Cirrus Logic, Inc. (CRUS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $108.02, Cirrus Logic, Inc. (CRUS) is priced for -0.9% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CRUS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCRUS
CompanyCirrus Logic, Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$108.02/sh
CompositionAudio Products 58% / HPMS Products 42%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)11.8%
Operating margin today23.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-11.2pp
Implied growth-0.9%
Multiple paid10x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.62σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)4

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.16x5expensive
Earnings0.90x5justifies
Relative0.53x5justifies
Growth0.72x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=18)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$265.260.41xyesFCF base $0.6B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.0%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$149.560.72xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.7x / 9.7x / 11.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$185.060.58xyesP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 18.3x / 22.0x / 25.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$92.881.16xyesBV/sh $43.68, ROE (TTM) 19.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$133.970.81xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$86.611.25xyesRev $2.0B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.2x / 2.6x / 3.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$227.610.47xyesEPS $8.18, growth 28% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.45 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$81.601.32xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.38B × (1−18%) / WACC 9.0% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$130.210.83xyesBV $43.68 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$89.661.20xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.18 × BVPS $43.68) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$168.590.64xyesEBITDA $0.49B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$136.980.79xyesFCF $572.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$119.380.90xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.49B (FCF $0.57B − SBC $0.08B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$263.940.41xyesEPS $8.18 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$22.084.89xyesBV $43.68 × (ROIC 4.6% / WACC 9.0%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$204.500.53xyesRevenue $2.05B × sector P/S 5.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$306.750.35xyesEPS $8.18 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$88.431.22xyesEPS $8.18 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Cirrus Logic (whole company)operatingenterprise1.9B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$891.3m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-2.31x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-1.89x (net cash)
Interest coverage470.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the disagreement, because it is unusually one-sided. Run Cirrus Logic through the standard frames and most of them land above the current share price. The peer-multiple methods put the price at roughly 0.7 times where they sit. The forward-growth methods put it at roughly 0.8 times. The earnings-power methods land essentially level with it, and only the asset-value frames, which judge a fabless designer on its book equity and therefore miss most of what it owns, land meaningfully below. When the value-oriented lenses say cheap and the growth lens is the least demanding of the group, that is a value read, not a momentum one.

The inverted version of the same point is sharper. Today's price works out to about 11.4 times company-wide operating income, and holding it requires operating profit to compound at roughly 4.5% a year over the next five years. That is a modest ask for a business that has been growing considerably faster than that recently. The price is not asking Cirrus Logic to be exceptional. It is asking it not to shrink.

The economics behind that are genuinely good. The FY2026 10-K reports that "gross margin for fiscal year 2026 was 52.8 percent", attributing the increase to "a more favorable product mix". Trailing operating margin runs 24.5%. Set that against the analog and mixed-signal cohort and the gap is not subtle: SWKS earns a 9.1% operating margin on $4.04 billion of revenue, QRVO 11.2%, MCHP 10.4%, and ON 10.0% on $6.06 billion. MTSI, the closest on profitability, earns 16.0%. Cirrus Logic is a fifth their size and roughly twice as profitable per dollar of sales.

The second product family is where the growth argument lives. Management states that "our HPMS product line presents the largest opportunity to drive application diversification and fuel exciting avenues of growth in the coming years", and the same filing records HPMS revenue rising about 10 percent from a fiscal 2025 base of $758.9 million, "largely attributable to demand for components shipping into smartphones". The company also reports gaining share "across all PC segments", with new amplifiers and codecs aimed at AI-enabled notebooks. Those are two different diversification paths: more silicon content per phone, and a second device category entirely.

Capital allocation reads like a company that agrees with the value case. The FY2026 10-K describes "$500 million in share repurchases authorized by the Board of Directors in March 2025", to be "funded from existing cash", and records 0.5 million shares bought back for $70.0 million in the fiscal fourth quarter alone. The share count has fallen about 2.8% a year over the four years to December 2025. Fiscal 2026 cash flow from operations was $650.6 million, and the filing states the company "had no amounts outstanding under the Revolving Credit Facility and was in compliance with all covenants". Buybacks funded from operations, not from borrowings, are the version of capital return that survives a bad year.

The bull has to concede the obvious: this is a single-customer business, and no amount of margin makes that not true. The counter is narrow but real. The concentration is the price of being the incumbent inside the highest-volume consumer hardware platform in the world, and the content-per-device trend has been running in Cirrus Logic's favour, not against it.

Bear Case

The competitor list in the 10-K is long and it is not a list of small companies. Cirrus Logic names "QUALCOMM Incorporated, Realtek Semiconductor Corporation, Renesas Electronics Corporation, Shanghai Awinic Technology Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co, Ltd., Skyworks Solutions Inc., ST Microelectronics N.V., Synaptics Incorporated and Texas Instruments, Inc." among those it competes with. Several of those are order-of-magnitude larger and can price an audio codec as a rounding error inside a broader platform sale. The filing is blunt about the consequence: "As markets mature and components become commoditized, competitors that can tolerate" lower returns gain ground, and "our competitors have increasingly frequent opportunities to achieve design wins in next-generation systems" because design-in cycles keep shortening.

But the competitor that matters most is on the other side of the table. The same filing warns that if customers "were to change system architectures, develop competing technologies and integrated circuits, incorporate some of the functionality of our products into other parts of the system, or eliminate certain functionality", the business is directly exposed. Now put a number on who that customer is. The 10-K discloses one end customer, Apple Inc., buying through contract manufacturers and representing "approximately 91 percent, 89 percent, and 87 percent, of the Company's total net sales" in fiscal 2026, 2025 and 2024. The concentration is not stable at a high level. It is rising. And this particular customer has spent a decade demonstrating that it moves component functions in-house when it decides the function is strategic.

