COHU INC (COHU): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $52.44, COHU INC (COHU) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~35.2 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/COHU

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCOHU
CompanyCOHU INC
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$52.44/sh
CompositionSystems-Semiconductor Test & Inspection 40% / Non-systems-Semiconductor Test & Inspection 60%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Trailing margin (depressed year)-6.9%
Must persist for35.2y
Multiple paid628x mid-cycle operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 11.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.28σ

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.38x2expensive
Earnings9.33x1expensive
Relative1.90x2expensive
Growth1.08x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=8)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$35.371.48xyesFCF base $0.0B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.2%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$27.601.90xyesP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$16.363.21xyesBook value floor: BV/sh $16.36, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$14.733.56xyesBook value with convergence: BV/sh $16.36, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$71.780.73xyesRev $0.5B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.8x / 4.7x / 5.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowth$48.441.08xyesMargin ramp: -7% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered)
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.9356.38xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.2% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarnings$5.629.33xyesFCF $34.9M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.13403.37xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.01B (FCF $0.03B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.051048.76xyesBV $16.36 × (ROIC 0.0% / WACC 8.2%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$27.601.90xyesRevenue $0.52B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Semiconductor Test & Inspectionoperatingenterprise0.5B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$183.1m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-55.74x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-44.03x (net cash)
Interest coverage0.8x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.8%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 0.8%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The market is pricing Cohu as a company that lost money last year, because it did. What the recent filings actually show is a business climbing out of a trough with a different revenue mix than it went in with.

Start with the mix, because it is the part that does not reverse when the cycle turns again. In fiscal 2025 the company reported systems including kits at 40% of net sales and recurring revenues at 60%, where Recurring revenues include interface products, spares, kits (not as part of system sales), software and services. Three years earlier the split was the other way around. That matters because interface products wear out. Test contactors and sockets are consumed by the act of testing chips, so their sales track how many devices customers run rather than how many machines they buy, and the company says as much: test interface is a key contributor to our recurring revenue. Capital equipment revenue arrives in lumps tied to customer capex decisions. Consumables arrive every quarter someone's fab is busy.

The trajectory underneath is improving faster than the annual figures suggest. Fiscal 2025 net sales increased 12.7%, year-over-year, to $453.0 million. Then the first quarter of fiscal 2026 delivered $125.1 million against $96.8 million in the comparable quarter, with non-systems revenue of $75.7 million and systems of $49.4 million, and the loss from operations narrowing to $11.2 million from $27.3 million. Management attributes the shift to a specific end market, writing that net sales benefited from increased customer activity associated with AI-driven computing applications, which helped to offset ongoing weakness in automotive, industrial, and consumer-focused markets. Two of the company's three demand engines are still stalled. The revenue line is growing at nearly thirty percent anyway.

Operating leverage in this industry is severe in both directions, which is the bull's central mechanic. Cohu's cost base carried a loss at -28.2% of sales a year ago and an 8.9% loss on 29% more revenue one year later, without a corresponding jump in spending. The scaled names in the same cohort show where that curve goes: TER runs a 26.5% operating margin on $3.79 billion of revenue growing 30.3%, and CGNX converts 18.8% of $1.05 billion into operating profit. Even the mid-sized comparables clear the line, with ONTO at a 10.0% operating margin and FORM at 8.4%. None of those companies has a structurally different cost problem than Cohu; they have more volume running through the same kind of factory.

The balance sheet bought the company time to get there. In September 2025 Cohu issued $287.5 million of 1.50% convertible senior notes due 2031, used part of the proceeds to make a $29.3 million cash repayment retiring the remaining principal of its Term Loan Credit Facility, and finished the first quarter of fiscal 2026 holding $488.7 million of cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments. A 1.5% coupon on money that does not come due until 2031 is close to the cheapest financing a mid-cap industrial can get, and it removed the secured lender who would have had the most leverage during a downturn.

Bear Case

Here is the fact a holder has to sit with: measured across the whole cycle rather than at any single point in it, this business earns almost nothing. The through-the-cycle operating margin works out to roughly 0.8% of sales. Not 0.8 points below peers. Zero point eight percent, full stop, on a business that has been buying, integrating and restructuring for years. The trailing figure is worse, at about -14.4%, and that one is genuinely a trough reading. The problem is that the normalized number, the one meant to strip the trough out, is barely positive.

Compare that with the cohort and the gap is not subtle. TER converts 26.5% of revenue into operating profit and CGNX 18.8%. Further down the size scale it still holds: KLIC earns a 6.7% operating margin and FORM 8.4%, both on revenue bases under a billion dollars, so scale alone does not explain the difference. Cohu's own annual report offers part of the answer, describing a market that is relatively small in terms of worldwide market size compared to other segments of the semiconductor equipment industry, has several participants resulting in intense competitive pricing pressures. Intense pricing pressure in a small addressable market is a structural ceiling on margin, not a phase.

