CONOCOPHILLIPS (COP): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $130.35, CONOCOPHILLIPS (COP) is priced for -3.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/COP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCOP
CompanyCONOCOPHILLIPS
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$130.35/sh
CompositionAlaska 12% / Lower 48 88%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.7%
Operating margin today23.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-19.4pp
Implied growth-3.6%
Multiple paid11x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 48 peers)35

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by earnings-power and growth-DCF value, while relative-multiple lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.31x4expensive
Earnings0.94x3justifies
Relative1.58x2expensive
Growth0.96x4justifies

Families that justify the price: Earnings, Growth Families that call it expensive: Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$382.500.34xyesFCF base $21.9B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$188.240.69xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.7x / 12.7x / 17.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 12.06x (blended: static sector reference 10x + trailing (TTM) 17x), scenarios: 9.0x / 12.1x / 14.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 8.02x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$70.451.85xyesStage 1: 7% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$83.531.56xyesBV/sh $54.40, ROE (TTM) 14.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$102.401.27xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$106.541.22xyesRev $63.3B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.9x / 2.5x / 3.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$90.841.43xyesEPS $7.57, growth 7% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.52 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$105.631.23xyesBV $54.40 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$96.261.35xyes√(22.5 × EPS $7.57 × BVPS $54.40) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $11.80B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$202.390.64xyesFCF $21925.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$138.750.94xyesEPS $7.57 × (8.5 + 2×6.7%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $63.34B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$75.911.72xyesEPS $7.57 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 6.7% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 10.0x
Earnings YieldEarnings$81.841.59xyesEPS $7.57 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Alaskaoperatingenterprise$5.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Lower 48operatingenterprise$41.4bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$15.6b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.65x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.07x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.6%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Valuing an oil producer is a different exercise from valuing almost any other business, and the difference is worth stating before any number appears. Conoco does not set the price of what it sells. That is decided by OPEC Plus quotas, by Chinese industrial demand, by a drone strike nobody forecast. What management controls is three things: what it costs to lift a barrel, how quickly it can stop spending when the price falls, and what it does with the money when the price is high. Judge the company on those three and the picture is a good deal steadier than the commodity underneath it.

Start with the ability to stop. In the first quarter of 2026 the company reinvested $2.9 billion, and the filing notes that over half of that spending related to flexible, short-cycle unconventional assets. Short-cycle means a well that pays back in months rather than a platform that pays back in decades, which in practice means the capital programme can be cut without stranding anything half-finished. That optionality is the single most valuable structural feature a producer can own in a cycle it cannot predict.

The long-cycle bet sits at the other end of the portfolio, in Alaska, and it is progressing. The 10-Q reports a successful Willow winter construction season with project achieving 50% completion. Alaska is a small share of revenue today, and the barrels realized there fetched 81.77 dollars each in the first quarter against 76.58 dollars a year earlier, a premium to the company's other crude streams. A project that is half built is also half paid for.

What happens to the money is where this company has been unusually explicit. The 10-K commits to a return of capital framework consisting of a growing, sustainable ordinary dividend and share repurchases, sized to hand back more than 30 percent of operating cash flow. In the first quarter of 2026 that meant $2.0 billion, split evenly between buybacks and the ordinary dividend, with the quarterly ordinary payment declared at $0.84 per common share.

The buyback is not cosmetic. Weighted-average diluted shares came to 1,225 million in the first quarter of 2026 against 1,275 million a year earlier, on the company's own filed count. Roughly one share in twenty-five disappeared in twelve months. And the starting valuation is undemanding: the market is paying about 11 times the pre-tax profit produced over the last twelve months, a level that embeds profits shrinking rather than growing from here. For a business that has just told you it can cut spending in months, that is a low bar to clear.

Bear Case

Look at where the money actually went last quarter, because the capital allocation arithmetic does not balance. Operating cash flow was $4.3 billion. Capital spending took $2.9 billion. Shareholder returns took another $2.0 billion. The two outflows together exceed what came in, and the difference has to come from somewhere: the balance sheet already carries $15.9 billion of net debt against $22.3 billion of gross borrowings, with only $6.4 billion of liquid assets on hand. Management's own framework promises more than 30 percent of operating cash flow back to shareholders. Last quarter it was closer to half. That is a promise sized for a better oil price than the one currently on the screen.

The dividend history shows how this is supposed to resolve, and it is not painless. The company pays an ordinary dividend plus a variable supplemental payment, and that variable part has already been cut hard: $2.50 per share in 2023, then $0.60 in 2024. The ordinary dividend has been held and raised, at $0.84 a quarter most recently, but the total distribution is designed to breathe with the commodity. Investors who read the recent headline distribution as a floor have misread the structure. The variable piece is the shock absorber, and it absorbs by getting smaller.

Underneath that, the commodity is doing what it does. The 10-K describes crude in 2025 as volatile, driven by forces that slowed global oil demand growth concurrent with higher oil production from OPEC Plus and other major oil producing countries. First-quarter earnings came in at $1.78 a share against $2.23 a year earlier. Neither number is a disaster; the direction is the point, and it is the direction that determines whether the payout stays where it is.

