CoreWeave, Inc. (CRWV): what the price requires
At today's price, CoreWeave, Inc. (CRWV) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~10.6 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CRWV
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | CRWV |
| Company | CoreWeave, Inc. |
| Current price | $83.27/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | revenue-multiple |
| EV / sales paid | 13.6x |
| Steady-state operating margin assumed | 28.7% |
| Must persist for | 10.6y |
The company earns no operating profit yet; the inversion runs on the revenue multiple and an assumed steady-state margin.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~2.1 years.
How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 15% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 9.73x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 2.82x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.69x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=7)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $181.50 | 0.46x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 26.1x / 28.1x / 30.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $29.54 | 2.82x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $9.03 | 9.22x | yes | Book value floor: BV/sh $9.03, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $8.13 | 10.24x | yes | Book value with convergence: BV/sh $9.03, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $120.82 | 0.69x | yes | Rev $6.2B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.6x / 7.0x / 8.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | $45.20 | 1.84x | yes | Margin ramp: -26% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered) |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 8327.00x | yes | EBITDA $2.99B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $29.54 | 2.82x | yes | Revenue $6.23B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $22.8b |
| Interest coverage | -0.1x |
| Burning cash | no |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- CoreWeave rents AI computing power: it buys Nvidia GPUs by the tens of billions, racks them in data centers, and sells access to AI labs and hyperscalers, a business growing revenue more than 100% year over year off a $99.4 billion backlog.
- The defining risk is the financing model: the company carries more than $22 billion of debt, much of it high-cost, and warns that "our high level of debt and the restrictive covenants" could compromise its ability to react to competitive pressure.
- What to watch is the gap between contracted demand and cash burn: management reaffirmed $12 billion to $13 billion of 2026 revenue while guiding 2026 capital spending to $30 to $35 billion, so the build is being funded well ahead of the revenue.
Bull Case
Start with the balance sheet, because for CoreWeave the financing is the strategy, and what it reveals is a management team racing to lock in a once-in-a-cycle demand wave. The company is funding an enormous GPU build, with 2026 capital spending guided to $30 to $35 billion, by raising debt and equity at scale, securing more than $20 billion of capital to de-risk its execution plan. That looks aggressive, and it is, but it is matched against a $99.4 billion backlog of contracted demand. When a company has the orders in hand and the constraint is how fast it can install the chips, borrowing to install them faster is the rational move, even at high rates, because the revenue is already signed.
The growth is the kind rarely seen at this revenue scale. First-quarter 2026 revenue more than doubled to $2.08 billion, adjusted EBITDA reached $1.16 billion at a 56% margin, and operating cash flow was $3.0 billion in the quarter. The customer roster reads like a who's who of AI: deals announced with Microsoft, OpenAI, Meta and Anthropic, and the company now counts ten clients committed to spending at least $1 billion. CoreWeave's edge is being purpose-built for AI workloads, with infrastructure optimized for training and inference rather than retrofitted from general-purpose cloud, and its tight relationship with Nvidia, which holds a stake, keeps it near the front of the line for the newest chips.
The diversification trend supports the durability case. In 2024, Microsoft was 62% of revenue; that concentration has been declining as OpenAI, Meta and others scale their commitments. The structure of the business, multi-year contracts billed on consumption, means the backlog converts to revenue over time rather than depending on winning new orders each quarter. The bull case is straightforward: the demand for AI compute is real and contracted, CoreWeave is one of the few specialists positioned to serve it at scale, and the debt is the tool that lets it capture the wave before competitors can. The price is paying for that capture playing out.
Bear Case
The structural truth a CoreWeave holder has to face is that this is a heavily leveraged bet on the durability of AI demand and the longevity of GPUs, and both are less certain than the price assumes. The company carries more than $22 billion of debt, some of it priced at junk-level rates, against a business that still loses money on a GAAP basis, with a net loss of $740 million in the first quarter. CoreWeave is candid about the danger, warning that "our high level of debt and the restrictive covenants in the c[ontracts]" could compromise its ability to react to competitive pressure, and that it requires "substantial and growing capital expenditures" to keep growing. That is a business borrowing to buy depreciating assets, and the asset at the center, the GPU, loses value fast as Nvidia releases new generations. Each new chip family that boosts performance also accelerates the obsolescence of the fleet CoreWeave just financed.
Customer concentration is the second structural fragility. Despite the diversification trend, the company tells investors that "a substantial portion of our revenue is driven by a limited number of our customers, and the loss of, or a significant reduction in, spending from one or" more of them would hurt the business, and it discloses that a single customer accounted for 68% of net accounts receivable at year-end. A handful of AI labs and hyperscalers, several of which are also building their own data centers, hold the demand that the $99.4 billion backlog rests on. If even one large customer slows its commitment or in-sources its compute, the contracted revenue the bull case treats as secure becomes less so.
The valuation leaves no room for any of this to go wrong. At roughly 18 times sales, the methods split into a moat-premium pattern: only the growth-DCF view reaches the price, while the asset-value and peer-multiple methods say richly valued. State the requirement plainly: the price implies CoreWeave eventually earns about a 30% operating margin and grows revenue near its self-funding ceiling for around 15 years, a pace only about 15% of comparable fast-growers sustained for even a decade. And the financing makes the downside steeper than usual. There is no net cash floor here; net debt is more than $22 billion, interest expense is large and growing, and a slowdown in AI demand would leave the company servicing that debt against depreciating chips and softening utilization. The bear case is not that AI compute demand is fake. It is that the combination of high leverage, fast-depreciating assets, customer concentration, and a price that assumes a flawless 15-year run leaves almost no margin for the cycle to disappoint.
