Core Natural Resources, Inc. (CNR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $99.62, Core Natural Resources, Inc. (CNR) is priced for +1.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/CNR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerCNR
CompanyCore Natural Resources, Inc.
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$99.62/sh
CompositionPower Generation 45% / Industrial 23% / Metallurgical 32% / Third-Party Terminal Revenue 1% / Other Revenue 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.6%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)9.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.3pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)1.9%
Implied growth1.7%
Multiple paid12x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 6: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 79 peers)15

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset4.57x5expensive
Earnings1.83x5expensive
Relative1.36x2expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$185.220.54xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.7%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$128.180.78xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 6.7x / 11.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 24.61x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 49x), scenarios: 18.5x / 24.6x / 29.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 8x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$21.814.57xyesBV/sh $74.92, ROE (TTM) 2.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$12.767.81xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$144.550.69xyesRev $4.3B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.9x / 1.2x / 1.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$70.701.41xyesEPS $2.02, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.41 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$15.946.25xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.07B × (1−12%) / WACC 8.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$9.4110.59xyesBV $74.92 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$58.351.71xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.02 × BVPS $74.92) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.72B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$57.891.72xyesFCF $259.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$54.501.83xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.24B (FCF $0.26B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$65.181.53xyesEPS $2.02 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$32.343.08xyesBV $74.92 × (ROIC 3.8% / WACC 8.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $4.27B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$75.751.32xyesEPS $2.02 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$21.844.56xyesEPS $2.02 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
High CV Thermaloperatingenterprise$2.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Metallurgicaloperatingenterprise$1.2bwithheldunresolved no unit value
PRBoperatingenterprise$718.8mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Core Marine Terminaloperatingenterprise$21.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$77.5m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.21x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.18x (net cash)
Interest coverage9.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)9.0%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 9.9%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the objection, because everyone starts with the objection. Coal-fired power in the United States is shrinking, and the 10-K does not pretend otherwise, noting that federal and state mandates for renewable generation "could also affect demand for our coal" and that retirements have fallen hardest on "older, less efficient coal-fired electric power generators". If this company were a bet on American power plants burning more coal, that would be the end of the discussion.

It is not that bet, or at least not only that bet. The revenue mix has been moving, and the direction is legible. In 2023 metallurgical customers in export markets accounted for 15% of coal revenue; in 2024, 19%; in 2025, 28%. Metallurgical coal is a steelmaking input, priced off blast furnace economics rather than off electricity demand, and roughly a third of this company's revenue now comes from that market. The Power Generation, Industrial and Metallurgical lines together with a marine terminal give it four different customer sets rather than one, and the terminal earns fees from third parties moving other people's tonnage.

Visibility is unusually good for a commodity producer. As of the end of 2025, for contracts where volumes and prices per ton were fixed or reasonably estimable, the company reported that "future estimated revenue totaled approximately $3.5 billion" and expects to "satisfy approximately 52% of these performance obligations in 2026 with the remainder thereafter". Against annual revenue near 4.2 billion dollars, that is most of a year already sold at known prices, plus a second year's worth behind it. Domestic coal contracts run a year or longer at fixed prices, which is why the cash keeps arriving through a trough.

The balance sheet is what makes waiting affordable. On a funded-debt basis the company is close to cash neutral: liquid assets of about 465 million dollars sit against roughly 455 million dollars of borrowings. Book value per share works out near 71.62 dollars, against a quote of $83.13. A cyclical trading a little above the accounting value of its own assets, with no meaningful net borrowing and a contracted order book, has a floor under it that most commodity equities do not.

Then there is the small piece almost nobody prices. The filing describes other revenue as coming from "carbon products and materials businesses led by CONSOL Innovations LLC", selling "carbon-based tools, parts and materials that are used in the aerospace and other industries". In July 2026 the Department of Energy selected that group to pursue critical mineral and material extraction from coal, and in May its composites subsidiary was named as a supplier into Northrop Grumman's YFQ-48A autonomous aircraft programme. Nothing in the current numbers depends on any of it. That is rather the point: it is free optionality sitting on top of a business valued as a melting asset.

Set against all of that, the price assumes through-the-cycle operating profit shrinks about 1.9% a year for five years. The contracted book alone covers a good part of that stretch.

Bear Case

The export franchise is the advantage that has been eroding, and the erosion is measurable rather than theoretical. Export markets supplied 71% of coal revenue in 2023, 66% in 2024 and 56% in 2025. Industrial customers abroad, historically the richest slice, supplied 40% of coal revenue in 2023, then 35% a year later, then 20%. Seaborne tonnage is where an American producer with its own marine terminal is supposed to earn a premium, and that share has narrowed in each of the last two years while domestic power generation filled the gap, reaching 37% of revenue in 2025. Domestic power is the lower quality end of the mix.

The cycle has already reached the income statement. Trailing operating margin sits at -1.2%, which is to say the company lost money at the operating line over the last twelve months. Through the cycle the same business has run near 9.9%, and every optimistic statement about the valuation depends on that second figure rather than the first. A normalized margin is a reasonable analytical tool. It is also an assumption that the past four or five years describe the next four or five, and for coal that assumption has been wrong in one direction for most of two decades.