The company says so itself, in the plainest terms a risk factor allows: "most of our customers can stop incorporating our products into their own products with limited notice to us and suffer little or no penalty", and their agreements "typically do not require them to purchase a" minimum. Ninety-one percent of revenue rests on relationships with that structure.

Now connect that to what the price assumes. The market is paying roughly 11.4 times company-wide operating income and needs about 4.5% annual operating-profit growth for five years to hold. That looks undemanding, and it is, right up until the growth is not 4.5% but negative. A single lost socket at this customer does not shave a few points off the compound rate; it removes a slice of revenue in one product cycle. The price already embeds some of that erosion: it assumes operating margins settling near 14.8% over roughly a dozen years, against 24.5% today. The bear case is that the erosion arrives faster and from one decision rather than gradually from competitive drift.

The supply side offers no cushion either. The company holds "a long-term capacity reservation and wafer supply agreement with GlobalFoundries, which includes obligations to" take specified wafer volumes through the end of the current commitment period. Fixed purchase obligations against a demand stream that can stop with limited notice is the wrong shape of contract to hold in a downturn.

The frames that say the shares are cheap are all built on the trailing margin holding. The asset-value methods strip that assumption out and rest on book equity alone, and against those asset-value frames the price sits at roughly 1.6 times their central estimate. That is the honest floor: without the customer, this is a mid-size fabless designer with good engineers, and the peer group trades where it trades because most of its members earn single-digit operating margins.

Valuation

Today's price of $133.58 works out to about 11.4 times company-wide operating income, and inverting it gives a modest requirement: roughly 4.5% compound growth in operating profit over five years, on a 10.4% cost of capital. The sensitivity runs mostly through that discount rate rather than through the business, with each percentage point on the cost of capital moving the required growth by about 4.7 points. Against the wider semiconductor cohort the multiple sits in the lower half of the peer range.

The methods used to triangulate the business mostly disagree with the price in the company's favour. The peer-multiple methods put the price at roughly 0.7 times where they land, the forward-growth methods at roughly 0.8 times, and the earnings-power methods essentially level with it. Only the asset-value frames sit clearly under, with the price at roughly 1.6 times their central estimate, and that is what asset-value frames always do to a fabless designer whose main assets are intellectual property and engineers rather than book equity. The single most useful individual read is the growth-adjusted earnings method, which compares trailing earnings of $7.85 a share against the company's historical earnings growth and marks the shares undervalued on that basis. The cash-flow perpetuity method lands furthest above the price by projecting free cash flow forward at a historical growth rate; it is the most optimistic of the set and should be treated as the ceiling of the range rather than the middle of it.

There is a quieter assumption inside the price that deserves to be said out loud. The engine's read implies operating margins drifting down toward about 14.8% over roughly a dozen years, against a trailing 24.5% today. In other words, the market is not paying for the current margin to persist. It is paying for a slow decline toward something closer to the peer group, and the shares are priced accordingly.

The filed inputs underneath are strong and specific. The FY2026 10-K reports "gross margin for fiscal year 2026 was 52.8 percent" and fiscal 2026 cash flow from operations of $650.6 million. The same document discloses that one end customer, Apple Inc., represented "approximately 91 percent, 89 percent, and 87 percent, of the Company's total net sales" across the last three fiscal years, and that the board authorized "$500 million in share repurchases" in March 2025, funded from existing cash.

Cohort position explains most of the multiple. Cirrus Logic's 24.5% trailing operating margin is roughly double SWKS at 9.1%, MCHP at 10.4% and ON at 10.0%, and better than MTSI at 16.0%. A business earning twice the cohort margin trading in the lower half of the cohort multiple range is a straightforward statement about how the market weighs customer concentration against profitability. The balance sheet does not complicate the picture: the filing records "no amounts outstanding under the Revolving Credit Facility", and the share count has fallen about 2.8% a year since 2021, so the buyback is showing up where it cannot be faked.

Catalysts

First-quarter fiscal 2027 results are scheduled for August 5, 2026, and the company issued its notice of the report on July 14, 2026. The comparison base is a strong one: Cirrus Logic closed fiscal 2026 on May 6, 2026 with fourth-quarter revenue of $448.5 million and record full-year revenue of $2.0 billion.

The most consequential development is upstream of the income statement. On March 26, 2026, Apple named Cirrus Logic among the suppliers added to its US manufacturing program. For a company that books roughly 91 percent of sales through that one end customer and reports international sales at "99" percent of net sales, a formal place in the customer's domestic manufacturing plans is the closest thing available to a signal about the durability of the relationship, and it speaks to the concentration risk more directly than any product announcement would.

Two smaller items fill in the diversification story. On May 28, 2026 the company introduced nine new audio converters aimed at a wider range of platforms and price points, which is the kind of catalogue broadening that supports selling outside the anchor customer. On July 23, 2026 it announced a Scottish Enterprise grant to advance smart energy work, a small figure in isolation but consistent with the stated push to move beyond audio into adjacent mixed-signal applications.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Cirrus Logic (whole company) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2026 Form 10-K, filed May 21, 2026 · company announcement, July 14, 2026 · Q4 FY2026 earnings release, May 6, 2026 · Apple announcement, March 26, 2026 · company product announcement, May 28, 2026 · company announcement, July 23, 2026

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