CNX Resources Corporation (CNX): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers CNX Resources Corporation (CNX) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CNX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCNX
CompanyCNX Resources Corporation
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$37.49/sh
CompositionNatural Gas Revenue 78% / NGL Revenue 8% / Oil/Condensate Revenue 0% / Purchased Gas Revenue 2% / Gain (Loss) on Commodity Derivative Instruments 4% / Other Revenue and Operating Income 8%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid37x mid-cycle operating income

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.46x4justifies
Earnings0.55x3justifies
Relative0.33x2justifies
Growth0.60x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$191.250.20xyesFCF base $0.5B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.9%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$62.640.60xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 9.0x / 14.0x / 19.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 7.5x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 8.39x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$69.380.54xyesBV/sh $32.74, ROE (TTM) 19.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$99.900.38xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$54.400.69xyesRev $2.6B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 2.1x / 2.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$75.480.50xyesEPS $6.29, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.25 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$97.180.39xyesBV $32.74 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$68.070.55xyes√(22.5 × EPS $6.29 × BVPS $32.74) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.57B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$22.581.66xyesFCF $526.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$202.960.18xyesEPS $6.29 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $2.60B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$235.880.16xyesEPS $6.29 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$68.000.55xyesEPS $6.29 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Shaleoperatingenterprise$1.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Coalbed Methane (CBM)operatingenterprise$148.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (buyback)-9.0%
Burning cashno

Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.

Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Land is the part of this business nobody puts on a slide. CNX has operated in southwestern Pennsylvania and West Virginia long enough to hold the surface as well as the gas beneath it, and the 10-K puts that first among the things it thinks it does better than the next operator: low-cost operations and legacy surface acreage position provide us with significant competitive advantages that position us for long-term value creation. Surface rights are unglamorous. They are also what decides whether a well pad costs what the plan said it would, because a producer who has to negotiate for every location pays for the privilege in money and in calendar time.

That matters more here than in most extractive businesses, because Appalachia does not reward size the way the Permian does. The filing is blunt about the shape of the contest: competition among producers is based primarily on acreage position, drilling and operating costs. There is no volume discount to win. EQT reported 10.3 billion dollars of trailing revenue and EXE 14.3 billion, against CNX at roughly 2.9 billion, and none of that gap converts into a structural cost edge for the bigger names in a basin where the wells are drilled one lease at a time. The Coalbed Methane segment carries depletion of 85 cents per Mcfe, and its depreciation, depletion and amortization ran 60 million dollars in both 2025 and 2024, which is what a mature, low-decline asset looks like on an income statement: expensive to buy once, cheap to keep.

Capital allocation is where the story gets unusual. CNX has not paid a common dividend since 2016. Everything goes to buying its own shares back, and the effect is visible in the one place it cannot be faked: the share count has fallen about 5.4% a year over the four years to March 2026. Cumulative repurchase authorization reached 2.9 billion dollars, of which roughly 0.4 billion remained at the end of 2025, and on January 29, 2026 the board added another 2.0 billion, restoring about 2.4 billion of headroom. A management team that keeps retiring stock rather than announcing a dividend is making a statement about where it thinks the value is, and it has been making it for years rather than for a quarter.

There is a second revenue line that most gas producers do not have. CNX sells environmental attributes, which the filing lists as carbon credits, air quality credits, renewable or alternative energy credits, methane capture credits, methane performance certificates, emission reductions, offsets and/or allowances. Capturing methane that would otherwise vent from legacy coal workings is an activity the company was going to perform anyway; being paid separately for it turns a compliance cost into a margin line. It is a modest slice of the whole, and its pricing depends on policy that changes with administrations, but it is genuine incremental cash off assets already owned.

Against all of that sits the most striking feature of the current price: every family of method used to triangulate this business lands above it. Peer multiples sit closest, the asset-value approaches furthest, and the cash-flow approaches in between. The bear will point out, fairly, that the trailing earnings feeding several of those methods were helped by the hedge book reversing. That concession is real. What it does not touch is the acreage, the low-decline coalbed base, or a share count that has shrunk every year regardless of which way gas prices went.

Bear Case

Repurchasing stock is the entire capital-return policy here, and the balance sheet funding it keeps no slack whatsoever. At the close of 2025 the company held under one million dollars of cash and equivalents; the revolving facility does the work an actual cash balance would do at most companies. Then look at the order of events. On January 29, 2026 the board added 2.0 billion dollars to the repurchase authorization. A month later, on February 26, 2026, CNX closed a 500 million dollar senior notes offering. Retiring equity with term debt is a legitimate choice. It is also a leveraged bet on the realized gas price over the life of those notes, made by the same people whose compensation moves with the share count they are shrinking.

The price makes that bet specific. At 34.25 dollars the market is paying roughly 37 times a mid-cycle year of operating income, and that multiple only resolves if operating growth stays pinned at the company's self-funding ceiling for about five years. The rate itself is not exotic; CNX has delivered it recently. The duration is the ask. Of comparable fast growers, only about a third held that pace for anything like five years. If growth fades on the ordinary schedule instead, the multiple has to come down to whatever a cyclical Appalachian gas producer normally commands, and nothing about the acreage position prevents that arithmetic from running.

