Carter's, Inc. (CRI): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers Carter's, Inc. (CRI) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CRI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCRI
CompanyCarter's, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$33.55/sh
CompositionBaby 43% / Playclothes 32% / Sleepwear 12% / Other 13%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.8%
Operating margin today9.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.7pp
Multiple paid6x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 6.5% sits below it).

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.30σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)3

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.58x5justifies
Earnings0.47x5justifies
Relative0.34x2justifies
Growth0.95x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.1%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$69.190.48xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 5.2x / 7.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 15.72x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 6x), scenarios: 13.2x / 15.7x / 18.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10.49x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$35.260.95xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$57.460.58xyesBV/sh $27.98, ROE (TTM) 19.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$81.360.41xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$25.021.34xyesRev $3.0B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.3x / 0.4x / 0.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$64.200.52xyesEPS $5.35, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.15 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$110.150.30xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.31B × (1−23%) / WACC 5.1% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$79.820.42xyesBV $27.98 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$58.040.58xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.35 × BVPS $27.98) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.34B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$71.820.47xyesFCF $293.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$68.080.49xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.28B (FCF $0.29B − SBC $0.01B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$172.630.19xyesEPS $5.35 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$38.000.88xyesBV $27.98 × (ROIC 6.9% / WACC 5.1%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.98B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$200.630.17xyesEPS $5.35 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$57.840.58xyesEPS $5.35 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
U.S. Retailoperatingenterprise1466.1B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
U.S. Wholesaleoperatingenterprise1001.3B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$85.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.40x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.30x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (buyback)-2.5%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the case against. American families are having fewer children, the quarterly dividend was cut from 80 cents to 25 cents, and import tariffs are chewing through the gross margin. Every one of those is true. None of them describes what the business actually did in its most recent quarter.

Net sales rose 8.1% to 681.1 million dollars in the first quarter of fiscal 2026, with all three segments growing, and the U.S. Retail stores and websites posted a fourth consecutive quarter of positive comparable net sales growth at 10.5%. That is not a business losing its customer. Traffic responded to marketing spend, average unit retail rose alongside volume, and the International arm swung from a small operating loss a year earlier to 4.2 million dollars of segment operating income across 191 stores in Canada and 64 in Mexico.

The reason demand holds up is worth sitting with, because it is unusual for an apparel company. Clothing brands normally live and die on taste, and taste in a two-year-old is exercised by a tired adult buying something that has to survive a washing machine twice a week. Carter's owns that decision. The 10-K puts its position at approximately 21% in the zero to two-year-old baby market and roughly 9% across ages zero to 10, and it reaches that customer through channels that compete with each other: company stores and websites on one side, exclusive brands sold at Amazon, Target and Walmart on the other. A parent who abandons the mall does not necessarily abandon the brand. They just buy it somewhere else, and Carter's still books the sale.

Management describes the strategy in the filing as being Direct-to-consumer first, leaning on a platform that No other children's apparel company combines our scale and capabilities across retail stores, eCommerce. Self-description in a 10-K is worth what it usually is, but the channel arithmetic behind it is real: replenishment basics through mass retail partners, higher-margin full-price selling through owned channels, and a credit card program run by a third party that carries the underwriting risk while Carter's collects royalties on usage.

On capital, the bull has to accept a concession and then look at what it bought. The dividend cut and the pause in buybacks were not gestures of confidence. They were the price of refinancing into a higher coupon while profits were down. What they preserved is a balance sheet with cash covering most of the debt outstanding and guided operating cash flow of 110 to 120 million dollars against 55 million dollars of capital spending for the year. A company that keeps its options open in a bad year gets to see the good one.

And the good one has a specific shape. Management expects the tariff and investment drag to moderate through the year, with earnings weighted to the second half. If that happens, the operating margin recovers toward the level this business sustains across a full cycle, and today's price is anchored to a year that will read as the trough rather than the trend.

Bear Case

Carter's does not make anything. We source all of our products from a global network of third-party suppliers, which means the single biggest variable in its profit line is set by governments rather than by management. In the first quarter of fiscal 2026, incremental tariff-related costs hit cost of goods sold by approximately 50 million dollars, average unit costs climbed by a low-teens percentage, and consolidated gross margin fell 310 basis points to 43.1%. For scale, the entire company produced 28.4 million dollars of operating profit that quarter. The tariff line was larger than the earnings line, and the only reason the margin held at all was that the company raised prices on parents.

That last point is the fragile part. Pricing works until it does not, and this is the value end of a discretionary category. The 10-K's own risk language names the exposure precisely: our ability to recover refunds of incremental tariff amounts or other tariff amounts paid sits on the list of things that could go the other way, and the fiscal 2026 outlook treats any such refunds as a possibility rather than a plan.

Now connect that to what the price is leaning on. Today's price is measured against a full-cycle operating margin near 11% of sales. Fiscal 2025 delivered 5.0%, down 400 basis points on the prior year, on operating income of 143.9 million dollars against 254.7 million a year earlier and 323.4 million the year before that. Three years, one direction. If the through-the-cycle figure is a memory rather than a mean, the methods that make this stock look inexpensive lose the base they stand on, and what is left is a company earning a mid-single-digit margin in a category where BKE earns 21.1% and ANF earns 13.0%.