Valuation
CoreWeave does not yet earn a steady-state operating profit, so the price is read against its sales, and at roughly 18 times revenue that is a demanding multiple that prices a specific future. Read backward, it implies the business eventually earns an operating margin near 30% and grows revenue at its self-funding ceiling for about 15 years. Keep those figures approximate; they are a single solve. The duration is the hard part: only about 15% of comparable fast-growers sustained a pace like that for even ten years, so the price underwrites more than a decade of near-maximum compounding in a field that did not exist at this scale a few years ago.
The methods we use to triangulate fall into a moat-premium pattern. Only the growth-DCF view reaches the price, by crediting CoreWeave's revenue compounding forward. The asset-value methods land far below, anchored on a book value the leverage has thinned. The peer-multiple comparison against other AI-infrastructure names also lands below the price. When the static frames all say richly valued and only the growth view reaches the price, the spread is a durability premium: the market paying for compounding the standard methods cannot see. The question is whether AI-compute demand, GPU economics, and CoreWeave's cost of capital all cooperate for long enough to earn it.
Solvency is where this name differs sharply from most high-multiple growth stories, and it is the load-bearing risk. There is no net cash cushion; CoreWeave carries more than $22 billion of net debt, with large and rising interest expense, and it warns that its high leverage and restrictive covenants limit its flexibility. The 2026 capital spending plan of $30 to $35 billion runs well ahead of the $12 to $13 billion of guided revenue, so the company is consuming capital to build ahead of demand, funded by debt against assets that depreciate quickly. The downside is therefore not bounded by a balance-sheet floor the way it is for a net-cash software company; it is bounded by the durability of the contracted backlog and the residual value of the GPU fleet. The price rests on the backlog converting and the build paying off before the leverage or the depreciation catches up.
Catalysts
The defining catalyst is the conversion of the backlog into revenue. CoreWeave reported a $99.4 billion backlog and reaffirmed 2026 revenue guidance of $12 billion to $13 billion, with second-quarter revenue guided to $2.45 billion to $2.6 billion. Because the entire thesis depends on contracted demand turning into cash on schedule, each quarter's revenue against that guidance, and the pace at which new GPU capacity comes online, is the cleanest read on execution.
The financing and capital-spending cadence is the second catalyst, and it cuts both ways. The 2026 capital spending plan of $30 to $35 billion, roughly double the prior year, is funded by ongoing debt and equity raises, and the terms of those raises matter: cheaper capital de-risks the build, while higher-cost debt erodes the economics. How CoreWeave finances the next leg of the build is a direct input to whether the contracted revenue translates into shareholder value.
The customer and technology catalysts frame the risk. New commitments from the major AI labs, and continued diversification away from the largest customer, would strengthen the durability case, while any large customer slowing or in-sourcing would undercut it. On the technology side, the cadence of Nvidia's GPU releases is a double-edged catalyst: access to the newest chips keeps CoreWeave competitive, but faster generational turnover accelerates depreciation on the existing fleet. Analysts are bullish on average, with a Buy consensus near $143, but the range from roughly $36 to $303 captures how genuinely divided the view is. The next earnings print is the test of whether revenue is tracking guidance and whether the path toward GAAP profitability is closing or widening.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- NBIS (Nebius Group NV)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- IREN (IREN Ltd)
- FY2025 10-K: …Our goal is to maximize utilization of our AI Cloud Services capacity by customers. We aim to enter into contracts for our AI Cloud Services once the relevant GPUs have been ordered or are installed and operational, and if any such computing power becomes available upon expiration of a customer contract or otherwise.…
- FY2025 10-K: …in which we operate (for example, through potential participation in demand response, ancillary services provision and load management in deregulated markets such as Texas). We have secured sites with access to land and power supply, which we believe positions us to take advantage of any growth in power demand for…
- CORZ (Core Scientific Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …intelligence and HPC workloads. We plan to develop and bring online the infrastructure required to meet our existing contractual commitments to our high-density colocation customer, expand our infrastructure portfolio by securing additional land and power at new and existing sites, and sign additional colocation…
- FY2025 10-K: …particularly in markets with limited availability of incremental power capacity, where the pace of new generation and grid infrastructure development has not kept up with demand from large-scale data center projects. As a result, utilities have implemented more structured and disciplined commercial frameworks…
- APLD (Applied Digital Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …industry is poised for significant growth, driven by the rapid adoption of digital technologies across all sectors. As businesses prioritize digital transformation, the demand for data center infrastructure is expected to increase substantially. Companies require robust, reliable and scalable solutions to process,…
- FY2025 10-K: …Applied Digital Cloud Corporation ("Applied Digital Cloud"), has locations in three states: Colorado, Minnesota and Utah. This business provides cloud 5 services to customers, such as AI and machine learning developers by renting space at third party co-location centers and providing the customers with access to its…
- ORCL (Oracle Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …development tools, among others. These infrastructure technologies are available through a subscription to our OCI offerings or through the purchase of a license and related license support, at the customer's option, to run within the Oracle Cloud as a part of a customer's cloud-based, on-premise or other IT…
- FY2025 10-K: …at the time of delivery of the related licenses and hardware products. In addition, we may not be able to accurately anticipate customer transitions from or be able to sufficiently backfill reduced customer demand for our license, hardware and support offerings relative to the expected increase in customer adoption…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
CRWV FY2025 10-K, accession 0001769628-26-000104 · CoreWeave Q1 2026 results · CoreWeave customer disclosures, 2026 · CoreWeave capital structure disclosures, 2026 · analyst consensus, 2026