Existing holders have already paid for growth once. The share count has risen about 10.2% a year over the four years to March 2026, most of that from the merger that created the company: the equity portion of the purchase consideration ran to roughly 2.5 billion dollars against a market value of $4.2 billion today. Combining two coal producers reduces the number of sellers into a shrinking market, which is a real benefit. It does not create demand, and the 10-K is candid that after the merger the two businesses "may not be integrated successfully", with the loss of customers, service providers and key employees named among the risks.

The demand risk has two separate clocks, and neither favours the seller. On the thermal side the filing points to renewable mandates and retirements. On the metallurgical side, which is the part the bull case leans on hardest, the filing names "electric arc furnaces or other processes that may use alternatives to coking as a reduction agent, which may limit demand" along with hydrogen-based steel production. Electric arc furnaces do not consume metallurgical coal. Every percentage point of global steel that shifts to scrap-fed production shrinks the addressable market for the segment now supplying roughly a third of revenue.

The contracted book is protection with an expiry date and a catch. The company warns that if multi-year sales contracts "are modified or terminated, if force majeure clauses are exercised, or if we are unable to replace or extend the contracts or new contracts are priced at lower levels, our profitability would be adversely affected". About half of the present book delivers during 2026. What replaces it gets priced at whatever the market pays then, and the trailing loss is a preview of what that looks like when the market is soft.

Here is the requirement in plain terms. The price implies through-the-cycle operating profit declining about 1.9% a year. That is a mild assumption if the through-cycle figure is right. If the mix shift out of high value export tonnage means the normalized margin has permanently stepped down, then the base itself is too high, the multiple is not what it appears, and the balance sheet becomes the only thing holding the price up. Net cash and a book value floor are genuine protection. They are also the argument you fall back on when the earnings argument has stopped working.

Valuation

Ten times through-the-cycle operating profit is what today's price works out to, and the basis matters more than usual here. The last twelve months produced an operating loss, with the margin at -1.2%, so the multiple is computed against the company's own normalized margin of 9.9% applied to current revenue rather than against the trough. On that basis the price embeds operating profit declining about 1.9% a year over a five year stage, at a 9.7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth. The result is sensitive to that discount rate: another percentage point of cost of capital moves the implied path by roughly 5 points.

The methods sort into two camps and the split is informative. The comparisons against sector multiples and the projections that carry cash flow forward both land at or above the price. The methods that take today's free cash flow, credit it no growth at all and capitalize it at a required return land well below: the price sits about 75% above where those earnings-power methods reach. That gap is the difference between valuing this company on what it earns in a soft year and valuing it on what its assets and contracts imply over a full cycle. Neither view is unreasonable. The reader's own view of coal prices decides which one applies.

One anchor sits underneath both. Book value per share runs near 71.62 dollars against today's $83.13 quote, so the market is paying a modest premium to the accounting value of the mines, the terminal and the working capital. That is a different starting point from most equities, where book value is a rounding error next to the price.

Against its own cohort the profitability is middling rather than distinguished. Through the cycle this company converts about 9.9% of revenue into operating profit. HCC runs 9.7% on a trailing basis with revenue growing 11.1%, ARLP converts 14.4% on revenue that fell 7.1%, and BTU is at -4.0% on revenue down 7.0%. Two of the three comparable operators are shrinking, which is the useful context: a low multiple in this sector is not an anomaly to be arbitraged, it is what the market pays for tonnage it expects less of.

The balance sheet is the strongest part of the case and the least ambiguous. On a funded-debt basis the company is roughly cash neutral, with liquid assets near 465 million dollars against about 455 million of borrowings; counting lease obligations as debt turns that into a small net borrowing rather than a burden either way. Interest is comfortably covered against through-cycle operating profit, and the company is not consuming cash. What the balance sheet does not do is fund a re-rating. Ownership has been diluted about 10.2% a year over four years to build this company, and the next four will be judged on whether the combined tonnage earns more than the two halves did apart.

Catalysts

Second quarter results are scheduled for August 6, 2026, confirmed by the company on July 23. The first quarter, reported on May 7, 2026, produced revenue of about $1.08 billion and net income of roughly $21 million, a positive quarter inside a twelve month period that still shows an operating loss. Whether the second quarter repeats it is the single most useful piece of information available in the near term, because the entire valuation case rests on where the normalized margin actually sits.

The more interesting developments are outside coal. On July 6, 2026 the Department of Energy selected the company's innovations group to pursue critical mineral and material extraction from coal. Coal seams and their waste streams carry rare earth and other critical elements, and a federally supported programme to extract them turns a disposal cost into a potential product line. The economics are unproven and the timeline is not visible from here, but the option costs shareholders nothing today.

In the same stretch the company's composites subsidiary was named as supporting Northrop Grumman's YFQ-48A autonomous aircraft development. That connects to the carbon products and materials line the annual report describes as serving aerospace and other industries, currently the smallest revenue category the company reports. A defense-linked materials business inside a coal producer is not what most holders think they own, and it is the piece most likely to be mispriced in either direction.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

High CV Thermal / PRB (reported)

Metallurgical (reported)

Core Marine Terminal (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

company announcement, July 6, 2026 · company announcement, May 19, 2026 · company announcement, July 23, 2026 · Q1 2026 results, May 7, 2026

View the full interactive CNR report on boothcheck