The cyclicality is not a background risk here either; it is the operating condition. The filing does not hedge: The semiconductor industry is highly cyclical and unpredictable. It goes further, noting that Sudden demand changes in business conditions, positive or negative, are common in our industry but the timing of such changes is very difficult to anticipate. A business converting a quarter of its revenue into operating profit can absorb a demand air pocket. One converting under a single percentage point of it through the cycle cannot, and the fiscal 2025 restructuring charges are the evidence of what the last one cost.

Now put the price against that. Every family of valuation method lands below today's quote. The methods that credit forward growth come closest, sitting about 27% under the price. Peer multiples land near half of it. The asset lens, working from book value of $16.36 a share, reaches under a third of the price, and the earnings-power methods, which capitalize normalized profit with no growth credited, land furthest away of all. That last one is the tell: when a method that simply capitalizes a company's own normalized earnings finishes that far below the market price, the market is not paying for the earnings. It is paying for the earnings that are supposed to arrive later.

How much later is the uncomfortable part. Working the price backwards into the growth it embeds, and treating the answer as directional rather than measured, today's quote implies the company sustains operating growth at the fastest pace it can fund from its own profits for something like 36 years. Roughly 14% of comparable fast-growers managed that pace for even a decade. The near-term rate is not the stretch; Cohu has delivered rates like that recently. The duration is the stretch, and duration is exactly what a highly cyclical industry does not supply. The remaining $287.5 million of convertible notes does not come due until 2031, so the balance sheet is not the near-term risk. The risk is that the recovery arrives, peaks, rolls over, and leaves the through-cycle margin exactly where it started.

Valuation

Two revenue lines carry this company, and they behave nothing alike. The non-systems line, which the filing groups as recurring revenue, is the larger of the two at 60% of fiscal 2025 net sales and consists of interface products, spares, kits, software and services. Test and inspection systems account for the remaining 40%, and that is the line that swings with customer capital budgets. A buyer at $50.65 is paying a systems-cycle multiple for a business that is now majority consumables.

What the price actually embeds is easier to see once the trough is removed. Trailing operating income is negative, so the useful comparison uses the company's own through-the-cycle economics, and on that basis the price works out to somewhere near 697 times normalized operating profit. That number is not a valuation so much as a symptom: when the normalized margin is 0.8%, the denominator is so thin that the multiple stops carrying information. Translated into time under a fixed cost of capital near 11%, it implies operating growth held at the 25% self-funding ceiling for roughly 36 years, with each percentage point of growth moving that horizon by about 3.9 years. Treat it as directional. The point is not the precise figure but the shape of what is required, which is a very long run of very good years starting from a very small base.

The methods disagree about the price without any of them defending it. The forward-growth approaches come nearest, sitting roughly 27% under today's quote, and they get there by projecting revenue growth in the low twenties with margins ramping from negative to positive over seven years. Peer multiples land near half the price. Book value, at $16.36 a share, supports less than a third of it. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize normalized profit and credit no growth at all, land furthest below. That ordering is the whole story: the price is defensible only by the methods that assume the recovery both happens and persists.

Solvency is the part of the picture that is genuinely comfortable. At the end of the first quarter of fiscal 2026 Cohu held $488.7 million of cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments, against roughly 315 million dollars of funded borrowings, leaving about 174 million dollars more liquid assets than debt on that basis. Counting lease obligations alongside the borrowings narrows the surplus considerably, but the direction does not flip into distress either way. The largest borrowing, $287.5 million of 1.50% convertible notes, matures in 2031. There is no refinancing wall in front of this recovery.

Which leaves one measurable thing standing between the balance sheet and the price. The first quarter of fiscal 2026 took the operating loss from 28.2% of sales to 8.9% on 29% more revenue. Two or three more quarters of that arithmetic put the company somewhere near the margins its cohort already earns; a stalled cycle leaves the through-cycle figure near where it has been.

Catalysts

The most recent hard datapoint is the first quarter of fiscal 2026, reported for the period ended March 28, 2026. Net sales of $125.1 million compared with $96.8 million in the same quarter a year earlier, and the loss from operations narrowed to $11.2 million from $27.3 million. Both revenue lines participated: systems of $49.4 million against $35.6 million, and non-systems of $75.7 million against $61.2 million.

The demand driver is named in the filing and it is narrow. Management wrote that net sales benefited from increased customer activity associated with AI-driven computing applications, which helped to offset ongoing weakness in automotive, industrial, and consumer-focused markets. That is a single end market carrying the recovery while the company's traditional bases stay soft. Automotive test demand turning back up would be additive rather than substitutive, and it is the swing factor most likely to change the shape of the next several quarters.

One quieter change is worth tracking. In the first quarter of fiscal 2026 no individual customer accounted for more than 10% of net sales, where a year earlier one customer represented 11%. In a business that has historically depended on a small number of buyers, a broadening base slightly reduces the risk that one customer's capital budget sets the quarter, though it also means no single relationship is now large enough to drive a step change on its own.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Semiconductor Test & Inspection (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Cohu FY2025 Form 10-K, filed February 17, 2026 · Cohu Q1 FY2026 Form 10-Q, filed May 1, 2026

View the full interactive COHU report on boothcheck