Why it might fade is not mysterious, and the 10-K says it plainly in its own risk language: Prices for natural gas and NGLs are volatile and can fluctuate widely based upon a number of factors beyond our control, including supply and demand for our products. The consequence is spelled out one line later: If natural gas prices decrease or operational efforts are unsuccessful, CNX may be required to record write-downs of the quantity and value of our proved natural gas properties. Reserve write-downs are not merely accounting. They shrink the borrowing base that the revolver, and therefore the buyback, depends on.

Two structural exposures compound that. The company has committed to firm transportation and processing agreements many of which have minimum volume delivery commitments that obligate us to pay fixed demand charges or fees on minimum volumes regardless of actual volume throughput, which converts a variable-cost business into a partly fixed-cost one exactly when volumes fall. And the customer base is narrow: in 2025, sales to Citadel Energy Marketing LLC and to NRG Business Marketing LLC each exceeded 10% of revenue from contracts with external customers. Two marketers carrying that much of the book is a negotiating position, not a moat.

Finally, the earnings that make the stock look inexpensive deserve a closer read. In the first quarter of 2025 the commodity derivative line took a 528 million dollar loss; a year later the same line was slightly positive. Across full-year 2025 the unrealized mark was a 278 million dollar gain, against an unrealized loss of 453 million the year before. None of that is production. It is the value of contracts that will settle later, marked today, and it flows straight through the top line of a company whose trailing profit is currently the argument for owning it. The debt behind the buyback, by contrast, does not get marked back. An aggregate principal amount of $600 million of 7.25% Senior Notes due March 2032 sits in the stack alongside a current portion of long-term debt at 208 million dollars, and those coupons are paid in cash in every gas price environment.

Valuation

Two honest readings of this company point in opposite directions, and the hedge book is why. That disagreement, not any single figure, is what a buyer at today's price is actually adjudicating.

Start with what the price assumes. At 34.25 dollars the market is paying roughly 37 times a mid-cycle year of operating income, and the only way that resolves is if operating growth holds at the company's self-funding ceiling for about five years. The calculation sits on a 7.94% cost of capital, and it is sensitive in a particular way: shifting the assumed growth rate by a single percentage point moves the required run by years rather than months, which makes this a bet on duration more than on pace. Measured against CNX's own record, the pace is within reach. Measured against how such runs usually end, it is not comfortable: only about a third of comparable fast growers sustained that level for anything close to five years. The bet the price makes is on persistence.

Now the other reading. Every family of method lands above the current price. The peer-multiple approaches sit nearest to it, the asset-value approaches furthest above, with the cash-flow methods in between. That is the profile of a value-supported name rather than a growth bet, and it is not a subtle pattern; nothing in the standard toolkit calls this price a stretch on trailing figures.

The two readings can both be right because they run on different bases. The static lenses take trailing GAAP results as given, including book value per share of $28.86 and trailing earnings per share of $7.50, both measured through a year in which the derivative book reversed hard in the company's favour. The through-the-cycle read averages the years when hedges pay with the years when they cost, and lands somewhere considerably less flattering. Neither basis is dishonest. A reader has to decide which one describes the cash CNX will actually collect, and the peer cohort suggests humility: OVV posted a 5.1% trailing operating margin over the same window in which EQT posted 46.6%, a spread far too wide to be explained by drilling skill.

Solvency does not offer a cushion so much as a constraint. There is no meaningful cash balance to fall back on, and the funded debt stack carries an aggregate $600 million of 7.25% Senior Notes due March 2032 plus a current portion of long-term debt at 208 million dollars, with a further 500 million dollar notes issue closed in February 2026. The offset is that the share count has fallen about 5.4% a year for four years, which is the same capital doing double duty: every dollar of cash flow directed at the buyback is a dollar not building liquidity, and every retired share raises what the remaining holders own of the acreage. That trade is the position. What it is not is a margin of error if gas prices go against the borrowing base.

Catalysts

The next scheduled information event is second-quarter 2026 results, which the company will report at 6:45 a.m. Eastern on July 30, 2026. The line worth reading first is not the headline profit but the split between gas actually sold and the derivative mark, because the first quarter of 2026 demonstrated how far apart those two can travel in a single period. A print where produced-gas revenue carries the quarter is a materially different signal from one where the hedge book does.

The financing side has already moved this year. CNX closed a 500 million dollar senior notes offering on February 26, 2026, roughly a month after the board raised the repurchase authorization by 2.0 billion dollars on January 29, leaving about 2.4 billion available. Taken together, the company is funding a shrinking share count with term borrowing rather than accumulated cash, and the pace of repurchases disclosed alongside the July results is the cleanest read on how committed management is to continuing that. Watch the borrowing base too: it was increased in May 2025, and it is the mechanism through which a weaker gas strip would reach the buyback first.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Shale (reported)

Coalbed Methane (CBM) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

CNX Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2026 · CNX press release, July 6, 2026; CNX FY2025 Form 10-K · CNX FY2025 Form 10-K · CNX press release, February 26, 2026 · CNX FY2025 Form 10-K, segment note · CNX press release, July 6, 2026

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