CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. (CSCO): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $109.95, CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. (CSCO) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.1 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CSCO

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCSCO
CompanyCISCO SYSTEMS, INC.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$109.95/sh
CompositionNetworking 50% / Security 14% / Collaboration 7% / Observability 2% / Services 27%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)28.9%
Operating margin today23.4%
Margin expansion (value-band)+5.5pp
Must persist for5.1y
Multiple paid32x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.71σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)60

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.35x5expensive
Earnings3.58x5expensive
Relative1.31x2expensive
Growth1.00x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$85.661.28xyesFCF base $12.7B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.6%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$130.730.84xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 30.6x / 32.6x / 34.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 28x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 23.2x / 28.0x / 32.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 23.78x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$32.803.35xyesBV/sh $12.40, ROE (TTM) 24.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$53.512.05xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$109.911.00xyesRev $60.7B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.9x / 7.1x / 8.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$69.721.58xyesEPS $3.01, growth 23% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.56 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$30.673.58xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $13.75B × (1−16%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$48.282.28xyesBV $12.40 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 24.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$28.983.79xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.01 × BVPS $12.40) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $14.19B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$24.874.42xyesFCF $11788.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$14.317.68xyesSBC-adj FCF $7.94B (FCF $11.79B − SBC $3.85B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$97.121.13xyesEPS $3.01 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$6.0918.05xyesBV $12.40 × (ROIC 4.2% / WACC 8.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $60.75B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$104.571.05xyesEPS $3.01 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 23.2% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 34.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$32.543.38xyesEPS $3.01 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Networkingoperatingenterprise$28.3b$131.3b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Securityoperatingenterprise$8.1b$61.7b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Collaborationoperatingenterprise$4.2b$12.9b indicative EV subtotalindicative enterprise value
Observabilityoperatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Servicesoperatingenterprise$15.0bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$18.2b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.53x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.28x
Interest coverage9.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.2%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The direction worth watching is not the headline number. Across fiscal 2023, 2024 and 2025 the services line went 13,856 then 14,550 then 15,046 million dollars, rising in each year regardless of what happened to hardware. Observability went 661, then 837, then 1,055 million over the same three years. Product revenue, meanwhile, fell and then partly recovered. Two of the three lines compound quietly; the third is the one that makes the quarterly headlines. That mix is the whole bull argument in miniature.

Behind it sits a contracted backlog that has become the most reliable number in the business. Remaining performance obligations totalled 43.5 billion dollars at the end of fiscal 2025 against 41.0 billion a year earlier, with product up 8% and services up 5%. The company states that it expects approximately 50% of total remaining performance obligations to be recognized as revenue over the next 12 months. Half of that balance is therefore already spoken for in the coming year, which is a very different starting position from a business that has to sell its entire year from scratch every August.

The competitive advantage that makes this possible is not a product feature and the 10-K is unusually plain about what it actually is. Cisco lists the terms on which it competes as the ability to provide value-added features such as security, reliability, and investment protection; conformance to standards; market presence; the ability to provide financing. Read that list again with an enterprise buyer in mind. Investment protection means the switch bought four years ago still works with the one bought today. The ability to provide financing means the vendor will lend the customer the money to buy its own equipment. Neither is glamorous. Both are extremely hard for a smaller competitor to replicate, and together they explain why an installed base this size renews rather than churns.

The obvious objection is that faster companies exist, and they do. ANET grew revenue 30.6% and ran a 42.8% operating margin, which is a better business by both measures on a fraction of the revenue base. The bull answer is not that Cisco matches that. It is that Cisco is being paid differently: an operating margin near 24% on a revenue base several times larger, interest covered about 9.5 times over, borrowings at roughly 1.27 times operating profit, and a share count that has come down about 1.2% a year over the last four years. The company converts scale into cash and hands a good deal of it back. For an infrastructure supplier in a market where enterprise buyers replace equipment on multi-year cycles, that is the durable version of the business, not the exciting one.

Bear Case

Start with the balance sheet, because it no longer works the way it used to. Gross borrowings run about 34.8 billion dollars against roughly 16.6 billion of liquid assets, and the buyback has retired only about 1.2% of the share count a year over the past four years. Nothing here is fragile. Interest is covered comfortably and the leverage is modest. But a stock priced as a compounder needs the compounding to come from somewhere, and the balance sheet is now a mild drag on that job rather than the engine it once was.

Which puts all the weight on operations, and this is where the price becomes the problem. At today's level the market is paying roughly 33 times the company's operating income, and the arithmetic behind that requires operating profit to grow at the fastest pace the business could fund from its own cash flow, sustained for about five and a half years. Of companies that have grown that fast, only about 32% held the pace that long. The sensitivity is unforgiving too: each percentage point of growth shifts the required runway by roughly 1.9 years, so a modest shortfall does not trim the assumption, it lengthens it past what the evidence supports. If that requirement mean-reverts, the multiple compresses toward where the earnings-power methods already sit, which is a long way down from here.