Geopolitics adds a second layer, and the company is leaning into it rather than away. Second-quarter production guidance excludes Qatar entirely because of the Middle East conflict, which is an explicit admission that some barrels are outside management's control. At the same time, on July 17, 2026 the company agreed to take a 42% interest in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk to support redevelopment of an Iraqi oilfield. Removing Qatari volumes from a forecast while committing capital in Iraq is a coherent strategy for a company that thinks in decades. It is a wider risk distribution than the share price alone conveys.

On valuation, the pattern is unambiguous. The discounted cash-flow methods are the only ones that reach today's price. Everything anchored on the balance sheet or on what comparable producers fetch lands well below: the price sits roughly 67% above where the asset-value methods land and roughly 97% above the peer-multiple methods. What bounds the fall is not the earnings but the assets around them. The company holds roughly $8.8 billion of equity interests outside its producing segments, close to 6% of its market value, which is a real floor under a bad year even if it is a small one relative to the whole.

Valuation

Today's $120.29 works out to roughly 11 times the pre-tax profit the business produced over the last twelve months, and inverting that gives an embedded assumption of about -2.4% annual profit growth for the next five years. Read that twice, because it is unusual. The market is not paying for growth here. It is paying for gentle decline, which for a company selling a commodity near the upper end of a volatile range is a coherent thing to price. The interesting question is not whether the assumption is aggressive. It is whether gentle decline is gentle enough.

The rarity read comes back quiet on both references. Against ConocoPhillips's own record, the pace sits within what it has recently delivered, and any stretch is in how long it must persist rather than how fast anything must move. Against the sector, the multiple sits in the lower half of the peer range. The overall assumption reads as broadly consistent with plausible outcomes, which is a rarer verdict in this corpus than the arithmetic might suggest.

The methods disagree sharply, and the disagreement is about which base year is real. The cash-flow methods are the only ones that reach the price; the peer-multiple methods put it about 97% above where they land, and the asset-value methods about 67% above. That spread is exactly what a cyclical produces when trailing profits sit above the mid-cycle level: methods that capitalize the trailing year read the price as expensive, and methods that discount a stream of future years read it as fair. Neither is wrong. They are answering different questions, and for a commodity producer the honest position is that the answer depends on where in the cycle these barrels were sold.

Peer economics frame the point. EOG Resources (EOG) runs a 29.8% operating margin on $23.9 billion of revenue, Occidental (OXY) turns a 23.6% profit margin on $20.3 billion, and Devon (DVN) 13.2% on $17.1 billion. At the integrated end, Exxon Mobil (XOM) converts $334.2 billion of revenue into a 7.6% profit margin and Chevron (CVX) $190.0 billion into 5.8%. ConocoPhillips, on roughly $58.2 billion of revenue, is structurally closer to the pure producers than to the refiners, which means its results swing harder with the crude price and are not cushioned by a downstream business that does better when oil is cheap.

The balance sheet is neither a strength nor a problem. Net debt of $15.9 billion against gross borrowings of $22.3 billion is ordinary for a producer of this size, and the maturity ladder is long, running out to notes due 2045. Depreciation, depletion and amortization of $2.9 billion in a single quarter is the more revealing figure: this is a business that consumes its own asset base and must spend continuously to stand still. That is why the capital programme, not the payout, is the line that determines what the next five years look like.

Catalysts

The next scheduled event is second-quarter results on August 6, 2026, and the guidance around it has already been reset. The company put second-quarter production at 2.185 to 2.215 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and the full year at 2.295 to 2.325 million, with Qatar excluded from the forecast given uncertainty surrounding the conflict in the Middle East. A guidance range that carves out a producing country is unusual and tells you where management's uncertainty actually sits.

Two developments cut in opposite directions on that same theme. The Alaskan long-cycle project reached 50% completion after the winter construction season, moving a large capital commitment past its halfway mark and closer to the point where it produces rather than consumes. Meanwhile, on July 17, 2026, the company agreed to acquire a 42% interest in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk as part of a broader set of investments in Iraqi oilfield redevelopment announced at the U.S.-Iraq Business Summit. One adds barrels in the most politically stable jurisdiction the company operates in; the other adds them in one of the least.

The income story continues on its declared cadence. A second-quarter ordinary dividend of $0.84 per common share has been declared, and the annual dividend rate stands at $3.36 a share for a yield near 2.8% at the current price. Analyst positioning has drifted up with the oil price rather than ahead of it: Susquehanna raised its target to $155 from $152 on July 24 while maintaining a positive rating.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Alaska / Lower 48 (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

press reports of the U.S.-Iraq Business Summit, July 17, 2026 · company earnings calendar, July 2026 · press reports, July 17, 2026 · company dividend declarations, 2026 · Susquehanna research note, July 24, 2026

View the full interactive COP report on boothcheck