a consensus of $3.33 on quarterly revenue of about $1.05 billion, so the recent record is one of beating a lowered bar rather than growing into a rising one. The disclosure that matters most in the July print is volume commentary from the commercial roofing channel, since two distributors account for the bulk of what moves through it.

The dominant item is corporate rather than operational. The Wall Street Journal reported in late June that Carlisle had made unsolicited acquisition offers for Owens Corning at a significant premium. Nothing has been signed publicly, and an unsolicited approach can end in silence as easily as in a deal. But the target is several times Carlisle's revenue base and currently earns a fraction of its margin, so a transaction would reshape the company far more than any quarter will. Management commentary on capital priorities at the July call is therefore the thing to listen for, ahead of the segment numbers.

Sell-side positioning has drifted in both directions this year. Goldman Sachs added the stock to its US Conviction List in the spring, arguing for a sales inflection during 2026. More recently Truist and Baird each trimmed their targets while leaving their ratings unchanged, in early and mid July respectively. The pattern of maintained ratings with lower numbers is what analysts do when the thesis is intact and the timing has slipped, which is a fair summary of where the building-products cycle sits.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Construction Materials (CCM) (reported)

Carlisle Weatherproofing Technologies (CWT) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement of results date, July 2026 · Wall Street Journal, June 2026 · Q1 2026 results, April 2026 · Goldman Sachs research note, April 2026 · analyst target revisions, July 2026

View the full interactive CSL report on boothcheck