Cisco's own risk disclosure describes the mechanism better than any outside critic would. The 10-K states that Barriers to entry are relatively low, and new ventures to create products that do or could compete with our products are regularly formed. That is a strange sentence to find under a company priced for durable compounding, and the peer numbers give it teeth. In networking, which is half of revenue, ANET grew 30.6% last year while Cisco's own total revenue rose 5.3% between fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2025. In security, FTNT ran a 31.1% operating margin. In observability, where Cisco's line reached 1,055 million dollars in fiscal 2025, DDOG grew 29.5% on a revenue base more than three times that size.

The collaboration segment shows what a mature line looks like when nobody is watching. It produced 4,052, then 4,113, then 4,154 million dollars across fiscal 2023 to 2025, which is essentially flat over three years, in a category where TEAM grew 24.7%. Seven percent of revenue is not going to decide the thesis on its own. It does illustrate what happens to a Cisco product line once a specialist with a better architecture arrives, and networking is not exempt from that pattern simply because it is bigger.

None of this makes the company weak. It makes the price specific. The static methods, the ones built on book value, on capitalized earnings and on peer comparison, all land well below the current level, and the only approaches that reach it are ones that project growth forward. The bear case is not that Cisco stops working. It is that a business growing revenue in the mid single digits gets valued as though it will grow operating profit at a multiple of that rate for half a decade, and that when the market stops believing the second part, the first part on its own does not support the share price.

Valuation

Take today's price as the input and ask what has to happen for it to make sense. At $114.17 the market is paying roughly 33 times what the whole company earns before interest and tax, and inverting that gives a specific requirement: operating profit growing at the ceiling the business could fund out of its own cash flow, held there for about five and a half years. Keep the number approximate, because it is one solve under fixed assumptions rather than a measurement. The direction is not ambiguous, though. Roughly 32% of comparable fast growers sustained that pace for that long, and each percentage point of growth moves the required runway by about 1.9 years, so the requirement is sensitive to exactly the variable nobody can pin down.

The methods used to triangulate value split cleanly on this, and the split is the information. The asset-value approaches and the earnings-power approaches both land far below the current price, well under half of it. The peer-multiple approaches are closer but still short: the price sits about 34% above where the peer-multiple methods land. Only the forward-growth approaches reach today's level at all. That pattern has a name in plain English, which is that the market is paying for durability the static frames structurally cannot see. Whether the premium is earned is a judgment about the next five years, not about the last twelve months.

It is worth being precise about how the forward methods get there. The two approaches that reach or exceed the current price share one construction: each holds the valuation the market applies today constant through the end of its own forecast. Remove that assumption and nothing in the set reaches $114. Take the same forward math with the multiple allowed to drift back toward the sector, and the answer moves substantially lower.

Peers sharpen it. ANET, competing directly in networking, grew 30.6% last year at a 42.8% operating margin. Cisco's trailing operating margin is about 23.8%. Its own revenue advanced in the mid single digits over the most recent fiscal year. The market is asking Cisco to compound operating profit at a pace its faster competitor is already delivering, without the growth rate that competitor uses to deliver it.

The balance sheet is what keeps the downside orderly. Net borrowings are about 18.2 billion dollars on the funded-debt build, which excludes leases; on the lease-inclusive measure the figure is nearer 29.4 billion. Either way, interest is covered about 9.5 times and net debt sits at roughly 1.27 times operating profit, so the debt is not the constraint on anything management wants to do. The share count has fallen about 1.2% a year over the past four years. This is a well-financed company generating a lot of cash, and the question the price poses has nothing to do with whether it survives. It has to do with how many years of above-normal growth the buyer is agreeing to pay for in advance.

Catalysts

August 12, 2026 is the next scheduled print, covering the fiscal fourth quarter. The fiscal 2025 year that closed in July 2025 saw revenue rise 5.3% while net income slipped slightly, so the burden on the coming report is to show product demand converting rather than backlog simply accumulating. Given how much of the current valuation rests on sustained growth rather than on today's earnings, the order and backlog commentary will matter more than the headline beat.

Two AI-related items landed in the last week of July 2026, both on the security side rather than the hardware side. Cisco introduced an AI tool named Antares aimed at protecting sensitive data, and its own security research reported that multi-turn attacks broke AI models in as many as 88% of attempts. The second is a marketing asset as much as a research finding: a company selling AI security benefits from published evidence that AI systems are easy to break. Whether either converts into the security segment's revenue line is a question for the next several quarters, not this one.

Two older items closed out risks rather than opening them. KeyBanc raised its price target and kept an Overweight rating in late June. Separately, the Supreme Court dismissed the long-running lawsuit alleging Cisco assisted in the persecution of the Falun Gong movement in China, removing a litigation overhang that had been outstanding for years.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Networking (reported)

Security (reported)

Collaboration (reported)

Observability (reported)

Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company earnings calendar via stockanalysis.com, July 2026 · fiscal 2025 results summary via stockanalysis.com, July 2026 · Bloomberg Markets and Finance, July 2026 · VentureBeat, July 2026 · TheFly, June 2026 · Fox Business, June 2026

View the full interactive CSCO report on boothcheck