The customer list adds its own fragility. two largest wholesale customers accounted for 11.0% and 10.3%, respectively, of consolidated net sales in fiscal 2025, and roughly 83% of gross accounts receivable sat with the ten largest wholesale customers, three of them individually above 10% of the total. Those relationships run without long-term commitments. A single large retailer trimming its baby department is a revenue event that arrives all at once, and the same accounts decide whether Carter's exclusive brands get the shelf space or a competitor's private label does.

Then there is the cost of the money. In November 2025 the company redeemed 500 million dollars of 5.625% senior notes due 2027 and issued 575 million of 7.375% senior notes due February 2031, and guides to net interest expense of approximately 40 million dollars in fiscal 2026. More principal, at a higher rate, landing on a smaller operating profit. That is a fixed claim paid before shareholders see anything, and it is why the dividend went from 80 cents a quarter to 25 and the buyback stopped. Management chose the lenders over the owners, which is the correct choice and also a statement about how much room there was.

Valuation

Price the whole company against what it earns in a normal year, not last year, and Carter's changes hands at a bit over seven times mid-cycle operating profit. That is low enough to sit under what a business in steady mid-single-digit annual decline would warrant. Which is a strange thing to say about the leading brand in its category, and it is the fact everything else here circles.

The methods used to triangulate the business disagree, and the pattern of the disagreement carries more information than any single output. Peer multiples applied to the current numbers reach past today's price. The forward cash-flow approaches land essentially on it. The lenses that capitalize the cash being generated right now, crediting no growth whatsoever, sit far under it: the price is more than double where they land. The asset-value lenses, which start from book value and add the return earned on it, put the price about 37% above them. Read together, those four say the same thing in different registers. Today's price is a bet on the cycle, not on the quarter.

What has to be true is unusually easy to state. The full-cycle operating margin the price is measured against runs near 11% of sales. Fiscal 2025 came in at 5.0% and the first quarter of fiscal 2026 at 4.2%, on net sales of 2.898 billion dollars for the fiscal year just closed. Roughly half the profitability the valuation assumes has to come back. Not new stores, not a new category, not a bigger market. Just the margin.

Cohort position sharpens the question rather than answering it. Among peers filing their own numbers, BKE runs a 21.1% operating margin, ANF 13.0%, URBN 9.8%, GAP 8.4% and AEO 6.0%. Carter's fiscal 2025 result puts it at the bottom of that group, and the multiple the market pays reflects exactly that ranking. The argument between the peer-multiple lenses and the cash-flow lenses is really an argument about whether Carter's belongs there permanently.

Solvency is the part that is not in doubt. Cash on hand covers most of the borrowings, leaving net debt of roughly 94.1 million dollars on the funded-debt basis, and the share count has come down about 3% a year over the last four years. Guided operating cash flow of 110 to 120 million dollars comfortably clears 55 million dollars of planned capital spending and roughly 40 million of net interest. The company can wait. Whether waiting is rewarded depends on a margin recovery no line on the balance sheet can produce.

Catalysts

The first quarter of fiscal 2026, reported May 6, 2026, was the clearest read on the tariff question so far. Net sales grew 8.1% to 681.1 million dollars with all three segments up, U.S. Retail comparable sales rose 10.5%, and operating income improved to 28.4 million dollars from 26.1 million, though the prior-year quarter carried leadership transition and restructuring costs that did not repeat. Diluted earnings came to $0.39 a share against $0.43 a year earlier, and the company paid a quarterly dividend of $0.25 totalling 9.2 million dollars with no shares repurchased.

Leadership changed hands in June. Sharon Price John, who ran Build-A-Bear Workshop since 2016 and before that led the Stride Rite children's business, took over as chief executive and president effective June 15, 2026, ending an interim arrangement under the finance chief. The board reaffirmed the fiscal 2026 outlook alongside that announcement, which matters more than the usual reassurance: a chief executive who inherits guidance rather than resetting it has less room to rebase expectations in her first year.

The outlook itself is where the next few quarters get decided. For fiscal 2026 the company projects low-to-mid single-digit percentage growth in net sales against 2.898 billion dollars in fiscal 2025, operating cash flow of 110 to 120 million dollars, capital spending of 55 million, net interest expense of approximately 40 million reflecting the refinanced notes, an effective tax rate near 22%, and average shares outstanding of roughly 36 million. Earnings are weighted to the second half on the expectation that tariff and investment costs ease. The second-quarter report is the first test of that assumption, and a first half that lands as planned would leave the whole recovery riding on the two reports that follow.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

U.S. Retail (reported)

U.S. Wholesale (reported)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

FY2025 Form 10-K · Q1 FY2026 Form 10-Q · Form 8-K, May 1, 2026; Q1 FY2026 earnings release, May 6, 2026 · Q1 FY2026 earnings release, May 6, 2026 · Form 8-K, May 1, 2026

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